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The aim of this thesis is to understand the political struggles that underpin international 
investment law. Social movements of various kinds have expressed alarm over an ‘epidemic’ 
of international legal challenges by transnational corporations against state measures designed 
to protect the environment, public health, or human rights. These state measures have often 
been introduced directly in response to hard-fought civil society campaigns (ranging from anti-
mining protests in El Salvador to climate change campaigns in Germany), yet academic analysis 
of what is formally known as ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ proceeds on the premise that 
these are simply disputes between ‘investors’ and ‘states’, as indeed the term implies. In turn, 
where the academic focus shifts towards wider questions of why this field of law emerged, and 
what role it plays in global politics today, even the investors disappear from view, and only 
states remain. The theoretical argument of this thesis is that the state is not an agent in political 
struggles, but a social structure that is both the ‘congealment’ of historic social struggles and a 
‘strategically selective’ arena within which social struggles are fought today. This theoretical 
argument challenges the state-centric premises of the academic literature, and enables a 
different empirical explanation of the politics of international investment law, and of the 46 
investment disputes arising out of environmental protection measures that have been selected 
for closer analysis. Drawing upon the work of scholars such as William Robinson, Stephen Gill, 
and David Schneiderman, the empirical argument of this thesis is that international investment 
law arose at the initiative of a transnational capitalist class, and it is designed to constrain the 
political agency of opposing social groups by ‘locking in’ policies that favour corporations. At 
stake in the struggle over international investment law is ultimately the very possibility for a 
different future. 
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Introduction 
 
“We can live without gold, but we can’t live without water”.1 This is the slogan of the National 
Roundtable against Metallic Mining (more commonly known as ‘La Mesa’), a network of civil 
society organizations that have campaigned against gold mining in El Salvador.2 The first signs 
of opposition to gold mining were distinctly local; farmers in the Cabañas region were 
perplexed to see that the river they depended on for irrigation had dried up, and Pacific Rim – 
a North American mining corporation that had used river water for its exploratory mining work 
– was identified as the culprit.3 The opposition of the surrounding community to gold mining 
grew stronger during the public consultation process that was required for Pacific Rim to be 
granted the environmental permits to proceed to the exploitation of the gold deposits it had 
located. Local civil society groups sought to educate themselves about mining, and returned 
from visits to other parts of El Salvador and neighbouring countries with stories of rivers that 
had been left with bright orange water as a result of acid mine drainage, with severe health 
consequences for the local communities that continued to use them.4 The civil society groups 
also commissioned an American hydro-geologist to assess Pacific Rim’s environmental impact 
assessment, and the report provoked further concerns in respect to the proposed use of over 300 
million litres of water per year – as much water in a single day as a Salvadoran family living 
near the mine used for household consumption in twenty years – as well as the risk of a cyanide 
spill into the Río Lempa, which provides over half of El Salvador’s population with drinking 
                                                             
1 Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, ‘The Global Fight Against Corporate Rule’, The Nation (14 January 2014), 
available at {http://www.thenation.com/article/177930/global-fight-against-corporate-rule#} accessed 3 
February 2015. 
2 See Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae 
by Mesa Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica de El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (2 March 2011). 
3 Randal C. Archibold, ‘First a Gold Rush, Then the Lawyers, New York Times (25 June 2011), available at 
{http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/world/americas/26mine.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&} accessed 3 
February 2015; Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, ‘Like Water for Gold in El Salvador’, The Nation (1-3 August 
2011), available at {http://www.thenation.com/article/162009/water-gold-el-salvador?page=0,1} accessed 3 
February 2015; Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae, p. 5. 
4 On visits to neighbouring countries, see: Broad & Cavanagh, ‘Like Water for Gold in El Salvador’; Lisa Fuller, 
‘El Salvador and Gold Mining: International Resistance to Transnational Attacks’, Left Turn (1 June 2010), 
available at {http://www.leftturn.org/El-Salvador-Gold-Mining} accessed 3 February 2015. Members of local 
community groups nevertheless also visited a mine elsewhere in El Salvador by another North American mining 
company, which had resulted in significant acid mine drainage. That company also launched now discontinued 
investment proceedings against El Salvador, see: Meera Karunananthan, ‘Blog Post: El Salvador Mining Ban 
Could Establish a Vital Water Security Precedent’, The Guardian (10 June 2013), available at 
{http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jun/10/el-salvador-mining-ban-water-
security} accessed 3 February 2015; Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of 
El Salvador, El Salvador’s Preliminary Objections Under Article 10.20.5 of CAFTA, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/7 
(16 August 2010), para. 119. 
8 
 
water.5 In contrast, the company maintained that the environmental impact of gold mining in 
the Salvadoran context would be “negligible” – indeed, “significantly cleaner than doing the 
laundry” – and that the growing social movement was simply composed of “anti-development” 
groups.6 
 
The mining debate led to significant tensions between the supporters of the mining project – 
including the corporations and the members of the local community that hoped to find work 
with the company – and an increasingly vocal opposition concerned about the environmental 
effects. Four anti-mining activists were murdered, and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights issued precautionary measures to protect staff at a radio station and environmental 
activists who had received death threats as a result of their criticism of mining. 7  Local 
community groups joined with national civil society organizations to form La Mesa, and 
together they succeeded in making mining an issue in national politics. The influential Catholic 
Church came out in opposition to it, and soon surveys revealed that 62% of the El Salvadoran 
population were against mining.8 In the run-up to a closely fought presidential election, both of 
the main political parties – including the previously mining-friendly governing party – voiced 
their opposition to mining.9 In the context of these wider political changes, Pacific Rim found 
                                                             
5 The study raised particular concerns about the seismic risks of the area and the fact that no remediation 
measures were proposed in the event of a cyanide spill; the cyanide detoxification process itself and the safety of 
the water afterwards; as well as the lack of baseline data. Robert E. Moran, ‘Technical Review of the El Dorado 
Mine Project Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), El Salvador’ (October 2005); Pac Rim v. El Salvador, 
Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae, p. 8; Council on Hemispheric Affairs, ‘Pacific Rim v. El 
Salvador and the Perils of Free Trade in the Americas’ (30 July 2010), available at {http://www.coha.org/pacific-
rim-v-el-salvador-and-the-perils-of-free-trade-in-the-americas/} accessed 10 January 2015. 
6 Pacific Rim Mining, ‘Pacific Rim Provides a Progress Report on Activities in El Salvador and Nevada,’ News 
Release (30 April 2012), available at {http://www.pacrim-mining.com/s/News.asp?ReportID=522141} accessed 
7 January 2013, also available at {http://www.newsfilecorp.com/release/2032/Pacific-Rim-Provides-a-Progress-
Report-on-Activities-in-El-Salvador-and-Nevada#.VND-umdyYeF} accessed 3 February 2015; Mining Watch, 
Debunking Eight Falsehoods By Pacific Rim Mining / OceanaGold in El Salvador (March 2014), p. 6; Denis 
Collins, ‘The Failure of Socially Responsible Gold Mining MNC in El Salvador: Ramifications of NGO 
Mistrust’, Journal of Business Ethics, 88 (2009), p. 261. 
7 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Héctor Antonio García Berríos and Others, El Salvador’, 
PM239/09 (7 October 2009); Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae, p. 
10-11; Amnesty International, ‘Death Threats for Activists Demanding Justice’, Urgent Action 223/09 (27 
August 2009); Richard Steiner, ‘El Salvador: Gold, Guns, and Choice: The El Dorado Gold Mine, Violence in 
Cabanas, CAFTA Claims, and the National Effort to Ban Mining,’ International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature & Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (February 2010), p. 12-15, available at 
{http://www.stopesmining.org/j25/index.php/background-on-mining/126-el-salvador-guns-gold-and-choice} 
accessed 3 April 2014; The Council of Canadians, ‘Murder in El Salvador Calls Canadian Mining Interests Into 
Question, Media Release (20 June 2011), available at {http://www.canadians.org/fr/node/333} accessed 10 
January 2015. 
8 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae, p. 6; Michael Busch, ‘El 
Salvador’s Gold Fight’, Foreign Policy in Focus (16 July 2009), available at 
{http://fpif.org/el_salvadors_gold_fight/} accessed 4 February 2015. 
9 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Decision on the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections 
Under CAFTA Articles 10.20.4 and 10.20.5, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (2 August 2010), para. 77-79; Pac Rim 
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that the permits that it had expected to receive as a matter of course were no longer 
forthcoming.10 
 
Before La Mesa could celebrate its victory in the domestic political debate, Pacific Rim decided 
to mount a legal challenge against the state of El Salvador before an international investment 
tribunal.11 Pacific Rim argues that the environmental impact assessment was a “formality”, that 
El Salvador has no legal basis for denying it the right to mine, and that the “politically motivated” 
conduct of El Salvador breaches the investment chapter of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement and other investment laws.12 The ultimate winner in this domestic political battle 
that has gripped Salvadoran politics for several years will now be determined by an international 
investment tribunal consisting of three private arbitrators. If the corporation wins, El Salvador 
will face an unpalatable choice between permitting the gold mining project to proceed, or 
paying the corporation for its direct losses as well as, crucially, up to another several hundred 
million US dollars in compensation for the profits that the company would have otherwise made, 
if the successful civil society campaign against mining had not put an end to its plans.13 
 
The Pacific Rim v. El Salvador dispute is part of wider developments in global politics and 
international law today. International investment law is estimated to be “the fastest growing 
area of international law at this time”, and most scholars and practitioners within this field of 
law and international law more broadly meet such news with delight.14 Notwithstanding the 
                                                             
Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 
(29 March 2013), para. 386, 390;  Rose J. Spalding, ‘El Salvador: Horizontalism and the Anti-Mining 
Movement’, in Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden, et al (eds), Rethinking Latin American Social 
Movements: Radical Action from Below (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 322. 
10 Before the investment tribunal, El Salvador argues that the company does not meet many of the requirements 
for receiving an exploitation permit, but Pacific Rim maintains that these are pretexts for not awarding the 
permits, which is in fact due to a ‘de facto’ mining ban. Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and 
Quantum; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Counter-Memorial on the Merits, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/12 (10 January 2014). 
11 Pacific Rim has now been taken over by Oceana Gold, which continues with the arbitration. 
12 The case was initially brought on the basis of CAFTA, but the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds 
and it is now proceeding on the basis of El Salvador’s own investment law instead, which also allows for 
international arbitration. Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, para. 219, 450, 454; Pac 
Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Response to Respondent’s Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/12 (26 February 2010), para. 53.  
13 On the standard of compensation applicable in international investment law, see Chapter 3. Pacific Rim is 
requesting approximately USD 75 million for the costs incurred through its exploratory work, and a further USD 
239 million in lost profits. These figures are often obscured in the arbitral calculations, but can here be inferred 
from the difference between the out-of-pocket figure in the Notice of Intent and the request for compensation in 
the Memorial. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Notice of Intent, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 
(9 December 2008), para. 38; Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, para. 692. 
14 Stephan Schill suggests that a first glance at the literature might suggest that voices critical of international 
investment law are prevalent, but that this is a “distorted view” – most international investment lawyers are still 
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few critical voices that have emerged in recent years, the tendency is – to cite Bruno Simma, a 
former judge on the International Court of Justice – to celebrate international investment law 
as “one of the great international legal success stories”. 15  Scholars and practitioners of 
international investment law express “amazement” at the “proliferation” of international 
investment agreements that have taken place in the last couple of decades.16 Indeed, there are 
now over 2,800 bilateral investment treaties in force, as well as over 300 other investment 
treaties (both multilateral trade and investment treaties such as NAFTA and sectoral treaties 
such as the Energy Charter), and these form an interlocking network of treaty protection for 
much of the world’s foreign investments.17 Scholars and practitioners of international law are 
particularly impressed with the fact that almost all such investment treaties provide corporations 
with the right, at their own initiative, to initiate arbitration proceedings against the states in 
which they operate, and to have their claims resolved and enforced at the international level. 
To cite Stephen Schwebel, a frequent arbitrator and formerly a judge on the International Court 
of Justice, this is “one of the most progressive developments of international law of the last 
century”.18  
 
Corporations have greeted these developments with enthusiasm – since this field of law first 
began to take off in the mid-1990s, they have initiated international arbitration proceedings 
against states on at least 568 separate occasions, and even this figure does not include what is 
estimated to be many more cases that are confidential. 19  Corporate law firms describe 
investment arbitration as a “most powerful weapon”, and it is now used to challenge everything 
                                                             
favourable towards international investment law. Stephan Schill, ‘W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature 
and Sociology of International Investment Law’, The European Journal of International Law, 22:3 (2011), p. 
899; Charles Brower & Stephan Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law?’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 9 (2008-2009), p. 472. 
15 Bruno Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?’, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 60 (2011), p. 574. 
16 L. Yves Fortier, ‘Investment Protection and the Rule of Law: Change or Decline?’, The British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 50th Anniversary Event Series, (2009), p. 5; L. Yves Fortier, ‘Expectations 
of Governments and Investors vs. Practice: A View from the Bench’, ICSID Review, 24:2 (2009), p. 350; 
Horacio Grigera Naón, ‘The Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Private Parties: An 
Overview from the Perspective of the ICC’, Journal of World Investment, 1 (2000), 60. 
17 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 - Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development 
(New York & Geneva: United Nations, 2013), p. 101. These compose an interlocking network through MFN 
clauses, as will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
18 Stephen Schwebel, ‘A Critical Assessment of the U.S. Model BIT’, Keynote Address at the British Institute of 
International & Comparative Law Conference, London (15 May 2009), available at 
{www.biicl.org/files/4253_schwebel-biicl15may2009speech_cor2.pdf} accessed 10 February 2015; see also, 
Stephen Schwebel, ‘The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment Treaties’, Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review, 32 (2008-2009), p. 267. 
19 UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’, IIA Issues Note, 1 (April 
2014), p. 1. 
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from tobacco plain packaging regulations in Australia to prohibitions on ‘fracking’ for shale 
gas in Canada.20 Approximately half of the world’s countries have defended themselves before 
an investment tribunal at one point or another, and some states have done so repeatedly.21 
Investment law scholars and practitioners view this “litigation explosion” as “nothing short of 
extraordinary”, and estimate that this makes investment arbitration the most used dispute 
settlement tool in the history of international law. 22  There is a tendency within much 
International Relations scholarship to assume that international law is little more than a form of 
normative guidance, but international investment law is backed by effective mechanisms for 
resolving and enforcing claims. A distinctive appeal of international investment law lies in the 
fact that it provides corporations with compensation not only for any direct losses, but also for 
estimated future lost profits – in one recent case, a company that had spent USD 5 million on 
developing an investment project received a further USD 900 million in compensation for its 
estimated future lost profits when the project fell through as a result of the state’s actions.23 
When a corporation wins such a case, it can be reassured by the fact that “such arbitral awards 
are among the most effectively enforceable in the international system”.24 
 
The enthusiasm of corporations and many scholars of international law is nevertheless not 
shared by La Mesa, the social movement that had arisen against Pacific Rim’s proposed gold 
mine. La Mesa and its constituent civil society organizations, proud to have organized the 
                                                             
20 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer in the context of the Argentina crisis, cited in Luke Eric Peterson, All Roads 
Lead out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties (Nautilus Institute for 
Security and Sustainable Development & International Institute for Sustainable Development, et al., 2002), p. 5, 
available at {www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf} accessed 11 February 2015; Philip Morris Asia 
Limited v. Australia, Notice of Arbitration (21 November 2011); Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of 
Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement , UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (8 November 2012). 
21 UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’, IIA Issues Note, 1 (April 
2014), p. 1. 
22 ‘Litigation explosion’ is a term used by UNCTAD, cited in Susan Franck, ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims 
About Investment Treaty Arbitration’, North Carolina Law Review, 86 (2007-2008), p. 44; William Rowley, 
‘ICSID At A Crossroads’, Global Arbitration Review, 1:1 (2006), p. 1; Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Howard 
Mann, ‘A Response to the European Commission’s December 2013 Document ‘Investment Provisions in the 
EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA),’’ International Institute for Sustainable Development Report 
(February 2014), p. 1, available at: {http://www.iisd.org/publications/response-european-commissions-
december-2013-document-investment-provisions-eu-canada} accessed 23 May 2014. 
23 The company had sought to develop a tourist resort in Libya, but Libya failed to vacate the land that it had 
promised to the investor. The USD 900 million is for “the certain profits (minimum value) that it should have 
realized from investing in the project’s 14 resorts and facilities throughout a period of 83 years”. Mohamed 
Abdulmohsen Al Kharafi & Sons Co. v. the Government of the State of Libya, Final Arbitral Award, Ad Hoc 
Arbitration (22 March 2013), p. 385-386; Diana Rosert, ‘Libya Ordered to Pay US$935 Million to Kuwaiti 
Company for Cancelled Investment Project; Jurisdiction Established Under Unified Agreement for the 
Investment of Arab Capital’, Investment Treaty News, 1:5 (19 January 2014), p. 14. 
24 José E. Alvarez, ‘The Internationalization of U.S. Law’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 47:3 (2009), 
p. 565. 
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successful campaign against mining in El Salvador, but without a seat before the international 
investment tribunal that will decide on the case, has requested permission to submit an amicus 
curiae (‘friend of the court’) briefing to the tribunal. Within it, La Mesa laments that “[t]he 
momentous gains that amici and their allies have achieved in the last decade are at stake in this 
arbitration” and that the corporation is attempting “to leverage international investment law to 
essentially hang a price tag on its opponents’ successes in domestic public policy debates”.25 In 
making such a claim, La Mesa makes a further observation that serves as the foundation for this 
doctoral thesis: 
“Claimant [Pacific Rim] is using this proceeding to gain an advantage in what is 
fundamentally not a dispute between it and the Republic [of El Salvador], but rather 
between it and the independently-organized communities who have risen up against 
Claimant’s projects”.26 
 
From climate change campaigners in Germany to local communities concerned with pollution 
in the Peruvian Andes, environmental movements are finding the success of their domestic 
political campaigns challenged in international investment tribunals.27 Yet there is a disjuncture 
between the way that the academic literature on the subject has approached investment disputes, 
and the understanding that is developing within social movements themselves. Within the 
academic international investment law literature, the story begins where the involvement of the 
social movements end: in the arbitral process, to which the civil society groups are not invited 
to formally participate, are very often not allowed to attend, and are sometimes allowed no 
knowledge of whatsoever. 28  Scholars of international investment law normally adopt the 
perspective of the dispute settlement process itself, which is captured in the formal term for this 
practice: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The battle lines drawn within the 
investment proceedings – investor v. state – are the only battle lines that are visible on the 
investment arbitration map, and the social movements, from whom the disputes originate, are 
normally invisible to academic researchers in the same way that they are invisible to the tribunal 
itself. This is in a sense not surprising; the lawyers that populate this academic discipline are 
                                                             
25 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae, p. 2. 
26 Ibid, p. 2. 
27 The Renco Group, Inc. v. The Republic of Peru, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim, UNCT/13/1 (9 
August 2011); Bear Creek Mining Corporation, ‘Bear Creek Announces its Intent to Commence an Arbitration 
Against Peru – Santa Ana Dispute’, News Release (12 August 2014), available at 
{http://www.bearcreekmining.com/s/news.asp?ReportID=676144} accessed 4 February 2015; Vattenfall AB, 
Vattenfall Europe AG and others v. The Federal Republic of Germany, Request for Arbitration, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/6 (30 March 2009). 
28 The submission of an amicus curiae brief does not render the civil society groups formal participants, and 
confidentiality is still a common feature of investment arbitration. See Chapter 2. 
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interested in the law – the legal dispute between the formal parties before the tribunal – and not 
the politics that underpin it. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the politics of international investment law. Politics, in 
the broad sense adopted here, refers to the governance of societies and of the social order within 
which we live. Since people often have different and conflicting interests and values, politics – 
to use Harold Lasswell’s classic definition – is fundamentally about “Who Gets What, When, 
How”.29 International investment law is part of the governance structure of societies today, and 
to investigate the politics of international investment law is to investigate how this field of law 
affects who gets what, when, and how. The study of politics is nevertheless not only about who 
gets what, when, and how, but it also raises the important question of why – what is it that 
determines who gets what, when and how? The research questions that motivate this project are 
as follows: 
 What are the political implications of international investment law and investment 
arbitration? 
 Why does international investment law have these political implications? 
 
The discipline of international investment law does provide some possible answers to these 
political questions. While lawyers often directly insist that they are only interested in the legal 
questions and not the political ones,30 the legal analysis itself provides a glimpse into the 
political implications – it is the legal outcome of investment disputes that influences what kind 
of role international investment law plays in global politics today, and consequently who gets 
what, when and how. Lawyers do frequently extrapolate from the legal analysis of investment 
disputes to the political consequences of international investment law itself; for instance, 
scholars may offer conclusions as to whether or not states remain unfettered in their ability to 
introduce public interest regulations on the basis of research into particular investment treaty 
obligations or investment disputes. More broadly, the existing scholarly effort to understand 
why international investment law emerged in the first place – and how it forms part of the 
                                                             
29 Harold Lasswell, Politics, Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Peter Smith, 1950); Robert Garner et al, 
Introduction to Politics, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 2-6. 
30 For instance, Jorge Viñuales’ recent book specifies that his work “does not seek to provide an analysis of the 
investment-environment equation from an economic or political perspective”, while Åsa Romson’s treatment of 
the same subject “aims at a ‘legal’ answer to its questions, rather than a ‘political’ or ‘sociological’ answer”. 
Jorge Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 2; Åsa Romson, Environmental Policy Space and International Investment Law 
(Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2012), p. 30. 
14 
 
governance structure of societies today – is, in accordance with the definition provided above, 
unavoidably political. The argument made here is therefore not that there is a complete absence 
of political analysis within the discipline of international investment law, although there is 
certainly a shortage,31 but that the theoretical premises informing the (implicit or explicit) 
political answers within this discipline lead to problematic conclusions.  
 
The foremost of such questionable theoretical premises is the conception of the state as an actor. 
The academic literature tends to proceed on the assumption that Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement is simply about resolving disputes between investors (i.e. corporations) and states, 
yet the decision to analytically conceive of the state as an agent in its own right serves to render 
invisible the social movements from whom investment disputes often emerge. In turn, where 
attention turns to broader questions in respect to the emergence of international investment law 
as a whole, and its role in global politics, even the corporations are often lost from view and 
only states remain. The political origins and trajectory of international investment law are often 
couched in distinctly state-centric terms, and the influence of any non-state actors (e.g. 
transnational corporate lobbying groups) tend to be mentioned only in passing, if at all. This 
thesis makes two related arguments: one theoretical, one empirical. In order to provide a better 
explanation of the politics of international investment law, this thesis proceeds from the 
theoretical argument that the state is not an agent in its own right, but a political structure, 
which is in turn both the ‘congealment’ of previous political struggles and an arena for current 
struggles. In order to understand how international investment law affects who gets what, when 
and how, this thesis will therefore not treat the state as a ‘who’ – and simply address the question 
of how this field of law affects states – but it will rather seek to understand the political 
implications for different groups of people. Similarly, in order to understand why international 
investment law has these political implications, this thesis will not simply explain it as an 
outcome of the agency of particular states – assumed to pursue their ‘national interests’ – but it 
will rather explain it as an outcome of the agency of particular social groups. This theoretical 
argument enables the empirical argument that will be advanced in this thesis: that international 
investment law arose at the initiative of a transnational capitalist class, and that it is currently 
implicated in political struggles around the world that are ultimately between transnational 
                                                             
31 Kyla Tienhaara, as one of the few political scientists within this field, suggests that “it is imperative that 
scholars from other disciplines now become more actively engaged in the critical debates surrounding 
investment law”. Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political 
Science’, in Chester Brown & Kate Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 606. 
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corporations and their opponents amongst local communities or social movements, of which 
the dispute Pacific Rim v. La Mesa is only one example. 
 
This thesis is structured into one shorter introductory chapter, which sets out and defends the 
theoretical, conceptual and wider political premises of the thesis, and three longer empirical 
chapters, that draw upon these premises in order to provide a better explanation of international 
investment law.  
 
Chapter 1 begins by elucidating the theoretical premises of the thesis, and how they differ from 
those that are prevalent within the international investment law literature. The central argument 
is that only human beings are political agents, and that the political struggles that underpin 
international investment law are undertaken by human beings, acting collectively to achieve 
their aims. In contrast, the political agent (in so far as there is one) in the study of international 
investment law is often the state, conceived as an actor in its own right. This chapter explains 
why the state should rather be conceived of as a social structure, which is itself the outcome of 
historic political struggles between social groups, and an arena for social struggles today. This 
is not to deny that state officials – as human beings – are agents in their own right, but to suggest 
that they do not possess the unity that would be required for them to be helpfully conceived of 
as a collective actor. The rejection of the notion of the state as an actor enables the investigation, 
undertaken in subsequent chapters, into the political struggles between opposing societal groups 
that ultimately underpin international investment law. This immediately raises the question of 
who these opposing societal groups are, and this question cannot be answered in reference to 
international investment law alone. The first chapter therefore concludes by setting out the 
wider political framework that serves as the foundation for the thesis, and it defends the claim 
that we live in an age of global capitalism distinguished by the rise of a transnational capitalist 
class. On this basis, subsequent chapters reveal how the collective agency of a transnational 
capitalist class is imperative for understanding the politics of international investment law. 
 
Chapter 2 explores the ‘big picture’ of international investment law: of the political struggles 
through which international investment law first emerged, and the role that it plays in global 
politics today. It contains three sections. The first section investigates why international 
investment law was first brought into being, and it seeks to move beyond the state-centrism 
inherent in most of the available historical narratives in order to highlight the involvement of 
societal groups. More specifically, it highlights the role of an emerging transnational capitalist 
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class in the making of international investment law, and the role of political struggles between 
a transnational capitalist class and opposing social movements in its current trajectory. The 
second section proceeds to detail the institutional structure of international investment law, and 
how that institutional structure reflects the needs of a distinctly transnational capitalist class. 
The third section investigates the role of international investment law in wider global politics, 
and it argues that William Robinson’s concept of a ‘transnational state’ is helpful in allowing 
us to do so. Robinson maintains that the ‘transnational state’ contains within itself both 
transformed national states (which now support a transnational capitalist class) as well as 
supranational institutions, but he does not fully explain how these different political institutions 
relate to each other. Drawing upon insights from how international investment law relates to 
national states, as well as the work of Stephen Gill and David Schneiderman, the section 
highlights the significance of supranational institutions in ‘locking in’ the interests of a 
transnational capitalist class beyond the reach of the state, and how it limits the range of political 
possibilities open to opposing social groups acting at the national level. Drawing further upon 
insights from how international investment law is situated vis-à-vis other fields of international 
law and other supranational institutions, the section also highlights the significance of the 
fragmentation of supranational sphere of politics for securing the interests of a transnational 
capitalist class. This chapter therefore provides the wider context that forms the basis for the 
investigation that follows in subsequent chapters into the particular social struggles that 
international investment law is implicated in around the world today. 
 
Chapter 3 begins the investigation into the Investor-State Dispute Settlement process itself, and 
how international investment law protects transnational corporations from measures that are, 
formally, introduced by states. Investment treaties only allow corporations to initiate arbitration 
against states in order to challenge measures taken by those states, and if corporations were 
always to lose these disputes (and if state officials and people more broadly were aware of that 
fact) then it would be safe to say that international investment law would only have negligible 
political consequences. It would not, in the end, influence ‘who gets what’; that question would 
be resolved through political struggles in other institutional contexts. Corporations nevertheless 
do win investment disputes, and the aim of this chapter is to understand the extent to which 
corporations can challenge state measures. International investment treaties are formally known 
as treaties for the ‘protection’ of investments, and this chapter therefore asks the question: 
protection from what? Are corporations only protected from a limited and unusual set of 
possible state actions, or does the protection afforded by investment treaties reach far into the 
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normal policy-making processes of states? The first section of this chapter justifies the selection 
of cases that has been selected for this thesis, namely investment disputes that arise from 
measures that states have taken to protect the environment. The second, third, fourth and fifth 
sections explore in detail what precisely corporations are protected from, so as to ascertain the 
extent to which corporations are protected from state measures taken to safeguard what is 
normally conceived of as the legitimate public interest of environmental protection. The sixth 
section explores the generous measure of compensation provided in the event of a corporate 
legal victory. This chapter therefore provides the legal basis upon which any understanding of 
the political consequences of international investment law ultimately rests. 
 
Chapter 4 continues and concludes the investigation into how Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
is implicated in political struggles around the world today. If the previous chapter investigated 
what international investment law protects corporations from, this chapter proceeds to the 
question: protection from whom? In contrast to the legal analysis presented previously, this 
chapter moves beyond the notion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement to consider the 
underlying political struggles between opposing societal groups that investment disputes arise 
from, and the consequences of international investment law in the context of such political 
struggles. The first section argues that the underlying political contestation between opposing 
societal groups is often rendered invisible or misrepresented within the academic study of 
international investment law, and it details how many of the investment disputes had initially 
involved a transnational corporation on the one hand, and local community groups, 
environmental organizations or wider social movements on the other. The second section 
explores how each of these non-state actors have often sought to make use of the state in their 
struggles with each other, and how the victory of the social movement in such domestic political 
debates turns a dispute between non-state actors into an investor-state dispute. The third section 
investigates the political consequences of international investment law for such underlying 
political struggles around the world today. 
 
In order to understand the political struggles that international investment law is implicated in, 
the thesis draws upon a range of different sources. Most importantly, the thesis is based on a 
close reading of investment awards, as well as the corporations’ and the states’ legal 
submissions (notices of arbitration, memorials, counter-memorials, etc) and, where available, 
amicus curiae submissions by NGOs. A list of the 46 investment disputes in respect to the 
environment that have been chosen for closer examination is detailed in the appendix. These 
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legal awards and submissions are on the surface about the law, but reading between the lines 
they reveal the political struggles that the cases reflect, and what is at stake in those struggles. 
The thesis furthermore draws extensively on other sources to complement the legal sources, 
ranging from corporate news releases, lobbying documents, government documents, through to 
news searches via both Nexis and online search engines. Most importantly, to address the 
absence within the arbitral setting of the social groups from whom investment disputes often 
originate, the thesis draws upon the campaigning materials of those groups and of other non-
governmental organizations that support them. Through an analysis of a variety of different 
sources, the thesis seeks to piece together an understanding of political struggles that are 
ultimately between transnational corporations and opposing social groups, and how these 
struggles are waged through the structures of the state and, finally, through international 
investment law. 
 
The intended audience for this doctoral thesis is three-fold. Its original contribution is to provide 
a new perspective on international investment law, a perspective that brings the underlying 
political struggles between transnational corporate actors and their opponents to the forefront 
of the analysis. That new perspective is juxtaposed with the perspectives prevalent within the 
specialist field of international investment law, and the aim is to illuminate political struggles 
that this particular specialist literature leaves in the dark. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to offer 
a contribution to the study of international politics. International investment law is still 
considered a field of “exotic and highly specialized knowledges” even to other international 
lawyers,32 and it is even more so to scholars of international politics. The wider aim is therefore 
to show that international investment law is not an obscure field of international law of interest 
only to legal specialists, but that it is directly implicated in political struggles around the world 
today. Its growing influence means that it deserves more sustained attention from scholars of 
international politics than it has hitherto received. The political struggles highlighted in this 
thesis pit transnational corporations against local communities, non-governmental 
organizations, or social movements, and this study will be of particular interest to scholars of 
global politics that draw upon Marxist theory. Indeed, the thesis itself draws upon Marxist 
theory to explain the wider political context, and the thesis in turn contributes to the task of 
understanding global capitalism and the nature and practice of class struggle today. Finally, this 
                                                             
32 This was contrasted to other areas of international law that were only ‘specialist’, such as trade law and human 
rights law. Martti Koskenniemi in a 2006 report, cited in Schill, ‘W(h)ither Fragmentation?’, p. 877 (Schill 
nevertheless maintains that this is changing). 
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thesis seeks to contribute to a growing debate on international investment law beyond academia, 
at this particular juncture provoked both by a number of controversial investment disputes and 
by the high-profile negotiations to conclude the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).33 The perspective advanced in this 
thesis is new to the academic study of international investment law, but it is a perspective that 
increasingly seems to inform the criticisms of non-governmental organizations and wider social 
movements. The aim is therefore to articulate this nascent civil society perspective in more 
definite terms, and to provide an analysis of international investment law that can help to inform 
these ongoing debates.  
 
The empirical contribution that is made in this thesis towards understanding the political 
struggles that underpin international investment law is necessarily tentative; it is not intended 
to provide any definite conclusions. This could be said of any empirical study, but there are two 
reasons why this is an especially important caveat in the context of this thesis. Firstly, the nature 
of the argument – that the decision to treat the state as a ‘black box’ serves to conceal the 
underlying political struggles between opposing societal groups – raises obvious 
methodological difficulties in respect to the identification of which societal group influences 
state action in what particular circumstances, and how they have done so. Secondly, the breadth 
of this study contrasts with the more modest but more definite doctoral work that often emerges 
within this field, and that often deals with a small number of investment disputes or a particular 
investment treaty obligation in a depth and detail that cannot be accomplished here. The aim of 
this thesis is not to provide a conclusive empirical investigation, but to provide a new 
perspective on international investment law, and to illustrate how that new perspective 
illuminates political struggles and political implications that the existing literature on the topic 
leaves in the dark. For this reason, the breadth of the thesis should be understood as an 
advantage rather than a limitation. The inevitable simplification of a complex reality that 
follows is necessary to convey the big picture and further serves to address the criticism that 
international investment law is often “disguised in complexity”.34 In summary, the thesis should 
                                                             
33 The investment disputes that have attracted particular civil society criticisms are the Pacific Rim case 
considered above; Lone Pine Resources v. Canada, Notice of Intent (in respect to fracking for shale gas); Philip 
Morris v. Australia, Notice of Arbitration (in respect to tobacco plain packaging regulations); Infinito Gold Ltd. 
V. Republic of Costa Rica, Request for Arbitration, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5 (6 February 2014) (in respect to 
mining); Chevron Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, Notice of Arbitration, 
PCA Case No 2009-23 (23 September 2009) (in respect to environmental degradation caused by oil 
exploitation), etc.  
34 Foreword by Jim Shultz in Thomas McDonagh, Unfair, Unsustainable, and Under The Radar: How 
Corporations Use Global Investment Rules to Undermine a Sustainable Future (Democracy Center, 2013), p. iii. 
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be judged on the extent to which it brings to light political struggles that the current investment 
law literature does not, and the extent to which it provides a plausible – if inconclusive – 
explanation of those political struggles. 
 
To conclude this introduction, to consider the politics of international investment law is to 
consider how this field of law influences ‘who gets what’ in the context of particular political 
struggles. Does La Mesa get the safer and larger quantity of water that it fears mining would 
put at risk, or does Pacific Rim get the gold that lies hidden beneath the hills in a concession 
that has been promisingly named ‘El Dorado’?35 This thesis nevertheless also argues that there 
is more at stake in these struggles. These particular disputes are in a sense manifestations of a 
wider political struggle; a struggle for the future. The question is how open the future should 
be to political change. Transnational corporate actors place their formidable lobbying powers 
at the service of promoting favourable political changes every day – they are by no means 
objecting to political change in general – but the aim behind international investment law is to 
ensure political closure of a particular kind. International investment treaties are approached as 
“powerful tools for managing and mitigating political risk”, and political risk is understood to 
involve any future political changes that work to the detriment of corporations. 36  The 
expectation, to cite one investment tribunal, is that states should act in such a manner that 
corporations “may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments”.37 International investment law forms part of what Stephen Gill contends is a 
wider political agenda to ‘lock in’ favourable policies at a particular point in time and to extend 
them far into the future.38 The future, in respect to the particular policies that have been ‘locked 
                                                             
35 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum. 
36 The quote is from the corporate lawfirm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
Managing the Risk of Government Intervention’, available at: 
{http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Bilateral%20investment%20treaties%20Mana
ging%20the%20risk%20of%20government%20intervention.pdf} accessed 20 June 2014. See also, Paul 
Comeaux & Stephen Kinsella, ‘Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA and OPIC Investment Insurance’, New York Law School Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 15:1 (1994), p. 4 (political risk is the ‘risk of government intervention); 
Matthew Shinkman, ‘The Investors’ View: Economic Opportunities Versus Political Risks in 2007-11’, in The 
Economist Intelligence Unit & Columbia Program on International Investment, World Investment Prospects to 
2011: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Political Risk (2007), pp. 84-94 (political risk stems, 
among other things, from ‘shifting legal and regulatory frameworks’); Jeswald Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global 
Regime for Investment’, Harvard International Law Journal, 51:2 (2010), p. 450 (an ‘unexpected change in the 
rules is a principal form of political risk, perhaps its very essence’). 
37 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2 (29 May 2003), p. 154. 
38 Stephen Gill, ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’, International Studies Review, 
4:2 (2002), pp. 47-65; Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24:3 (1995), pp. 399-423; Stephen Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, 
Democratisation and Global Political Economy’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 10:1 (1998), pp. 23-38. 
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in’, is therefore expected to look much the same as the present. Yet all over the world, people 
come together to collectively organize for a different future than the one that corporations have 
come to expect – a future, say, where mining is no longer permitted. It is in such circumstances 
that the social movements’ struggle for a different future comes into contact with international 
investment law, which is, to cite a key textbook, intended to “provide for stability and 
predictability in the sense of an investment-friendly climate”.39 In precisely such a context, La 
Mesa laments that “the democratic gains [that La Mesa] and their constituent communities have 
earned, for literally the first time in El Salvador’s history, could be drastically undermined”.40 
This sentiment is shared by Jim Shultz, the director of the Democracy Center, an NGO involved 
in the Cochabamba Water War in Bolivia that led to an investment dispute with Bechtel. In 
light of what the South Centre refers to as an ‘epidemic’ of investment disputes,41 Shultz 
observes that the struggle over international investment law: 
“[Is] not about one corporation, it’s not about one country. It is about whether we 
genuinely have democracy, it’s about whether or not people actually have the right, 
as a people, to write the rules that determines what their futures are, and the futures 
for their children”.42 
 
                                                             
39 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 22.  
40 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae, p. 2. 
41 Martin Khor, ‘The Emerging Crisis of Investment Treaties’ South Bulletin, 69 (21 November 2012), p. 2.  
42 Network for Justice in Global Investment, Global Investment Rules: Threat to Democracy and the 
Environment, video (November 2011), min: 7.40, available at {http://justinvestment.org/2011/12/video-global-
investment-rules-threat-to-democracy-and-the-environment/} accessed 13 February 2015. 
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Chapter 1 
Locating Agency: States and Social Groups in International 
Investment Law 
 
The wider aim of this doctoral thesis is to understand how international investment law is 
implicated in political struggles around the world today, and how it arose from such political 
struggles in the first place. The aim of this first chapter is to show that the theoretical premises 
that currently inform research into international investment law make such a task difficult, if 
not impossible. The analytical decision to treat the state as an agent serves to render invisible 
the real political struggles between human beings, acting collectively, that ultimately underpin 
international investment law. In order to bring the political agency of those human beings back 
in, this first chapter will defend a new set of theoretical premises in respect to the state and to 
the structure-agency debate.  
 
To illustrate the theoretical assumptions that inform international investment law, the first 
section of this chapter will explore three different approaches to understanding why 
international investment law emerged, and why it has evolved in the way that it has. Within the 
first approach, the history of international investment law is presented as undergoing an almost 
natural emergence and evolution, where agency of any kind is not part of the story that unfolded. 
Within the second approach, the history of international investment law is explained in 
reference to political agency, negotiation and (at times) struggle, but the agents in this story are 
states. In contrast to these two approaches, this chapter presents a third approach: one in which 
the history of international investment law is explained in reference to political agency, but one 
in which the agents are not states. The second section of this chapter will lay the theoretical 
foundations for the approach adopted in this thesis: one that explains the history of international 
investment law in reference to the political agency of human beings, acting collectively as part 
of social groups, and acting through political structures such as the state. In order to do so, the 
section will first provide an explanation of the structure-agency debate and what is at stake, 
before situating states and social groups within that explanation. Having discussed states as 
structures and people as agents in the abstract, the third section will explain the particular 
structures and agents that are most important for understanding the trajectory of international 
investment law. It will begin with an investigation into the macro structure of capitalism, and 
in that context explain the relationship between the structure of the capitalist state and the 
agency of social classes. It will thereafter turn to the meso structure that forms the wider context 
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for this thesis, namely global capitalism and globalization, and it will explain why a 
transnational capitalist class should be understood as an important collective agent at this 
particular historical juncture.  
 
Three Approaches to International Investment Law 
 
Almost all understandings of the emergence and evolution of international investment law share 
certain empirical commonalities. It is generally agreed that international investment law 
emerged as a legal regime that was distinctly beneficial for corporations; to cite José Alvarez, 
the early investment treaties “deployed every lawyerly device imaginable to achieve a single 
unitary object and purpose: to protect the foreign investor”.1 It is also generally agreed that the 
current state of international investment law has more recently encountered a ‘backlash’; to cite 
Bruno Simma, “this awesome edifice has more recently developed some visible cracks”.2 As a 
result, some modest changes have been made to investment treaties (e.g. in the form of ‘right 
to regulate’ clauses) and to the institutional structure of investment arbitration (e.g. in respect 
to greater transparency). The differences within the literature lie in the particular explanations 
for why international investment law emerged in the way that it did, and why it has subsequently 
evolved in the way that it has. The next chapter will provide a particular historical explanation 
in response to those questions, but this chapter will first address the theoretical premises that 
serve as foundations for the different explanations. This section will elucidate two approaches 
to understanding the emergence and evolution of international investment law, in order to 
illustrate how the discipline suffers from a structure-agency problem that renders the most 
important agents in this story invisible. The problem with the two approaches is not that they 
are empirically wrong; it is that they are conceptually problematic. It should nevertheless be 
made clear from the outset that these two approaches are not ones that particular scholars self-
identify with – indeed, scholars often fluctuate between all three – and the purpose is not to 
offer a perfect characterization of the literature. The aim is rather to try to make explicit some 
theoretical premises that are usually left implicit, in order to show the advantages of a consistent 
application of the third approach that will be proposed here. 
 
                                                             
1 José E. Alvarez, ‘The Return of the State’, Minnesota Journal of International Law, 20:2 (2011), p. 231. 
2 Bruno Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?’, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 60 (2011), p. 575; on the ‘backlash’, see: Michael Waibel et al. (eds), The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010); Asha 
Kaushal, ‘Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment 
Regime’, Harvard International Law Journal, 50:2 (2009), pp. 491-538. 
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A Natural Evolution? 
 
Within the primarily legal or policy literature on the subject, the history of international 
investment law is often, normally implicitly, presented as one of a natural evolution. 3 
International investment law emerged in order to address a particular problem (the lack of 
protection for foreign investors), but, to cite an UNCTAD report, it subsequently “brought to 
light unanticipated – and partially undesired – side effects” of the investment agreements.4 Any 
subsequent changes to such agreements are consequently presented as a normal response to 
such unanticipated side-effects, and the semi-automatic end point is expected to be a ‘balanced’ 
international investment regime. This sense of natural evolution is further supported by the 
common use of anthropomorphic metaphors to describe the history of this field of law: 
international investment law is “in its infancy”, but it is undergoing normal “growing pains”, 
or perhaps a “teething period”, and it is expected to eventually reach “maturity”. 5  Such 
metaphors normalize the history of international investment law, and lends its particular 
historical trajectory a sense of inevitability.  
 
Unwilling to delve into politics, lawyers may be inclined to present international investment 
law as undergoing a natural evolution, and in some circumstances this is portrayed as a 
distinctly legal evolution – international investment law may now be in its “state of 
adolescence”, but it will nevertheless “prove capable of correcting its own mistakes as 
erroneous decisions are discarded while the fittest survive”. 6 The problem with the above 
representations is the lack of any explicit consideration of agency. The argument made in this 
thesis, to cite Karl Marx, is that “[h]istory does nothing […] history is nothing but the activity 
                                                             
3 The scholars cited here often revert to a state-as-agent approach elsewhere in their analysis, but for comparative 
purposes this is presented as a distinct perspective. 
4 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequal, UNCTAD Series of Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II (New York & Geneva: United Nations, 2012), p. iv; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013, 
Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2013), p. 
107. UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (New York: United Nations, 2012), 
p. 43. 
5 L. Yves Fortier, ‘Expectations of Governments and Investors vs. Practice: A View from the Bench’, ICSID 
Review, 24:2 (2009), p. 362; Susan D. Franck, ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’, North Carolina Law Review, 86 (2007-2008), p. 4; Susan D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’, Fordham 
Law Review, 73 (2004-2005), p. 1523; Silvia Constain, ‘ISDS Growing Pains and Responsible Adulthood’, 
Transnational Dispute Management, 11:1 (2014), pp. 1-3; (the latter two nevertheless suggests that to achieve 
‘responsible adulthood’ the investment regime will require more guidance from states).  
6 José E. Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment (Nijhoff: Brill 
Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law, 2011), p. 360.  
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of human beings pursuing their own aims”.7 The sense of natural evolution that is often evident 
in how investment law scholars present the emergence and evolution of this regime conceals 
the very possibility that particular actors brought this field of law into being, and that its future 
will be determined by political contestation between such actors.  
 
Politics between States? 
 
In response to the common perception that the constraints on states’ regulatory powers were an 
‘unanticipated side effect’ of international investment treaties, Daniel Price, the lead U.S. 
negotiator of NAFTA and an experienced investment arbitrator, maintains that the “enormously 
broad” scope of protection for corporations “is not an accident. The parties did not stumble into 
this. The parties did not inadvertently do this. This was a carefully crafted definition”.8 Price 
therefore explicitly acknowledges the role of political agency in the story that unfolded, but the 
agents in his story are states: the parties that formally negotiated the treaties. This is the most 
common way of explaining the history of international investment law, both from its proponents 
within the mainstream of the discipline and from its critics on the fringes. 
 
The mainstream literature on the subject tends to proceed from the assumption, to cite Jeswald 
Salacuse, that “[s]tates form and participate in international regimes in order to protect and 
advance their national interests”.9 The early investment treaties all emerged in order to protect 
the foreign direct investments of corporations from the ‘capital-exporting’ states in the West to 
the ‘capital-importing’ states of the Third World, and the literature therefore proceeds from an 
investigation into why it was in the national interests of those respective states to conclude such 
treaties. It is often recognized that “[c]apital-exporting states have been the primary force 
driving the negotiation of investment treaties”, and it is assumed that they do so to protect ‘their’ 
corporations in their foreign ventures.10 In contrast, ‘capital-importing states’ agreed to sign 
such treaties in order to “gain an advantage in the competition for investment”.11 How, then, do 
you explain the subsequent changes to international investment law in recent years, the so-
                                                             
7 Cited in Laurence Cox & Alf Gunvald Nilsen, We Make Our Own History: Marxism and Social Movements in 
the Twilight of Neoliberalism (London: Pluto Press, 2014), p. 21. 
8 Daniel M. Price, ‘Chapter 11 – Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein 
or Safety Valve? Canada-U.S. Law Journal, 26 (2000), p. 109. 
9 Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’, Harvard International Law Journal, 
51:2 (2010), p. 436. 
10 Ibid, p. 436. 
11 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Virginia Journal of International Affairs, 38 (1998), p. 688. 
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called ‘backlash’? Alvarez observes that if “[t]he United States led the charge in favor of 
investor protections, it now appears to be leading the drive in the opposite direction”, and 
further explains that “many of the states that established the regime are having second thoughts 
about the amount of sovereign ‘policy space’ they have ceded”.12 In a more systematic manner, 
Karen Halverson Cross argues that the current changes are due to the fact that “the line between 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states has increasingly blurred” and that states are now 
operating behind what John Rawls termed a ‘veil of ignorance’ in respect to their investment-
related national interests.13 The ‘backlash’ is an indication that states in the West are “not 
willing to commit to the strong investment protections that they themselves had pressured 
capital-importing countries to undertake”.14 Within the mainstream literature, the agents in this 
story are therefore states, and their respective ‘national interests’ can be inferred from their 
status as either capital-importing or capital-exporting. 
 
Much of the critical literature on international investment law is inspired by a Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) perspective and, except for the normative 
implications, it tends to provide a remarkably similar explanation of the course of events. The 
TWAIL literature argues that “by having exercised substantial economic, military, political 
power over the former colonies, Europe and the United States have established patterns of 
dominance that persist till date".15 In this context, the emergence of international investment 
law is conceived as a means for Western states to protect their corporations’ investments in the 
Third World by legal means, since the end of colonialism and wider developments in 
international law had made it increasingly objectionable to do so through the use of force.16 The 
current ‘backlash’ against the investor-friendly rules, to cite M. Sornarajah, “obviously results 
from the fact that the shoe is on the other foot. The erstwhile capital-exporting States are 
becoming massive recipients of capital”.17 The international investment regime may therefore 
increasingly “come to haunt” the very states that created it, and these states in the West may be 
                                                             
12 (My emphasis) Alvarez, ‘The Return of the State’, p. 235, 234. 
13 Karen Halverson Cross, ’Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice’, North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation, 38 (2012), p.156. 
14 Ibid, p. 179. 
15 James Thuo Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography’, Trade Law and Development, 3:1 (2011), p. 38. 
16 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 20. 
17 M. Sornarajah, ‘Evolution or Revolution in International Investment Arbitration? The Descent Into 
Normlessness’, in Chester Brown & Kate Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 639. 
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“bent on backtracking” on rules that they had once imposed on others.18 From a similar vantage 
point, Kate Miles argues that international investment law had originally “been shaped at a 
fundamental level through this ‘colonial encounter’ into a mechanism that protected only the 
interests of capital-exporting states”, but now that “developed states begin to find themselves 
on the receiving end of investor-state complaints […] a more balanced conceptualization of 
international investment law” may follow.19 For Sornarajah, the moral of the story is clear: “it 
is good that the pain and the indignity that such control has inflicted on the poorer states now 
attends those at the source. Some relief may result”.20 Within this critical perspective, the 
colonial origins and imperialist nature of international investment law is brought to the fore, 
but the primary agents are still states.  
 
Politics between Social Groups 
 
This thesis argues that both of the above approaches are based on a problematic understanding 
of agency; of who is responsible for the emergence and evolution of this regime. In the first 
approach, the question of agency disappears altogether – the history of international investment 
law is portrayed as the outcome of a natural evolutionary process. In the second approach, 
agency is attributed to states – it is states (primarily in the West) that have acted to create and 
to change the international investment regime. 
 
This lack of attention or mis-attribution of agency leads to an analysis where social groups are 
assumed to have a negligible role to play in the emergence and evolution of international 
investment law. Indeed, even where such social groups (organized through corporations or 
corporate lobbies, NGOs, or social movements) are empirically acknowledged, their agency is 
nevertheless accorded little weight in the explanation itself. 21  This is problematic in an 
explanatory sense – and the next chapter will argue that bringing social groups back in will lead 
                                                             
18 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, p. 4; see also M. Sornarajah, ‘Mutations of 
Neoliberalism in International Investment Law’, Trade, Law & Development, 3:1 (2011), p. 203. 
19 Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of 
Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 2; Kate Miles, ‘International Investment Law: 
Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the Environment’, Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy, 21:1 (2010), p. 47. 
20 M. Sornarajah, ‘The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law of Foreign Investment’, Simon 
Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs (12 September 
2002), p. 16. 
21 For instance, Cross recognizes the role of civil society actors in the demise of the MAI and Alvarez records 
‘sharp divisions’ within the U.S. in respect to the development of the new U.S. Model BIT. Halverson Cross, 
’Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice’, p. 178; Alvarez, ‘The Return of the State’, p. 240. 
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to a better explanation of international investment law – but it is also problematic in a practical 
and a normative sense. Our explanations are not politically innocent; they influence how we 
perceive the world and therefore how we act within it.22 The first approach presents the history 
of international investment law as the outcome of a natural evolution, and this lends it a sense 
of inevitability. In contrast, an agential approach highlights that the future of international 
investment law is what agents make of it, and it therefore opens up the possibility for a range 
of different futures. The second approach presents the history of international investment law 
as the outcome of the agency of states, and in addition to the problems of the first approach 
(‘we’ are not states, and our potential agency is unacknowledged) it can also result in 
questionable normative conclusions. In portraying the history of international investment law 
as the outcome of the agency of states, Jacob Werksman concludes that “[i]t is one of history’s 
happier ironies, that the victims of this particular experiment are likely to be the governments 
of two countries [the U.S. and Canada] that have been pushing the need for increased investor 
protection harder than most”.23 Such normative conclusions are present in much of the literature 
that treats states as agents: a note of hypocrisy is present in the claim that states in the West are 
now ‘backtracking’ on investment rules that they had once forced onto others. The third 
approach advocated here opens up such normative assumptions to scrutiny. Once the search for 
agency shifts from states to social groups, there is an empirical possibility that international 
investment law emerged at the initiative of a capitalist class, and that this capitalist class is still 
fighting tooth and nail to maintain and expand the corporate privileges it has come to appreciate. 
In contrast, these investment rules have not ‘come to haunt’ the very states that created them, 
but they have rather come to haunt other social groups – from local communities to 
environmental movements – who are seeing the outcome of their hard-fought campaigns 
questioned in international investment tribunals. Once a focus on social groups is adopted, the 
‘happy irony’ of the state-centric narrative is quickly lost and the moral of the story becomes 
rather more questionable. 
 
The third approach proposed here will not sideline the state, in the same way that much of the 
literature sidelines social groups; it will rather propose an alternative conception of the state 
                                                             
22 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millennium: 
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23 Jacob Werksman, ‘Commentary: In Response to the Paper by Konrad von Moltke and Howard Mann, 
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that allows for a consideration of both. In the investment law literature the theoretical premises 
of the state-as-agent approach is not explored or defended, and as such the precise nature of the 
state and its relationship (if any) to other social groups is left undefined. At times, the emphasis 
on the ‘national interest’ of the state – which is taken as a given – may suggest that social groups 
need not be considered. At other times, such social groups are mentioned in passing but not 
accorded much explanatory weight, and it is possible that this is due to an understanding of the 
state and social groups as separate actors that are externally related; on the basis of such a 
premise, the agency of social groups may indeed pale in comparison to the agency of states. 
The third approach proposed here does not side-line the state; it will rather account for the 
importance both of the state (as a social structure) and social groups (as agents) in the 
emergence and evolution of international investment law.  
 
The State in the Structure-Agency Debate 
 
In a statement that is often seen to capture the essence of the structure-agency debate, Marx 
famously observed that “[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past”.24 To avoid a problematic understanding of the state, this 
thesis seeks recourse to the structure-agency debate. The understanding of the structure-agency 
debate that will serve as a foundation for this thesis is one in which the agents in the story are 
human beings. As they exercise their agency, these human beings encounter not only the present 
agency of other people, but also pre-existing social structures that constrain or enable their 
agency. An important contribution of a critical perspective to world politics is its ability to 
“unmask the apparent objective status of structures”.25 These pre-existing social structures are 
not ‘givens’ or natural phenomena, but are in turn “the results of other people’s collective 
action”.26 This is an important distinction; to cite Andreas Bieler, “understanding structure as 
the result of strategies in the past, makes it possible to reflect on the freedom of action in the 
present”.27 
                                                             
24 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, available at: 
{https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm} accessed 6 March 2015. 
25 Andreas Bieler & Adam David Morton, ‘The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A 
Neo-Gramscian Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations, 7:5 (2001), p. 26 
26 Cox & Nilsen, We Make Our Own History, p. vii. 
27 Andreas Bieler, ‘Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives and the 
Analysis of European Integration’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:4 (2005), 
p. 517. 
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Structures and agents each have distinct properties and causal powers.28 Structures “do not ‘do’ 
anything per se”; they do not ‘act’ – they only enable certain forms of action and restrain other 
forms.29 Structures are prior to individuals; Colin Wight observes that “from the point of view 
of specific participants entering these settings, they are experienced as already-established 
forms of organisation, with which they have to contend in various ways”.30 However, to cite 
Robert Cox, this does not mean that structures are “in any deeper sense prior to the human 
drama itself”.31 In so far as social structures are the outcome of past collective agency, they are 
also often the outcome of historical social struggles between opposing collective agents – as 
such, they resemble “a kind of truce line” from social struggles of the past.32 Social structures 
can take ideational, material or institutional forms, and they often combine all three elements.33 
The distinctive properties of agency, in turn, are self-consciousness, reflexivity and 
intentionality.34 Agency and personhood are often closely connected; scholars who accord the 
state agency normally also personify it.35 Purposeful action based on consciousness is, from a 
Marxist perspective, indeed part of our human ‘species being’.36 While human beings are 
influenced by the ideational structures of the world into which they are born, agents are not 
simply a reflection or ‘bearers’ of such ideational structures – our consciousness enables us to 
reflect and sometimes to question the ideas of the societies in which we live, and to act 
accordingly. To cite Wight, “what goes on in the heads of these agents makes a difference”.37 
 
Ralph Miliband maintains that “in the politics of Marxism there is no institution which is nearly 
as important as the state”, yet as the first section of this chapter has indicated, the ‘state’ can be 
conceptualized in different ways.38 This section will approach the state from the vantage point 
                                                             
28 Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Jonathan Joseph, ‘Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International 
Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution’, Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), p. 117. 
29 William Robinson, ‘Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of the Transnational State’, Theory and 
Society, 30:2 (2001), p. 164; Joseph, ‘Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem’, p. 117. 
30 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, p. 114; see also Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social 
Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 135-161. 
31 Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 395. 
32 Cox & Nilsen, We Make Our Own History, p. 57. 
33 For a perspective on how these relate, see Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order’, p. 135-138. 
34 Joseph, ‘Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem’, p. 117;  
35 However, a different definition of agency will also result in a different assessment in respect to whether states 
have agency, see Colin Wight, ‘State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity?’ Review of International 
Studies, 30 (2004), p. 273. 
36 See Cox & Nilsen, We Make Our Own History, p. 26-31. 
37 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, p. 199. 
38 Cited in Colin Hay, ’Marxism and the State’, in Andrew Gamble et al (eds) Marxism and Social Science 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 156. 
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of the structure-agency debate, and it will first consider the common understanding that the 
state is an agent, before setting out an alternative perspective in which the state is a social 
structure, and in which agency is reserved for human beings and social groups. 
 
The State as an Agent? 
 
In everyday language and the media, it is common to personify the state and to treat it as an 
actor in its own right, and this practice is reflected in academia.39 If the international investment 
law literature is problematic in its treatment of the state, then the subject of International 
Relations – which this thesis draws upon for an understanding of the wider global political 
context – commits precisely the same mistake. Alexander Wendt observes that “[i]n a field in 
which almost everything is contested”, the idea that “state personhood is meaningful and at 
some fundamental level makes sense […] seems to be one thing on which almost all of us 
agree”.40 Indeed, given the origins and the distinctive focus of the discipline, Colin Wight 
maintains that for scholars of International Relations “to ask if the state really is an agent is akin 
to asking Descartes to doubt his own existence”.41 This section will therefore draw upon both 
international investment law and International Relations to explore the notion of state agency. 
 
Scholars within both disciplines revert to state agency without articulating the particular 
understanding of the state that underlies such premises, but it seems that the state is treated as 
an agent in at least four different ways. Firstly, the state can be treated as an agent in the formal 
and legal sense; for instance, the state is said to have ‘signed’ a treaty, even though the state 
cannot hold a pen. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States makes clear 
that the state is “a person of international law” and this thesis will follow common practice in 
treating the state as an agent in this respect.42 The problem is not to theoretically acknowledge 
that the state is, as an actual social fact, a legal actor in international law and international 
relations. The problem is rather that academic and non-academic representations of the state 
insist upon conceiving it as an agent in an analytical sense, where the explanation or 
understanding of a particular phenomena relies on the idea of state agency. In such accounts, 
                                                             
39 Alexander Wendt, ‘The State as Person in International Theory’, Review of International Studies, 30:2 (2004), 
p. 289. 
40 Ibid, p. 289. 
41 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, p. 178 
42 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (26 December 1933), art. 1, available at 
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the state did not only ‘sign’ a treaty but the reasons why it signed a treaty is answered by 
recourse to state agency.   
 
In a second sense, the state is therefore conceived as an actor in its own right, and the state’s 
action is explained in reference to what ‘it’ wants, ‘its’ national interests, or ‘its’ ‘second 
thoughts’ on a particular matter. This often involves a decision to ‘black box’ the state and the 
consideration of domestic factors is deemed unnecessary for the analysis. Some scholars 
actively suggest that the state is an agent; Wendt, in this respect, suggests that “states are people 
too” and the state is deemed to possess many of the human traits normally associated with 
personhood and agency, such as intentionality and perhaps even consciousness.43 Most scholars 
nevertheless treat the state ‘as if’ it were a person because doing so is deemed useful. In 
International Relations many theories explicitly start from the premise that states can be 
helpfully treated as rational and unitary actors and their behaviour explained in reference to 
their objective attributes and their position within the international system.44 In international 
investment law this decision is often implicit, but it seems to be the foundational premise of the 
common explanation that this field of law emerged and evolved as a result of the agency of 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states that each pursued their respective ‘national 
interests’. Treating the state as an agent may seem to be an attractive analytical short-cut, but it 
rests on problematic assumptions. The state cannot have interests, and the recourse to ‘national 
interests’ obscures the question of whose interests these actually are; the interest of all the 
people, or only of a particular social group? If the state is treated as a unitary actor from the 
outset, such questions cannot be asked. In so far as this approach conceals and deems beyond 
the scope of the analysis the agency and conflicting interests of opposing social groups, it leads 
to a problematic understanding of the political struggles that underpin international investment 
law.  
 
In a third sense, the state is often treated as an agent, but this is explicitly or implicitly a form 
of short-hand for state officials or the government. These state officials are in turn deemed to 
act with sufficient cohesiveness that it makes sense to refer to them as a collective agent in the 
singular rather than discrete agents in the plural. An expectation of such cohesiveness can be 
premised on the notion that state officials have distinct interests, as a group, by virtue of their 
position within the state. This appears to be the contention of the ‘new imperialism’ literature 
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within Marxist theory, where scholars such as David Harvey and Alex Callinicos claim that 
capitalism involves “two distinct logics of power”, one economic and the other geopolitical.45 
From that premise, Harvey suggests that capitalists are motivated by profit, while “statesmen 
usually seek outcomes that sustain or augment the power of their state vis-à-vis other states”.46 
Callinicos similarly suggests that state officials are interested in “maintaining and, if possible, 
expanding the internal and external power of the state”.47 State officials therefore possess 
distinct interests and motivations by virtue of their structural position within the state, and can 
therefore be considered a relatively unified collective agent. It is nevertheless not particularly 
clear why state officials would seek to sustain or augment the power of their state, and it is 
certainly possible that state officials are motivated by quite different personal goals as opposed 
to such collective ‘state’ goals. A different perspective on what motivates state officials in the 
exercise of their agency will be considered further on. Some structural forms of Marxism 
similarly consider state officials to form a particular ‘social category’, but here state officials 
do not seek to expand the power of their state vis-à-vis others, but rather seek to further the 
long-term interests of the capitalist class, thereby acting as an “ideal collective capitalist”.48 
Finally, the state can be treated as a short-hand for “collectivities of officials” in the weaker 
sense evident in the influential call by Theda Scocpol and others to “bring the state back in”.49 
Here the potential influence of societal pressures is recognized, and there is no assumption that 
the state is always an agent, but state officials may come to acquire sufficient autonomy from 
such pressures to pursue distinct state projects that contrast with those of societal groups.50 
While this is certainly a possibility (with an important caveat provided below), this thesis 
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imperialism’, William Robinson, ‘Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational 
State’, in Alexander Anievas (ed), Marxism and World Politics: Contesting Global Capitalism (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 61-76. 
48 Poulantzas maintains that state officials “constitute a specific social category” with a “specific internal unity”, 
Nicos Poulantzas, ‘The Problem of the Capitalist State’, New Left Review, I/58 (November 1969), pp. 73-74; see 
also Bob Jessop, ‘Bringing the State Back in (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections', 
International Review of Sociology, 11:2 (2001), p. 151. 
49 Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, et al (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).  
50 Theda Scocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Peter Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, et al (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
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the State’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, et al (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 356. 
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contends that state officials have not acquired such autonomy in respect to international 
investment law. 
 
In a fourth sense, the state is conceived as a structure vis-à-vis people within the state, but that 
structure becomes an agent at the international level. 51 Here the role of domestic political 
struggles in forming the ‘national interest’ of a state is explicitly recognized, but the state is 
seen to consolidate such struggles and to act as a unified agent internationally. Such an approach 
seems to be adopted by David Schneiderman, the one scholar of international investment law 
who provides an explicit definition of the state, and whose research is extensively drawn upon 
in this thesis. Schneiderman objects to the tendency of many critical scholars to “abandon states 
as the locus for securing change”, and he highlights how the state continues “to offer their 
citizens a site of collective agency with which to resist the hegemony of economic 
globalization”.52 At the domestic level, Schneiderman appears to approach the state as a social 
structure that “reflect[s] the balance of class forces in society” and that forms a “terrain[…] of 
political struggle”.53 At the international level, he nevertheless explicitly conceives of the state 
as an agent, and he places great emphasis on states as “critical agents” in the development of 
international investment law.54 At times, he appears to do so in the first sense considered above; 
the state is a legal agent with the jurisdiction both to make and unmake international investment 
law.55 At other times, he nevertheless appears to revert to state agency in a stronger sense. States 
are considered to be the “principal architects and authors” of the international investment 
regime, and often no authors or architects of the state’s own policy to promote such a regime 
are explicitly identified - indeed, the question of what political struggles the state reflects is 
sometimes explicitly outside the scope of his analysis.56 As such, the recognition that the state 
is domestically a structure does not lead to a new research agenda on uncovering the social 
struggles that underpin international investment law.  
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The difficulty with Schneiderman’s approach is not only that social groups as collective agents 
are once more often sidelined, but that state agency in a stronger sense can also easily sneak 
back in. This appears to be the case when he turns to consider in what “locales might resistance 
be generated”, or specifically, what state might “take the lead” in resistance to international 
investment law. 57  He considers the possibility for resistance in the U.S. and the EU, but 
dismisses that possibility on the basis that American negotiators and decision-makers and the 
European Council have hitherto not shown much signs of such resistance.58 These, in turn, 
appear to be unproblematically deemed to represent the potential for resistance from the 
“national publics” of those states.59 Interestingly, his own case studies refer both to the extent 
of corporate lobbying and to emerging social movement opposition,60 but his recourse to state 
agency (used interchangeably throughout the chapter with state officials and “national publics”) 
does not seem to allow for the possibility that the balance of power in social struggles within 
these states may change. As such, the recourse to state agency serves as blinkers towards 
understanding the battle for the state that his own definition of the state would seem to require. 
Some of Schneiderman’s work is more attuned to such struggles, but the ease with which these 
lessons are forgotten suggests that the best way of remembering that the state is a social 
structure resting on political contestation is to consistently treat it as such, and not to revert to 
an emphasis on states as “critical agents” within international investment law. 
 
In summary, the decision to treat the state as an agent – in whatever sense of the word – tends, 
to cite Colin Wight, to “place a sharp dividing line between domestic and international politics, 
with the domestic ‘we’ seemingly cohering into the singular ‘I’ at the boundaries of the 
international realm”. 61  This, in turn, tends to “underplay[…] the amount of conflict and 
fragmentation that occurs in domestic politics”.62 In order to bring political struggles between 
social groups to the forefront of the analysis, this thesis will conceptualize the state as a social 
structure rather than an agent. 
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58 Ibid, p. 71-90, 161. 
59 Ibid, p. 72. 
60 Ibid, p. 78-80, 84-85.   
61 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, p. 191.  
62 Ibid, p. 191. 
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The State as a Structure 
 
The emphasis on state agency is sometimes designed to emphasize the state’s continued 
importance in contemporary global politics. The state can nevertheless also be considered 
hugely important as a social structure “within which and through which social forces operate”.63 
Within such a conceptualization, the state no longer engages in conscious action and it no longer 
holds intentions, thoughts, beliefs, desires or interests of its own.64 It is nevertheless of great 
importance in so far as it constrains or enables the actions of human beings, including in the 
context of making or unmaking international investment law. 
 
As a social structure, the state is the “material condensation”, 65 the “crystallization”,66 or the 
“congealment”67 of past social struggles in a set of political institutions. In so far as the state 
‘congeals’ the outcomes of previous social struggles it has, to cite Bob Jessop, a “structurally 
inscribed strategic selectivity”.68 This strategic selectivity ensures that the state is not neutral in 
the context of current social struggles but that it privileges some actors and some strategies over 
others. To deny agency to the state itself is nevertheless not to deny agency to the state officials 
who take up positions within the “slots” of the state structure.69 State officials are constrained 
in their agency by the state structure, but they also possess an element of agency within it – 
more in the case of some (the executive) than of others (lower level administrative officials). 
State officials exercise that agency in the context of a variety of structural pressures. To remain 
in their position, state officials may need to harness the private economic power of capitalists 
(upon which both the state’s revenues and their personal electoral fortunes might depend) and 
the democratic power of citizens. State officials may also need to contend with the state’s 
position within the international system, but this does not mean that sustaining and augmenting 
the power of their state is the overriding structural imperative that it sometimes appears to be 
                                                             
63 Andreas Bieler & Adam David Morton, Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of 
European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 18.  
64 For a critique of Panitch & Gindin’s influential work in precisely these terms, see William Robinson, ‘The 
Fetishism of Empire: A Critical Review of Panitch and Gindin’s the Making of Global Capitalism’, Studies in 
Political Economy, 93 (2014), pp. 147-165. 
65 Nicos Poulantzas, cited in Jonathan Joseph, Marxism and Social Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), p 79; see also Andreas Bieler & Adam David Morton, ‘The Will-O’-The-Wisp of the Transnational 
State’, Journal of Australian Political Economy, 72 (2013-2014), pp. 23-51. 
66 Bob Jessop, cited in Hay, ’Marxism and the State’, p. 170. 
67 Robinson, ‘Social Theory and Globalization’, p. 165. 
68 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 40. 
69 Roy Bhaskar’s term, cited in Archer, Realist Social Theory, p. 152. 
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in Harvey’s or Callinicos’ work;70 the relative international standing of the state may well seem 
of less immediate concern than the economic and electoral pressures that influence particular 
state officials’ successes in the next election. State officials are also societal beings in their own 
right. Their position within society influences their personal aims and motivations, their social 
group belonging and family ties, and their consciousness and view of the world. State officials 
are therefore not separate from society – they are both societal beings in their own right and 
subject to societal pressures, and they exercise their agency in relation to, and as part of, wider 
social struggles. 
 
This cautions against viewing state officials and social groups as distinct actors external to each 
other. State officials may indeed, as Theda Scocpol maintains, “pursue goals that are not simply 
reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society”. 71  The risk is 
nevertheless that such an analysis can place too hard a boundary between the state and society, 
and may fail to notice how the state structure itself is the outcome of previous social struggles, 
and how state officials are themselves agents within such struggles.72 The idea that the state and 
society are externally related to each other is evident in much of the international investment 
law literature. Kate Miles highlights “the alignment of home state interests with those of the 
investor”, but does not investigate how that alignment comes about.73 Gus Van Harten, while 
astute in drawing attention to the role of corporations in the emergence of international 
investment law, concludes, “multinational firms and their lobbyists have been the major players, 
other than states, in the promotion and negotiation of investment treaties”.74 If the state is 
viewed as a structure that ‘congeals’ previous social struggles and if state officials are 
considered societal beings in their own right, it becomes more difficult to conceive of the state 
and society as distinct and separate actors. 
 
 
 
                                                             
70 Harvey, ‘From Globalization to the New Imperialism’, p. 91; Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political 
Economy, p. 98. 
71 Theda Scocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In’, p. 9. 
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73 Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law, p. 3 
74 Gus Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law – A Return to the Gay Nineties?’ 
Transnational Dispute Management, 4:5 (September 2007), p. 38; see also, Gus Van Harten, ‘Private Authority 
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Social Groups as Collective Agents 
 
To establish that the state is ultimately not an agent in the emergence and evolution of 
international investment law does not, on its own, establish who is. For all the references to 
‘great men’ in history, this thesis would suggest that human beings are often most influential 
when they act collectively. It is therefore important to highlight the role of social groups and 
social movements – against slavery, against colonialism, against patriarchy – that have 
transformed our world in important ways. It is nevertheless just as important to highlight, as 
does Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen, that “collective agency is not something that is 
resorted to by subaltern groups alone; in normal times, it is the powerful, the wealthy and the 
culturally privileged who are most capable of producing collective agency in a sustained and 
effective manner”.75 When the history of the world is told as a story of collective agency from 
both ‘above’ and ‘below’ the transformative – and reproductive – potential of agency is revealed, 
and it is no longer perceived to be “simply a blip on the otherwise pacific surface of society”.76 
 
Individual human beings can be said to form a social group to the extent that they are joined by 
a certain sense of unity or common purpose, even if differences within such groups will always 
remain. This thesis draws to a large extent on a Marxist and neo-Gramscian literature within 
International Relations, and this literature often refers to ‘social forces’ interchangeably with 
‘social groups’. Social forces “engendered by the production process” are conceived to be the 
most important collective actors.77 This thesis will nevertheless normally refer specifically to 
social groups, since the meaning of the term social forces is often unclear and scholars use it 
differently.78 Social groups, in turn, often pursue their aims through organizations of different 
kinds. At various points, this thesis will refer to corporate lobbying groups, transnational 
corporations and NGOs ‘acting’ to advance ‘their’ interests. This should be understood 
distinctly as a form of short-hand for particular social groups, but since it treats organizations 
(which are social structures) as agents it raises the obvious question of why this does not 
replicate the problems that have just been identified in respect to state agency. Similar problems 
                                                             
75 Cox & Nilsen, We Make Our Own History, p. 60. 
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may indeed occur also in this context, but the difference is that it is clearer who the short-hand 
is for. The members of an NGO have joined the organization voluntarily with the express 
purpose to pursue particular aims, while the shareholders and managers who control a 
corporation similarly tend to have an important element of unity in their aims. In contrast, this 
is rarely the case with the state. It is not inconceivable that the state could act as a collective 
agent on behalf of a relatively unified ‘nation’, but this is an empirical claim that is highly 
disputable and that would need to be carefully made. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind 
that this is only a form of short-hand – for instance, corporations are “only vehicles for 
capitalists” and the disappearance or ill-fortune of particular organizations does not necessarily 
say much about the social group itself; if a corporation goes bankrupt, the capitalists will simply 
restructure their wealth elsewhere.79 
 
In summary, this section has rejected the notion of state agency that serves as a foundation for 
much research in both international relations and international investment law. In contrast, the 
aim is to conceptualize the state as a social structure, which in turn, to cite William Robinson, 
allows for research to identify “the constellation of social forces in conflict and cooperation, 
their changing historical development, interests, and relations, as explanatory of state policies 
[and] ideologies”.80 
 
Capitalism, States and Classes in Global Politics 
 
The above two sections have set out the conceptual and theoretical premises that informs this 
thesis, and the final section will turn to investigate the relevant historical context and the 
primary structures and agents within it. The section will first briefly explore the ‘macro 
structure’ of capitalism itself, and particularly of the role of the state specifically in capitalism.81 
The section will then turn to the ‘meso structure’ of global capitalism and globalization, and 
will highlight the emergence of a transnational capitalist class both objectively, as a “class in 
itself”, and subjectively, as a “class for itself” in global politics.82 
                                                             
79 Gerard Greenfield, cited in Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Globalisation and the State: Where is the Power of 
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Capitalism and the Question of the State 
 
This thesis is informed by a Marxist understanding of capitalism as a particular mode of 
production and surplus appropriation, and this places the social relations of production – the 
class structure – at the heart of the analysis. Ellen Meiksins Wood suggests that every society 
in which “one class appropriates the surplus labour of another” contains two ‘moments’ of 
exploitation: “the appropriation of surplus labour and the coercive power that enforces it”.83 In 
feudal societies, these two moments were fused; the class that appropriates surplus labour is 
also the class that holds political and military power.84 In contrast, in capitalism people are 
formally free and legal equals, but a market mechanism ensures that those who do not own the 
means of production will need to sell their labour power in exchange for a wage in order to 
survive, while those who do own the means of production appropriate this surplus labour as 
profit.85  In capitalism, there is therefore a differentiation between the economic sphere of 
appropriation and the political sphere that enforces a particular social order based on private 
property.86 The social structure of capitalism is not inevitable; it is itself the outcome of historic 
collective agency and social struggle, but it forms the social context within which agency is 
exercised today. 
 
The fact that the economically dominant class does not directly control the political sphere of 
the state does not mean that the state is a neutral arbiter amongst social groups, as some liberals 
or pluralists may suggest.87 But if the economy is formally separated from the political sphere, 
how does the capitalist class ensure that the state continues to support its interests and a social 
order that works to its advantage? Following the infamous debate between Ralph Miliband and 
Nicos Poulantzas in the 1960s and 1970s, there has been a tendency to distinguish between 
‘instrumentalist’ and ‘structuralist’ reasons for why state officials tend to act in the interest of 
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a capitalist class.88  These need not be contradictory, and their relative importance can be 
considered an empirical question. 89  The idea that state officials are subject to structural 
pressures is relatively uncontroversial. As long as the economy remains under ‘private’ as 
opposed to state control, capitalists are the ones to decide if and where to invest and in what 
form; decisions that inevitably affect both the state’s resources and the ability of state officials 
to achieve their aims, as well as the work prospects of those of their citizens who do not own 
the means of production.90 As Wood observes, this means “most aspects of everyday life, those 
that come within the scope of the economy, fall outside the range of democratic 
accountability”.91 Capitalists can therefore exercise their economic agency in such a way as to 
ensure political influence, and state officials will need to cooperate and to ‘attract’ investors 
with the promise of business-friendly policies. 
 
The claim that a capitalist class is exercising political agency is rather more controversial, yet 
structural pressures alone do not necessarily lead to the outcome desired by a capitalist class.92 
Structural pressures constrain state officials in their actions, and they encourage them to act in 
particular ways, but there are a multitude of different ways in which state officials can respond 
to such structural pressures – including by resisting them or by responding in ways not 
conducive to capitalists. Nor is it always sufficient that state officials respond to structural 
pressures, but they may also be expected to proactively support capitalist interests by advancing 
(global) capitalism. While structural pressures are likely to make state officials wary of 
introducing regulations that will discourage capitalists from investing, such structural pressures 
may be less likely to prompt state officials to actively take the initiative to develop and to 
introduce business-friendly policies. 93 As such, it is not surprising that the direct political 
influence of corporations and corporate lobbying groups is evident in almost every sphere of 
public policy in many capitalist countries. Trade unions, environmental groups and consumer 
groups also send lobbyists to meet with state officials, but the latter tend to meet far more 
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frequently with corporate representatives.94 Such lobbying often works; for instance, in the U.S. 
the corporations that lobby the most have been found to pay a significantly lower tax rate than 
those that lobby less.95 At times, state officials have been found to copy legislative amendments 
verbatim from draft proposals provided to them by corporate lobbies, and the initiative for new 
pro-business policies can often be traced to business actors.96 Corporate lobbying is often lent 
extra weight by campaign contributions, as well as through business influence on the media 
(via ownership or advertising revenue), both of which tend to influence the electoral fortunes 
of state officials.97 Despite the formal differentiation of the economic and the political spheres, 
it is furthermore clear that the capitalist class does not only influence state officials, but 
permeates the state more directly. State officials often have a business background, and many 
will seek lucrative private sector jobs upon leaving political office.98 Some hold onto their 
directorships of corporations throughout their political service.99 As a general rule, elected high 
level state officials tend to be more privileged than the citizens they ostensibly serve – in the 
2010 UK cabinet, 23 of the 29 ministers were estimated to be millionaires,100 and such a socio-
economic background is likely to influence their personal interests, the interests of their family 
and personal connections, as well as more subtly their values and beliefs.101 There also seems 
to be an increasing tendency to employ business representatives either as outside consultants, 
or for business executives to be seconded into government.102 Despite the differentiation of the 
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economic and political spheres, Ralph Miliband therefore observes that “[u]nequal economic 
power, on the scale and of the kind encountered in advanced capitalist societies, inherently 
produces political inequality, on a more or less commensurate scale, whatever the constitution 
may say”.103 
 
Globalization and the Question of Agency 
 
If the macro structure that is necessary to understand the context for this thesis is capitalism, 
then the meso structure is globalization and global capitalism. The academic study on 
globalization can be said to have progressed through three phases – a structural phase, an 
agential phase, and one that tried to combine the two.104 Globalization was from the outset 
conceived as a structural phenomenon in which “peoples everywhere are increasingly subject 
to the disciplines of the global marketplace”, and the capacities of states to determine their own 
course of action was deemed to have declined. 105 Other scholars noticed that there was very 
little agency in such accounts, and turned around to suggest that states were the “authors” of 
globalization and the state consequently came to be viewed “more like a source of continuing 
globalization than as its main victim”.106 Dissatisfied with the excessive focus on either the 
structural pressures of globalization or the agential powers of states, scholars subsequently tried 
to reconcile the two and to find a ‘middle ground’.107 As such, Philip Cerny suggests that “state 
actors have acted and reacted in feedback loop fashion” in creating and responding to 
globalization.108 
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The problem with the course of this debate was that globalization was presented as a structural 
phenomenon void of agency, and when scholars subsequently tried to bring agency back in, 
they turned to the only actor that the discipline of International Relations has traditionally 
afforded agency: the state. To cite Jens Bartelson’s characterization of the agential position, 
“there is nothing irreversible or necessary about globalization, since globalization ultimately is 
the outcome of agency, however unintended. As Panitch […] has argued, ‘capitalist 
globalization is a process which also takes place in, through, and under the aegis of states; it is 
encoded by them and in important respects authored by them’”.109 The literature, like the above 
paragraph, often moves seamlessly from the argument that any given structure is ultimately the 
outcome of agency, to the argument that states need to be brought back into the analysis. The 
globalization-as-structure vs. state-as-agent representation of the debate therefore conceived of 
the puzzle in the traditional state-centric terms familiar to scholars of International Relations. 
Within these accounts, the role of a capitalist class was acknowledged, but only in terms of the 
“impersonal forces of the market” and the “global flows” that are viewed as defining features 
of globalization. 110 In contrast, and in line with the theoretical rejection of state agency made 
above, this section defends the claim that the primary agent behind globalization was a capitalist 
class in the process of transnationalizing. 
 
The capitalist class exercised both economic and political agency in such a way as to be 
justifiably able to claim authorship of globalization. In economic terms, the very term 
globalization emerged as a concept within the corporate world in the 1960s, and it has been 
consciously pursued by the leading edge of a capitalist class.111 The corporations that led the 
way did not do so under circumstances of their own choosing; they have a structural incentive 
to pursue capital accumulation, and such capital accumulation was increasingly restricted at the 
national level. The struggles that led to the emergence of a ‘class compromise’ in the form of 
the ‘welfare state’ in the West and ‘developmental states’ in the Third World, along with the 
increasing success of trade unions in negotiating better working conditions, had initially secured 
high growth rates but soon placed limits on such capital accumulation.112 The decision to ‘go 
global’, to cite Robinson, “allowed capital to shake off the constraints that nation-state 
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capitalism had placed on accumulation and to break free of the class compromises and 
concessions that had been imposed by working and popular classes and by national 
governments in the preceding epoch”.113 Capitalists therefore acted under structural pressures 
of their own, but the way they responded to such structural pressures was not inevitable. As 
neo-Gramscian scholars such as Mark Rupert often remind us, globalization is not “somehow 
automatic or self-actualising”.114 
 
Globalization did not occur in the economic sphere alone; in order to globalize, a capitalist class 
needed to change politics too. Globalization required the development of new international 
economic rules to support trade, investment and capital flows. It was also coupled with a push 
back against the welfare and developmental state structures and policies through the promotion 
of what has come to be known as neoliberalism. It was precisely in the 1970s that corporations 
first began to form and join associations on a larger scale, such as the Business Roundtable and 
the American Chamber of Commerce in the U.S.115 This was sometimes quite explicitly done 
to counter the political gains that were being made by opposing societal groups. Phillips 
Petroleum posted an advertisement in Fortune Magazine in 1976 with the headline “It’s time 
American Industry took a stand for Free Enterprise” with the message to other corporations that 
“[i]t’s gone past the point where an isolated business is under attack. The system itself is in 
danger. And if we don’t stand up for it, who will?”116 The “political project” of neoliberalism 
involved not only direct political pressure by the new associations that were formed in the 
period, but also a battle for ideas.117 Susan George refers to the advocates of neoliberalism as 
“right-wing Gramscians”, precisely because they “truly believed in the power of ideas”.118 
These ideas were not just articulated by Milton Friedman and others, but were explicitly 
promoted through “public and private meetings, conferences, academic and more popular 
publications, lobbying of various types, feeding the media, assiduous contacts with the 
politically powerful (or soon to be powerful) and, with the exception of mass demonstrations, 
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all the trappings that are the daily fare of social movement research”. 119  With more than 
adequate financial backing, Leslie Sklair observes that this is not a story of the power of ideas 
alone, but of how the adherents of such ideas “work[ed] away until the material forces beg[a]n 
to change in their direction”.120 It is sometimes suggested that “globalization is what states have 
made of it”,121 but this section has on the contrary suggested that globalization is rather what a 
capitalist class – exercising both economic and political forms of agency – have made of it.  
 
A Transnational Capitalist Class-In-Itself  
 
This thesis draws upon William Robinson’ argument that globalization constitutes a “new stage 
in the history of world capitalism”, which is distinguished by the transnationalization of 
production and, along with it, the transnationalization of the leading elements of the capitalist 
class.122 The concept of a transnational capitalist class is contested within much of the Marxist 
and non-Marxist literature. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, in a prominent recent Marxist 
contribution to International Relations, reject the notion of a transnational capitalist class in a 
single sentence and thereafter distinguish between different “national capitals”, and, without 
specifying in any detail what makes capital a national of a particular country, proceed to suggest 
that different countries have ‘their own’ multinational corporations. 123 Different theoretical 
approaches reject the notion of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ from different starting points, 
and it is beyond the scope of this section to address each of them. It will nevertheless indirectly 
contribute to those debates by providing a positive, if inevitably tentative, account for why it 
makes sense to speak of a transnational capitalist class, and more importantly in demonstrating 
how such an understanding aids in the explanation of international investment law in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Drawing upon Marxist theory, this thesis defines ‘class’ as first and foremost an objective 
category that relates to how people are situated within a particular mode of production.124 The 
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capitalist class is in this context understood to be the owners and managers of the means of 
production, 125 who share certain common interests by virtue of their position within the system 
irrespective of whether they recognize such interests or not – as such, they form a class ‘in 
itself’.126 But what makes a transnational capitalist class? The evidence for the emergence of a 
transnational capitalist class can rest on a combination of three possible grounds: in respect to 
how the production process is organized, in respect to how corporations are organized, and in 
respect to how ownership is organized. On the basis of these indicators, it will be argued that it 
is increasingly difficult to distinguish between separate ‘national’ capitalist classes that are each 
embedded within particular states, and that a transnational capitalist class seems to have 
emerged. 
 
Many scholars question the ‘newness’ of globalization; to cite Immanuel Wallerstein, “what is 
described as something new [...] has in fact been a cyclical occurrence throughout the history 
of the modern world-system”.127 In particular, some scholars highlight the ‘first globalization’ 
that is said to have occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and which may even score 
more highly on certain indicators of international interconnectedness than the world today.128 
Robinson nevertheless distinguishes previous periods of internationalization from the 
contemporary transnationalization of the production process itself.129 The emergence of global 
commodity chains ensures that, to cite Jan Aart Scholte, “the research centre, design unit, 
procurement office, fabrication plant, finishing point, assembly line, quality control operations, 
data processing office, advertising bureau and after-sales service could each be situated in 
different provinces, countries and regions”. 130 While sixty percent of international trade is 
estimated to occur within transnational corporations, there is also the common use of 
subcontracting, outsourcing, production-sharing arrangements, joint ventures, etc, and by the 
end, to cite Susan Strange, it is “impossible even to guess the ‘nationality’ of the whole 
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network”.131 The transnationalization of production ensures that irrespective of where particular 
capitalists are situated, their class interests hinges on transnational processes of production. As 
such, even if the governing board were to consist only of nationals of one country, as Jerry 
Harris observes, “the mental space occupied daily by corporate leadership is focused on global 
concerns”.132  
 
Many of those who are sceptical about the emergence of a transnational capitalist class do not 
dispute the transnationalization of production, but look at how corporations are organized and 
maintain, in the words of Ellen Meiksins Wood, that “the most elementary point is that so-
called ‘transnational’ corporations generally have a base, together with dominant shareholders 
and boards, in single nation states and depend on them in many fundamental ways”.133 There is 
evidence that points towards the transnationalization of boardrooms, but adherents of the 
concept of a transnational capitalist class rarely conceive of this as the primary criteria.134 In 
terms of how corporations are organized more generally, Wood’s statement raises the question 
of what it means to have a ‘base’ in a particular country. Indeed, the critical power of 
transnational corporations today seems to rest precisely on their ability to choose their ‘base’ 
on economic grounds and to “fly different flags on different occasions”.135 Fiat, the ‘Italian’ 
firm, has recently moved its legal domicile to the Netherlands, its tax residence to the UK, and 
its main stock market listing to New York. 136  Not being too precise about where the 
corporation’s ‘base’ is located is especially important in terms of taxation, and almost all 
transnational corporations make use of tax havens in one way or another.137 As a result, the 
British Virgin Islands is home to around 30,000 inhabitants and over 500,000 corporations, and 
the Economist remarks with irony that much of the world’s patents are “owned by outfits in 
such unlikely innovative hubs as Barbados, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda”.138 In the end, 
one can try to force transnational corporations into an analytical framework based on the nation-
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state, but this obscures the way that their power lie precisely in not being too dependent on any 
particular state. To cite the president and CEO of Lenovo, “[i]n today’s world, assessing 
companies by their nation of origin misses the point”.139 
 
Beyond the question of the production process and how corporations organize their affairs, who 
ultimately owns the corporations? Several studies reveal the extent to which the shares of the 
world’s transnational corporations are owned by financial institutions, normally U.S. ‘based’ 
ones such as Blackrock and Capital Group, but this begs the question of who owns the shares 
in those financial companies – it is clear that capitalists from elsewhere in the world hold at 
least some shares, but the full extent is almost impossible to determine.140 To start at another 
end of the puzzle, research on how ‘high net worth individuals’ (the world’s rich) invest their 
assets suggest that they are not nationalists in their investment strategies. While North 
America’s wealthy invest only 24% of their assets beyond their own region, this rises to 36% 
of individuals from the Asia-Pacific region, 41% from Europe and 53% from Latin America.141 
Crucially, these figures do not include investments in ‘home’ transnational corporations that 
themselves have extensive investments outside their regions.142  
 
None of these indicators provide definitive evidence of the formation of a transnational 
capitalist class, but each suggests that the insistence that capital is still ‘national’ in nature rests 
on increasingly shaky foundations. The transnationalization of production and of how 
corporations are organized suggests that attempting to identify a ‘home state’ for transnational 
corporations misses the very novelty in how they operate. This claim coheres with the 
worldview of capitalists themselves; the CEO of IBM maintains that the very term 
‘multinational corporation’ suggests “how antiquated our thinking about it is”,143 while the 
CEO of Siemens questioned the very concept of “offshoring” on the basis that the “home shore” 
for Siemens is “now as much China and India as it is Germany or America”.144 Moreover, the 
owners of capital “anywhere in the world need no more than internet access to invest their 
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money through globalized financial circuits”.145 To conclude, the idea that capitalism is still 
organized around distinct ‘national capitalist classes’ or ‘national corporations’ obscures how 
capitalists increasingly rely on making innovative use of different states for different purposes; 
in contrast, this is a phenomena that the concept of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ immediately 
draws attention to. 
 
A Transnational Capitalist Class-For-Itself 
 
The previous section has argued that a transnational capitalist class has emerged objectively as 
a class in itself, but this does not, of course, automatically mean that it is a collective actor in 
political life. The next chapter will nevertheless not only suggest that a transnational capitalist 
class is exercising its economic agency in such a way as to pressure states to advance 
international investment law, but that it is exercising political agency to achieve that goal. The 
idea of a transnational capitalist class as a collective agent sometimes tends to conjure up images 
of shady individuals in secret locations plotting to take over the world, but the present argument 
is more modest: there is a concerted effort by the leading edge of a capitalist class to promote 
a world of open global markets and business-friendly governance. Given that the ‘common 
sense’ of our contemporary society (understood in the Gramscian sense to be opposed to ‘good 
sense’) is that capitalism benefits everyone and that economic growth ‘lifts all boats’, the 
transnational capitalist class can do so openly through identifiable institutions. The argument is 
therefore, to cite Robert Cox, that a transnational capitalist class has acquired “its own ideology, 
strategy and institutions of collective action”, and that it has “attained a clearly distinctive class 
consciousness”. 146 The capitalist class is not only class conscious, but also “conscious of its 
transnationality” and its common interests in pursuing specifically global capitalism.147 
 
It is sometimes suggested that the fierce economic competition between different corporations 
prevents the capitalist class from realizing its collective class interests and therefore of 
exercising collective agency but, to cite Clyde Barrow, “methodological decrees do not answer 
historical evidence”.148 The historical evidence shows clearly that capitalists are able to put 
some of their competitive struggles aside to form associations and to pursue collective political 
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aims when their shared interests are at stake. In respect specifically to a transnational capitalist 
class, such collective agency can be more narrowly focused on changing or introducing 
particular policies, or it can be more widely aimed at developing, asserting and promoting new 
and existing agendas in support of global capitalism.149  
 
In the narrower sense, corporations increasingly channel their lobbying efforts through business 
associations such as the Business Roundtable in Washington D.C. or BusinessEurope in 
Brussels, as well as a wide variety of sectoral groups. 150  These groups are often hugely 
influential on public policy issues both small and large; for instance, one study details the 
considerable influence of the European Round Table of Industrialists in the development of the 
European Union. 151  These lobbying groups can only with difficulty be said to represent 
particular ‘national’ or even ‘regional’ fractions of capital. Aside from the question of whether 
the transnational corporations themselves are truly ‘nationally based’, the lobbying groups often 
represent corporations that are headquartered elsewhere in the world. 152  The Business 
Roundtable that lobbies the U.S. government includes ‘German’ Siemens and ‘Anglo-Dutch’ 
Shell.153 State-centric perspectives tend to “only account for [transnational corporations] by 
regarding them as several, unconnected actors in their individual domestic sphere”, but the 
tendency of transnational corporations to act within several states and international institutions 
simultaneously suggests the importance of viewing them as “transnational actors transgressing 
the line of separation between international and domestic politics”. 154 
 
In a wider sense, the transnational capitalist class also acts collectively beyond lobbying on 
specific issues. Recent decades have seen the emergence of powerful policy groups that seek to 
articulate the interests of a transnational capitalist class, to develop common ideas and agendas, 
and more widely to “translate class interests into state action”. 155  The above business 
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associations also contribute to this,156 but particularly important in this respect are global policy 
groups such as the World Economic Forum, the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Group, and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development.157 These groups were often set up by business actors who continue to have a 
privileged position within them, but William Carroll observes that in their aim to mobilize 
“around visions and policies that enunciate the common interests of transnational capital”, these 
groups nevertheless also seek to “persuade state managers, journalists and others to see those 
interests as universal in scope”.158 For example, only the CEOs of the largest transnational 
corporations are ‘members’ of the World Economic Forum, but selected ‘media leaders’, high-
level politicians, NGOs and academics are invited to participate.159 These actors help to further 
the ‘common sense’ of global capitalism, to secure the leadership of the capitalist class, and to 
construct what neo-Gramscian scholars often refer to as ‘hegemony’.160 
 
This section has emphasized the political agency of a transnational capitalist class; to cite Leslie 
Sklair, “class hegemony does not simply happen as if by magic. The capitalist class expends 
much time, energy and resources to make it happen and to ensure that it keeps on happening”.161 
This does not mean that a transnational capitalist class is a unified agent at all times, but more 
modestly that transnational capitalists hold certain common class interests in the development 
and furtherance of a global economy, and that they act collectively, and relatively openly, to 
advance such interests through identifiable institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis is to uncover the political struggles that underpin international investment 
law. It has been argued that the literature on the subject tends to adopt state-centric blinkers that 
serve to render such struggles invisible, and this chapter has proposed an alternative analytical 
framework that will serve as the foundation for the empirical investigation of international 
investment law that follows in the remainder of the thesis. That alternative framework does not 
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involve a rejection of the state, but the recognition that the state is a social structure that is both 
‘strategically selective’ as a result of previous social struggles, and an arena within which 
contemporary social struggles are played out. 
 
It is often difficult to remember that the world in which we live, with its imposing and seemingly 
inevitable social structures (capitalism, global institutions, the state, the law) is ultimately the 
outcome of human agency. Indeed, Marxism itself was long preoccupied with structural 
theorizing, yet such structural investigations are most valuable precisely “if they guide an 
understanding of the choices made, and the specific institutions created, by specific historical 
actors”.162 The final section of this chapter has detailed the social structures that form the wider 
context within which political struggles in respect to international investment law are fought 
out, and it has sought to highlight the role of human agency in the creation of these social 
structures. Warren Buffett, one of the world’s richest men, famously remarked that “[t]here’s 
class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re 
winning”.163 Yet as an Occupy Wall Street poster remarked, “[t]hey don’t call it class warfare 
until we fight back”.164 In contrast to the tendency to think of capital as only a structural force, 
this thesis will highlight how a transnational capitalist class has acted collectively to shape the 
world in which we live in important ways, and how it is currently busy shaping our future. Its 
success, however, will depend on what alternative collective agency it encounters along the 
way. 
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Chapter 2 
The ‘Big Picture’: The History, Structure and Global Politics of 
International Investment Law 
 
An ‘arbitration scorecard’ published by the American Lawyer describes international 
investment arbitration as a “secret world” made up of the “biggest cases you never heard of”.1 
The aim of this chapter is to delve into that secret world, in order to understand how it emerged, 
by whom, and for what purpose. If the wider aim of this thesis is to understand the political 
struggles that international investment law is implicated in, this chapter will consider the ‘big 
picture’ of how international investment law first emerged and its position in wider global 
politics. It therefore seeks to understand the broader political struggles in respect to 
international investment law as a whole, while subsequent chapters will analyse the role of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the context of particular political struggles with opposing 
social groups that arise in different parts of the world today. This chapter is structured into three 
sections. 
 
The first section will explore the historical trajectory of international investment law, and in 
line with the theoretical argument made in the previous chapter it will investigate the role of 
social groups – not states – as important agents in the history that unfolded. The legal protection 
of foreign investments has a long history, and it initially emerged in a period in which nationally 
embedded corporations were seeking global expansion through the support of their own ‘home 
states’. The framework for investment protection that emerged in this period contributed to the  
emergence of a transnational capitalist class, and this, in turn, is the class actor that more 
recently pursued the expansion of the international investment regime. The second section 
explains the institutional structure of international investment law today, and it suggests that 
while international investment law arose to support ‘national capital’ in its foreign ventures and 
initially reflected the close reliance of corporations on their ‘home states’, this field of law has 
more recently changed in subtle ways to support the interests of a distinctly transnational 
capitalist class. The third section will situate international investment law in wider global 
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politics in order to understand the role that it plays in contemporary political struggles. In order 
to do so, it draws upon William Robinson’s concept of a ‘transnational state’, and shows how 
distinct (and apparently separate) national and supranational institutions combine together to 
support a transnational capitalist class.  
 
The Historical Origins of International Investment Law 
 
The first section of this chapter investigates the emergence of international investment law, and 
in line with the theoretical approach set out in the previous chapter it seeks to move beyond the 
state-centric explanations that are normally provided. However, this is easier said than done; to 
theoretically conclude that the state is not an agent does not help with the empirical question of 
who is. The argument presented here is that the key actor in the formation of the international 
investment regime is a capitalist class. The previous chapter distinguished between two forms 
of capitalist agency: a capitalist class can exercise economic agency in such a way as to present 
state officials with structural incentives to support it, but a capitalist class can also exercise 
political agency in such a way as to more directly persuade state officials to adopt a particular 
course of action. An explanation of the history of international investment law requires that 
both forms of capitalist agency are accounted for. 
 
The Colonial and Post-Colonial Period 
 
The origins of international investment law date back to the 19th century, and its early features 
were shaped by the times in which it emerged; a time when particular national capitalist classes 
were more strongly embedded within their particular ‘home’ states and acted through, or with 
the support of, those states in furthering their global ambitions. In large swathes of the world, 
foreign property remained under de facto protection because of colonialism or extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, but this period also witnessed the emergence of legal protections for foreign-owned 
property, both in the form of treaties as well as in customary international law.2 The standard 
interpretation of the law of foreign investment was derived from the 1758 seminal legal treatise 
of Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, which maintained that the property of foreigners 
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abroad remained the wealth of their home nations.3 In the event of a host state’s interference 
with the property of foreign nationals the home state acquired the right (but not the obligation) 
to assume “the national’s claim as its own” in demanding restitution from the offending state.4 
This was confirmed in the 1924 Permanent Court of International Justice ruling in the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, in which a state’s right to exercise diplomatic 
protection over its nationals abroad was deemed an “elementary principle of international law”.5 
The legal protection of capital abroad was therefore contingent upon the support of the home 
state, and the enforcement of the law relied in the last instance on the threat of force by that 
home state.6 Great Britain intervened militarily in Latin America at least forty times between 
1820 and 1914 in defence of its nationals and, often, their property rights.7 A particularly 
noteworthy episode involved a blockade of Venezuelan ports by a coalition of English, German 
and Italian forces to enforce the payment of contract debts owed to their nationals.8 Such 
episodes highlight the close relationship between foreign investors abroad and their home states, 
and Marxist scholars at the time discussed such developments under the heading of 
‘imperialism’.9 
 
From the mid-20th century, the laws on foreign investment became contested, first from within 
states in Latin America, and later with the onset of decolonization from within the newly 
independent states in the rest of the so-called Third World. Anti-colonial struggles had brought 
to power state leaders who came to view the continued dominance of the former colonial 
masters within the economic sphere as a form of ‘neo-colonialism’.10 The signing of the UN 
Charter prohibited the use of military force except in self-defence and increased the significance 
of the legal debate. In respect to nationalization and expropriation, Western states adhered to 
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what was known as the ‘Hull Rule’, namely that “no government is entitled to expropriate 
private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective 
payment therefor”.11 The newly independent states, along with the states of the Soviet bloc (that 
had themselves emerged from social struggles and represented a different constellation of social 
forces), began to use their newfound majority within the General Assembly to revise the strong 
property rights advocated by the West. By 1974, several General Assembly resolutions had 
emphasized “the permanent sovereignty over natural resources” and the right to nationalize 
property in accordance with domestic law.12 It is this international legal uncertainty in respect 
to customary international law that prompted the negotiation of investment treaties. 
 
After a failed attempt to negotiate a multilateral treaty in 1949, international investment law has 
expanded through the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The story of 
international investment law, as we know it today, often begins with the signature of the first 
BIT between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959, as well as the OECD model investment 
treaties in 1962 and 1967. The story nevertheless begins before this time – while it is often 
difficult to trace the role of a capitalist class in political developments, this is one area where 
the agency of a capitalist class is not concealed behind closed doors. The earliest proposals for 
investment treaties all “originated primarily from within the business communities that had the 
greatest interest in the protection of foreign investment, such as the oil industry or the banking 
sector that financed many foreign investment projects”.13 An early actor in this regard was the 
International Chamber of Commerce, which issued a draft code on the treatment of foreign 
investments as early as 1949.14 The most influential draft was nevertheless the Abs-Shawcross 
Draft Convention of 1959, which was itself a merger of two earlier draft treaties.15 The first of 
these was a draft convention by a German business group under the name of the German Society 
to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment, and it was inspired by the President of the 
Society, Hermann Abs.16 Abs was the Director-General of the Deutsche Bank, the founding 
purpose of which was to “challenge the hegemony of British banks” in the provision of finance 
                                                             
11 Andrew Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties,’ Virginia Journal of International Law, 38 (2008-2009), p. 645. 
12  Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them’, pp. 648-650; Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of 
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13 Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, p. 35. 
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Investment Treaties, p. 20. 
15 Muchlinski, ‘A Brief History of Business Regulation,’ p. 50-51. 
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for foreign trade and investment.17 The second was a draft code written by a group of European 
lawyers headed by Sir Hartley Shawcross, who is normally introduced in the literature as a 
former Attorney General of the UK,18 but who was also at the time a director of Royal Dutch 
Shell.19 Merged into a single draft convention in 1959, under the auspices of another group of 
businesses and international lawyers, the Abs-Shawcross Convention provided extensive 
treatment standards for foreign investments: beyond the expected requirement of compensation 
for expropriation or nationalization, it also included requirements to provide foreign investors 
with fair and equitable treatment, protection against discriminatory measures and observance 
of undertakings.20 The first BIT between West Germany and Pakistan was subsequently based 
on this convention, and so was the 1962 and 1967 OECD Draft Conventions.21 The first BIT 
therefore “closely resembled” the 1967 OECD Draft Convention, and while the latter was never 
adopted because of resistance from the less developed states within the OECD, it became a 
model for other bilateral treaties. 22  Bilateral investment treaties are negotiated separately 
between different pairings of states, but almost all BITs today are still “worded similarly or 
even identically”, and this is precisely “because the treaty texts derive from a uniform model 
treaty”.23 The network of bilateral investment treaties that serve as a foundation for international 
investment law today can thus be traced directly back to a draft convention authored by 
members of the capitalist class and originally championed by organizations working on its 
behalf. To account for capital as only a structural influence is insufficient; the direction of 
politics and law can very often only be understood in reference to the creative agency of the 
capitalist class. 
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Business Regulation,’ p. 51; for particular clauses, see OECD, International Investment Perspectives, Chapter 7: 
Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (2006) available at 
{http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/30/40079647.pdf} accessed 1 May 2012. 
22 Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, p. 40; Muchlinski, ‘A Brief History of 
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If this explains the origins of the model investment treaties adopted by states in the West – and 
corporate lobbies also aided in ensuring their adoption24 – it does not explain how Third World 
states came to accept them. The puzzle is that the first BITs were all signed just as the rejection 
of these same investment rules gained momentum in the General Assembly, and often the very 
same countries that supported the General Assembly resolutions would sign BITs with 
expansive treatment standards in one-to-one negotiations.25 It has been suggested that this 
seeming contradiction can be accounted for by the logic of a prisoner’s dilemma, in which “it 
is optimal for them, as a group, to reject the Hull Rule, but in which each individual [less 
developed country] is better off ‘defecting’ from the group by signing a BIT that gives it an 
advantage over other [less developed countries] in the competition to attract foreign 
investors”.26 While the political influence of the capitalist class was important in the West, it 
was therefore its structural economic power, and the need for states to ‘attract investment’, that 
ensured the acceptance of BITs in the Third World. 27  For the next couple of decades 
international investment law expanded slowly, and it was not until the 1990s that the 
international investment regime as we know it today began to take shape. Two major changes 
occurred during this period: there was a proliferation of BITs, and there was a second major 
push towards the conclusion of a multilateral agreement. 
 
The Recent History 
 
In the 40 years from the first bilateral investment treaty in 1959 until 1989, there were only 385 
BITs signed, but in the 20 years leading up to 2010, this had increased to more than 2800.28 
There are few countries in the world today that stand fully outside the international investment 
regime, and there are more countries that have signed investment treaties than there are 
members of the WTO.29 This growth in BITs was accompanied by the end of General Assembly 
                                                             
24 Newcombe & Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, p. 47; Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of 
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resolutions to limit investment protection, and by the 1980s the enthusiasm for a New 
International Economic Order had dissipated. This historical evolution of international 
investment law mirrors wider historical trends, and reflects changes in the balance of social 
forces that have occurred under globalization. The transnationalization of capital amounted to 
an increase in its structural power and a consequent transformation of the global political 
landscape. In the Third World, the explanation for the growing acceptance of BITs can be 
explained by the debt crisis, which placed previously reluctant countries under economic 
pressure to earn foreign exchange for debt repayments.30 There was also political pressure due 
to structural adjustment loans from the international financial institutions; the World Bank 
initiates and monitors negotiations on BITs, and there is anecdotal evidence to suggest loans 
are made conditional on the signature of investment treaties, as well as statistical evidence to 
show that states that seek IMF loans are more likely to sign BITs.31 The debt crisis in the Third 
World furthermore strengthened social forces within these countries that benefited from global 
capitalism, as well as sectors of the government “with external linkages”, and in the process 
transformed these countries from within to support global capitalism.32 
 
Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke remark that “[i]t is striking that the single most 
important factor among the many economic drivers of globalization – investment – has no 
single institutional focal point”.33 However, this is not for a lack of trying. The second major 
development during the 1990s was a push towards multilateral investment treaties. BITs were 
historically signed mainly between the ‘home states’ of corporations in the West and the ‘host 
states’ for foreign investment in the Third World, and as such in practice only imposed 
constraints on state measures taken by the latter. Many of the new multilateral agreements and 
draft agreements of the 1990s were designed to more fully advance the rights of corporations 
investing within the West. The largest of these proposed agreements was the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) that was negotiated within the OECD. The initial preparation 
for the MAI began in 1991, and while these negotiations drew upon the draft conventions of 
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the 1960s – in themselves based upon earlier corporate drafts – the OECD also worked closely 
with the International Chamber of Commerce and other business organizations on the initial 
agenda and the drafting of preparatory documents for the MAI.34 Despite the wholehearted 
support of transnationally oriented business lobbies, the MAI was nevertheless eventually 
stopped in its tracks. While business lobbies had access to the negotiations from the outset, 
other interested parties were not so lucky – the European Parliament condemned the fact that 
the negotiations had been conducted “in the utmost secrecy”.35 Once a draft copy of the MAI 
was leaked to civil society organizations in 1997, it quickly encountered resistance; the OECD 
itself at the time lamented that the negotiations were at “the centre of heightened public scrutiny 
as part of a broader debate about the implications of globalisation”.36 In parallel with more 
nationally oriented fractions of capital such as the French film industry, labour and 
environmental groups made hesitant gains (e.g. the introduction of a ‘right to regulate’ clause) 
and were gearing up for more.37 The business community – sensing the outcome may not be 
the investor-friendly agreement it had desired – lost interest and the MAI negotiations were 
abandoned in 1998.38  The civil society campaign was widely recognized as a resounding 
success and a key reason for the MAI’s eventual failure.39 Several subsequent attempts were 
similarly abandoned, and there are only three significant multilateral agreements in place today: 
the Energy Charter Treaty, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the latter two of which contain specific 
investment chapters.40 Corporate lobbying was important in the conclusion of each – in the run-
up to NAFTA, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce called every member of Congress on a daily 
basis.41 
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The failure of negotiations for multilateral agreements coincided with the continued expansion 
of BITs, offering almost identical privileges to corporations as the multilateral agreements 
concurrently under attack.42  In contrast to multilateral negotiations, BITs rarely made the 
headlines and were quietly concluded behind the scenes. It is only in the last few years that new 
multilateral investment treaty negotiations have commenced yet again. This latest attempt 
started with the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP), a multilateral 
trade and investment agreement, which Lori Wallach of Public Citizen has described as 
“NAFTA on Steroids”.43 The only publicly known details are based on leaked draft chapters, 
but these seem to adhere closely to the desires of business groups.44 Indeed, while the U.S. 
government has refused to share its negotiating texts with the public, over 600 corporate 
representatives have full access to such documents as members of the government’s Industry 
Trade Advisory Committee.45 Senator Ron Wyden, the chair of the Senate committee with 
jurisdiction over the TPP, contend that these “industry advisors sit in a far stronger position 
than virtually everyone in the Congress”.46 Senator Wyden discovered that even he could only 
access negotiating texts in a secure location on a ‘read only’ basis – senior members of his staff 
with high security clearance were denied access – while “an industry advisor from the Motion 
Picture Association can sit at their desk with a laptop, enter their username and password, and 
see the negotiating text”.47 Senator Wyden introduced a bill to improve democratic oversight 
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of the negotiations, and in his speech to the Senate justified this as necessary to “ensure that the 
representatives elected by the American people are afforded the same level of influence over 
our nation’s policies as the paid representatives of PhRMA, Halliburton and the Motion Picture 
Association”.48 These examples reveal the political influence of a transnational capitalist class. 
These are all transnational corporations or representatives thereof – members of PhRMA 
include the ‘British’ corporation GlaxoSmithKline, ‘Japanese’ Daiichi Sankyo and ‘Swiss’ 
Novartis – and if these corporations are found to exercise greater influence over American 
investment negotiations than the country’s elected representatives, it is safe to say that the 
outcome is likely to favour a transnational capitalist class. 49  The TPP negotiations have 
expanded to now include twelve countries, and the U.S. government indicates that membership 
could eventually expand to include half of the world’s nations.50 
 
The most recent chapter in the history of international investment law was opened with the 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and 
the U.S., and a similar agreement between Canada and the EU (CETA). A distinguishing feature 
of the current negotiations is the extent to which corporate lobbying groups on both sides of the 
Atlantic have joined together to promote these agreements, through the Trans-Atlantic Business 
Council and more importantly through the production of sector-wide joint position papers on 
particular issues, and the European Commission has acknowledged that it is prioritizing 
business sectors that have done so within the negotiations because they “can count on the joint 
push by industry”.51 The corporate lobbying has been intense – the vast majority of meetings 
between Commission officials and non-state actors have been with corporations and corporate 
lobbies, and even when the Commission initiated a ‘Civil Society Dialogue’, most of the 
participants turned out to be corporate representatives. 52  The European Roundtable of 
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Industrialists had initially hoped that the deal would pass “with as little noise as possible”, but 
growing civil society resistance has now dashed these hopes.53  The European Commission has 
been forced to open civil society consultation, and in the meanwhile the investment chapter 
negotiations have been placed on hold.54 The extent of the opposition has already changed the 
negotiating position of the EU. The U.S. and Canada have historically seen more opposition to 
international investment law due to its experiences from NAFTA arbitration, and these states 
have already been forced to revise certain clauses to protect the right to introduce public interest 
regulations. When TTIP and CETA negotiations first opened, some EU member state officials 
expressed concern that “NAFTA-contamination” would dilute the EU’s more distinctly 
corporate-friendly treaties, and early leaked negotiating drafts reveal that European 
Commission officials were pushing for much broader protections for corporations, but the 
extent of opposition has prompted it to change track and it is now promoting a treaty with 
similar provisions to NAFTA.55 
 
In conclusion, the history of international investment law is one of political struggle, and the 
contestants in this struggle are not states but societal groups. In the early period, treaties tended 
to link ‘capital-exporting states’ in the West with ‘capital-importing states’ in the Third World. 
The first section of Chapter 1 detailed how the international investment law literature has 
explained this early history in reference to states acting to further their respective ‘national 
interests’, as given by their respective positions within the global economy, but this section has 
argued that this overlooks the agency of human beings and the struggles between them. To 
explain the investor-friendly policies of the ‘capital-exporting states’ without acknowledging 
the agency of the capitalist class – which drafted the first treaties upon which the whole edifice 
of international investment law now rests, and that have promoted them at every stage of the 
journey – is to miss an important part of the explanation. Similarly, the ‘capital-importing states’ 
were themselves the outcome of decolonial struggles, and it is difficult to explain the ‘neo-
colonial’ objections towards investment law as voiced in the General Assembly without 
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understanding the societal struggles from which those states emerged. The decision of Third 
World states to individually sign bilateral investment treaties in practice, while objecting to 
such treaties in principle, further testifies to the structural power of a capitalist class that holds 
the levers of economic power. The first section of Chapter 1 also detailed how the investment 
law literature explains the recent developments, especially in the revision of treaties to better 
protect the public interest, as a consequence of the “second thoughts” of Western states, who 
are now acting from behind a “veil of ignorance” in terms of their ‘national interests’.56 This 
recent history should rather be understood in terms of struggles between a transnational 
capitalist class and other societal groups, where both sides seek to persuade states to support 
their interest. Recourse to the ‘state as an agent’ and ‘national interests’ obscures the existence 
of such conflicts, and how it is the contestation between opposing social groups that will 
determine the future of international investment law. 
 
The Structure of International Investment Law 
 
Within the discipline of International Relations, it is sometimes implied that international law 
is not really ‘law’ – it is assumed that it lacks effective mechanisms of asserting and enforcing 
legal claims, and it therefore seems to be conceived more as a form of normative guidance. 
International investment law may well afford corporations substantive rights vis-à-vis states 
and the social groups who seek to accomplish their aims through those states – as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapters – but without effective mechanisms to assert and enforce 
such rights their significance would appear marginal. This section explains the institutional 
structure of international investment law, and how that institutional structure renders it a 
powerful mechanism for transnational corporations to uphold and enforce claims against states. 
Indeed, the nature of that institutional structure makes this field of law more closely attuned to 
the interests of a capitalist class than any domestic court systems. 
 
This section furthermore returns to the question of the nature of the capitalist class whose 
interests international investment law ‘congeals’. Kate Miles maintains that international 
investment law still reflects its imperial origins, and her research highlights the “repetition of 
age-old patterns of engagement” and how “dynamics derived from its origins in imperialism 
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appeared to have remained imbued within modern international investment law”.57 In contrast, 
this section argues that there are significant discontinuities that are overlooked within such a 
representation. Miles suggests that the tendency of international investment law to promote 
corporate interests over those of host states is a historical relic from imperial times, and the 
challenge seems to be to muster the “cultural shift” required to bring international investment 
law in line with the contemporary world.58 The above section has detailed the historical origins 
of international investment law, but this section reiterates that international investment law has 
subtly changed, so that it no longer reflects its historical origins in a world of national capitalist 
classes, but that it rather reflects the emergence of a transnational capitalist class. In doing so, 
the section also answers some possible criticisms from Marxist scholars of global politics. In 
respect to William Robinson’s argument that political institutions such as the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank support a transnational capitalist class, Giovanni Arrighi observes that 
“[s]ince all these institutions or their original nuclei were in place before the formation of the 
[transnational capitalist class] – a post-1960 phenomenon, by Robinson’s and Harris’ own 
account – their rise could not possibly be the expression of the class consciousness of a 
[transnational capitalist class]”. 59  This section argues that the historical agent behind, and 
beneficiary of, the investment regime was originally a national capitalist class, but with the 
transnationalization of this class international investment law was “not bypassed but 
instrumentalized and transformed”.60 This section highlights how international investment law 
has subtly changed over time so that it now supports specifically a transnational capitalist class. 
 
Investment Arbitration and Investment Arbitrators 
 
International investment law emerged in a period where ‘national corporations’ expanded 
outwards with the support of their home states, and the previous section detailed how 
corporations relied on their home states to assert and enforce their legal rights, in the form of 
diplomatic protection. An important manifestation of the rise of a transnational capitalist class 
is that it has now acquired the ability, at its own initiative, to assert and enforce its own rights 
under international law. This is commonly referred to as the ‘depoliticisation’ of the 
international investment regime – the home state of the investor is no longer drawn into the 
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dispute – yet in line with the wider argument of this thesis, the elimination of state-to-state 
dynamics does not make the dispute less political.61 The fact that transnational corporations 
have acquired the right to assert their own rights under international law is a unique 
development – even within the WTO (“the archetypical transnational institution of the new era” 
according to Robinson62) dispute settlement is still formally a state-to-state procedure. Indeed, 
outside of the European Union there is no other international regime under which private parties 
have acquired the direct right to seek and enforce damages due to it as a result of a state’s 
violation of international law.63 
 
Transnational corporations assert and enforce their investment treaty claims through 
international arbitration. At times, this thesis follows civil society practice in referring to these 
legal challenges as ‘lawsuits’, but this is formally incorrect. Arbitration has normally been 
conceived as a more ‘consensual’ form of dispute settlement, and the mechanisms for asserting 
claims differs from formal litigation. While dispute settlement within the WTO is specifically 
designed for its particular purpose, international investment law “piggybacks on the existing 
structure of international commercial arbitration”, which was originally aimed at resolving 
private commercial conflicts, and this is reflected in its institutional design. 64  In private 
commercial arbitration, the parties to a dispute will have specifically consented to resolving 
disputes between them in arbitration, but international investment treaties contain the ‘general 
consent’ of states to permit any dispute with any corporation from the other state party to be 
resolved in arbitration. 
 
There is no single institution that handles investment arbitration, and most investment treaties 
provide corporations with a choice of several possible institutional settings. As the institutions 
operate under different procedures, this enables investors to ‘rule-shop’ for the set of arbitral 
rules that is deemed most favourable to the particular investment dispute at hand.65 The most 
prominent such institution is the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). ICSID was created in 1966 on the basis of a multilateral treaty drafted by the World 
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Bank, and today has 147 member-states.66 It is the only institution designed specifically with 
investor-state disputes in mind, as opposed to disputes between private parties. While ICSID 
was essentially dormant for its first few decades, since the mid-1990s it has witnessed an 
explosion of activity and has as of today registered 497 cases, many of which are still pending.67 
It is estimated to handle a majority of investor-state disputes, but since it is also the only 
institution with a public registry of claims this is difficult to ascertain. 68 The second most 
common form of arbitration is under UNCITRAL procedural rules, but UNCITRAL is not a 
supervising institution and unable to provide even an estimate of its number of claims. Other 
institutions often provided for in investment treaties are the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, and the 
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
 
These institutions do not conduct the arbitrations, but primarily act as facilitators. An arbitral 
tribunal is normally composed of three arbitrators; one chosen by the corporation, one chosen 
by the defending state, and one chosen either by the consensus of the parties or, increasingly, 
by the supervising institution.69 Even where a presiding arbitrator is to be agreed by consensus, 
in the event of a lack of agreement the task of appointing one almost always falls on the 
supervising institution, a quite significant role since awards are decided on the basis of majority. 
If one of the parties asks for the annulment of an award, the supervising institution often 
appoints the annulment committee.70 Despite their facilitatory role, the supervising institutions 
do in other words have some influence over the course of the proceedings, and it is therefore 
worth noting that most of them “have a decided slant in favour of the interests of capital-
exporting states or international business”. 71  The World Bank’s predisposition towards 
transnational capital has been noted in Robinson’s work, but a more direct financial interest in 
the outcome of a case may also occur where the investor has received a loan from the World 
Bank’s International Finance Corporation or insurance from the World Bank’s Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency – in such cases, a loss for the investor has financial implications 
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for institutions linked to the World Bank itself.72 A particularly noteworthy development is the 
use of arbitration under the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration. Approximately 20 % of 
bilateral investment treaties allow investors the option of pursuing arbitration under the ICC, 
and in addition a majority of cases based on state-investor contracts are believed to be arbitrated 
under this institution.73 The transnational capitalist class has therefore gained the right to take 
a sovereign state to a court that is instituted under its primary lobbying organization. The ICC 
considers itself “the world’s only truly global business organization”, representing corporations 
around the world that agree on its “fundamental objective” to “further the development of an 
open world economy”.74 The members of the ICC’s court are appointed by the ICC World 
Council of Business on the recommendation of the ICC Executive Board.75 It is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that the ICC’s self-professed “assertive[ness] in expressing business 
views” might extend to its tasks in resolving disputes between corporations and states.76 
 
While the influence of the supervising institutions should not be underestimated, it is the 
arbitrators themselves that are most influential. Investment arbitrators are chosen by the parties 
on a case-by-case basis, but they normally have a commercial law background and are often 
drawn from a close-knit community of specialists on investment arbitration, that some 
arbitrators contend is increasingly beginning to operate as a ‘club’.77 Over half of all known 
investment disputes have been decided by an elite group of only fifteen arbitrators, and 
according to the former Secretary General of the ICC “[e]veryone knows everyone in the 
arbitration world”.78 The interests of the community of professional arbitrators are intimately 
linked with the interests of the transnational capitalist class. Arbitrators are appointed on a case-
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by-case basis, and the security of tenure that exists as a safeguard of independence in public 
law is absent. While this is also the case in commercial arbitration between private parties, from 
which investor-state arbitration derives its institutional design, a crucial feature of the latter is 
that only the corporation has the power to trigger the system by bringing a claim against a 
state. 79  This gives arbitrators a financial incentive to support and to find in favour of 
transnational corporations. To cite Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, “the greater the utility 
of investment arbitration to investors, the greater the number of claims will be filed, the greater 
the demand for arbitrators”.80 The Chief Justice of Singapore has similarly observed that it is 
“in the interest of the entrepreneurial arbitrator to rule expansively on his own jurisdiction and 
then in favour of the investor on the merits because this increases the prospect of future claims 
and is thereby business generating”.81 In carrying out their task of deciding on investment 
disputes, arbitrators will therefore be inclined to show “sufficient fidelity to the economic 
powers who must in the end find their services worth purchasing and deploying”.82 As an elite 
group of highly remunerated private international lawyers, arbitrators hold a significant 
business interest in the expansion of investment arbitration. Indeed, many of the key state 
officials that have advocated and negotiated investment treaties – including the lead U.S. 
negotiator of the investment chapter of NAFTA – now advertise their services as arbitrators and 
as counsel for corporations in the investment disputes that they made possible while in political 
office.83 Investment arbitrators have unsurprisingly been some of staunchest defenders of the 
investment regime, and have often opposed any attempt to ‘water down’ the treaties to give 
more regulatory powers back to states.84 The high fees charged by international investment 
lawyers – both as counsel and as arbitrators – renders arbitration a costly system of dispute 
resolution for states. The cost of convening an arbitral tribunal is normally split between the 
parties, so even where a defending state prevails on the merits the legal costs alone amount to 
an average of USD 8 million dollars.85 Indeed, it has been estimated that the costs of defending 
a case can alone consume up to half of the annual Justice Department budget of a large 
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developing country.86 Of course, the cost of arbitrating a dispute is also costly to many smaller 
corporations, and a member of the U.S. Congress rightly observed that this makes international 
investment law “tailor-made for multinational corporations”.87 For transnational corporations, 
the legal costs pale in significance compared with the possibility of several hundred million 
U.S. dollars in compensation.  
 
The investment lawyers that serve as arbitrators can be conceived as members of a transnational 
capitalist class by virtue of their own position within the global economy, but there are also 
often close links between arbitrators and the transnational corporations that bring the disputes. 
For instance, Yves Fortier – once named the ‘world’s busiest arbitrator’ by a leading arbitration 
journal – presided over five cases involving the extractive industries while himself a director of 
mining giant Rio Tinto and chairman of Alcan.88 At times, more direct financial links with the 
corporations have been flagged up in annulment tribunals. While serving as an arbitrator on 
Vivendi v. Argentina, Gabriella Kaufmann-Kohler was also a member of the Board of Directors 
of UBS, which was in turn the single largest shareholder of Vivendi.89 Kaufmann-Kohler’s 
potential conflict-of-interest was not made known during the case, but when Argentina asked 
for an annulment of the award in favour of Vivendi the annulment committee – despite its 
critique of Kaufmann-Kohler’s lack of disclosure – allowed the award to stand. 90  Direct 
conflicts-of-interests may be rare, but at a more general level there is often a fine line between 
the transnational corporations that bring disputes to arbitration and the community of arbitrators 
that judge on them. 
 
There is a widespread acknowledgement in the literature on investment law that arbitral 
tribunals over the last two decades have expanded the rights granted to investors through treaty 
interpretation.91 This is corroborated by a statistical study of 140 investment treaty disputes, 
which suggests that arbitrators consistently adopt an expansive (and thereby investor-friendly) 
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interpretation of various clauses.92 The above discussion on the inclinations of the supervising 
institutions and the financial considerations of the arbitral industry may provide part of the 
explanation, but the significance of any partiality also lies in the nature of the treaties 
themselves. International investment treaties provide arbitral tribunals with considerable scope 
for interpretation. While ‘hard law’ in the sense that they enable tribunals to make binding and 
enforceable decisions that often require states to provide tens or even hundreds of millions of 
dollars in compensation to investors, the investment treaties are not drafted with the precision 
that would be expected of hard law.93 Rather, one leading arbitrator describes the provisions of 
these treaties as “dazzlingly abstract” and “maddeningly imprecise”.94 When treaties adopt such 
“deliberately vague” rights as ‘fair and equitable treatment’, it is left to tribunals to fill them 
with content.95 While many arbitrators insist that “there is nothing alarming about this”, the 
outcome is a transfer of power from the state signatories of the treaty to the tribunals – the latter 
of which it has already been acknowledged has a vested interest in bolstering the party with the 
power to trigger the system, i.e. transnational corporations. 96  An important feature of 
international investment law is that there is no formal system of precedent. While awards are 
as a result often directly contradictory, there are nevertheless signs that a special jurisprudence 
is developing from leading awards.97 Even in the absence of a strict obligation to follow the 
reasoning of previous awards, arbitrators regularly (if often selectively) draw upon them and 
these are in practice becoming one of the primary sources for treaty interpretation. 98  An 
important consequence of this combination of vaguely worded treaties and the potential to set 
an informal precedent, is that, to cite Jeswald Salacuse, “arbitrators do not merely settle disputes; 
they also make rules for the regime”.99 A particularly interesting means of expanding investor 
rights through treaty interpretation is the so-called purposive or teleological method of treaty 
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interpretation. Most investment treaties have as their stated objective the protection of foreign 
direct investment in the host state and the assurance of a predictable investment climate. In light 
of this overall purpose, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines decided to “resolve uncertainties in 
interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments”, i.e. in favour of the 
corporation.100 The tribunal in Noble Ventures v. Romania rejected this practice, but in doing 
so noted that “it is not permissible, as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses 
exclusively in favour of investors”. 101  The practice of interpreting treaties in favour of 
corporations thus appears to be fairly well-established. In various ways, investor-friendly 
arbitrators have used the scope provided by imprecise treaties to offer interpretations that have 
significantly bolstered investor rights over the years. 
 
An important feature of the international investment regime is that arbitrators are not in any 
way bound by the interpretations of the states that are party to a particular treaty, and there is 
little these states can do to correct an investor-friendly interpretation. It is not uncommon that 
all of the state parties to a treaty submit legal interpretations on a particular aspect of an ongoing 
case, but that tribunals adopt the corporation’s interpretation.102 Tribunals are not normally 
obligated to follow the interpretations offered by state parties, but under NAFTA the state 
parties do have the competence to issue binding interpretations via the Free Trade 
Commission.103 However, even here tribunals appear determined to assert their independence. 
In Pope and Talbot v. Canada, the home state of the investor (the U.S.) and the host state 
(Canada) had both issued submissions to the tribunal that the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
standard did not indicate a higher standard of protection than that offered by customary 
international law, but the tribunal disagreed and opted for a more expansive view of the 
protections afforded to corporations. 104  In response, the state parties offered a binding 
interpretation via the Free Trade Commission in support of the original interpretation by the 
U.S. and Canada, but the tribunal proceeded to argue that even if the ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ standard was indeed equivalent to customary international law, the latter had itself 
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evolved to offer a broader standard of protection. 105  More recent NAFTA tribunals have 
followed this expansive interpretation, and have therefore “deprived the 2001 NAFTA 
Interpretative Statement of any practical effect”.106  Both by right and in practice, tribunals have 
substantial leeway in offering their own interpretations of a treaty, and they have noticeably 
taken advantage of this to expand the protections offered to investors by this legal regime. 
 
When a tribunal proceeds to expand the protections provided to investors by means of treaty 
interpretation, the losing state is left with few options. One of the cornerstones of international 
arbitration is that there is normally no right to appeal on substantial grounds. A defending state 
does have the opportunity to call for an annulment committee, but “[a]nnulment is different 
than appeal”.107 Annulment can be made on the basis of arbitrator corruption, unacknowledged 
conflict of interests, or failure to state reasons, but not on the merits of the case.108 This absence 
of a system of appeal further strengthens the independence of tribunals and their ability to 
unhindered advance the interests of transnational corporations. Arbitration based on vaguely 
worded treaties have in practice, to cite Stephan Schill, allowed arbitrators to “develop into 
legislators for the entire system of international investment law”.109  
 
One of the key characteristics of investment arbitration has traditionally been the promise of 
confidentiality. This is listed as one of the regime’s key advantages by the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and can protect corporations from the unfavourable publicity that legal 
action to challenge government measures can otherwise engender. 110  The extent of 
confidentiality is nevertheless contingent upon both the investment treaty in question and the 
institutional rules under which arbitration is filed. In terms of investment treaties, NAFTA and 
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CAFTA-DR are some of the most transparent, and in terms of arbitral institutions, ICSID is the 
most transparent – the latter provides a list of all its cases, and either party to a dispute is 
permitted to make the final award public. There is nevertheless concern that as a consequence 
of the heightened civil society and academic scrutiny of ICSID awards, corporations may be 
“decamping for more obscure and opaque arbitral venues”.111 Both arbitral proceedings and 
final arbitral awards under the alternative institutions – the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
the International Chamber of Commerce, and UNCITRAL – have normally been confidential 
in the absence of the consent of both parties. This is currently changing within UNCITRAL – 
as a result of the so-called ‘backlash’ against international investment law UNCITRAL adopted 
new rules on transparency in 2014 – but these will only slowly begin to come into effect over 
the next decade or more.112 For the foreseeable future, researchers and other interested parties 
continue to be forced to revert to “a variety of needle-in-a-haystack techniques” to learn of the 
very existence of many investment disputes, let alone their details.113 In 2013, one estimate 
suggested that almost 40% of known investment awards were not in the public domain, and it 
is an open question how many cases are being concluded without public knowledge at all.114 In 
the literature on international investment law there is a tendency to generalize from publicly 
available awards, but since the level of confidentiality is chosen by the corporation it is 
impossible to ascertain whether such awards are representative. To the contrary, controversial 
cases – cases where the legal right is stronger than the moral one – may be more likely to be 
raised in less transparent venues.  
 
It has so far been argued that corporations have the ability to effectively assert their legal rights 
before investment tribunals that are closely attuned to the interests of investors, but how are any 
successful legal claims subsequently enforced? The insulation of the international investment 
regime from state-control during the arbitration stage is in many ways unprecedented, but its 
independence at the enforcement stage is equally striking. Despite the use of private arbitrators 
to interpret vague treaties and the lack of procedures for appeal, international investment law is 
a case of ‘hard law’; arbitral decisions are binding and enforceable. 115  The particular 
mechanism of enforcement nevertheless depends on the institution under which arbitration is 
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undertaken. Most treaties give investors a choice of institutions under which to constitute an 
arbitral tribunal, and this choice is influenced by the means of enforcement. There are two 
principal ways of enforcing an arbitral award: awards under ICSID have their own enforcement 
mechanisms provided for by the treaty, and other awards are normally enforced under the New 
York Convention.  
 
The enforcement mechanisms of ICSID are unparalleled under international law. ICSID 
arbitration is completely insulated from the control of national legal systems, and “the ICSID 
Convention provides the sole mechanism for recourse against an ICSID award”.116 As we have 
seen, the annulment of an award cannot be made on the merits of the case and the Convention 
“was designed purposefully to confer a very limited scope of review”.117 This bestows ICSID 
arbitration with a particularly strong level of finality – in contrast to dispute settlement within 
the WTO, not even the collective agreement of states can overturn an award.118 Host states 
rarely refuse the payment of damages, 119  but even if a host state were to refuse to pay 
compensation, corporations are not necessarily inconvenienced. An ICSID award is enforceable 
against the assets of a losing state in any of the 147 state parties to the ICSID convention, and 
a corporation can thus enforce awards against the assets that a host state holds in, say, a bank 
account in New York or Geneva. ICSID awards are to be treated by national courts in all 
signatory states “as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State” – these national courts 
in the country in which an investor tries to enforce an award therefore have no right of review.120 
This makes ICSID arbitration unique within international law, and for example human rights 
treaties have a long way to go before permitting individual damages claims and an automatic 
enforcement of awards by domestic courts in any state party.121 
 
Awards issued by arbitral tribunals convened under any other arbitral institution are normally 
enforced through the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
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Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Convention. The initial draft of the New 
York Convention was produced by the International Chamber of Commerce, and former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan has duly acknowledged that it was indeed the “initiative of the 
ICC itself that prompted the United Nations to prepare an international treaty on arbitral 
awards”.122 Despite being viewed as the lesser of the two methods of enforcement, it is a 
convention that has served transnational corporations well. Like ICSID, the New York 
Convention allows investors to enforce an arbitral award against host state assets in any of its 
146 member states.123 In contrast to ICSID it nevertheless allows for a right of review by 
national courts in the state in which enforcement is attempted on specific limited grounds, 
notably including public policy grounds. As observed by Robert Briner, then Chairman of the 
ICC’s International Court of Arbitration, enforcement is nevertheless “[b]y and large […] 
considerably easier than the enforcement of judgements rendered by national courts”.124  
 
The compliance with arbitral awards is normally a routine matter, but there have been some 
high-profile refusals to comply with judgements in recent years. However, these only tend to 
reveal the extraordinary lengths that states have to go through to escape payment; for instance, 
Venezuela has brought home gold reserves from foreign banks and is reportedly preparing to 
transfer cash reserves from European and U.S. banks to Russia, China and Brazil, presumably 
on the grounds that these would be less likely to enforce awards.125 Difficulties of enforcement 
in certain cases shows that compliance is not guaranteed, but corporations are nevertheless 
provided with access to a novel and for the most part effective mechanism of enforcing awards 
against reluctant states. 
 
 
 
                                                             
122 Kofi Annan, ‘Opening Address Commemorating the Successful Conclusion of the 1958 United Nations 
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,’ in Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under The New York 
Convention: Experience and Prospects (UNCITRAL, 1999), p. 1, available at 
{http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf} accessed 2 July 2012. 
123 UNCITRAL, Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(2012), available at {http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html} 
accessed 3 July 2012. 
124 Robert Briner, ‘Philosophy and Objectives of the Convention,’ in Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under The 
New York Convention: Experience and Prospects (UNCITRAL, 1999), p. 9, available at 
{http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf} accessed 2 July 2012. 
125 Sergey Ripinsky, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’. Investment 
Treaty News, 3:2 (April 2012), p. 12. 
78 
 
Nationality and Transnationality in International Investment Law 
 
Ellen Meiksins Wood maintains that “[i]t hardly needs to be added that international agencies 
of capital, like the IMF, the World Bank, or the WTO, are above all agents of specific national 
capitals”. 126  This thesis disputes such claims. The previous sub-section suggested that 
international investment law provides corporations with a powerful means of asserting and 
enforcing their rights under investment treaties, and it also suggested that the institutional 
structure through which it does so today is very different from the institutional structure it 
originally had. In contrast with the historical reliance of corporations on their own home states 
to assert and enforce their rights, transnational corporations have acquired the right to assert 
and enforce their own rights under international law. This section further considers the question 
of corporate nationality in the context of international investment law, and therefore also 
provides support for the claim that this legal regime supports a distinctly transnational capitalist 
class. 
 
International investment law may on the face of it appear to be an unlikely candidate to embed 
the interests of a transnational capitalist class. Unlike the other institutions that are often seen 
to fulfill that promise, such as the multilateral institutions of the WTO, the IMF, and the World 
Bank, international investment law is still predominantly based on some 2800 bilateral treaties. 
It could thus be easily assumed that this field of international law responds to bilateral rationales 
more supportive of theories that give prominence to particular national capitalist classes that 
advance their interests through their own national states. International investment law can thus 
be seen as a ‘hard case’ for theories that centre on transnational capital. Despite the fact that the 
international investment regime rests formally on a bilateral basis, it nevertheless increasingly 
resembles “a de facto multilateral agreement”.127 ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) clauses have 
become standard fare in bilateral and regional investment treaties, and enable investors to latch 
onto protections offered in treaties with any other states. These MFN clauses serve to “disable 
States from entering into bilateral quid pro quo bargains that extend preferential treatment to 
certain States and exclude it with respect to others”, and has brought about “an order that is 
multilateral in substance but bilateral in form”.128 This does not of course demonstrate that 
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national capitalist classes are not responsible for these developments – states might simply have 
sought to extend the advantages given to other national capitals to its own – but it does suggest 
that this formal bilateralism should not mask what is in fact an interlocking network of 
agreements that in many ways form an integrated global legal regime for the protection of 
foreign investment.129 
 
A bilateral investment regime tied together with MFN clauses contain additional advantages to 
transnational corporations that a multilateral treaty could not offer. Despite the fact that bilateral 
treaties are often negotiated ‘as a package’ where provisions more favourable to investors are 
‘out-weighted’ by provisions more favourable to the host state, MFN clauses allow investors to 
‘cherry-pick’ more favourable provisions from a treaty that a host state has signed with a third 
country, without being bound by any less favourable provisions in that third country’s treaty.130 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development argues that this enables investors to 
design a “super treaty”, by means of “piecing together a patchwork of only the most favourable 
provisions” of a variety of agreements that a particular host state has negotiated separately with 
many different countries.131 In doing so, MFN clauses “harmonize investment protection at the 
most elevated level available”.132 Crucially, knowledge of this possibility allows a transnational 
capitalist class to focus its lobbying efforts at the negotiation or renegotiation stage of any 
particular treaty in the confidence that gains in one treaty are automatically extended across the 
board. An important consequence of MFN clauses is moreover that it slows down a state’s 
ability to withdraw rights previously given to corporations. Treaties are normally of a long 
duration and renegotiation occurs at set intervals, and in the event that new treaties shift the 
balance of rights towards host states, corporations bound by newer treaties can use MFN clauses 
to extract more favourable provisions from older treaties.133 As such, Stephan Schill argues that 
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MFN clauses serve to “lock States into the most favorable level of investment protection 
reached at one point of time and project this level into the future”.134  
 
It can be countered that while a corporation is not reliant on its home state for diplomatic 
protection to assert and enforce its rights, nor for that home state to include particular treatment 
standards in their treaties, it nevertheless is reliant on that state to introduce an investment treaty 
that includes an MFN clause to begin with. It is indeed true that transnational corporations 
remain reliant on states to support their political interests, but the argument made here is that 
they are not reliant on any particular home state. It has become increasingly common for 
corporations to ‘migrate’ into another ‘home state’ in order to take advantage of a particular 
bilateral investment treaty. International law firms routinely advice corporate clients to structure 
investments in such a way as to come under the protection of an advantageous treaty, and some 
law firms lament that it “remain[s] a mystery” that all do not.135 When Australia temporarily 
began to withdraw the right to ISDS from its investment treaties, the law firm White & Case 
advised its Australian clients that this “can be addressed by intelligent corporate restructuring”, 
while the law firm Clifford Chance suggested the Netherlands as “a very popular choice”.136  
 
An early case that highlighted the potential for corporate restructuring is Bechtel v. Bolivia. 
The Bolivian-incorporated company Aguas del Tunari had signed a concession contract to 
operate water and sewage services in the city of Cochabamba. The majority shareholder of 
Aguas del Tunari was International Water, based in the Cayman Islands, which was in turn 
owned by the American corporation Bechtel.137 Neither the Cayman Islands nor the U.S. had 
an investment treaty in force with Bolivia at the time. 138  Within a year of operating the 
concession, protests had erupted in Cochabamba in response to sharp hikes in water prices, and 
Bechtel – arguably in anticipation of a detrimental fallout – undertook a restructuring of the 
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investment. 139  There was a ‘migration’ of the company from the Cayman Islands to 
Luxembourg, and a holding company was imposed above it and situated in the Netherlands.140 
When the Bolivian government failed to curb the protests and was forced to take water back 
into state ownership, Bechtel launched arbitral proceedings against Bolivia on the basis of a 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.141 Jurisdictional questions immediately came to the fore, and Bolivia 
contended that the purpose of investment treaties was to protect capital from one signatory state 
to another.142 There had been no assets moved from the Netherlands to Bolivia, and the Dutch 
company was referred to as a ‘mere shell’ without effective control over the investment.143 The 
tribunal sided with Bechtel, and countered that “it is not uncommon in practice, and […] not 
illegal to locate one’s operations in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory 
and legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or the substantive law of the 
jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT”. 144  The tribunal further observed that 
“[a]lthough titled ‘bilateral’ investment treaties […] such treaties serve in many cases more 
broadly as portals”, through which investments originating from different countries are 
structured.145 The conclusion that the ‘actual’ nationality of a corporation is of little import has 
been mirrored in cases that have followed Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, and controversy 
normally only arises where corporate restructuring occurs after a dispute has arisen. For 
example, Exxon Mobil had invested in petroleum production in Venezuela through subsidiaries 
located in Delaware and the Bahamas, but when Venezuela increased tax rates and royalties for 
the industry, the company restructured its investment via a Dutch holding company. The 
tribunal declined to find jurisdiction for the pre-migration claims, but in doing so declared that 
the practice of nationality-planning to secure protection under an investment treaty was “a 
perfectly legitimate goal as far as it concerned future disputes”.146 
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One of the more controversial aspect of nationality-planning nevertheless involves the use of 
so-called ‘shell’ or ‘mailbox companies’. In order to qualify as a corporate ‘national’ very little 
actual movement into foreign territory is normally required: “[n]o real offices or employees are 
necessary, and visiting the country is optional”.147 Similar to Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, the 
tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic explicitly discussed concerns about granting rights to 
mailbox companies, but concluded that by the wording of the treaty there was no opportunity 
to refuse such companies access to investment protection.148 The Netherlands – a popular 
destination because of its extensive BIT network – has explicitly affirmed that its treaties are 
designed to protect mailbox companies.149 In response to this practice, the U.S. and Canada 
have both started to introduce so-called ‘denial of benefits’ clauses into their investment treaties, 
and the first case to address such a ‘denial of benefits’ clause was Pacific Rim v. El Salvador. 
Pacific Rim is headquartered in Canada and had structured its investment into El Salvador via 
a holding company in the Cayman Islands. Neither Canada nor the Cayman Islands had an 
investment treaty with El Salvador, and as problems arose Pacific Rim restructured the 
investment through a holding company in the United States, with the aim of raising the dispute 
under CAFTA. In its decision to decline jurisdiction, the tribunal described the U.S. holding 
company as a ‘passive actor’ lacking ‘a board of directors, board minutes, a continuous physical 
presence and a bank account’, thereby indicating that some or all of the above may satisfy the 
requirement of being a ‘national’ under the treaty.150 ‘Denial of benefits’ clauses are designed 
to ensure that only companies with ‘substantial business activity’ in a state can seek protection 
under its treaties, but ‘substantial’ is nowhere defined and the clause was explicitly formulated 
to ensure that genuine subsidiaries of transnational corporations could seek protection under 
the treaty.151 A company sometimes perceived as quintessentially American – the tobacco giant 
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Philip Morris – is concurrently taking legal action to challenge the cigarette packaging 
requirements of Uruguay as a national of Switzerland, and of Australia as a national of Hong 
Kong.152 Neither treaty contains a ‘denial of benefits’ clause, but even had they done so the 
company would in all likelihood have passed the ‘substantial activities’ test.153 
 
An interesting further twist on this phenomenon is the practice of ‘round-tripping’, in which 
capital from a particular state is moved to another and then brought back into the original state 
as a foreign investment protected by a bilateral investment treaty.154 In one such case, ‘round-
tripping was permitted on the basis that under the invoked treaty “neither corporate control, 
effective seat, nor origin of capital has any part of play in the ascertainment of nationality”.155 
Under investment treaties, host states are required to provide foreign corporations with ‘national 
treatment’ that guarantees equality with domestic companies, and beyond this also substantial 
and procedural rights not granted to those domestic corporations. Foreign investors are as such 
consistently awarded higher standards of treatment than what developed and developing 
countries alike grant their own corporations, and the practice of round-tripping is therefore not 
a surprising development on corporate restructuring. 156  This suggests that international 
investment law does not simply protect capital irrespective of ‘home’ nationality, but that it 
may further encourage the transnationalization of capital by providing corporations from a 
particular state higher standards of treatment if they ‘round-trip’ through a subsidiary or holding 
company abroad. 
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A final example to highlight the opportunities available to a transnational capitalist class under 
a bilateral investment regime with an expansive understanding of nationality is Lauder v. Czech 
Republic and CMS v. Czech Republic. In response to regulatory measures that impacted on the 
investment of CMS, the Czech Republic was brought to arbitration first by its controlling 
shareholder, Ronald Lauder, on the basis of a United States-Czech Republic BIT, and six 
months later by the corporation itself under a Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT.157 On the basis 
of essentially the same facts and substantially similar treaty provisions, the two arbitral tribunals 
issued diametrically opposite awards. 158  The tribunal in Lauder v. the Czech Republic 
dismissed all claims, while the tribunal in CMS v. the Czech Republic awarded the company 
$353 million in damages, including compensation for lost profits. 159 In revealing that two 
tribunals can interpret the same facts in ways that lead to extremely divergent outcomes, this 
case is frequently taken as “the ultimate fiasco in investment arbitration”.160 However, it also 
reveals how the ‘splitting’ of an investor’s nationality amongst several countries – or more 
narrowly the ability to choose whether to adopt the nationality of the controlling shareholder or 
the corporate seat, or both – can improve the chances for a favourable award. Despite the fact 
that one tribunal dismissed all claims on the basis of essentially the same facts that the other 
tribunal used to uphold the claims, the Czech Republic had to pay the damages awarded by the 
second tribunal in full.161 The bilateral nature of the investment regime allows a transnational 
capitalist class to make creative use of its ability to adopt different nationalities, and provides 
investors with a myriad of options for careful assessment to ensure the best probability of a 
favourable award. In various ways, the bilateral investment treaty regime allows corporations 
to ‘play the nationality card’ to their advantage. 
 
In discussing the idea of a ‘global state’, Neil Davidson maintains that national states are needed 
in order to enable particular national capitalist classes to compete against each other, and states 
will require territorial limits “to be able to distinguish between those capitals who will receive 
its protection and support, and those who will not”.162 The prevalence of corporate migration 
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within the international investment treaty regime casts such notions in doubt. To refer to 
transnational corporations as nationals of particular states is to miss the point of how they 
operate to further their political interests. Beyond the benefits of corporate migration itself, 
investment disputes reveal the dizzying array of ‘nationalities’ through which transnational 
corporations structure their investments. One tribunal decided to helpfully include a diagram of 
the corporate structure and its various subsidiaries and jurisdictions as a visual aide “on the 
assumption that this lengthy chain might confuse readers of the award”.163 Another tribunal 
struggled with the question of determining who the ultimate owner of the investment was in the 
first place, given that the investment in Bulgaria had been made through holding companies in 
a variety of secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens – via Cyprus, the Seychelles, the British Virgin 
Islands and the Bahamas – although the tribunal eventually determined that the ultimate owner 
was probably the French claimant in the case.164 When the investor lost, the state could not 
enforce the reimbursement of some of its arbitral costs because the Cypriot company did not 
hold any funds to speak of.165 The ways that corporate nationality operates in the context of 
international investment law serves as a microcosm of corporate nationality in global politics 
more widely, and makes the idea of ‘national capital’ increasingly difficult to sustain. 
Furthermore, contra Davidson, states do not seem particularly inclined to “distinguish between 
those capitals who will receive its protection and support, and those who will not” – most are 
content to allow their treaties to serve as “portals” through which corporations from around the 
world can bring legal challenges against states, and even those who have introduced ‘denial of 
benefits’ clauses do not seek to discourage genuine subsidiaries of transnational corporations, 
but only mailbox companies. 
 
This section has demonstrated that corporations can effectively enforce and assert the rights 
afforded to them by international investment law through international arbitration. In respect to 
the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, B.S. Chimni observes, “[t]he usual lament that 
international laws lack enforcement mechanisms does not apply to these institutions. They do 
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not merely bark, they also bite.”166 The same applies to international investment law. The very 
institutional set-up furthermore ensures that this legal regime is closely attuned to the needs of 
corporations and inherently unsympathetic towards the needs of states – or more accurately, the 
needs of social groups within those states. This section has also shown that the roots of 
international investment law in the pre-globalization period does not imply that the social forces 
that underpin this field of law have remained unchanged. The historic beneficiary and agent 
behind the international investment regime was a capitalist class embedded within and 
dependent upon its ‘home state’. The current beneficiary is a transnational capitalist class, 
which has subtly transformed this legal regime so that corporations do not require the direct 
support of their home states, and so that, to cite Schill, within this regime the “nationality [of a 
corporation] is becoming increasingly irrelevant”.167 
 
The Global Politics of International Investment Law 
 
A recent book on the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank is aptly entitled ‘Unholy Trinity’,168 
duly capturing the view of many on the ‘alter-globalization’ left that these three institutions are 
the political pillars of an unjust global economic order. These three organizations also figure 
most prominently amongst the institutions highlighted by William Robinson as making up the 
supranational dimension of an emerging ‘transnational state’, that ‘congeals’ the interests of a 
transnational capitalist class. 169  The burgeoning international investment regime is rarely 
mentioned in this context, and this thesis seeks to illustrate that this is an unfortunate 
omission.170 If the empirical argument put forward in the other chapters is accepted, then 
international investment law is an important pillar of a global order that supports a transnational 
capitalist class. 
 
The aim of this section is to understand the role of international investment law vis-à-vis other 
global and national political structures and therefore to situate this field of law within that wider 
global order. In order to do so, it draws upon Robinson’s concept of a ‘transnational state’. 
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Beyond Robinson’s own work, the concept has not been developed further by other scholars – 
and it has encountered strong opposition from other Marxists171 – but this section is based on a 
‘hunch’ that this concept is helpful in allowing us to better understand contemporary global 
politics, and it seeks to articulate that hunch in more definite terms. The first sub-section will 
seek to understand Robinson’s own definition of the concept, and it will thereafter propose 
certain adjustments to it. In contrast to certain expectations that the transnational state will 
acquire a more centralized and coherent institutional form, it is argued that different institutions 
within the transnational state are separated from each other in ways that are conducive to the 
transnational capitalist class. The subsequent three sub-sections will look at three important sets 
of ‘boundaries’ within world politics: the ‘boundaries’ between national states, the ‘boundary’ 
between the national and the supranational spheres, and the ‘boundaries’ between different 
supranational institutions. Each sub-section will situate international investment law within 
wider global politics and, in doing so, will offer certain tentative ideas on how different 
institutions within the transnational state relate to each other. The concluding section will 
explain why it may still be helpful to conceive of this fragmented and decentralized political 
structure as one transnational state. 
 
The Concept of a ‘Transnational State’ 
 
For the concept of a ‘transnational state’ to make sense, a particular concept of the ‘state’ itself 
is required. Robinson defines the state as “the congealment of a particular and historically 
determined constellation of class forces and relations” that is always “embodied in sets of 
political institutions”.172 This definition is consistent with the definition of the state as a social 
structure that was set out in the previous theoretical chapter, but there is no direct explanation 
in Robinson’s own work as to what distinguishes a state from other social structures, aside from 
the fact that social forces are ‘congealed’ in political institutions. Robinson does not explicitly 
define ‘political’, but in line with other Marxist scholars he defines capitalism itself by the 
“separation of the economic from the political”. 173  Other scholars further explain that in 
capitalism “politics is abstracted out of the relations of production, and order becomes the task 
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of a specialised body – the state”, and observe that the political sphere involves a “moment of 
coercion”.174 It would be theoretically consistent with Robinson’s argument to suggest that the 
state is distinguished from other social structures by its political task of maintaining and 
enforcing a particular social order that is advantageous to the social groups whose agency it 
‘congeals’. The state, in Robinson’s work, is therefore from the outset defined neither by 
demarcated boundaries, by a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, nor any of the other 
attributes that other theoretical approaches commonly ascribe to the state. The state is rather a 
political structure whose particular characteristics can vary widely from one period to another, 
as long as it serves to maintain and enforce a particular social order.  
 
The character of a particular state is in turn defined a) by the particular constellation of social 
forces that have been ‘congealed’ and b) the particular set of political institutions that these are 
embodied in.175 Robinson suggests that in the previous stage of capitalism the state was a) the 
‘congealment’ of the interests of national capitalist classes and other subordinate groups in b) 
territorially defined nation-states. In contrast, the transnational state is defined a) by the 
‘congealment’ of a transnational capitalist class and other subordinate social groups, in b) a 
much broader set of political institutions, including both transformed national states (which 
now support transnational rather than national capital) as well as supranational institutions.176 
This is not to suggest that a transnational capitalist class consciously set out to create a 
transnational state, but more narrowly that it has acted to further its political interests, and that 
over time its agency has subtly transformed different political institutions so that they 
increasingly congeal its interests, rather than the interests of other social groups. This 
‘congealment’, in turn, ensures that when different social groups seek to act through the 
structures of the transnational state today, that structure is already ‘strategically selective’ in 
favour of projects and agents that support global capitalism.177 
 
The explanatory emphasis of Robinson’s work tends to be on a) above, namely on how political 
institutions (both supranational and national) have been transformed so as to “maintain, defend 
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and advance the emergent hegemony” of a transnational capitalist class. 178  If the present 
argument that international investment law supports a transnational capitalist class is accepted, 
along with Robinson’s theory, then international investment law is by definition a component 
of a transnational state. Less explanatory emphasis has been placed on b) above, namely on 
how these become congealed in a particular set of political institutions. This is the question 
that will be addressed in this section: how do different political institutions relate to each other, 
and how do they form one transnational state? The starting point of the discussion is that while 
Robinson’s theory is not founded on the premise that the transnational state will necessarily 
come to adopt a more coherent or centralized institutional form, he nevertheless at times seems 
to hold the expectation that it will. For instance, he acknowledges that “[t]here is no clear chain 
of command and division of labor within the [transnational state] apparatus, nor anything 
resembling, at this time, the type of internal coherence of national states, given the embryonic 
stage of the process.”179 If the transnational state lacks internal coherence as a consequence of 
“the embryonic stage of the process”, there is an expectation that it is moving towards a more 
coherent form. This is supported by remarks elsewhere that the transnational state “has not yet 
acquired any centralized institutional form”, and also that global institutions are “gradually 
supplanting national institutions”.180 Robinson’s later work seems even less certain on this point 
– more recently he observes that “the network, moreover, has not yet (and may never) acquire 
any centralized form” – but it may be these tendencies in his own argument that lead critics to 
call the transnational state a “global-state-in-the-making”.181 
 
The aim of this section is to understand the wider global political context and how international 
investment law is situated within it. The section supports the theory of a transnational state, but 
it also more directly raises the question of what institutional form that transnational state is 
inclined to take, and in doing so proposes certain adjustments to Robinson’s theory. Drawing 
upon international investment law, the section suggests that a transnational capitalist class is 
exercising its agency in such a way that we should expect the transnational state to take a 
particular institutional form. However, the institutional form that we should expect is neither 
the one implicit in Robinson’s own argument, nor the one advanced by some of his critics. 
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Robinson sometimes seems to expect the transnational state to take a more coherent and 
centralized institutional form, while some of his critics seem to suggest that the emergence of 
a transnational capitalist class has not changed the overall framework of inter-state politics. In 
contrast to these two approaches, this section suggests that the current seemingly fragmented 
and decentralized global order – distinguished by a multitude of different institutions operating 
at different levels – is not a stepping stone to a more centralized and coherent transnational 
state, but may already be indicative of the institutional form that the transnational state is 
disposed to take. 
 
In his more recent work, Robinson sometimes describes the transnational state as currently 
composing a “loose network” of different political institutions,182 but when he provides support 
for his theory the emphasis tends to be on the different institutions themselves – on what could 
be conceived as the ‘nodal points’ in the network. This section further suggests that the agency 
of a transnational capitalist class is not only congealed in the different institutions that make up 
the network, but also in the structure of the network itself. It suggests that different political 
institutions relate to each other in specific ways, and that the particular connections and 
apparent separations within the network are critical for the transnational state to continue to 
maintain a political order conducive to a transnational capitalist class. It will be argued that, 
internal to the transnational state, there are (for lack of a better word) ‘boundaries’ between its 
constituent parts – vertically between its national and supranational spheres, and horizontally 
within each – and that each of these three sets of boundaries supports a transnational capitalist 
class in particular ways.183 The second sub-section below will consider the horizontal boundary 
between states (i.e. the existence of the nation-state system); the third sub-section will consider 
the vertical boundary between the national and supranational spheres; and the fourth sub-section 
will consider the horizontal boundaries between different institutions at the supranational level. 
These ‘boundaries’ predate the emergence of a transnational capitalist class, but just as specific 
institutions have been transformed through its collective agency to support its emerging class 
interests, so have the nature of the boundaries between them. The key to understanding global 
politics today lies in the nature of these boundaries. It is through the specific ways in which 
different political institutions are both connected and separated that the transnational state has 
come to maintain and to enforce the interests of a transnational capitalist class. 
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The Inter-state System and Structural Power 
 
Marxist theory has frequently emphasized the importance of the first of these boundaries, 
namely between a multitude of territorial states within an inter-state system.184 Robinson’s 
theory does not go so far as to suggest that the emergence of a transnational state is leading to 
the disappearance of boundaries between national states; indeed, he argues that the “continued 
existence of the nation-state system is a central condition for the power of transnational 
capital”.185 In the previous stage of capitalism, the historical emergence of centralized, coherent 
national states that ruled over a demarcated territory had enabled people to engage in a struggle 
for democratic representation and to organize collectively for a redistribution of resources. 
National capitalist classes had therefore been “forced [...] to reach a historic compromise with 
working and popular classes”, resulting in the ‘welfare state’ of the North and the 
‘developmental state’ of the South.186 The transnationalization of capital was as such in the first 
instance largely a response to the fact that the working classes of many countries were making 
strident gains against their own national capitalist classes. 187  The emergence of global 
capitalism has as such enhanced the structural power of the capitalist class vis-à-vis other social 
forces. 
 
The horizontal fragmentation of territorial states allows a transnational capitalist class to utilize 
its newfound mobility in such a way as to play some states off against others and to exercise a 
competitive pressure on national states to adopt favourable policies. The threat by transnational 
capital to leave or not to enter a state can encourage a ‘race to the bottom’ amongst states in 
relation to the cost of labour, taxation, or regulations in the public interest.188 The promise to 
enter a state in response to certain incentives can also induce a ‘race to the top’ in regulations 
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that favour transnational capital. In order for transnational capital to exert a competitive 
pressure on individual states to do its bidding, it is clear that a multiplicity of states is required, 
but this multiplicity of states simultaneously ensures that resistance to such competitive 
pressures is to a large extent contained within precisely the national states that are subject to 
such structural pressures. If a transnational state is designed to support a transnational capitalist 
class, it should therefore not be expected to take an institutional form that dismantles the very 
national boundaries that it relies on. Indeed, there is no indication that a transnational capitalist 
class is exercising its agency so as to make that happen; Sol Picciotto observes that transnational 
corporations “have been the staunchest defenders of the national state”.189 The contention that 
the continued existence of boundaries between different territorial states supports a 
transnational capitalist class should be fairly uncontroversial, and this section will instead focus 
on the other two sets of boundaries previously identified. 
 
Supranational Institutions and the Limits to Democracy 
 
The second ‘boundary’ internal to the transnational state is the one between the national and 
the supranational spheres of politics. Robinson contends that national states are not external to 
the transnational state, but have been “transformed into proactive instruments for advancing the 
agenda” of a transnational capitalist class and are thereby “becoming incorporated into [the 
transnational state] as component parts”.190 Robinson has therefore emphasized the resilience 
of national state institutions within global capitalism, but what accounts for the growing 
influence of supranational institutions? In a long critique of Robinson’s framework, Paul 
Cammack questions,  
“[his] claim that ‘transnational blocs became hegemonic in the vast majority of 
countries and set out to thoroughly transform their countries, using national state 
apparatuses to advance globalization and to restructure and integrate them into the 
global economy’ […] If so, it follows directly that there is no need for a 
transnational state at all […] Robinson has been too absorbed by banging his head 
against the imaginary brick wall of ‘state centrism’ to notice that his own argument 
demolishes the case for a transnational state”. 191  
Cammack questions why supranational institutions are still required, if a transnational capitalist 
class has already captured and transformed national states so that these act in its interests. 
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Interestingly, this critique is not directly addressed in Robinson’s reply, nor explicit in his other 
work.192  Robinson argues that in certain respects supranational institutions are “gradually 
supplanting national institutions” and he allocates them a number of functions “traditionally 
associated with the national state”.193 This includes compensation for market failure, money 
creation, legal guarantees for property rights, and the provision of public goods.194 However, 
he provides no explicit justification for why supranational institutions, rather than the 
transformed national states, have come to undertake these functions.  
 
This sub-section suggests that supranational institutions have not only emerged to usurp the 
functions of national states – and that they are not simply designed to ensure coordination 
between them – but that an important reason for the growing influence of supranational 
institutions is the need to place legal and political constraints on what (democratic) national 
states can do. Cammack questions the need for a supranational element to the transnational state 
if a transnational capitalist class has already gained dominance within national states, but the 
missing element in his analysis is the question of change over time. National states, while 
successfully captured by a transnational capitalist class in the 1980s and 1990s, are inherently 
prone to being targets of resistance. The supranational institutions that they nurtured at that time 
subsequently serve to place durable legal and political constraints on what national states can 
do if captured by opposing social groups. Within the larger structure of a transnational state, 
the national state is therefore retained as a central battleground for different social forces, but 
the supranational dimension of the transnational state serves to limit the field of possibilities 
open to national states, or at least to raise the costs of deviance from the path charted by a 
transnational capitalist class. 
 
This understanding combines Robinson’s framework with the insights of Stephen Gill’s work 
on ‘new constitutionalism’.195 Just as constitutionalism was about ‘limited government’, Gill 
argues that economic neoliberalism has in recent years been complemented by the emergence 
of political and juridical constitution-like constraints to “prevent future governments from 
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undoing commitments to a disciplinary neoliberal pattern of accumulation”.196 To incorporate 
Gill’s insights into Robinson’s framework as adjusted above, it can be said that the 
supranational element of the transnational state is designed to “lock[…] in future governments” 
through “a series of precommitment mechanisms”. 197  This vertical dual structure of the 
transnational state is designed to enable states that have been captured by transnational capital 
to impose constraints upon themselves that – policed through supranational institutions – will 
subsequently be difficult to change. A transnational capitalist class is thus utilizing national 
states to advance its interests, and the supranational dimension of the transnational state to 
enforce them in the event of subsequent resistance from below. It is in this sense that the 
transformed national states and supranational institutions have complementary functions within 
the larger structure of a transnational state. 
 
For this argument in respect to the conducive separation between national states and 
supranational institutions to hold up, three conditions will need to be met. Firstly, there will 
need to be supranational ‘precommitment mechanisms’ that ‘lock in’ the interests of a 
transnational capitalist class in the event of a challenge by opposing social groups at the national 
level. Drawing upon Gill’s work, David Schneiderman argues that international investment law 
fulfils precisely this function - it “institutionalizes a legal incapacity to act” in ways that 
undermine the interests of transnational corporations.198 The notion of ‘new constitutionalism’ 
coheres with how arbitrators themselves see the purpose of international investment law; to cite 
one arbitrator in S.D. Myers v. Canada, investment agreements “are comparable in many ways 
to […] a country’s constitution. They restrict the ways in which governments can act and they 
are very hard to change”. 199  Investment treaties are by definition intended to pre-commit 
national states to treat corporations in a favourable manner, as will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3. Secondly, these precommitment mechanisms need to be backed by credible means 
of enforcement, or they could not be said to be ‘locked in’, and the previous section of this 
chapter has demonstrated that international investment law fulfils that requirement. Thirdly, the 
final requirement for the argument presented here to hold is that the precommitment 
                                                             
196 (My emphasis) Gill, ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’, p. 47-48. 
197 Ibid, p. 47-48. 
198 Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization, p. 17; see also, Iannos Glinavos, ‘Neoliberal 
Law: Unintended Consequences of Market-Friendly Law Reforms’, Third World Quarterly, 29:6 (2008), p. 
1087-1099. 
199 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Separate Opinion by Dr Bryan Schwartz, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc 
Arbitration (12 November 2000), para. 34; David Schneiderman, ‘Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International 
Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint? Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 1:4 (2011), p. 10. 
95 
 
mechanisms themselves should be fairly durable. It has already been shown in the previous 
section of this chapter that states cannot simply break international investment law to introduce 
policies that benefit other social groups, but an obvious alternative route to meeting their 
demands is to change or rescind the international investment treaties themselves. What is there 
to prevent a national state, that has come to represent a different set of societal interests, from 
simply withdrawing from the treaties it had previously agreed to? 
 
Investment treaties were indeed initially concluded by states, but the critical point is that they 
were from the outset designed to place durable constraints on the state policies of subsequent 
governments. To quote a former Egyptian Finance Minister, the effect of a state signing an 
investment agreement is, “if anybody in the future wants to go backwards, they cannot”.200 As 
stated by a former UK Trade Minister, investment agreements thereby “help lock in individual 
countries’ own investment reform efforts”.201 Upon riding a wave of indigenous protests into 
the presidential office, Bolivian president Evo Morales quickly noted that the constraints 
imposed by the economic treaties signed by his predecessors made him “feel like a prisoner” 
despite occupying the highest political office in the country. 202  Along with other Latin 
American countries influenced by social movements from below, Bolivia has revolted against 
the international regime of investment protection. In response, UNCTAD published a report on 
the ability to terminate agreements that carried the sub-heading “not so fast”.203 The essential 
trick of the game is precisely that states cannot immediately withdraw from investment treaties. 
Investment agreements can normally only be renegotiated or terminated after a minimum 
duration or at specific intervals, and furthermore normally contain ‘survival clauses’ that 
guarantee corporations with existing investments treaty protection after the termination of the 
treaty. The Energy Charter Treaty stipulates a 6-year minimum term before the treaty can be 
terminated, and another 20 years of treaty protection for existing investments at the date of 
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termination.204 To take a current example, the recently negotiated bilateral investment treaty 
between Canada and China stipulates a 16-year minimum term, and adds another 15 years of 
treaty protection for existing investments. 205  Restrictive rules of termination, along with 
survival clauses, ensure that a state’s decision to withdraw from a treaty is “of little immediate 
significance”.206 Schneiderman observes that the intended effect of investment agreements is 
“to slow down or paralyze certain political processes”, and the rules on termination allows a 
transnational capitalist class many years – even decades – to reassert its power via the national 
state before the effect of resistance is felt.207 If the Canada-China treaty is ratified, it will take 
social forces critical of global capitalism a total of 31 years to legally undo commitments made 
by governments acting on behalf of a transnational capitalist class today. During this time, the 
agreement remains in force and continues to constrain governments in their formulation of 
public policies. 
 
In Gill’s theory of ‘new constitutionalism’, no distinction is made between the constitution-like 
constraints that are introduced at the international and at the domestic level. There is 
nevertheless something quite distinctive about the international constraints that may be lost in 
drawing such a comparison. While domestic constraints will require a larger legislative majority 
and a more determined administrative effort to change, international constraints are beyond the 
state’s legislative powers altogether. Non-governmental organizations that have come to oppose 
international investment law often appeal to sovereignty – the sovereignty of the state to 
introduce new public interest measures – but the transnational capitalist class is not seeking to 
undermine sovereignty.208 Daniel Price, a prominent arbitrator, reiterates that the signature of 
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international investment agreements is to the contrary “an exercise of sovereignty”.209 The 
strategy of a transnational capitalist class relies on the present sovereignty of the state to sign 
agreements that allow supranational institutions restrain its own future powers. A common 
objection to the very idea of a ‘supranational institution’ is that these institutions were initially 
created by states, and the assumption that follows is that they remain under state control. The 
point, however, is that once such supranational institutions have been created, they can acquire, 
temporally, a relatively independent existence and can thereby place constraints on the very 
states that created them. It is true that it is the national state – democratic or otherwise, and with 
or without public knowledge – that originally consents to an investment regime that protects 
transnational capital. It is nevertheless also true that, as Schneiderman observes, it is the 
supranational element that “bind[s] states far into the future, whatever political combinations 
develop at home to counteract it”.210 
 
The introduction of this thesis indicated that international investment law involves a struggle 
for the future. For a transnational capitalist class, it is a struggle to place limits on the future; to 
cite Schneiderman, international investment law is “concerned with pinning states down […] 
to the narrowest field of political possibilities”. 211  Within the wider framework of a 
transnational state, national states undoubtedly continue to provide a forum for subordinate 
classes to vent their grievances, but the supranational element of the transnational state imposes 
limits on what national states can do to meet their demands. This is not to suggest that the 
resistance of other social forces has become insignificant, but that the very structure of the 
transnational state is designed to undermine such resistance.  
 
The Supranational Sphere and Hidden Asymmetries 
 
The final set of boundaries considered here are those within the supranational sphere of politics, 
and more specifically the existence of a multitude of different supranational institutions for 
different purposes. This sub-section draws upon a parallel discussion on the ‘fragmentation’ of 
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international law.212 The potential problems of fragmentation were highlighted by the President 
of the ICJ in three consecutive speeches to the UN General Assembly, and one concluded with 
the warning that “the proliferation of courts presents us with risks, the seriousness of which it 
would be unwise to underestimate”.213 Lawyers have expressed concern that the proliferation 
of separate courts and tribunals can result in overlapping jurisdictions and a lack of overall 
coherence, which in turn detracts from the distinctly legal character of international law.214 
Bruno Simma, another ICJ judge, nevertheless observes that fears of fragmentation have in 
recent years given way to a more positive appreciation of the increasing ‘diversity’ of 
international law.215 This sub-section draws upon this debate, but will not appraise the positive 
or negative effects of fragmentation on international law itself, but rather its effects on different 
social groups. By showing how international investment law is situated vis-à-vis other 
supranational institutions, it illustrates a few (distinctly non-exhaustive) ways in which the 
fragmentation of the supranational sphere into a wide variety of distinct institutions serves to 
empower a transnational capitalist class at the expense of other social groups. 
 
International investment law is one of many such distinct legal regimes, and it is designed for 
the singular purpose of protecting corporations. This is not an accident; transnational corporate 
lobbies have worked hard to ensure that other legal rules that relate to foreign direct investment, 
but that are disadvantageous to corporations, are not included in these treaties. In respect to 
proposed investment treaty clauses to ensure that states do not lower regulations to attract 
foreign companies to invest, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce made clear, “BITs aren’t designed 
nor should they be used to achieve other important objectives such as raising labor and 
environmental standards, which are the ambit of other international institutions and 
agreements”.216 The existence of self-contained and distinct institutions and legal regimes for 
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different purposes allows a transnational capitalist class to demand strong rights within one 
institution, and to shuffle off rules that benefit other social groups to another institution, while 
simultaneously lobbying against strong standards in that other institution. 217  Similarly, 
UNCTAD rightly observes that business lobbies’ strong advocacy for international rights to 
benefit them contrasts with their “aversion to binding legal standards governing corporate 
operations”. 218  Over a decade after transnational corporations had acquired the right to 
unilaterally take sovereign states to international tribunals to demand compensation for the 
infringement of the extensive rights it holds under international investment law, the UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Multinational Corporations and Human Rights 
(SGSR) still declared that corporations could not themselves be subject to binding codes of 
conduct because they lack international legal personality.219 The SGSR had been subject to 
strong lobbying from corporations in the writing of the report, and subsequently noted that 
“[i]nternational business responded favorably” to its conclusions, while leading NGOs were 
strongly critical.220 The fact that different issues are negotiated in different institutional settings 
allows a transnational capitalist class to avoid flaunting its simultaneous demands for extensive 
rights and minimal responsibilities, or its demands for strong protection for its foreign direct 
investments and weak protection for the environment that is adversely affected thereby. 
Institutional fragmentation prevents the political compromises that alternative social forces 
would conceivably try to force upon transnational corporations within a more centralized 
negotiating setting, within which competing interests were considered side-by-side. 
 
The fragmentation of the supranational sphere also conceals the extent to which a transnational 
capitalist class has acquired benefits not extended to other social groups in similar 
circumstances. The most direct comparison can be drawn between investment law and human 
rights law, since both are designed “for the benefit of individual (or private) interests”.221 Yet 
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despite their similarities, the level of protection offered by these two legal regimes differs 
widely. Firstly, investors have direct recourse to investor-state dispute settlement. This is rare 
in human rights law, and where it exists – such as under the European Court of Human Rights 
– it is always coupled with the more onerous requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.222 
Secondly, corporations who receive a favourable monetary award have unprecedented means 
of enforcing such a judgement against assets held by the state in any of around 150 countries 
around the world, while human rights courts normally rely on voluntary compliance. Finally, 
investment tribunals appear to offer stronger standards of substantial protection than human 
rights tribunals. This is of course difficult to determine, since investment law is designed to 
protect a person’s property, and human rights law to protect their well-being. However, two 
recent arbitral awards provide a more direct basis for comparison, and these indicate that 
investment tribunals may be inclined to offer not just a stronger standard of substantial 
protection for an investor’s property rights, but a stronger standard of protection for an 
investor’s human rights.223 In one case, an investor approached an investment tribunal to seek 
compensation for Romania’s alleged denial of due process under both an investment treaty and 
the European Convention on Human Rights.224 The tribunal did not reject the possibility that 
an investment tribunal could enforce an investor’s rights under a human rights convention, but 
instead argued that this question was “moot” because the investment treaty provided a “higher 
and more specific level of protection […] compared to the more general protections offered to 
them by the human rights instruments referred above”. 225  The possibility that investment 
treaties might offer better protection against human rights violations than human rights 
instruments themselves has recently been confirmed in a case against Yemen. Whilst primarily 
a contract dispute, the tribunal also found that the host state had failed to protect the managers 
of the corporation from threats of violence, and that it had further detained them for several 
days without adequate reason. The tribunal recognized the Claimant’s “stress and anxiety of 
being harassed, threatened and detained by the Respondent as well as by armed tribes” and 
awarded moral damages for the “physical duress exerted on the executives”.226 Charges of 
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illegal detention and protection from threats of violence would normally be raised in human 
rights courts, yet here the claimant would need to exhaust domestic remedies and would not 
have been equipped with such strong means of enforcement. Most notably, the investment 
tribunal awarded $1 million in moral damages, a sum that is exceedingly rare in human rights 
tribunals, “even for the most egregious of abuses including torture, disappearances, extra-
judicial killings”.227 This suggests that investors, simply by virtue of being members of a 
transnational capitalist class, can in certain circumstances bypass the more restrictive human 
rights regime and appeal to a stronger body of law for protection. Where the closest comparison 
can be made, investors have thereby acquired a higher standard of human rights protection than 
that granted to other people. 
 
The above example indicates that the supranational sphere is imbalanced in favour of a 
transnational capitalist class, but it could plausibly be argued that it is better to fully protect the 
human rights of some (propertied) classes than of none at all. The investment activities of 
transnational corporations can nevertheless affect other social groups in a variety of ways, and 
it is where their interests clash that these asymmetries within the supranational sphere can 
favour a transnational capitalist class over opposing social groups. International investment 
treaties contain a dispute settlement mechanism for corporations, but this cannot be used by 
other social groups against corporations, and these are expected to resolve any disputes they 
may have with a transnational corporation within their national state structures.228 In some 
circumstances, this raises the difficult question of whether states can actually hold transnational 
corporations to account. For instance, a transnational corporation can structure its investments 
abroad so that its subsidiaries hold only limited capital and, if an environmental accident strikes, 
it can be allowed to go bankrupt to shield the parent company from liability.229 International 
investment tribunals tend to ignore the separate legal personality of subsidiaries where it 
benefits corporations, but other courts have been distinctly more reluctant to lift the corporate 
veil where it does not; for instance, when a gas leak from a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, 
India killed some 28,000 people and left 150,000 with severe injuries, the U.S. court declined 
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to hold the parent company responsible.230 The cases detailed in this thesis furthermore involve 
civil society groups that have successfully argued within a domestic setting that an investment 
project infringes upon their rights to a healthy environment, but where the corporation counters 
in an international tribunal that if the civil society group’s demands are met then that infringes 
upon their rights as foreign investors. As discussed in the previous sub-section, international 
investment awards act as a ‘trump card’ against state measures,231 yet these tribunals do not 
have the jurisdiction to consider the rights of the social groups for whom such state measures 
may have been granted. 
 
There is no supranational forum in which the arguments of the investor and the civil society 
groups can both be heard side-by-side, and where their concerns are given equal consideration. 
There are nevertheless several instances in which both a transnational corporation and social 
groups affected by its activities have simultaneously sought to have their claims resolved at the 
supranational level, in an investment tribunal and a human rights court respectively. For 
example, adverse health effects caused by pollution from a metals smelter in La Oroya, Peru, 
prompted civil society groups to bring a claim against Peru to the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights.232 The smelter had been in operation for almost a century, and had made the 
town into one of the 10 most polluted places in the world, but the smelter was privatized in the 
1990s for the specific purpose of bringing up its environmental standards.233 Renco took over 
the smelter complex, but did not accomplish the contractually required environmental 
remediation and improvement within the designated timeframe.234 Before the Inter-American 
Court, Peru had defended its environmental record on the basis that while an extension was 
provided to the company to come into compliance with its obligations, that extension was 
strictly limited and “requirements in addition to [the original ones] were established”.235 The 
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company responded by bringing a case against Peru to an investment tribunal, in which it 
maintained that Peru had acted in violation of the treaty in providing it with an inadequate 
extension of time and furthermore for making it contingent upon additional “onerous” 
environmental requirements.236 Precisely the measures that Peru maintained brought it into 
compliance with human rights law are therefore challenged as a violation of international 
investment law. These cases have yet to be concluded, but neither court will be able to address 
the claims made in the other. In a similar case, when Burlington Resources sought to begin oil 
exploration in Ecuador, it quickly encountered strong opposition from the Sarayaku indigenous 
people, and this opposition halted its plans. The Sarayaku people approached the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights to challenge Ecuador’s failure to protect it from the oil 
company, and the oil company approached an investment tribunal to challenge Ecuador’s 
failure to protect its exploratory activities from the Sarayaku people, yet neither of the two 
courts mentioned the other simultaneous international legal proceedings at all.237 
 
In theory, it can be argued that such cases can unproblematically be heard in separate tribunals, 
because the rights of investors do not actually conflict with the rights of other social groups. 
Even if a corporation is successful in its claims, investment tribunals rarely require a state to 
directly rescind measures that had been taken to protect people from an investment project; it 
only requires the payment of compensation to the company. As such, even if the Inter-American 
Court were to determine that Ecuador should adopt stricter measures to address pollution from 
the smelter, the investment tribunal, were it to find in favour of the company, could simply 
require Peru to provide it with compensation for the economic impact of those stricter measures. 
In practice, this discrepancy between the strength of the respective legal regimes may more 
directly favour a transnational capitalist class against its opponents. Aside from the fact that 
any compensation in itself comes from taxes otherwise intended for other social purposes, 
Chapter 4 will also argue that the very threat of investment arbitration can dissuade states from 
adopting public interest regulations that would become subject to a potentially costly 
investment treaty challenge. The opposing social groups can, of course, also threaten to bring 
the case to a human rights court, but the asymmetries between these tribunals make such threats 
less credible: most people around the world do not have access to a supranational human rights 
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court in the first place, and where they do, recourse requires the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. To paraphrase the investment tribunal in the Romanian case considered above, human 
rights instruments may furthermore offer ‘lower and less specific levels of protection’.238 Most 
importantly, even if a human rights court were to find in favour of the civil society group, 
human rights law normally rests on voluntary compliance, while investment law is perhaps “the 
most effectively enforceable in the international system”.239 It is here that the discrepancy 
between the powers of different institutions at the supranational level may be of critical 
importance: what would otherwise merely be an imbalance in the rights afforded to different 
social groups may in such circumstances ensure the protection of the rights of a transnational 
capitalist class against the rights of others. 
 
In “surveying the disjointed development of [these] two different areas of international law”, 
Luke Eric Peterson argues that “one thing becomes abundantly clear: the global village could 
use a good town planner”.240 The fragmentation of the supranational sphere aids in concealing 
the fact that these two distinct legal regimes belong to the same ‘village’ in the first place: they 
were initiated and negotiated separately, they develop separately over time, and they have at 
times split what is essentially the same dispute between a transnational corporation and other 
societal groups half-way down the middle, so that the rights of corporations cannot be 
considered side-by-side with the rights of other social groups. The fragmentation of the 
supranational sphere into a variety of apparently distinct institutions makes such asymmetries 
less obvious. To understand the implications of such fragmentation, an analogy can be drawn 
with the historical development of international investment law. At the same time that civil 
society groups from around the world had coalesced against and defeated the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, bilateral investment treaties offering essentially the same benefits to 
corporations were “multiply[ing] like fruit flies”.241 Civil society groups have more recently 
begun to realize that the proliferation of separate investment agreements on a bilateral basis 
involves a “divide-and-rule” strategy that leads to “fragmented and isolated movements”.242 
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The same lesson can be drawn in respect to the supranational sphere more generally: 
centralization and coherence empowers civil society groups, while fragmentation enables a 
transnational capitalist class to make use of the agility that its superior financial resources 
equips it with to pursue incremental reforms in a variety of negotiating settings. As such, within 
this fragmented supranational sphere, a transnational capitalist class has not only gained 
inordinate rights while evading responsibilities, but it has also acquired rights and legal avenues 
not extended to other social groups, as well as the ability to use these to its advantage in direct 
conflicts with those other groups. 
 
The Concept of a Transnational State Revisited 
 
This section has argued that world politics is currently organized around at least three sets of 
‘boundaries’ that divide different spheres of political life from each other, and that are integral 
to how the interests of a transnational capitalist class are politically maintained, advanced and 
enforced. Many Marxists have stressed the first set of boundaries between territorial states, and 
how the transnational capitalist class depends on this multiplicity of states for its structural 
power, and this has not been analysed in further detail here. The second ‘boundary’ separates 
the national from the supranational sphere of politics, and drawing upon the theory of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ it has been argued that this enables a transnational capitalist class to pursue 
its political interests through either national or supranational political institutions at one point 
in time, but to thereafter have these enforced through supranational institutions in the event of 
subsequent resistance emanating from social groups within particular nation-states. The third 
set of ‘boundaries’ are those within the supranational sphere itself, and it has been argued that 
the fragmentation into different supranational institutions for different purposes allows a 
transnational capitalist class to use its superior lobbying power to strengthen particular 
institutions that are conducive towards its interests, while ensuring that gains made within such 
institutions are not passed on to institutions that are more conducive towards the interests of 
opposing social forces. The existence of a range of distinct and self-contained supranational 
institutions is decisive in hiding the type of asymmetries that benefits a transnational capitalist 
class, and it therefore deflects challenges from alternative social forces. 
 
Each of these three sets of ‘boundaries’ sustain the political interests of a transnational capitalist 
class in different ways. This is not to suggest that a transnational capitalist class has alone 
designed this institutional form, or that it is alone in maintaining it. This institutional form is 
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the product of historical struggles between different social forces, and history cannot be reduced 
to the actions of one social group alone. What has been argued is rather that if a transnational 
capitalist class is accruing substantial benefits from global institutional fragmentation, it 
follows that we should not expect it to use its influence to dismantle the very ‘boundaries’ it 
relies upon. In contrast, the evidence suggests that it is actively seeking to police and sustain 
these boundaries, and to transform them in such a way that the global political system, as a 
whole, confers privileged rights to corporate groups at the expense of opposing social forces. 
 
This section began with the argument that these ‘boundaries’ are internal to a ‘transnational 
state’, but if this transnational state is no longer even expected to adopt a more centralized and 
coherent institutional form, does it still deserve the label of a ‘state’? In so far as it remains the 
‘congealment’ of a transnational capitalist class and other subordinate social forces in a set of 
political institutions, this is – by Robinson’s definition – still a state. However, this in turn begs 
the question of whether Robinson’s concept of the state is actually appropriate. In a 
characteristically dismissive critique of Robinson’s work, Paul Cammack exasperatedly notes: 
 “[W]hen Robinson finally tells us what he means by the ‘transnational state’ 
through which the global bourgeoisie rules, it turns out […] [to be] a loose yet all-
encompassing conglomeration of global institutions, nation states, and other 
agencies [...] Whatever else this is, it is not a state, transnational or otherwise”.243  
Here Cammack is not criticising the concept of a transnational state for not adhering to 
Robinson’s own concept of a ‘state’, but for not adhering to another (unspecified and 
presumably better) concept of the state. Cammack is right to point out that Robinson seems to 
depart from the way that the concept of the state is used in everyday language, and given that 
concepts are designed to aid in communication, such a departure may seem to require further 
justification. Two questions will therefore tentatively be considered here: Firstly, does 
Robinson’s particular conception of the ‘state’ adhere to the way that the word is used in 
everyday language, and if not, why not? Secondly, is his concept actually helpful in allowing 
us to acquire a better understanding of the underlying reality the concept is grasping at? 
 
Robinson’s concept of the state can easily be said not to adhere to ordinary conceptions thereof. 
In International Relations, the state is often conceptualized both “as a force within society and 
as a social actor in external relations with a larger world”, an understanding that largely adheres 
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to everyday usages of the term.244 Within the discipline of International Relations, the emphasis 
has normally been on the external dimension of the state rather than its internal function. The 
state is often immediately defined in its opposition to other states, and introductory textbooks 
may from the outset define a state as “a clear-cut and bordered territory, with a permanent 
population, under the jurisdiction of supreme government that is constitutionally independent 
of all foreign governments”. 245  Within such a definition, the ‘state’ is immediately 
distinguished by its territorial form in opposition to other territorial states, and the notion of a 
‘transnational state’ would presumably become a contradiction in terms. 
 
However, the external aspect of a state is only one part of everyday understandings of the term. 
While International Relations scholars tend to think of the state in relation to other states, in 
everyday interactions people also tend to refer to the state as much by its ‘internal’ aspect; as a 
political structure that regulates society and that maintains and enforces a particular social order. 
This, indeed, corresponds to the way that the concept of the state appears to be used in Marxist 
theory, with the caveat that the social order that is maintained and the way that society is 
regulated depends on the particular social groups whose agency it congeals – and in capitalism, 
this has primarily been the agency of a capitalist class. Robinson’s definition of the state departs 
from everyday understandings of the term in its ‘external’ aspect, but corresponds broadly to 
everyday ‘internal’ understandings of the term. The maintenance and enforcement of a 
particular social order was previously the ‘internal’ task of a national state that congealed the 
interests of a national capitalist class and subordinate social groups. In contrast, the particular 
social order that congeals the agency of a transnational capitalist class is maintained and 
enforced through an interlocking network of both supranational institutions and national states, 
which lacks an ‘external’ dimension. If the above analysis of global politics today is accurate, 
then a state cannot by definition be both a territorial unit opposed to other territorial units and 
the political structure that maintains and enforces the contemporary social order. It is therefore 
changes to the way that the political sphere itself is organized and whose interests it congeals 
that makes the above two dimensions of the state – the state in its ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
aspects – difficult to reconcile. If the state can no longer, in their unity, be both a territorial unit 
in opposition to other such territorial units and the network of political institutions that maintain 
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and enforce the contemporary social order, then the question is whether to retain the concept of 
a state for its ‘internal’ or ‘external’ usage. Given that territorial units are not disappearing, it 
could plausibly be argued that we should maintain the concept of the ‘state’ to describe these 
territorial units even if the concept thereby no longer encapsulates the wider political structure 
that governs us and that maintains and enforces the contemporary social order. Indeed, 
Robinson retains the concept of a state to describe those territorial units, but distinguishes 
between particular national states and the wider transnational state of which they form a part, 
and this thesis follows this practice. 
 
Adopting the concept of a ‘state’ to describe what used to be the ‘internal’ dimension of a 
national state is helpful in enabling us to grasp how the global capitalist social order within 
which we live is politically maintained and enforced. There is often a distinct tendency to think 
of national states and supranational institutions in oppositional terms – if one is more powerful, 
the other must be less so, and vice versa. For example, Ellen Meiksins Wood reiterates that the 
national state is “the only noneconomic institution truly indispensable to capital” and that “no 
other institution, no transnational agency, has even begun to replace the nation state as the 
coercive guarantor of social order, property relations, stability or contractual predictability, or 
any of the other basic conditions required by capital”.246 Wood often contrasts the relative 
power of supranational institutions and national states, and from that starting point it is easy to 
conclude that the former are of marginal importance. The advantage of the concept of a 
transnational state is that it enables us to see how supranational institutions and national states 
are not contradictory, but how – through the distinct tasks fulfilled by each – they together 
combine to support a transnational capitalist class. The national state can retain ‘its’ power, but 
the power of a transnational capitalist class vis-à-vis other social forces increases by virtue of 
how such national states are becoming incorporated into the wider political framework of the 
transnational state. 
 
This section has drawn upon Robinson’s theory of a transnational state in order to situate 
international investment law within wider global politics. His own work has primarily focused 
on how the agency of a transnational capitalist class has become congealed within a variety of 
different political institutions that together compose a transnational state. This section has 
further argued that one of the distinct advantages of the concept itself is that it enables us to 
                                                             
246 Wood, Empire of Capital, p. 139. 
109 
 
understand how a global capitalist world order is maintained and enforced not only through a 
variety of different national and supranational institutions, but crucially also through the 
boundaries between them. Robinson sometimes describes the transnational state as a ‘network’ 
of different supranational and national institutions, and this section has argued that the agency 
of a transnational capitalist class has not only become congealed in the ‘nodal points’ of that 
network, but also in the ‘net’ itself; in how the network is formed in the first place. The concept 
of a transnational state immediately draws our attention to how the political sphere as a whole 
is organized in favour of a transnational capitalist class, and how it avoids the critical scrutiny 
that a more centralized global political structure would be likely to bring. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the ‘big picture’ necessary to understand the particular investment 
disputes considered in subsequent chapters, and in doing so it has explained the wider political 
struggles that international investment law is implicated in. The emergence and evolution of 
international investment law is normally explained in reference to states – to their interests, 
thoughts and agency – and to the struggles between them. The first section of this chapter has 
demonstrated that such a perspective conceals the fact that these are ultimately struggles 
between social groups, acting through states. It conceals the agency of a transnational capitalist 
class in the making of international investment law, and it conceals the ways in which struggles 
between opposing social groups are currently determining its future. The agency of a 
transnational capitalist class has left a mark on the institutional structure through which 
international investment laws are asserted and enforced, and the second section showed that 
this is a remarkably powerful field of international law that hews closely to the needs of 
corporations. Despite its origins in a time when national capitalist classes were more strongly 
embedded within particular ‘home’ states, the second section has further argued that 
international investment law has subtly changed so as to ‘congeal’ the interests of a distinctly 
transnational capitalist class. This transformation is evident in how corporations no longer 
require their ‘home states’ to assert and enforce their rights in the form of diplomatic protection, 
and how it has acquired the ability to enforce any awards against assets held by a state in any 
of around 150 countries of the world. If capitalism was still dominated by nationally based 
capitalist classes acting through their own national states, as some Marxist scholars contend, it 
would furthermore be difficult to explain the emergence of an international investment regime 
in which, to cite Schill, “virtually any investor from virtually any country is capable of opting 
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into virtually any BIT regime”.247 This increasingly elastic definition of nationality does not 
mean that transnational corporations escape the confines of national states altogether, but it 
supports William Robinson’s proposition a transnational capitalist class “may turn to any 
national state to gain competitive advantage as part of their corporate strategy”.248 The final 
section of this chapter situated international investment law within wider global politics. It 
argued that the interests of a transnational capitalist class is not only congealed in a variety of 
national and supranational institutions, but that it is also congealed in the boundaries between 
them: in the particular ways in which different political institutions relate to each other. The 
transnational capitalist class has not exercised its agency so as to undermine the formal 
sovereignty of national states, but it has used this sovereignty to bring into being supranational 
institutions that restrain the subsequent ability of those states to adopt unfavourable policies in 
response to other societal groups. While transnational corporations have acquired significant 
supranational rights, the fragmentation of the supranational sphere itself ensures that it has not 
acquired corresponding obligations, nor that other social groups have acquired similar rights. 
The concept of a ‘transnational state’ has explanatory purchase precisely because it draws our 
attention to how the political sphere as a whole is interconnected – and separated – in such a 
way as to support a transnational capitalist class in its ongoing struggles with any opposing 
social groups. 
 
 
                                                             
247 Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, p. 238. 
248(My emphasis) William Robinson, ‘Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to Transnational 
Hegemony’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:4 (2005), p. 568. 
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Chapter 3 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Protection from Environmental 
Regulations? 
 
“Wrong!” is the simple answer provided by the European Commission to civil society claims 
that investor-state dispute settlement “gives too many rights to companies”. 1  In fact, the 
European Commission adds, “the rights which can be enforced under investor-state dispute 
settlement are limited”.2 The previous chapter has argued that the institutional framework of 
investment arbitration is designed in such a way as to support the interests of transnational 
corporations, but this will indeed be of little consequence if the European Commission is correct 
in its claim that few substantive rights are actually granted to corporations by investment treaties. 
This chapter therefore aims to investigate what substantive benefits investment treaties actually 
provide to a transnational capitalist class. 
 
It is uncontroversial to state that investment treaties are designed to protect and benefit 
corporations; the “promotion and protection of investments” is their stated purpose. 3 
Investment treaties are normally narrowly focused on ensuring that states provide corporations 
with certain standards of “treatment”, or protection from certain state measures, and do not 
normally contain any corresponding obligations for corporations or any protections to host 
states from any detrimental corporate conduct.4 In so far as corporations have also acquired the 
right to enforce their legal entitlements in international tribunals, the investment law regime 
“resembles the structure of rights protection found in the bills of rights of many national 
jurisdictions”, and critics frequently refer to investment treaties as Bills of Rights for 
corporations.5 The question is therefore not whether investment treaties protect the rights of 
                                                             
1 European Commission, ‘Incorrect Claims about Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (3 October 2013), p. 1, 
available at: {http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151790.pdf} accessed 17 June 2014. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Many agreements contain this phrase in their titles, e.g. one BIT is entitled “Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic 
of Ghana for the Promotion and Protection of Investments” (22 March 1989). The U.S. model investment treaty 
is titled “Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment”, see United States of America, Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), available at: 
{http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf} accessed 4 September 
2014. 
4 Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense 
of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 269. 
5 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s 
Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 223. 
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corporations, but how far such rights extend and in what particular circumstances they can be 
invoked.  
 
The most commonly invoked treaty standards require states to grant corporations ‘national 
treatment’ or ‘most favoured nation treatment’ (also commonly said to protect investors from 
‘discrimination’), fair and equitable treatment, and finally the treaties include a prohibition on 
expropriation without compensation. At first glance these treaty standards do indeed seem fairly 
innocuous, and to lend support to the European Commission’s rejection of civil society claims 
that investment treaties grant too many rights to corporations. Karel De Gucht, the European 
Commissioner for Trade, maintains that “[t]here is nothing shocking in these rules – rather, they 
are basic principles of the rule of law”.6 Yet if these treaty standards are so clearly “limited”, 
why is the government of Canada – a country not normally associated with repeated violations 
of ‘basic principles of the rule of law’ – the world’s sixth most frequent defendant state before 
investment tribunals?7  This chapter suggests that while requirements to treat investors (or 
anyone) fairly and equitably and without discrimination may at first glance seem like innocent 
and uncontroversial propositions, there may be more to these treaty standards than immediately 
meets the eye. Far from such treaty standards being strictly “limited” and clearly restricted to 
basic principles of the rule of law, these standards are potentially very open-ended. Jeswald 
Salacuse, a prominent scholar and arbitrator, suggests that “for a lawyer trained only in the 
domestic law […] the stated norms of the regime seem breathtaking in their generality, 
vagueness, and lack of specificity”. 8  An answer to the question of the extent to which 
investment law grants rights to corporations can therefore not be provided by reference to the 
text of the treaties alone – the question is how such vague and general treaty standards are 
interpreted in practice. The use of such open-ended standards are all the more significant given 
that there are few limitations in respect to what type of state conduct can be challenged before 
investment tribunals. International investment law can protect corporations from specific 
government measures, administrative decisions, or breaches of domestic law, but also from 
general legislation enacted by parliaments or supreme court decisions that are interpreted to be 
                                                             
6 Karel De Gucht, ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate’, European 
Commission Speech No 14/406, Speech at the European Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat (Berlin, 22 May 
2014), available at: {http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-406_en.htm} accessed 31 August 2014. 
7 UNCTAD, ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, IIA Issues Note, No 1 (April 2012), p. 
17, available at: {http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf} accessed 1 September 
2014. 
8 Jeswald Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’, Harvard International Law Journal, 51:2 
(2010), p. 453. 
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in breach of the above treaty standards.9 Indeed, a global law firm suggests that what is so 
promising about international investment law is precisely the ability to challenge political 
decisions “usually considered to be immune” from legal challenge.10  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to look beyond the innocuous but inherently vague standards 
articulated in investment treaties to understand what substantive protections this body of 
international law actually affords to corporations, and in what circumstances these treaties can 
be invoked for their benefit. This chapter therefore shows how corporations can use investor-
state dispute settlement to protect themselves from states, while the next chapter illustrates how 
corporations are ultimately seeking to protect themselves from the political victories of social 
groups within those states.  The first section will provide a justification for the environmental 
focus of this thesis and an explanation of the approach used to analyze the cases, and the 
subsequent four sections will each detail the specific ways in which corporations can challenge 
environmental regulations before investment tribunals.  
 
The Environment in Investment Arbitration 
 
International investment law is designed to prevent certain government measures that challenge 
the contemporary global economic order, and it is not surprising that it expressly prohibits many 
of the developmental strategies used by countries in the past, such as the protection of domestic 
corporations or the nationalization of key industries. What is more surprising is that many of 
the first investment treaty disputes concerned not such policies, but rather measures introduced 
to protect the environment. One early study suggested that half of all known NAFTA disputes 
before 2000 concerned environmental regulations, and scholars suggest that measures taken to 
protect the environment remain one of the most common sources of investment disputes.11 On 
                                                             
9 Zoe Phillips Williams, ‘Risky Business or Risky Politics: What Explains Investor-State Disputes?’ Investment 
Treaty News, 3:5 (August 2014), p. 5. 
10 Wojciech Sadowski, ‘International Investment Treaties as a Possible Shield Against Government Cutbacks in 
Subsidies for the Green Energy Sector’, International Arbitration Alert of K&L Gates (10 January 2013), 
available at: {http://www.klgates.com/international-investment-treaties-as-a-possible-shield-against-government-
cutbacks-in-subsidies-for-the-green-energy-sector-01-10-2013/} accessed 30 June 2014. 
11 Sanford Gaines, ‘Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11’, 
International Environmental Agreements, 7 (2007), p. 173; Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, ‘Environmental and 
Health Regulation: Assessing Liability under Investment Treaties’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 29:1 
(2011), p. 2; International Institute for Sustainable Development, Private Rights, Public Problems: A Guide to 
NAFTA’s Controversial Chapter on Investor Rights (2001), p. 16, available at: 
{http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_citizensguide.pdf} accessed 1 May 2012 (this study nevertheless takes a wider 
view of ‘environmental’ than the one adopted here); M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 77.  
114 
 
the face of it, this is surprising – the treaties are not formally intended to protect corporations 
from environmental regulations, and indeed few would explicitly suggest that they should. 
Environmental regulations are after all in no way antithetical to the contemporary global 
economic order. While it can certainly be argued that states in the developing world should be 
allowed to protect their infant industries from competition from large transnational corporations, 
this is an argument that runs contrary to the global capitalist ideology prevalent today, and even 
most of the political left does not actively contest the logic of global competition and a global 
free market economy. In contrast, the idea that states should be allowed to take measures to 
protect their environments is one that most are willing to accept. Even for the most adamant 
adherents of global capitalism, environmental regulations are still potentially desirable in order 
to prevent ‘externalities’ from business operations, and the priority accorded to environmental 
protection has largely coincided with and evolved side-by-side with the emergence of global 
capitalism in the last few decades.  
 
This thesis has chosen to focus on investment treaty disputes arising from measures taken to 
protect the environment for three reasons. Firstly, the focus on the environment is helpful as an 
illustration of the substantive rights that international investment law affords to transnational 
corporations. Rather than provide an abstract description of what investment law protects 
corporations against – and rather than focusing on all known cases, which would be an 
unmanageable task – the thesis explores this question through a detailed analysis of disputes 
emerging out of environmental protection measures. Investors have challenged environmental 
measures on the basis of most treaty standards – as discriminatory, as unfair and inequitable, 
and as tantamount to expropriation – and this makes the environment a particularly suitable lens 
through which to understand how corporations make use of international investment law. Given 
this focus, there are nevertheless also a few treaty standards that are not discussed in this chapter 
– perhaps most notably, investment treaties often prohibit states from restricting the transfer of 
capital, and in preventing capital controls investment treaties often deny states a potentially 
useful tool for preventing and mitigating financial crises.12 It should therefore be kept in mind 
that the benefits provided to transnational corporations by the investment regime extend beyond 
the discussion provided in this chapter.  
 
                                                             
12 Cecilia Olivet & Pia Eberhardt, Profiting from Crisis: How Corporations and Lawyers are Scavenging Profits 
from Europe’s Crisis Countries (Amsterdam/Brussels: Transnational Institute & Corporate Europe Observatory, 
2014), p. 13, available at: {http://www.tni.org/briefing/profiting-injustice} accessed 13 March 2014. 
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Secondly, environmental regulations are on the boundary – if not actually beyond the boundary 
– of what investment law is intended to protect corporations against. This makes it a very 
suitable focus for exploring precisely how far the protections afforded by investment treaties 
actually extend. This body of law could be institutionally strong (as described in the previous 
chapter) but if the substantive rights granted by the regime are weak then the benefits offered 
to transnational corporations would be negligible. An indicator of the weakness of such 
substantive provisions could be if they only protected corporations in very exceptional 
circumstances – for instance against outright nationalization without any compensation, which 
is extremely rare today, and which runs directly counter to the current global economic order. 
In contrast, the further these treaty standards extend into and delimit the ordinary workings of 
governments around the world, the stronger and more beneficial this regime can be said to be 
to the transnational capitalist class it supports. The almost universal support for environmental 
protection ensures that this is not what investment law is explicitly intended to protect 
corporations against, and yet the prevalence of precisely such disputes makes it a suitable focus 
for understanding where the boundary between permissible and impermissible government 
measures actually lies. 
 
Thirdly, and to situate the environmental focus in the context of the wider thesis, it should be 
emphasized that in contrast to much of the academic literature on the subject this particular 
focus has not been chosen on the basis of a normative priority accorded to the environment per 
se. Much of the literature highlights a struggle between the protection of the environment and 
the protection of investment, and perceives the solution as involving the balancing of these two 
competing concerns. In contrast, the social forces approach adopted in this thesis lends itself to 
an understanding that the struggle is not between investment and the environment, but between 
different social groups – or to be more precise, between a transnational capitalist class and the 
social groups that contest it. The environment nevertheless provides an appropriate focus 
because environmental advocacy groups have been the investment treaty regime’s “most 
vociferous opponents”, and many other civil society critics view corporate challenges to 
environmental regulations as the clearest indicator of the wider malaise that investment law 
entails.13 Investment treaty disputes arising out of environmental measures are therefore the 
                                                             
13 Ray Jones, cited in: Charles Brower, ‘NAFTA’s Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts about Second 
Generation Rights’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 37 (2003), p. 1553 (footnote 102); Howard Mann, 
Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exceptions Clauses Create a Safe Haven for 
Governments? (International Institute for Sustainable Development & Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 2007),  
p. 8, available at: {http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_agreements_reg_state.pdf} accessed 20 August 2012. 
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ones that have engendered the most resistance, and this makes the environmental focus essential 
for understanding how investment law is implicated in struggles between opposing social 
classes or groups. 
 
A Historical Overview 
 
A substantial academic literature on investment arbitration and the environment has emerged 
since the first investment treaty disputes that seemed to implicate environmental regulations. 
Within this literature, most scholars now suggest that the initial response to the early disputes 
were “unnecessarily alarmist” and that environmental protection measures are not, in fact, 
actually at risk from challenges before investment tribunals.14 With the benefit of hindsight, 
Alessandra Asteriti claims that investment treaty disputes in respect to environmental 
regulations “caught the main actors and the public unprepared and engendered fears and 
anxieties that revealed themselves to be either exaggerated or misplaced”.15 Sanford Gaines 
similarly suggests that recent history proves that “environmentalists have little ground for 
alarm”, while Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo conclude that “legitimate environmental regulation 
is unlikely to be challengeable under the investment rules of modern [multilateral investment 
treaties] – irrespective of exaggerated claims made so far for advocacy purposes in arbitral 
litigation and equally exacerbated anxieties expressed by NGOs”.16 While there were “early 
jitters” caused by the emergence of a number of controversial investment treaty challenges of 
environmental protection measures, as well as certain early cases where states were required to 
provide compensation to investors, the recent reassurances have been prompted by tribunals’ 
rejection of corporate claims in a number of more recent high profile cases.17 The history of 
international investment law is therefore normally presented as one of the rise and fall of 
concerns about the risk posed to environmental regulations. 
 
                                                             
14 Madeline Stone, ‘NAFTA Article 1110: Environmental Friend or Foe?’, The Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review, 15 (2002-2003), p. 788. 
15 Alessandra Asteriti, ‘Metalclad, Methanex and Chemtura: 10 Years of Environmental Issues in NAFTA 
Investment Arbitrations’, Transnational Dispute Management, 9:3, (2012), p. 21, available at SSRN: 
{http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021180} accessed 17 August 2012. 
16 Gaines, ‘Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration’, p. 171; Thomas Wälde & Abba 
Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in International Law’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50 ( 2001), p. 814. 
17 The reference to ‘early jitters’ is by Julie Soloway & Jeremy Broadhurst, cited in: Brower, ‘NAFTA’s 
Investment Chapter’, p. 1556 (footnote 116). 
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In this thesis twelve concluded investment treaty cases have been identified as involving 
environmental protection measures, but in addition there are many others that were defeated on 
jurisdictional grounds, settled, withdrawn, or are still pending. All are listed in the appendix 
and many will be discussed in substance elsewhere in the chapter, but to understand the history 
of the academic debate a brief introduction to the key cases is required. The first investment 
dispute in respect to the environment was launched under NAFTA by Ethyl Corporation, a 
producer of a fuel additive known as MMT, against Canada in response to its introduction of 
the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act in 1996.18 Several concerns had been raised in respect 
to MMT, most notably health effects and increased pollution as a result of MMT’s tendency to 
interfere with pollution control devices in cars. For reasons to be discussed in more detail 
elsewhere, Canada settled the dispute with Ethyl and agreed to withdraw the legislation, to 
provide CAD 19.5 million in compensation for legal costs and lost profits, and finally to issue 
a statement confirming that there is no evidence MMT is harmful to human health.19 An article 
in the Toronto Star concluded that this “is a bizarre episode in Canada’s own history – a 
government bill approved by the Parliament of Canada has been vetoed by Ethyl Corp. of 
Virginia”.20 From the outset this case had been seized upon by the emerging protest movement 
against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and Ethyl’s ultimate success was deemed to 
confirm that investment law really did present a risk to environmental and health regulations.21  
  
Ethyl’s successful recourse to investment arbitration was followed by three more cases 
concluded in 2000 – 2003 in which investors successfully challenged environmental measures 
taken by governments. Metalclad and Tecmed had both invested in hazardous waste treatment 
facilities in Mexico, but found their investments jeopardized by environmental protests that had 
emerged at least partly in response to the corporations’ own conduct (the decision not to 
remediate unlawful pollution by previous owners of the facility in the case of Metalclad, and 
                                                             
18 Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (14 April 
1997). 
19 Ken Traynor, ‘How Canada Became a Shill for Ethyl Corp.: NAFTA and the Erosion of Federal 
Environmental Protection’, Intervenor 23:3 (1998), available at: {http://www.cela.ca/article/international-trade-
agreements-commentary/how-canada-became-shill-ethyl-corp} accessed 1 September 2014. 
20 Dalton Camp, ‘You Can Thank Free Trade Agreement for MMT Travesty’, The Toronto Star (29 July 1998), 
p. A15. 
21 For example, see: Third World Network, ‘Ethyl Corp. Sues Canada Under NAFTA, Illustrating What Could 
Happen Later Under MAI Rules’, Third World Economics, 163 (16-30 June 1997), available at: 
{http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/eth-cn.htm} accessed 2 September 2014; George Monbiot, ‘Running on MMT: 
The Multilateral Agreement on Investments Will Force Governments to Poison their Citizens’, The Guardian 
(13 August 1998), available at: {http://www.monbiot.com/1998/08/13/running-on-mmt/} accessed 17 March 
2013. 
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violations of environmental regulations in the case of Tecmed).22 The S.D. Myers case emerged 
from the corporation’s unexpected success in lobbying the U.S. to open its side of the border to 
imports of hazardous PCB waste from Canada after a decade-long border closure, and the 
subsequent decision of Canada to introduce an interim ban on exports while it considered the 
environmental implications of the new situation. 23  The tribunals in Metalclad v. Mexico, 
Tecmed v. Mexico and S.D. Myers v. Canada were in some quarters deemed to have issued 
distinctly investor-friendly awards, requiring states to compensate investors affected by 
environmental protection measures, and along with Ethyl v. Canada these roused the attention 
of environmental groups.  
 
What followed these investor-friendly awards was nevertheless a trio of investment awards in 
2005 – 2010 that rejected the respective corporations’ claims, and these were in contrast deemed 
to have proved the initial concerns unfounded. The pivotal case in this respect was the decision 
of Methanex Corporation to challenge the decision by California to phase out a gasoline 
additive called MTBE, which had caused widespread contamination of groundwater.24 After 
years of what one scholar described as “arbitral warfare”, the tribunal dismissed the case and 
commentators quickly labeled the U.S. victory "a major win for the environmental community” 
and “the harbinger of a new era” in investment arbitration.25 The case had from the outset been 
deemed a ‘textbook example’ of the potential conflicts between investor rights and 
environmental protection, and a representative of Methanex publicly complained that it had 
been made “the poster child in Washington based on people’s dislike of NAFTA”.26 Prominent 
scholars suggested that the tribunal’s decision to finally dismiss Methanex’ claims “alone goes 
a long way toward justifying the conclusion that investment arbitrations are not putting at risk 
the right to regulate”, while the International Institute for Sustainable Development praised the 
award for its “crystal-clear statement that non-discriminatory regulations in the public interest 
                                                             
22 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (30 August 
2000); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2 (29 May 2003). These cases are discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
23 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, First Partial Award, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (13 
November 2000). This case is discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
24 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 
UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (3 August 2005). This case is discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
25 Todd Weiler, ‘Methanex Corp. v. U.S.A.: Turning the Page on NAFTA Chapter 11?’, Journal of World 
Investment and Trade, 6 (2005), p. 903-904; Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, cited in: Moloo & Jacinto, 
‘Environmental and Health Regulation’, p. 47. 
26 David Gantz, ‘Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA 
Chapter 11’, George Washington International Law Review, 33 (2000-2001), p.  657; Heather Scoffield, 
‘Methanex Set to Sue Uncle Sam under NAFTA over Gas Additive’, The Globe and Mail (3 November 1999), p. 
B7. 
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(such as environmental laws) will almost never be considered expropriation”.27 The Methanex 
case was followed by two awards that were equally welcomed by the environmental community. 
Glamis Gold had challenged new legislation requiring the backfilling of open-pit mines in 
California, while Chemtura had challenged a Canadian ban on the use of the pesticide lindane.28 
In respect to the decision in Chemtura, scholars similarly suggested that “the tribunal's 
unambiguous rejection of the claims confirms that investment treaty obligations do not 
significantly impede a state's ability to engage in legitimate regulatory activities” and that “the 
(negative) hype [in respect to the environment] turned out to be exaggerated”.29 
 
With the exception of Tecmed v. Mexico, that nevertheless challenged environmental measures 
in a NAFTA country, all of the above cases emerged within NAFTA, and these are indisputably 
the ones that have received most attention. While few critics were aware of the possible 
implications of the investment chapter in NAFTA at the time of the treaty negotiations, the 
agreement as a whole was negotiated with environmental protests in the background and it was 
consequently from the outset the ‘greenest’ trade agreement ever negotiated.30 The history of 
opposition to NAFTA ensured that environmental advocacy groups were from the outset paying 
attention to any undesirable effects of the agreement, and quickly seized upon the investment 
disputes in respect to the environment that subsequently arose. As a result, the above disputes 
have received extensive publicity, while investment treaty disputes arising from other treaties 
have only received sustained attention by scholars within the specialist academic field of 
                                                             
27 Jan Paulsson, ‘Indirect Expropriation: Is the Right to Regulate at Risk?’ Making the Most of International 
Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda, Symposium Co-Organised by ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD (Paris, 
12 December 2005), p. 2, available at: 
{http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36055332.pdf} accessed 21 January 2011; 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Methanex v. USA’, available at: 
{http://www.iisd.org/investment/dispute/methanex.asp} accessed 1 September 2014. 
28 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (8 June 2009); 
Chemtura Corporation (formerly Crompton Corporation) v. Government of Canada, Award, UNCITRAL Ad 
Hoc Arbitration (2 August 2010). These cases are discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
29 Moloo & Jacinto, ‘Environmental and Health Regulation’, p. 65; Asteriti, ‘Metalclad, Methanex and 
Chemtura’, p. 21. 
30 Cited in: Wälde & Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking’, p. 817; 
see also: Simon Baughen, ‘Expropriation and Environmental Regulation: The Lessons of NAFTA Chapter 
Eleven’, Journal of Environmental Law 18:2 (2006), p. 216; Åsa Romson, Environmental Policy Space and 
International Investment Law (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2012), p. 288. In terms of the 
lack of attention to the environmental implications of the investment chapter, see: Howard Mann & Konrad von 
Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the Impact of the Investor-State Process on the 
Environment (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999), p. 3; the Bill Moyers 
documentary ‘Trading Democracy’ also reports that when NAFTA was negotiated the debate was about jobs, 
and the investment chapter was “too obscure to stir up controversy”, for a summary see: Tamara Straus, ‘Trading 
Democracy’, Alternet (14 January 2002), available at: {http://www.alternet.org/story/12233/trading_democracy} 
accessed 2 September 2014. 
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international investment law. Of the other concluded environmental cases, two involve awards 
against Costa Rica for expropriations of beachfront property in order to protect endangered wild 
cats and sea turtles respectively.31 In both cases Costa Rica did not dispute the principle that the 
affected investors should receive compensation for their property, but only how much 
compensation should be provided. In MTD v. Chile the tribunal awarded the investor 
compensation for its ill-fated attempt to acquire the necessary permits to build a residential 
satellite town in Santiago’s greenbelt.32 Two further cases concerned the environment only as 
a side issue. In the Maffezini case the tribunal dismissed a chemical company’s complaint in 
respect to the requirement for an environmental impact assessment, and decided that Spain did 
indeed have the right to fully enforce its domestic environmental laws and EU law.33 In Plama 
v. Bulgaria the tribunal dismissed the investor’s complaints in respect to the remediation 
requirements of a privatized oil refinery, and in any case also dismissed the case on 
jurisdictional grounds because the investor had committed fraud and made the investment “in 
flagrant violation” of Bulgarian law.34 Finally, the most recent award emerged in 2013, when 
Abengoa won another dispute arising out of Mexico’s conduct towards an investment in the 
waste treatment industry.35 
 
In addition to the above concluded cases, there are also a range of others that were rejected on 
jurisdictional grounds. The largest known environmental claim ever made – a USD 57 billion 
claim (three times the country’s GDP) by an oil company against Costa Rica’s decision to 
withdraw rights to oil exploitation – was deemed inadmissible because the investment contract 
did not allow for arbitration, and the Central American Free Trade Agreement had not yet 
entered into force.36 Dismissals on jurisdictional grounds are likely to become less frequent in 
                                                             
31 Compañía Del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, Final Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1 (17 February 2000); Marion Unglaube & Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1 & ICSID Case No. ARB/09/20 (16 May 2012) (the two cases were subsequently 
consolidated). These cases are discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
32 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (25 
May 2004). This case is discussed in more detail elsewhere.  
33 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (13 November 2000), 
para. 70-71; see also Tra Pham, ‘International Investment Treaties and Arbitration as Imbalanced Instruments: A 
Re-Visit’, International Arbitration Law Review, 13:3 (2010), p. 85-86; UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes 
Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, UNCTAD Series of International Investment Policies for 
Development (New York & Geneva: United Nations, 2005), p. 46. 
34 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 (27 August 2008), 
para. 134-135, 137, 143. 
35 Abengoa, S.A. y COFIDES, S.A. v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2 (18 April 
2013) (in Spanish only). 
36 No publicly available legal documents are available in this case. The USD 57 billion figure was widely 
reported, but a lobbyist for the company was also reported to have suggested that the company would back down 
if compensated for the 10 million it had actually spent on initial oil exploration. The details of any settlement are 
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the future, as treaties have been in force for longer and as investors learn to structure their 
investments so as not to fall foul of the nationality requirements of treaties. At least another six 
cases have ended with settlements, and in others the investors have withdrawn the claims. 
Finally, while some scholars in the mid-2000s suggested that the early wave of environmental 
disputes had not been followed by a second wave, that second wave is now clearly here – at 
least another twelve environmental cases are currently pending, and many challenge high 
profile political decisions such as Germany’s phase-out of nuclear power and Quebec’s 
moratorium on the controversial natural gas extraction technique of ‘fracking’.37 Environmental 
disputes therefore continue to emerge, and this chapter seeks to understand precisely how 
corporations can make use of investment treaties to challenge unfavourable environmental 
protection measures. 
 
Argument, Methods and Structure 
 
To summarise the argument that will be made in this chapter, corporations continue to have the 
ability to challenge environmental protection measures before investment tribunals, and under 
the right circumstances they still stand a good chance of winning. It is sometimes implied that 
in the wake of the environmentally friendly awards in Methanex v. USA, Glamis Gold v. USA 
and Chemtura v. Canada, the risk to the environment has diminished, and that these awards 
have superseded the previous investor-friendly awards. For instance, M. Sornarajah claims that 
in comparison to the decision in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, the decision in Methanex in respect 
to expropriation “does change the law in the area significantly”.38 However, in 2012 the tribunal 
in Unglaube v. Costa Rica repeated verbatim the original interpretation of the law on 
expropriation in Santa Elena, and proved that the original investor-friendly interpretation had 
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not been consigned to history.39 Similarly, while Tecmed v. Mexico and Metalclad v. Mexico 
are often considered high points of investment protection, the investor-friendly principles 
espoused by the tribunals continue to be cited in more recent awards.40 As such, many of the 
legal principles of earlier awards still stand and have even been confirmed in recent cases, and 
it would be too optimistic an assessment to suggest that the law itself has changed in an 
environmentally friendly direction as a result of arbitral re-interpretation. Indeed, given the lack 
of precedence in international law the law should not be expected to change in a linear direction, 
absent changes to the treaties themselves. As such, this chapter will highlight areas of legal 
disagreement, but it should not be assumed that the interpretation of the law that allows for 
more regulatory freedom for states is the one that will be drawn upon in any particular pending 
environmental dispute. The rejection of the argument that there is a linear historical 
development from more investor-friendly to state-friendly awards also allows for a thematic 
rather than chronological structure to this chapter. 
 
Many who reject the proposition that environmental protection measures are at risk from 
investment arbitration would nevertheless not do so on the basis that the law has changed, but 
rather on the basis that the cases that were lost by states did not implicate genuine or legitimate 
environmental measures to begin with, while legal challenges to ‘proper’ environmental 
measures were rightly defeated. In this vein, Sanford Gaines suggests that the government 
actions in the early cases “were not truly environmental protection measures”, and Todd Weiler 
concurs that environmental protection was not actually “at the heart” of the early claims.41 On 
this basis, Charles Brower and Stephan Schill conclude that “while investment treaties establish 
rights only for foreign investors, they do not abolish the host state's regulatory powers […] 
[states] are not required to compensate foreign investors for the effects of bona fide, general 
regulations that further a legitimate purpose in a nondiscriminatory and proportionate way”.42 
This statement may well be true on its own terms, and a key aim behind this chapter is to 
investigate what understanding of the words ‘nondiscriminatory’, ‘proportionate’ and 
‘legitimate’ underpins this claim. In doing so, it agrees that the distinction between the 
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environmental cases where the companies won and lost lies primarily in the underlying 
characteristics of the cases themselves, as opposed to any significant changes in legal 
interpretation. 
 
This chapter therefore seeks to investigate both how wide or narrow an understanding of 
‘proportionate’ or ‘legitimate’ the proponents of investment arbitration are working with, as 
well as the claim that environmental defences simply act as an excuse for government measures 
actually taken for other reasons. Antony Crockett suggests that “a government may well use 
human rights or environmental laws in the manner of a ‘Trojan Horse’ – that is, in order to 
disguise measures that are harmful to an investment project but which lack genuine links to 
human rights or environmental concerns”.43 Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo similarly suggest 
that many investment disputes involve “mistreatment of unwary foreign investors, often blatant, 
but camouflaged in the much more palatable clothes of sacred environmental causes”.44 This 
argument mirrors a concern within international trade law about “green protectionism”, or the 
possibility that trade restrictions may be justified with environmental arguments even where 
the true intention lies elsewhere.45 In theory, this is not at all an implausible suggestion. Beyond 
protectionism in itself, it is often remarked upon that people on the left no longer possess an 
alternative economic logic with which to challenge global capitalism on ideological grounds (a 
position once held by socialism) and the language of environmental protection and human rights 
is one of the few languages people on the political left currently share. It would therefore not 
be surprising if wider objections to global capitalism were couched in terms of environmental 
protection. Furthermore, the protection of the environment or human rights constitute legitimate 
reasons for government measures even for those committed to a global capitalist world order, 
and since this includes most of the investment arbitrators that judge on these disputes 
governments are provided with an added incentive to dress up measures taken for other reasons 
in environmental clothing. The question of whether environmental language is merely used to 
justify government measures actually taken for other reasons is therefore a legitimate area of 
research – and indeed a question that will be considered in this and next chapter – but it should 
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also be emphasized that any concealed ‘true reasons’ for a regulation are not necessarily by 
default illegitimate. For instance, in a current case a corporation seeking to develop offshore 
wind power suggests that internal government communications have revealed that a Canadian 
moratorium was not ‘really’ motivated by a lack of scientific knowledge about the 
environmental harms (the project would have been the first large freshwater offshore wind farm 
anywhere in the world) but rather by the fact that the project would be more expensive than 
onshore alternatives.46 The corporation therefore implies that saving public money is a less 
legitimate reason for a government policy than environmental protection, or at least one on a 
less secure footing legally. 
 
It should nevertheless be made clear that the focus on environmental regulations does not imply 
that transnational corporations are inherently against the environment, nor that opposing social 
groups are inherently in favour of more environmental regulations. A few recent cases, in which 
corporations have brought legal challenges against states for not maintaining environmental 
protection laws, has prompted Anatole Boute to lament that the investment treaty regime’s 
“potentially positive role for improved environmental protection […] is only sporadically 
mentioned”.47 Similarly, Avidan Kent complains that “critics overlook the possibility that this 
system can also support sustainable development goals”.48 This may be a fair criticism against 
scholars who suggest that international investment law is inherently environmentally unfriendly, 
but this is not the argument pursued here. Corporations are concerned with their bottom-line, 
and in a world where environmental services and industries present profitable investment 
opportunities, corporations are also likely to seek recourse under investment treaties to protect 
such investments. The most prominent example of this is over 30 recent investment treaty 
challenges against Spain and the Czech Republic against changes, prompted by the financial 
crisis, that these countries have made to their often very generous subsidies for green energy.49 
To cite the CEO of Impax Asset Management, one of the investment funds that have recently 
sought compensation for Spain’s decision to cut subsidies for green energy: 
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“We don’t have an ethical mandate per se. […] We are often attractive for ethical 
investors, because what we do fits their objectives, but we also manage funds for 
investors who would say they are agnostic on ethical investing, at best! They’re 
attracted by exposure to a high growth area... They ought to be able to make good, 
if not better, returns in the long term from this area than from anything else”.50  
Contra Boute and Kent, the point is that the investment treaty regime does not “support 
sustainable development goals” any more than it directly threatens the environment – rather, it 
supports businesses, and their interests can lie either in states promoting or refraining from 
environmental regulations. In so far as green investments are a high growth area with high 
returns, we are likely to see more corporations challenge governmental measures that are 
negative towards the environment in the future, while in so far as corporations continue to find 
environmental regulations costly or cumbersome we are likely to see legal challenges against 
them. The argument here is therefore not that investment treaties place specifically 
environmental regulations at risk, but that corporations are striking down on any unfavourable 
government measures that are designed to support other social groups or social interests. 
 
Given disagreements on whether environmentally related investment disputes are actually 
about the environment at all, a clarification is nevertheless needed in respect to the selection of 
cases in this thesis. The cases selected for more detailed analysis are not only ones that arise 
out of definitely ‘legitimate’ environmental measures (on a narrow reading of the term), but all 
cases where environmental protection is cited as a reason for a disputed government measure. 
Included are also cases that arise out of environmental policies, environmental protests or that 
otherwise relate to the environment. However, it should be made clear that the specific selection 
of cases is not particularly important for the analysis that follows. There is no attempt at 
providing a representative view of the state of investment arbitration in respect to the 
environment – in any case an impossible task given that confidentiality is likely to render many 
cases unknowable – and the purpose is solely to provide a basis for more detailed analysis of 
the particular circumstances in which corporations can successfully challenge environmental 
regulations. Finally, a thorough engagement with the secondary literature on environmental and 
non-environmental cases alike ensures that no legal issues have been overlooked as a result of 
the selection of cases.  
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This chapter is not structured strictly according to the treatment standards found in the 
investment treaties themselves. This would be the conventional method for structuring work on 
this topic, and suitable for research concerned with legal interpretation of particular clauses. 
Treatment standards nevertheless often overlap. The ‘full protection and security’ standard has 
recently been interpreted to include legal security, and the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria rightly 
remarks that "[i]n this last respect, the standard becomes closely connected with the notion of 
fair and equitable treatment”. 51  Similarly, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ has often been 
interpreted to include a requirement of non-discrimination, and then the standard becomes very 
similar to the ‘national treatment’ and ‘most favoured nation treatment’ standards. 52 
Furthermore, the treatment standards themselves do not necessarily accurately portray the gist 
of what investment treaties actually protect corporations from in practice. Investment treaties 
do not contain a treatment standard that explicitly protects corporations from a change of 
circumstances, but with the arbitral innovation of the requirement to respect an investor’s 
‘legitimate expectations’, companies may be protected against certain types of change despite 
the lack of direct textual support for this proposition in most treaties.  
 
This chapter is therefore not structured directly according to treatment standards, but rather in 
terms of four broad umbrella categories that better explain the actual substance of what 
investment law protects corporations from. The decision to structure the chapter in terms of 
what investment treaties offer corporations “protection from” can nevertheless also seem like 
an odd choice of words for a critical study of investment arbitration. Other critics of the 
investment regime suggest that corporations use investment treaties as a ‘sword’ rather than a 
‘shield’ against government measures, and it would not be unreasonable to suggest “attack” as 
a more accurate description of how corporations make use of these treaties.53 ‘Protection’, in 
contrast, is the word used by the proponents of the regime – indeed, it is also the term used in 
the investment treaties themselves, the titles of which formally call for “the promotion and 
protection of investments”.54 From a critical standpoint it might therefore seem counterintuitive 
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to follow the proponents of the investment regime in adopting the term ‘protection’, but this is 
precisely what follows from the wider argument of this thesis. The previous chapter suggested 
that the investment law regime formed part of an emerging ‘transnational state’, within which 
national and supranational political structures often fulfill different functions for a transnational 
capitalist class. While national states continue to be important in furthering global capitalism 
more generally and the interests of particular corporations specifically, supranational 
institutions are instrumental in ‘locking in’ favourable policies and measures in the event of 
resistance from within national states. A transnational capitalist class therefore advances its 
interests within national states – or with the support of governments in those states – but often 
maintain their positions through institutions at the supranational level. In this context, 
investment treaties are not primarily used to further the interests of transnational corporations, 
but to ‘protect’ them against subsequent changes often prompted by resistance from subordinate 
groups within states. Most of the government measures challenged before investment tribunals 
are new environmental protection measures. In the parlance of advocates of the investment 
treaty regime, investment law is designed precisely to protect corporations from ‘political risk’ 
– the risk of new and unfavourable political changes introduced by a state.55 While corporations 
continue to commit their formidable lobbying powers to securing new business-friendly 
policies within national states as well as international institutions, investment treaties can help 
to ensure that changes occur in only one direction – new policies that are unfavourable to 
businesses can often be challenged before investment tribunals. This chapter therefore seeks to 
understand what investment treaties can protect corporations from. In contrast, the next chapter 
asks who such treaties offer protection from – new policies unfavourable to particular 
corporations have often been instigated by opposing social groups.  
 
Of the four broad categories that the investment regime protects corporations from, the first 
three broadly overlap with particular treaty standards but also include other treaty standards 
within their remit. The first category is protection from ‘discrimination’ on the basis of 
corporate nationality – this is essential in supporting a distinctly transnational capitalist class, 
and is the requirement most non-experts associate with investment treaties. The second category 
is protection against expropriation – essentially the protection of property rights widely 
conceived, an important element of what the legal and political superstructure of capitalism is 
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said to accomplish in Marxist theory. The third substantive area of protection is from 
‘unfairness’ – a term that a top arbitrator suggests is “intentionally vague” and “designed to 
give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules necessary to 
achieve the treaty’s object and purpose in particular disputes”.56 In practice this encapsulates 
anything objectionable in light of most treaties’ singular purpose of promoting foreign 
investment, but which does not fit under any of the other headings. The fourth category is 
protection from change – as suggested above, unfavourable changes are precisely what 
investment law as a whole seeks to protect investors from, but it is here used to capture changes 
that are not necessarily expropriatory, discriminatory or obviously unfair in character. These 
are the four categories that will be discussed in this section, but a fifth category has been 
consigned to the next chapter – protection from protests. There is an increasing tendency of 
corporations to contend that states have failed to accord corporations “full protection and 
security” from political protests, and particularly protests motivated by environmental concerns. 
This category nevertheless overlaps with the resistance that investment treaty disputes often 
arise out of, and is therefore discussed in the next chapter. The final section of the chapter will 
consider the consequences of state failure to protect corporations from the above measures, and 
in particular the question of the generous measure of compensation required within this body 
of international law. 
 
Each of the above sections will consider the relevant treaty standards and their legal 
interpretation, as well as their past applicability in investment disputes arising out of 
environmental protection measures. Some will also consider the utility of such protections in 
pending environmental disputes in order to further illustrate the circumstances under which 
investment treaties might benefit corporations. From the outset, it should finally be mentioned 
that each section considers only allegations relevant to that particular category. Most arbitral 
cases include several allegations that are legally independent of each other, and tribunals often 
award compensation to a corporation because a state has breached a particular standard, even 
if violations of the other treatment standards are not found. This chapter is therefore not 
structured case-by-case, but will deal with separate allegations under the appropriate headings. 
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Protection from ‘Discrimination’ 
 
When the Canadian parliament discussed proposals for cigarette plain packaging regulations in 
the late 1990s, one of the main U.S. negotiators of NAFTA appeared before a parliamentary 
committee on behalf of Philip Morris and RJR Reynolds in order to explain to surprised 
parliamentarians that NAFTA required more than simply equal treatment between US and 
Canadian tobacco corporations, and suggested that the plain packaging regulations under 
consideration may well fall foul of the other investment chapter requirements.57 Those other 
requirements will be discussed in the next sections, but what is notable about this episode is 
that Members of Parliament – normally more informed than the general public – had associated 
the investment chapter of NAFTA specifically with the obligation to treat foreign corporations 
equally with national corporations, and only with that obligation. If this is the one requirement 
that is commonly associated with international investment law, the question raised in this 
section is what that obligation demands in practice, and how corporations can utilize this 
obligation to challenge environmental protection measures that are disadvantageous to their 
business operations. 
 
Investment treaties almost all require states to offer corporations ‘national treatment’ and ‘most 
favoured nation treatment’. Some investment tribunals have suggested that ‘discrimination’ 
between investors of different nationalities is also a violation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
standard, and finally some scholars and tribunals suggest that national treatment is now a 
requirement under customary international law.58 While investment treaties normally refer to 
‘national treatment’ and ‘most favoured nation treatment’, investment tribunals as well as 
policy-makers and the academic literature normally speak of the above provisions as protecting 
corporations from ‘discrimination’.  This is a normatively loaded term, and it is surprising that 
even critics of investment treaties have adopted this language. Given the affinity with human 
rights discourse, there is immediately a normative presumption against discrimination. The 
decision as to whether to offer foreign corporations ‘national treatment’ would normally be 
conceived of as a policy choice, but the common practice of couching the debate in terms of 
‘protection from discrimination’ ensures that the policy is linguistically placed beyond normal 
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policy-making – few government officials would feel comfortable advocating discrimination. 
Enabled by the use of this language, the requirement to treat foreign corporations equally with 
domestic corporations has become a well-established principle both within the investment 
treaty regime and beyond. 
 
In practice this treaty requirement prohibits states from introducing policies that treat foreign 
corporations unfavourably in comparison with domestic corporations. Most obviously, this 
requirement would prohibit the protection of ‘infant industries’, which has been a hallmark of 
many development strategies adopted by countries in the past. 59  The effect of non-
discrimination is therefore not necessarily equitable in practice – where transnational 
corporations are considerably larger than domestic corporations, equal treatment can lead to the 
preservation of such differentials. Furthermore, for all the talk about non-discrimination as a 
principle, the ‘protection from discrimination’ provided by investment treaties is decidedly one-
sided – domestic corporations are often placed at a competitive disadvantage in comparison 
with foreign corporations, in that they are not entitled to recourse to arbitration or to any of the 
other treaty standards, such as fair and equitable treatment or protection from expropriation. 
Finally, some tribunals have determined that states have not only an obligation to refrain from 
discriminating against foreign corporations, but a positive obligation to engage in “proactive 
behavior” to “encourage and protect” foreign investors. 60  The combined effect of non-
discrimination together with additional rights for foreign corporations is, to cite an UNCTAD 
report, “positive discrimination in favour of foreign investors against domestic investors”.61 
The attempt of many commentators to latch onto non-discrimination as a positive value with 
affinity to human rights discourse is therefore decidedly one-sided. 
 
An environmental protection strategy that relied upon imposing more stringent environmental 
regulations on foreign corporations would be in obvious breach of the national treatment 
standard, even if this was to be justified in terms of the more advanced technology or access to 
resources that is often said to be the advantage of attracting foreign investment to developing 
countries. No such case has emerged, and given that the law on this topic is fairly clear, such a 
case would be unlikely to reach the stage of arbitration. The environmental cases in respect to 
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national treatment are rather ones in which the state claims that no discrimination has occurred, 
or where the state maintains that there are good environmental reasons for treating the foreign 
corporation differently and therefore that it is not in ‘like circumstances’ with the domestic 
comparator. Of the concluded environmental cases that serve as the basis for the analysis in this 
chapter, the one that most directly addresses this question is S.D. Myers v. Canada.  
 
S.D. Myers is an Ohio-based corporation involved in the disposal of hazardous waste, including 
PCB waste. Due to the risk to human health and the environment, the production of PCBs has 
been prohibited in both the USA and Canada for several decades, and more recently under 
international environmental treaties, but an existing stock of PCBs is still in use.62 In 1980 the 
U.S. closed its border with Canada to the import and export of PCBs. The investment chapter 
dispute arose after a long lobbying campaign by S.D. Myers, conducted within both countries, 
to have the border re-opened.63 Canada had already explicitly informed S.D. Myers that its 
policy was to destroy PCB waste domestically, but in 1995 the company finally met with some 
success in the U.S.64 The law prohibiting the import and export of PCBs remained in force, but 
instead the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (potentially concerned about lobbying on 
behalf of S.D. Myers by politicians with influence over the agency’s budget) issued a so-called 
‘enforcement discretion’ – imports of PCBs would remain in violation of U.S. law, but the 
Environmental Protection Agency committed itself not to enforce the ban.65 Canada had not 
introduced its own import and export ban, but as a result of the U.S. ban PCB waste had not 
been exported abroad for 15 years. The investment tribunal that was subsequently instituted in 
the case “accepts that [Canada’s] ministers and their officials were taken by surprise” by the 
new developments, and observed that a “period of intensive activity followed” as Canada 
considered the implications of the sudden opening of the border.66 
 
Canada’s response, and the measure that S.D. Myers alleged was in violation of investment law, 
was an ‘interim ban’ on PCB exports to allow time for a reconsideration of its own policy. 
Amongst others, Canada’s concerns included whether PCBs exported to the U.S. would be 
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disposed of in an environmentally safe manner (regulations differed between the two countries); 
whether the export of PCBs would be in compliance with the Basel Convention and its 
restrictions on the export of hazardous waste (the U.S. was not a party to the agreement); and 
whether the export of PCBs would influence the long-term financial viability of Canada’s 
domestic capacity for PCB disposal.67 By February 1997 Canada had nevertheless reached the 
conclusion that, with appropriate safeguards, the export of PCB waste could safely commence. 
The border nevertheless only remained open for a few months. Social and environmental NGOs 
had from the outset considered the enforcement discretion provided by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency “legally dubious”, and by July 1997 the U.S. again closed its side of the 
border in response to a lawsuit by an environmental group, the Sierra Club. 68 S.D. Myers 
brought the case to international arbitration, and the investment tribunal subsequently decided 
that Canada’s ‘interim ban’ had breached the national treatment standard and that Canada had 
to compensate S.D. Myers for its lost profits during a 15-month period from November 1995 
until the interim ban was lifted in February 1997.69 
 
Within the investment law literature, the S.D. Myers case is often presented as a classic instance 
of an environmental justification being used as a ‘Trojan horse’ for the introduction of a 
protectionist measure. 70  This, indeed, was essentially the tribunal’s own conclusion. The 
tribunal acknowledges that government motivation is often a “complex and multifaceted matter” 
and furthermore that “[u]ndoubtedly, there were legitimate concerns” that had motivated 
Canada in its introduction of the interim ban.71 The tribunal nevertheless concludes that the 
primary reason had not been concerns about less stringent PCB disposal standards in the U.S. 
or concerns about being in breach of the Basel Convention, but rather that the “policy was 
shaped to a very great extent by the desire and intent to protect and promote the market share 
of enterprises that would carry out the destruction of PCBs in Canada and that were owned by 
Canadian nationals”. 72  Even accepting the tribunal’s assessment that this was the primary 
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objective, it is notable that Canada itself had essentially acknowledged the first part of that 
statement – the protection of the domestic PCB treatment facility was explicitly one of the five 
reasons for the interim ban – but justified it precisely on environmental grounds. Canada 
claimed to be concerned with the long-term viability of its only domestic PCB treatment facility, 
a previously state-owned facility that it was clear would very quickly find itself in financial 
difficulty if exposed to competition from U.S. firms.73 Fearing a sudden U.S. closure of the 
border for imports of PCBs (as indeed happened in July 1997), Canada stressed the importance 
of ensuring that its only domestic treatment facility did not go out of business.  
 
The tribunal maintains that “there was no legitimate environmental reason for introducing the 
ban”, but it does acknowledge that there was “an indirect environmental objective – to keep the 
Canadian industry strong in order to assure a continued disposal capability”.74 The tribunal 
accepts that “[t]his was a legitimate goal, consistent with the policy objectives of the Basel 
Convention”.75 It nevertheless concludes that this objective “could have been achieved by other 
measures” and that “where a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental protection 
through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative 
that is most consistent with open trade”.76 The S.D. Myers case involves complex questions in 
respect to trade-related aspects of investment, but the equivalent in a non-trade-related 
investment dispute would be a requirement to assess the different policy measures that a state 
could conceivably take to address a particular (environmental) concern, and thereafter the 
obligation to choose the option that affects foreign investors least – a ‘least restrictive measures’ 
test. The tribunal in S.D. Myers acknowledged that the ultimate objective of ensuring domestic 
disposal capacity was legitimate, but decides that government subsidies would have 
accomplished the same objective with less adverse effects on S.D. Myers.77 Environmental 
NGOs have objected to this line of reasoning, and contend that the tribunal “appears to have 
been totally unaware of, or indifferent to, the economic context within which sustainable waste 
management regimes must be established” and imply that public expense should be a legitimate 
consideration in the development of environmental policy.78  
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What is particularly interesting about the tribunal’s conclusion is nevertheless the underlying 
premise of its decision vis-à-vis the underlying premise of the Basel Convention. Where the 
tribunal contends that Canada was “obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with 
open trade”, the Basel Convention is unique amongst international treaties in that it, on the 
contrary, discourages international trade in hazardous waste – it opens with the conviction that 
“hazardous wastes and other wastes should, as far as is compatible with environmentally sound 
and efficient management, be disposed of in the State where they were generated”.79 It is 
difficult to argue that the disposal of PCB waste in Canada would not be “compatible with 
environmentally sound and efficient management”,80 and therefore the basic premise of open 
trade espoused by the tribunal seems to conflict with the premise of avoidance of international 
trade in hazardous wastes that underpins the Basel Convention. 
 
Throughout the arbitral proceedings Canada maintained that it was only concerned with 
ensuring domestic disposal capacity in the face of an uncertain situation on the border, and that 
S.D. Myers would have been welcome to establish disposal facilities in Canada itself. The 
tribunal nevertheless further supported its argument that Canada had been primarily motivated 
by a discriminatory intent by reference to certain statements by a senior politician involved in 
the decision to introduce an interim ban. The tribunal emphasized an answer provided by the 
Minister for the Environment in response to a parliamentary question: “[i]t is still the position 
of the government that the handling of PCBs should be done in Canada by Canadians”, a 
statement that was repeated verbatim on a different occasion by the same Minister.81 The 
tribunal, in interpreting these two statements, suggests that Canada’s policy was not simply that 
PCB remediation should take place in Canada, but that it sought to protect the domestic 
corporation because it was Canadian. However, the tribunal itself cites the third occasion on 
which the same Minister uttered the controversial statement as follows: “We are meeting our 
obligations under the Basel Convention to dispose of our own PCBs […] The handling of PCBs 
should be done in Canada by Canadians. We have to take care of our own problems”.82 Given 
the context of the remark, the colloquial phrase “in Canada by Canadians” seems primarily 
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intended to emphasize that Canadians should take care of their own problems and not to export 
them abroad – the very reason why the Basel Convention was first established – but to the 
investment tribunal this constitutes further evidence that the policy was illegitimately designed 
to protect the Canadian corporation. To scholars of international investment law, the case serves 
as evidence of the ‘blatant mistreatment’ that can befall foreign investors when state officials 
decide to “camouflage[…] [protectionism] in the much more palatable clothes of sacred 
environmental causes”.83 
 
The S.D. Myers case is an interesting example of how an investment tribunal has assessed the 
illegitimacy of a measure that the state in question maintained was taken to protect the 
environment. Canada had maintained that S.D. Myers was not in ‘like circumstances’ with the 
Canadian competitor; only S.D. Myers would be engaged in cross-border trade of PCBs, and it 
is this practice that would have environmental implications. The tribunal at various points in 
the award acknowledges these concerns and does not contest that Canada should have acted to 
address them, but finds Canada at fault for not having chosen the policy option that was least 
restrictive for the foreign investor. 84  This conclusion may itself restrict the scope for 
environmental protection, but what deserves emphasis is also the fact that Canada, of course, 
had eventually come to precisely the decision to open the border of its own accord. The interim 
ban was lifted safely within the two years required by Canadian law, and exports of PCBs 
proceeded until the U.S. closed its side of the border. The measure that the investment tribunal 
found inconsistent with NAFTA was an interim ban designed to provide the breathing space 
required to assess the options and to put in place appropriate safeguards – safeguards that the 
tribunal itself acknowledges were necessary for the environment to be protected. The tribunal, 
in awarding S.D. Myers compensation for lost profits for the full period of the interim ban 
essentially concludes that Canada should have immediately assessed the options and adopted 
the right course of action. The tribunal’s decision that an environmental measure has to be not 
just reasonable in light of the environmental objective, but the measure to affect the investor 
least, as well as its lack of appreciation for the time needed to consider policy options required 
of a new situation, both suggest that states may have to walk a very fine line in their adoption 
of policies that affect foreign investors if they are to escape an investment treaty challenge. 
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The prohibition on ‘discrimination’ is the one aspect of investment treaties that non-specialists 
seem to be aware of, but the actually existing cases reveal that the determination of what 
‘discrimination’ involves in practice is far from straight-forward. The S.D. Myers case is the 
only concluded environmental case where the question of ‘discrimination’ has been central to 
the analysis,85 but other cases have been lost on jurisdictional grounds or are still pending. For 
instance, Windstream Energy suggests that the decision of the Canadian province of Ontario to 
introduce a moratorium on offshore wind energy is discriminatory, because onshore wind 
energy has not been subject to a similar moratorium. Similarly, Pacific Rim and the Commerce 
Group have objected that El Salvador’s decision not to permit gold mining on environmental 
grounds is discriminatory because “other industries whose operations raise similar 
environmental concerns, such as power plants, dams, ports, and fishing operations”, have been 
permitted to continue.86 In response to such allegations, states present explanations for any 
differential treatment that are, at least on the face of it, reasonable.87 It remains to be seen 
whether such defences meet the more exacting standards of investment arbitrators, who tend to 
be very attentive to the first whiff of protectionism. The only concluded case suggests that 
companies have considerable leeway to challenge state measures, where alternative measures 
are available with a lesser impact on the investor or where unguarded political statements in 
any way implicate a company’s foreign origin. 
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Protection From Expropriation 
 
If the ‘non-discrimination’ requirements are what many associate with investment treaties today, 
it is nevertheless the expropriation provision that was initially the main justification for the 
treaties. In the immediate post-colonial period from the 1950s–1970s, many newly independent 
countries in the developing world engaged in large-scale nationalizations of foreign-owned 
property, often as part of an economic strategy to address the continued dominance of the 
recently departed colonial masters and the effects of what Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah 
termed ‘neo-colonialism’. 88  As already explored in the previous chapter, this period also 
involved various UN initiatives by Third World countries to change the international laws in 
respect to expropriation towards a less demanding standard of compensation.89 The first modern 
Bilateral Investment Treaties were drafted during this period, largely at the initiative of business 
actors, and sought to establish that full compensation was indeed due for expropriation.  
 
Most provisions of investment treaties concern state measures that are deemed illegitimate and 
unlawful on their own terms – ‘discrimination’, unfair or inequitable treatment, lack of 
protection and security – and in this respect expropriations are the exception; they are not on 
their own either unlawful or illegitimate. Expropriations of property take place for all sorts of 
legitimate public purposes. To cite the tribunal in the non-environmental case Azurix v. 
Argentina, “the issue is not so much whether [a state measure that affects the property rights of 
an investor] is legitimate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure that, being 
legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to a compensation claim”.90 If the 
government measure in question is found to constitute an expropriation, the answer is ‘yes’. To 
be lawful, an expropriation has to be both for a legitimate public purpose and accompanied with 
full compensation for the affected company.91 Direct formal expropriations as part of large-
scale nationalization programs are nevertheless rare today, and most current investment treaty 
disputes concern the question raised in the Azurix statement – how to distinguish between 
legitimate public interest measures that are compensable from those that are not. By the wording 
                                                             
88 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism (original 1965), available at 
{https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/neo-colonialism/introduction.htm} accessed 27 March 2015. 
89 See Andrew Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 38 (1997-1998), pp. 639-688. 
90 Azurix v. Argentina, Award, para. 310. 
91 For example, the relevant clause in NAFTA Chapter 11 reads “No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize 
or expropriate an investment […] except (a) for a public purpose […] and (d) on payment of compensation” (my 
emphasis). North American Free Trade Agreement (adopted 17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 
1994), Chapter 11, Article 1110. 
138 
 
of most investment treaties, expropriation includes not only formal dispossession of an 
investor’s property, but also state measures deemed to ‘indirectly’ expropriate an investor’s 
property – and then the question is how to distinguish between what are sometimes called 
‘regulatory takings’ from non-compensable regulations. This section will first address the 
question of direct expropriations that have been undertaken for the purpose of environmental 
protection, before delving into the thorny question of how to distinguish between an 
expropriation and other state measures that adversely affect investors. 
 
Direct Expropriation  
 
Francisco Orrego Vicuña, a frequent arbitrator of investment disputes, suggests that disputes in 
respect to direct expropriations are now “quite exceptional”.92 It is significant that the only two 
environmental cases that concern a direct expropriation for an environmental purpose do not 
revolve around questions about whether compensation is required – or even the standard of 
compensation – but simply disputes about how much full compensation amounts to under the 
circumstances of each case. The first case, Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, arose from a 1978 
expropriation decree of land adjacent to a national park on which the foreign investor had 
planned to develop a tourist resort.93 Costa Rica maintained that the expansion of the national 
park was required to “maintain stable populations of large feline species such as pumas and 
jaguars”, as well as for other environmental purposes. 94  The investor did not dispute the 
expropriation decree itself, but was dissatisfied with Costa Rica’s assessment of the value of 
the property, and a 20-year long legal battle followed within Costa Rica’s domestic courts.  
 
The tribunal that was eventually instituted in the case accepts the legitimacy of the underlying 
environmental purpose and also explicitly refrains from taking a position on which party is at 
fault for the long delay in resolving the issue of compensation.95 In proceeding to once and for 
all settle the issue, the award makes an important statement in respect to the relationship 
between the environmental purpose and the standard of compensation: 
“While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a 
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property 
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was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking […] The international source of the 
obligation to protect the environment makes no difference. […] Expropriatory 
environmental measures—no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a 
whole—are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state 
may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even 
for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s 
obligation to pay compensation remains”.96 
While Costa Rica accepted that fair market value compensation was required, it had submitted 
detailed evidence on the environmental importance of the expropriation and its obligations 
under international environmental law – presumably on the expectation that this would reduce 
the compensation required – but the tribunal here explicitly rejected the relevance of 
environmental considerations for the measure of compensation.97 This is indeed in line with the 
language of most investment treaties. 
 
A particularly interesting aspect of this case is the question of payment of interest. The tribunal, 
despite refraining from making any judgement on which party is at fault for the long delays, 
decided against simple interest in favour of compound interest. This is where the tribunal would 
have had an element of discretion to take what it acknowledged was a legitimate environmental 
purpose into account. Indeed, the tribunal even acknowledged that had it followed standard 
practice the amount of compensation would have been reduced; the tribunal observed that there 
is “a tendency in international jurisprudence to award only simple interest” but noted that 
“compound interest certainly is not unknown or excluded in international law”.98 Given the 
long legal battle that had taken place in Costa Rica’s own courts, this made a substantial 
difference in the compensation that Costa Rica had to provide to the investor – a property 
bought by the investor for a modest USD 395,000 in 1970 had, according to the tribunal, 
acquired the full market value of USD 4.2 million by the time of the expropriation in 1978 (a 
figure exactly half-way between the investor’s assessment and Costa Rica’s).99 However, with 
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compound interest Costa Rica eventually had to pay the investor a full USD 16 million to fulfill 
its goal of expanding the national park.100 
 
The more recent case of Unglaube v. Costa Rica is very similar to the Santa Elena case.101 The 
dispute stems from another expropriation of beachfront property, and the tribunal goes to great 
lengths to acknowledge what it clearly deems a laudable decision to protect “one of the world’s 
most important nesting sites for the highly endangered leatherback turtle”.102 It nevertheless 
proceeds to cite verbatim the conclusion in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica that “[e]xpropriatory 
environmental measures – no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – are, in 
this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies,” namely that the measure of compensation is not affected by any 
environmental considerations.103  
 
Most investment treaties make clear that an expropriation has to be both for a public purpose 
as well as accompanied by full compensation, but what is uncontroversial legally should 
perhaps not be so uncontroversial politically. Both of the above cases concerned relatively small 
tourism developments, and Costa Rica did not struggle with payment of the awards and is 
sufficiently concerned about environmental protection (upon which its tourism industry relies) 
to also be willing to pay the price. However, in other circumstances this legal provision can 
have a considerable impact on the possibility of states to expropriate property for environmental 
purposes, and it is surprising that even environmentally inclined civil society organizations like 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development so readily accepts the law in this 
respect.104 The question of the assessment of compensation will be considered in the final 
section of this chapter, but two things should be reiterated here. Firstly, full market value 
compensation by definition includes a consideration of the profits the company could have 
made – it is not only designed to compensate the company for its direct losses.105 Secondly, the 
assessment of the market value of a profitable or promising business venture can be enormous. 
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When Harken Energy reportedly sought $57 billion from Costa Rica for what it alleged was an 
indirect expropriation of its oil concessions (ultimately unsuccessful on jurisdictional grounds), 
it was probably not kidding – it may well have put forward an over-optimistic assessment of 
the value of the concessions, but it was not an entirely unreasonable claim.106 The market value 
of projects in the natural resources and oil sectors have often been found to range in the billions. 
To say that an expropriation has to be both for a public purpose and accompanied with full 
market value compensation – and that environmental considerations will not influence the 
measure of compensation in any respect – is plausibly a considerable disincentive against 
expropriating property for many states. No such case has emerged to date, but neither should 
one perhaps be expected to; if the law is fairly self-evident, then disputes would be more likely 
to be settled out of court, or avoided altogether as states refrain from introducing prohibitively 
expensive expropriatory measures to begin with. 
 
Indirect Expropriation 
 
The above two Costa Rican cases show that disputes in respect to direct expropriations continue 
to arise, but today companies are far more likely to challenge what are variously described as 
‘indirect expropriations’, ‘measures tantamount to expropriation, or (borrowing from U.S. law) 
‘regulatory takings’. The law in respect to direct expropriations is fairly clear, but the law in 
respect to indirect expropriations is, to cite a prominent arbitrator, on the contrary “clearly 
ambiguous”.107 This difficulty stems in part from the fact that the definition of ‘property’ that 
can be expropriated is, to cite another prominent arbitrator and one of the main negotiators of 
NAFTA, “enormously broad”.108 In the investment treaty context ‘property’ involves not only 
material possessions or land, but essentially all rights and interests that have monetary value, 
and the only real limit is the imagination of corporate lawyers.109 Philip Morris, in a currently 
pending case, is alleging that Australia is “expropriating its valuable intellectual property” 
through its cigarette plain packaging legislation. 110  Ethyl Corporation maintained that a 
legislative debate in the Canadian Parliament – which had provided negative publicity of the 
health effects of the gasoline additive MMT – was an “expropriation of the goodwill” of the 
                                                             
106 Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration’, p. 618 – 621. 
107 Yves Fortier & Stephen Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It 
When I See It, or Caveat Investor’, ICSID Review, 19:2 (2004), p. 326. 
108 Daniel Price, ‘Chapter 11 – Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or 
Safety Valve?’, Canada-United States Law Journal, 26 (2000), p. 109. 
109 Ibid, p. 109. 
110 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia, Notice of Arbitration (21 November 2011), para. 1.5. 
142 
 
company.111 What a tribunal would have made of this is unclear, but the settlement agreement 
included a Canadian public statement that MMT is not harmful after all – presumably to restore 
the company’s ‘goodwill’ – in addition to monetary compensation.112 
 
While the definition of ‘property’ is sufficiently open-ended as to invite many innovative legal 
interpretations, the thornier legal question is how to determine what kind of interference with 
such property rights constitutes an ‘indirect expropriation’. After all, governments take 
measures that affect property rights all the time – indeed, general taxation would fulfill that 
criteria, but is not normally deemed to constitute an expropriation. The investment law literature 
commonly distinguishes between three different approaches towards determining when a 
government measure amounts to expropriation.113 Each approach has been adopted by different 
investment tribunals, and which approach is adopted is critical for understanding the extent to 
which corporations can challenge environmental regulations as expropriatory. Firstly, the ‘sole 
effects’ approach declares that any substantial interference with an investor’s property 
constitutes an expropriation, regardless of either the nature of the government measure or the 
purpose behind it. Secondly, the ‘police powers’ approach contends that government measures 
that fulfill certain criteria (notably in terms of public purpose and the nature of the measure) do 
not constitute an indirect expropriation even if the economic effect on the investor is 
considerable. Thirdly, the ‘proportionality’ approach takes both the effect of the measure as 
well as the nature or intent behind the measure into consideration, and seeks to assess whether 
the public benefits of a regulation is proportional to the economic impact on the company. Each 
approach has its advocates amongst investment tribunals, arbitrators and the investment law 
academic literature, and there is not yet a clear consensus on which approach is most suitable. 
Due to this legal uncertainty, and given that the choice of approach determines the extent to 
which states will be required to compensate investors for environmental regulations, each 
approach will be considered here in detail. 
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The first approach is the ‘sole effects’ approach. In recent debates on the Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership the European Commission has expressed a noticeable annoyance 
with critics who suggest that companies can bring investment treaty challenges to seek 
compensation for profits lost as a result of government measures.114 The European Commission 
insists that companies cannot “sue successfully just because their profits might be affected” and 
is indeed correct to point out that a violation of an investment treaty provision is required.115 
However, the European Commission’s further rejection of such claims as instances of 
“scaremongering” and “dystopian caricature” is to take the point too far.116 While companies 
cannot sue just because their profits are affected, they can sue just because those profits are 
sufficiently affected – this is precisely what the ‘sole effects’ approach to the expropriation 
provision entails. The other investment treaty standards allow corporations to sue for lesser 
interferences with property, but only if they can be shown to be discriminatory, unfair, etc. In 
contrast, when the ‘sole effects’ approach is adopted the expropriation clause allows 
corporations to sue whenever profits are affected, but only if that effect is sufficiently 
substantial. 
 
The ‘sole effects’ approach, a term coined by Rudolf Dolzer, has often been considered to be 
the dominant or ‘orthodox’ approach towards the determination of whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred.117 To cite Todd Weiler, according to this approach an expropriation 
includes “all measures that have the effect of substantially interfering with an investment”.118 
The distinguishing characteristic of the ‘sole effects’ approach is, to cite the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, that “[t]he intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures 
on the owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference is less important than the 
reality of their impact”.119  In many ways, the ‘sole effects’ doctrine is the most logically 
consistent of the three approaches. Rosalyn Higgins, formerly a judge on the International Court 
of Justice, is widely cited in this respect: “Is not the State in both cases (that is, either by a 
taking for a public purpose, or by regulation) purporting to act in the common good? And in 
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each case has the owner of the property not suffered loss? Under international law standards, a 
regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and effect) to a taking, would need to be ‘for a 
public purpose’ […] [a]nd just compensation would be due”. 120  In essence, a direct 
expropriation requires compensation despite the fact that it was taken for a public purpose, in a 
non-discriminatory manner, and in accordance with due process. Correspondingly, why would 
a regulatory measure that had the same effect on the investor be exempt from the compensation 
requirement just because it was taken for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner and 
in accordance with due process? 
 
A number of investment tribunals have expressed support for this proposition, but the only 
environmental case in this respect is Metalclad v. Mexico. 121  The tribunal in Metalclad 
maintained that expropriation includes not only “deliberate and acknowledged takings of 
property” but also “covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host 
State”.122  Two government measures were deemed to have individually both violated the 
expropriation provision: the municipality’s decision to deny a construction permit for the 
hazardous waste landfill; and the decision to make the entire area into an ecological preserve 
for rare species of cacti. The analysis of the first expropriatory act of denying a construction 
permit was largely based on the prior finding of a denial of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and 
will be discussed elsewhere. 123  However, the legal analysis in respect to the second 
expropriatory measure is more significant in terms of the ‘sole effects’ approach, and was 
deemed ‘in and of itself’ to constitute an expropriation.124 In introducing the ecological preserve, 
the municipality did not issue an expropriation decree for the investor’s landfill but simply 
regulations to protect the environment – most notably to forbid any potentially polluting 
activities – that would nevertheless most likely have made the hazardous waste landfill 
impossible to operate in the area.125 In doing so, the tribunal maintained that it “need not decide 
or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree” in order to 
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determine that an expropriation had occurred.126 Since this is the most clear-cut case where the 
‘sole effects’ approach was adopted in an environmental case, the expropriation analysis raised 
concern amongst groups such as the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD). 
However, this was less because of the actual determination that an expropriation had occurred 
– the IISD implies that the nature of the measure was such that compensation should be due, 
and indeed the case bears similarities to the Costa Rican cases except for the lack of a formal 
expropriation decree and the offer of compensation.127 The objection is rather that the legal 
analysis was deemed to set a dangerous precedent if applied in other circumstances.  
 
If the ‘sole effects’ doctrine is adopted in another environmental case, it is clear, to cite Dolzer, 
that the exclusive focus on the effect of a given government measure in the ‘sole effects’ 
approach “leaves no room for an argument that the environmental purpose of a governmental 
action and the concern for the environmental value to be protected by the measure should enter 
into the legal process of deciding whether or not a taking has occurred”.128 As such, if the ‘sole 
effects’ approach is adopted, the primary difficulty lies in identifying a threshold for an 
expropriation. The threshold issue did not emerge in Metalclad; the hazardous waste landfill 
could not operate at all within the ecological preserve, and the effect on the investment was 
absolute. The legal literature is nevertheless clear on the fact that the effect on a corporation’s 
property need not be total, yet it does need to be substantial, yet substantial is nowhere defined.  
 
Addressing specifically the question of when an environmental regulation can amount to an 
indirect expropriation, Francisco Orrego Vicuña, one of the world’s most prominent and 
experienced arbitrators, suggests that a regulation ‘crosses the line’ to become an expropriation 
if the investment is no longer “capable of earning a reasonable return”.129 It is therefore clear 
that an environmental regulation that wiped out the profits on a particular investment would 
constitute an expropriation according to the ‘sole effects’ approach. Orrego Vicuña thereafter 
suggests that environmental regulations would nevertheless rarely result in an expropriation, 
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because the cost of complying with environmental regulations is normally fairly low – at most 
1-3 % of the investment.130 Vicuna concludes that “[n]o reasonable regulation with a one-to-
three percent incidence would be subject to an international claim. It is another matter altogether 
where the incidence might reach high percentages of the investment, seriously diminish its 
returns, or wipe the investment out entirely”.131 Of the concluded environmental cases, the 
tribunal in Glamis Gold v. USA directly addressed the question of the appropriate threshold. 
The tribunal did not adopt the ‘sole effects’ doctrine, but it nevertheless stated that the effect of 
the measure was the starting point regardless of the approach used – without a substantial effect 
no expropriation could have occurred.132 The proposed investment involved the development 
of an open-pit gold mine in California, and the dispute concerned new regulations that required 
the backfilling of all open-pit mineral mines. Glamis Gold alleged that this made the project 
uneconomical and therefore constituted an indirect expropriation of its investment, but the 
tribunal engaged in a careful cost analysis and found that with the gold price at the time of the 
alleged expropriation the backfilling requirements would have involved a reduction of 
anticipated profits from USD 49 million to USD 28-29 million.133 While a substantial reduction, 
the tribunal deemed this not to have reached the threshold for an expropriation – especially 
given the possibility of an even better return in the future with improved technology and 
increased gold prices (the gold price was already significantly higher by the time the tribunal 
issued its award).134 This finding pleased some civil society organizations, and the International 
Institute of Sustainable Development noted that such a high threshold for a finding of 
expropriation was “extremely significant”.135 However, it is still not clear precisely how much 
an investment’s anticipated profits would have to be reduced before an expropriation was found 
to have occurred – or if other tribunals will agree with the ‘high threshold’ of the Glamis Gold 
tribunal in this respect. 
 
The indirect expropriation provision was initially the one that had raised most concerns in 
respect to the effect on environmental regulations, and particular concerns had been raised that 
a ‘sole effects’ interpretation thereof would be adopted in Methanex v. USA or Chemtura v. 
Canada, two cases that both concerned the prohibition of certain toxic or environmentally 
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hazardous substances. Here the regulations prohibiting the substances in question did indeed 
wipe out the companies’ investments in those substances, and according to the ‘sole effects’ 
approach the prohibitions would consequently have amounted to expropriations. To cite the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, the expropriation clause would thereby 
turn “the ‘polluter pays’ principle of environmental management, established by the OECD in 
1972, into a ‘pay the polluter’ principle”.136 However, tribunals have not yet adopted the ‘sole 
effects’ approach in the worst case scenarios where it was most feared that they would.  
 
The second approach is the ‘police powers’ approach. That the right to regulate is within a 
state’s ‘police powers’ is recognized also by the ‘sole effects’ doctrine, but within that approach 
a legitimate regulation is precisely one that involves only a lesser interference with foreign 
companies’ profits. In contrast, scholars and arbitrators who adopt the ‘police powers’ approach 
contend that some regulatory measures are carved out from the definition of expropriation 
irrespective of the effect on the investment. To cite Yves Fortier and Stephen Drymer’s 
description of this approach, “a legitimate public purpose may, in certain circumstances, in and 
of itself suffice to cast a measure as being in the nature of the normal exercise of police powers, 
and hence non-compensable, regardless of the magnitude of its effect on an investment”.137 
This approach substantially limits the extent to which companies can challenge government 
measures taken to protect the environment – in addition to evidence of substantial interference 
with the investment, a company will also have to show that a measure is by its nature or intent 
not a legitimate public purpose regulation. 
 
Howard Mann, of the International Institute of Sustainable Development, contends that this had 
been the conventional approach until it was “threatened [when] the notion of ‘regulatory takings’ 
from American jurisprudence was transposed onto Chapter 11 of NAFTA”.138 In doing so, 
Mann implies that customary international law had previously not recognized ‘regulatory 
takings’ as instances of expropriation, and that the ‘sole effects’ approach had only come into 
use with the emergence of a treaty-based body of international investment law. Within at least 
one such treaty negotiation, textual language to support the ‘police powers’ interpretation of 
expropriation had been explicitly considered in the form of a confirmation that states need not 
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“pay compensation for losses which an investor or investment may incur through regulation, 
revenue raising and other normal activity in the public interest undertaken by governments”.139 
This statement was nevertheless not included in the treaty, presumably because it was deemed 
to unfavourable towards companies, but it would have captured the essence of the ‘police 
powers’ approach: the notion of an indirect expropriation still exists, but general regulations 
and “other normal activity in the public interest” is excluded from that definition. 
 
The ‘police powers’ approach has been adopted in two high profile environmental cases under 
NAFTA. The classic case in this respect is Methanex v. USA, in which the company sought 
USD 970 million in compensation for California’s decision to phase out the gasoline additive 
MTBE.140 This gasoline additive is highly soluble and easily contaminates groundwater, and 
while the health effects are contested, the water tastes like turpentine at even very low levels. 
MTBE contamination forced the closure of public drinking water wells in many parts of 
California; Santa Monica, for instance, lost almost half of its drinking water supply as a result 
of contamination. 141  The California Senate adopted a bill to investigate the matter and 
commissioned the University of California to compile a report, which subsequently formed the 
basis for the decision to phase out MTBE. In a classic statement, the tribunal that was 
constituted to hear Methanex’ complaints declared that “a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, 
a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given”.142 This is the essence of the ‘police powers’ approach, and a 
similar interpretation was found in Chemtura v. Canada. In this case the company challenged 
Canada’s decision to prohibit the pesticide lindane, which had been found to have significant 
occupational health risks for agricultural workers as well as other environmental risks.143 The 
tribunal that was constituted in the case concluded that the environmental agency “took 
measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing 
awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the environment. A 
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measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the State’s police powers and, 
as a result, does not constitute an expropriation”.144 
 
The ‘police powers’ approach, where adopted by a tribunal, clearly restricts the extent to which 
a company can seek compensation for costly environmental regulations. However, even this 
approach presents certain hurdles for states engaging in environmental protection. A key feature 
of the ‘police powers’ approach is the emphasis on the nature of the regulation and the 
regulatory process – the regulation needs to be non-discriminatory, taken for a public purpose, 
and in accordance with due process. The prohibitions on MTBE and lindane had both passed 
these tests, but the tribunals’ analyses in this respect suggest that such requirements can, in 
other circumstances, make environmental regulations susceptible to investment treaty 
challenges even under the ‘police powers’ approach. The tribunals in Methanex and Chemtura 
both took these criteria very seriously, engaged in a thorough assessment of the facts, and were 
clearly impressed by both the states’ regulatory motives and the fairness of the regulatory 
processes. It has already been argued that the ‘non-discrimination’ requirement can affect 
environmental regulations, and the due process requirements will be considered in more detail 
in the next section, but it is striking that the tribunals in both Methanex and Chemtura are clearly 
sympathetic towards the regulatory intent behind the government measures, and at times seem 
visibly annoyed with the companies’ decisions to challenge them. In Methanex, the tribunal 
devoted over 50 pages of the award to a discussion of the scientific evidence underlying the 
phase-out of MTBE.145 While Methanex maintained that the measure constituted a “sham” or 
“pseudo” environmental measure, the tribunal concluded that the University of California report 
that underpinned the decision to phase out MTBE reflected “a serious, objective and scientific 
approach to a complex problem”.146 While Methanex had described the report as flawed and 
underfunded (it had a budget of USD 500,000 and involved more than 60 researchers), the 
tribunal was clearly impressed with the study itself and emphasized that the report was 
furthermore “subjected at the time to public hearings, testimony and peer-review” and had 
“emerge[d] as a serious scientific work from such an open and informed debate”. 147  The 
tribunal acknowledged that “it is possible for other scientists and researchers to disagree in good 
                                                             
144 Chemtura v. Government of Canada, Award, para. 266. 
145 Moloo & Jacinto, ‘Environmental and Health Regulation’, p.26; Methanex v. USA, Final Award of the 
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, part III, chapter A, pp. 1-52. 
146 Methanex v. USA, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, part III, chapter A, para. 41; part 
IV, chapter B, para. 26; part III, chapter A, para. 101. 
147 Methanex v. USA, Notice of Arbitration, p. 6; Methanex v. USA, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction 
and Merits, part III, chapter A, para. 3; part III, chapter A, para. 101. 
150 
 
faith with certain of its methodologies, analyses and conclusions”, but this was not sufficient to 
invalidate the report and in any case the tribunal was “much impressed by the scientific expert 
witnesses presented by the USA and tested under cross-examination by Methanex […] [and] 
accepts without reservation these experts’ conclusions”.148 Similarly, in Chemtura the tribunal 
acknowledged that it could not “ignore the fact that lindane has raised increasingly serious 
concerns both in other countries and at the international level since the 1970s” and that “there 
is ample evidence that the use of lindane caused genuine concerns, both in Canada and 
abroad”.149 It concluded that the prohibition on lindane met the ‘police powers’ test both in 
respect to the regulatory conduct and the validity of the underlying environmental motive.  
 
Within the investment law literature, the tribunals in these two cases are widely praised for their 
sensitivity to environmental concerns, and scholars commend the arbitrators for their “capacity 
[…] for reasoned and informed analysis of technical and scientific issues”.150 However, such a 
thorough engagement of the tribunals with the scientific basis for a government measure may 
also suggest a strong preference for environmental measures taken on solid scientific grounds. 
Indeed, David Gantz suggests that under the ‘police powers’ approach, tribunals face “[t]he 
most difficult task […] [of] devising a methodology for determining whether the scientific 
justification for regulatory action is sufficient to bring the action within the ‘police power’ 
exception”. 151  The assessment of whether a scientific justification is ‘sufficient’ brings 
investment tribunals into thorny territory, and it is not yet certain how such questions will be 
resolved in cases where the scientific basis is less conclusive than in Methanex or Chemtura.  
 
Two questions are likely to become especially important in this respect. Firstly, what level of 
scientific certainty is required? While it is implausible that tribunals will demand full certainty, 
the question is how strong the science will have to be. For instance, will tribunals be 
sympathetic towards environmental protection measures adopted on the basis of the 
‘precautionary principle’? Secondly, in cases where the science is inconclusive, what kind of 
process will tribunals expect states to go through before adopting regulations? In Methanex, the 
tribunal seems less concerned with the science itself than with the process, and it is precisely 
the impressive effort of commissioning a University of California study that the tribunal pays 
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most attention to. Such a thorough procedure might not be commonly applied in all countries 
as part of the regulatory process, and the question is whether investment tribunals will be less 
impressed by environmental measures introduced in the absence of such a scientific assessment. 
Indeed, similar cases within international trade law suggest that this is not an unfounded 
concern. The Beef Hormones case before the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade 
Organization, brought by the U.S. against the European Communities, concerns a prohibition 
on imports of beef from cattle raised with artificial growth hormones. The trade panel found 
that the European Communities’ import prohibition was not based on an adequate assessment 
of the scientific risk, and stressed the fact that the preambles of the EU regulations did not 
invoke any scientific studies and that the panel had not been presented with evidence that such 
studies had “actually been taken into account” in introducing the import prohibition.152 It also 
determined that the scientific studies invoked by the EU did not themselves conclude that the 
use of hormones was unsafe “if used in accordance with good practice”, and therefore the EU 
regulations could not have been ‘based on’ these studies. 153  This case therefore contrasts 
directly with Methanex, in which the tribunal concluded that the phase-out of MTBE had been 
directly based on the conclusions of the University of California report.154 The Beef Hormones 
case is clearly not directly applicable here – the relevant trade law provisions do not exist in 
investment treaties – but it does reveal some of the difficulties that can emerge if investment 
tribunals were to similarly question not just the validity of the science itself, but also whether 
environmental regulations were actually based on that science. Assessments of the alleged 
scientific basis behind possibly expropriatory measures are likely to re-emerge in future cases. 
Indeed, such claims are already raised in pending arbitrations – for example, in the Philip Morris 
case the tobacco company contends that Australia lacks sufficient scientific evidence that plain 
cigarette packaging reduces the incidence of smoking.155 
 
The two cases where the ‘police powers’ approach to expropriation have been applied are both 
ones where the tribunals were clearly sympathetic to the regulatory measures under 
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consideration. Indeed, they are also cases where the tribunals appear decidedly unsympathetic 
towards the investors. Weiler observes that Methanex had “apparently vexed” the tribunal 
throughout the arbitral proceedings and that the tribunal was “clearly upset” by some of its 
conduct.156 The tribunal in Chemtura similarly dismisses some of the company’s arguments as 
“obviously unfounded” and criticizes its “elusive behaviour”, finally concluding that Canada’s 
conduct did not “even come close” to breaching investment treaty standards.157 The previous 
chapter nevertheless argued that arbitrators have both a financial incentive to favour investors, 
as well as the commercial law background that would in any case make them prone to investor-
friendly findings, and it should perhaps be expected that the public purpose invoked would need 
to be fairly convincing to trump the inherent tendency to favour investor rights. While the 
‘police powers’ approach therefore clearly allows more scope for the introduction of new 
environmental regulations than the ‘sole effects’ doctrine, it includes potentially restrictive 
criteria that will continue to enable corporations to challenge environmental measures as 
expropriatory. 
 
The ‘police powers’ approach in Methanex and Chemtura has been well received in 
environmental advocacy circles, but it has found critics within international investment law. 
Barnali Choudhury contends that “the Methanex line of reasoning broadens the scope of the 
police-powers exception beyond the texts of most investment treaties”,158 and Todd Weiler 
similarly claims that the Methanex tribunal “staked a position that will have undoubtedly 
delighted the NGOs […] while confounding most experts on the customary international law 
of expropriation […] [the legal text] simply cannot be reconciled with the Tribunal's finding”.159 
The expropriation provision in most treaties define the term as including both direct and indirect 
expropriation, and then specifies that an expropriation of either kind of has to be of a certain 
nature (non-discriminatory and in accordance with due process) and of a certain motive (public 
purpose), and in addition also accompanied with compensation. Within the ‘police powers’ 
approach some regulations are not deemed to constitute expropriations to begin with and 
therefore compensation is not due, but what precisely is it that excludes some regulations from 
the definition of expropriation on the basis of their character and purpose, while other 
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regulations nevertheless constitute expropriations despite meeting the same criteria of 
legitimate nature and intent? It is clear that a tension remains within the police powers approach. 
On this basis, Weiler concludes that while the Methanex tribunal’s findings “may cheer anti-
globalization groups […] their lack of any solid doctrinal footing and their obiter status will 
likely blunt any future impact”.160 
 
Finally, the third approach is the ‘proportionality’ approach. Along similar lines to Choudhury 
and Weiler, the tribunal in Azurix v. Argentina critiques the ‘police powers’ approach as 
“somehow contradictory”. It finds that “[t]he public purpose criterion as an additional criterion 
to the effect of the measures under consideration needs to be complemented”.161 The tribunal 
in Azurix determined this complementary criterion to be proportionality. In response to what 
are sometimes viewed as two extreme positions, the investment law literature and arbitral 
practice may be moving in the direction of adopting proportionality analysis to assess whether 
an indirect expropriation has occurred. To cite Fortier and Drymer, this approach involves 
“weighing both the purpose and effect of a measure in a sort of regulation/expropriation 
balance”.162 As such, “[t]he higher the purpose of a measure and the greater its practical benefit 
to the public welfare, the greater is the level of investment interference that must be 
demonstrated in order to tip the scales toward a characterization of the measure as an 
expropriation”.163 
 
The environmental case that is often viewed as a classic instance of the ‘proportionality’ 
approach is Tecmed v. Mexico. The dispute concerned the development of a landfill for 
hazardous waste, and subsequent public opposition to it on environmental grounds. The 
company had on several occasions been found to have breached various environmental 
regulations, and when the permit to operate the landfill came up for renewal the relevant 
environmental agency decided not to renew the permit.164 Tecmed alleged that the non-renewal 
of the permit constituted an indirect expropriation, and the investment tribunal’s analysis began 
with an analysis of the effect of the measure; given that the company could no longer operate 
the landfill, the investor’s loss was total. However, the tribunal then finds it “appropriate to 
examine [...] whether the Resolution, due to its characteristics and considering not only its 
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effects, is an expropriatory decision” and “whether such actions or measures are proportional 
to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to 
investments, taking into account the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding 
the proportionality”.165 In a clear adoption of ‘proportionality’ analysis, the tribunal concludes 
that “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight 
imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory 
measure”.166 
 
To assess proportionality, the tribunal commenced its analysis with an assessment of the public 
purpose behind the measure. The stated justification for the non-renewal of the permit was 
infringements of a number of environmental regulations, for which the company had already 
been issued fines and warnings, and the non-compliance with the conditions of the previous 
permit.167 The fact that the company breached a number of the conditions under which the 
permit had been issued is undisputed, but the tribunal points out that these breaches were 
“remediable or remediated or subject to minor penalties” and castigates Mexico for its “literal 
or strict interpretation of the conditions under which the Permit was granted”.168 It concludes 
that ”it is irrefutable that there were factors other than compliance or non-compliance by Cytrar 
with the Permit’s conditions or the Mexican environmental protection laws and that such factors 
had a decisive effect in the decision to deny the Permit’s renewal”.169 These other factors were 
precisely the environmental and community protests that had emerged against the landfill, 
which eventually led the municipal authorities to oppose the landfill as well. The tribunal 
maintains that the environmental agency had not made its decision to reject the renewal of the 
permit on the basis of its own assessments of the environmental risks involved with the non-
compliance with the previous permit; indeed, while fines or warnings were issued for breaches 
of environmental regulations, these were not at the time found to have entailed a “significant 
effect on public health or [to] generate an ecological imbalance”. 170  The company’s 
transportation of waste to the site in violation of applicable environmental regulations had been 
found to “pose or may pose a risk to the environment or to health”, but transportation of waste 
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was conducted under a permit from another agency.171 Rather, the environmental agency had 
been swayed by growing public opposition, and subsequently local government opposition, to 
the landfill. For instance, the tribunal points out that when the company had proceeded to 
expand the landfill without the required authorizations, the director of the environmental agency 
was primarily concerned that “the company had not helped me create trust among local 
authorities as it expanded the cells without any authorization”.172  
 
Interestingly, the tribunal did not end the proportionality analysis here – rather, it decided that 
since the environmental agency had in actual fact taken its decision on the basis of the public 
opposition, the tribunal should “consider whether community pressure and its consequences [...] 
were so great as to lead to a serious emergency situation, social crisis or public unrest”, since 
such “factors must be weighed when trying to assess the proportionality of the action adopted 
with respect to the purpose pursued by such measure”.173 The tribunal nevertheless found that 
while the protests “amount[ed] to significant pressure on the Mexican authorities, [they did not] 
constitute a real crisis or disaster of great proportions”.174  The tribunal therefore assessed 
proportionality against two possible motivations – the environmental agency’s stated motive in 
respect to breaches of the environmental conditions attached to the initial permit, and the 
agency’s ‘real’ motive in addressing the situation engendered by the public opposition – and 
found neither motive to be proportionate to the effect on the investor. What the tribunal did not 
do, was to assess the proportionality between the effect on the investor and the public purpose 
invoked by the environmental protestors themselves, or for that matter its own assessment of 
the environmental risks of the landfill. The protesters had a more acute sense of concern about 
the breaches that had been identified by the environmental agency, some of which had indeed 
only been identified as a result of inspections demanded by the protesters themselves.175 This 
question will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but for the current analysis it 
suffices to say that the adoption of a ‘proportionality’ approach led to a finding of expropriation, 
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and Tecmed was provided with compensation for costs associated with the landfill as well as a 
measure of lost profits. 
 
Andreas Kulick suggests that proportionality analysis requires a consideration of three 
elements.176 Firstly, the government measure needs to serve a public purpose and be generally 
suitable for that purpose – as previously indicated, this element is also crucial within the ‘police 
powers’ approach. Secondly, the government measure needs to be ‘necessary’ to achieve the 
public benefits invoked – a least restrictive measures test can also be invoked under the ‘police 
powers’ approach, but it might be more central to the present analysis given the stated objective 
of achieving an appropriate balance between investor rights and public interest measures.177 
The full range of possible government measures to achieve a legitimate public purpose 
objective will therefore need to be considered, and the one that has the minimum influence on 
the investor will need to be chosen. This is where Canada encountered problems in the S.D. 
Myers case – the decision to close the border (albeit temporarily) could not be shown to have 
been necessary to achieve the objective of maintaining domestic disposal capacity for PCBs, 
since government subsidies would have achieved the same result. 
 
Finally, the third element – not found within the ‘police powers’ approach – is proportionality 
stricto sensu, and this assessment of proportionality raises questions of its own. 178  Most 
obviously, how will tribunals assess whether “the burden on the investor [is] excessive in light 
of the public benefits”?179 The proportionality approach explicitly requires a tribunal to ‘weight’ 
the effect on the investor against the public benefits, and the immediate question is what kind 
of scale to use. Some scholars suggest that the scale currently adopted is heavily biased in favour 
of investors – David Schneiderman remarks that “on the few occasions where tribunals move 
to a proportionality analysis, there remains a heavy burden on states to dislodge the presumption 
against measures that run afoul of investment disciplines”. 180  Part of the reason for this 
presumption might lay in the tendency of arbitrators to favour investors in general, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, but an important reason may also be found in some of the basic premises that 
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often underlie ‘proportionality’ in the investment context, namely that companies should not 
have to make ‘a special sacrifice’ for the sake of general benefits for the wider community. The 
tribunals in Azurix v. Argentina and Tecmed v. Mexico both cite in support of their 
expropriation analysis a European Court of Human Rights ruling that a government measure is 
disproportionate if “the person concerned has had to bear ‘an individual and excessive 
burden’”.181 Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo, two prominent scholars and arbitrators, similarly 
conclude that “if individuals are required by regulation to make a special sacrifice in terms of 
their proprietary rights for the benefit of the society at large”, then compensation has to be 
provided.182 Finally, Jan Paulsson and Zachary Douglas, another two prominent arbitrators, in 
the same way suggest that “international law does not allow the Host State to place such a high 
individual burden on an investor for the pursuit of a regulatory objective for the benefit of the 
community at large without the payment of compensation”.183 A notable feature of the above 
arguments is that each refers to the investor as an ‘individual’ who should not have to make ‘a 
special sacrifice’ for the interests of the wider community.184 Of course, the ‘individual’ in most 
investment treaty disputes is a company, and very often one of the world’s largest transnational 
corporations whose revenues exceed the GDPs of the countries in which they operate. Once 
this is recognized, the claim that large corporations should not have to make a ‘special sacrifice’ 
to support the environmental interests of the wider community becomes a much more 
questionable proposition. Indeed, under the ‘polluter pays’ principle it might be reasonable to 
make the corporation in question bear the special sacrifice of adhering to environmental 
regulations designed to prevent the undesirable consequences of their operations.  
 
To further support the presumption that the rights of investors weigh more heavily, several 
investment tribunals have also found that foreign companies should not have to bear an 
excessive burden from new environmental measures because they are ‘non-nationals’ – to quote 
the Tecmed tribunal, “the foreign investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the 
decisions that affect it, partly because the investors are not entitle [sic] to exercise political 
rights reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting”.185 Given the extent of lobbying by 
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corporations in the states in which they operate, the proposition that foreign companies do not 
participate in the taking of decisions that affect them is questionable. Foreign companies 
nevertheless do lack the formal right to participate in the political decision-making processes, 
and tribunals conclude that there may be “legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a 
greater burden in the public interest”.186 The defining characteristics of foreign corporations as 
‘individuals’ vis-à-vis the larger community, and as ‘non-nationals’ vis-à-vis citizens, have 
therefore both led tribunals to tip the scales used in proportionality analysis in favour of the 
companies.  
 
In contrast to the more restrictive ‘police powers’ approach, the ‘proportionality’ approach 
opens up new avenues for corporations to challenge state measures deemed to be 
disproportionate to their objectives. While a ‘middle way’ of considering both the effect on the 
company and the justification behind the public interest measure can seem intuitively 
appropriate, a lot depends on the scales that are used. In non-environmental and environmental 
cases to date, Schneiderman nevertheless observes that “the balancing is decidedly tilted in 
favor of investor protection”.187 Proportionality analysis can therefore often lead in the same 
direction as the ‘sole effects’ approach. This is nevertheless unlikely to be the case under the 
new U.S. and Canadian treaties. In response to the controversy over ‘indirect expropriation’ 
and the civil society protests it has engendered, the U.S. and Canada have included an 
interpretative clause in their more recent treaties that adopts a proportionality approach but 
could still serve to tip the scales in favour of the state: “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives […] do not constitute indirect expropriations”.188  Environmental 
activists and scholars nevertheless object that the ‘except in rare circumstances’ still “opens 
loopholes” that did not exist in the Methanex approach.189 Finally, if a government measure is 
deemed to have been disproportionate, it is notable that no proportionality assessment will be 
undertaken in the consideration of compensation – the full market value of the investment, the 
measure of which includes a consideration of lost profits, will have to be provided to the 
affected company.  
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Concluding Remarks on Expropriation 
 
The question of how to determine whether an ‘indirect expropriation’ has occurred has proved 
to be one of the most intractable within international investment law – indeed, one of the world’s 
most prominent arbitrators resigned himself to the fact that the best explanation he could muster 
was “I know it when I see it”.190 In the context of the article that bears this title, this was 
intended to be reassuring – the jury might be out on how to logically defend the finding of an 
expropriation, but arbitrators do ‘know it when they see it’ – but given that the previous chapter 
has already shown that arbitrators have a tendency and financial incentive to favour investors 
this conclusion is anything but reassuring. The ‘sole effects’, ‘police powers’ and 
‘proportionality’ approaches are all intended to provide a more logically coherent way of 
assessing whether an ‘indirect expropriation’ has occurred, but each raises a number of 
questions of their own. The ‘sole effects’ doctrine, to cite Simon Baughen, would risk reversing 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle into “no regulation without compensation”.191 The ‘police powers’ 
approach would raise difficult questions in respect to the scientific foundations and process 
required to introduce environmental regulations. The ‘proportionality’ approach tends, to cite 
Schneiderman, to be “disproportionately applied against state objectives”. 192  Whichever 
approach is chosen by a given tribunal, it seems that the protection afforded against indirect 
expropriation now go well beyond that found within many national legal systems.193 Finally, 
while the criteria for the finding of an indirect expropriation is “clearly ambiguous”, the criteria 
for a direct expropriation is clearly not. There is remarkably little debate on the requirement 
that full compensation, that well exceeds the actual costs incurred by corporations in developing 
an investment project, should be provided even for expropriations designed to achieve 
indisputably legitimate environmental purposes such as the protection of endangered sea turtles 
or jaguars. 
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Protection from ‘Unfairness’ 
 
The concepts of discrimination and expropriation may be difficult in practice, but they are fairly 
clear in principle – one involves the differential treatment of investors from different countries, 
the other a sufficiently substantial reduction of the economic value of a company’s investment. 
In contrast, the concept of ‘fairness’ is vague in both principle and practice, yet investment 
treaties require countries to provide investors with ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) without 
providing tribunals with much guidance on how to interpret such terms. A number of 
commentators and tribunals note that ever since Methanex and similar awards made appeals to 
‘indirect expropriation’ less certain to succeed, there has been a ‘migration’ of legal challenges 
from the indirect expropriation clause towards the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ clause.194 
Dolzer observes that “hardly any lawsuit based on an international investment treaty is filed 
these days without invocation of the relevant treaty clause requiring fair and equitable 
treatment”, and an UNCTAD report concludes that the FET provision “has emerged as the most 
relied upon and successful basis for [international investment agreement] claims by 
investors”.195  
 
The key function of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ clause is often said to be its ability to fill 
the gaps between other treaty provisions, and to ensure that investment treaties protect investors 
in circumstances where a state has not violated other, more specific, treaty obligations but has 
nevertheless acted to the disadvantage of a company. To cite the prominent arbitrator Charles 
Brower, the FET clause is “designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to 
articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty’s object and purpose in particular 
disputes”.196 Similarly, while an UNCTAD report cautions that “the vague and broad wording 
of the obligation carries a risk of an overreach in its application”, the tribunal in Rumeli 
Telekom v. Kazakhstan maintained that the clause was “intentionally vague” precisely in order 
to “give tribunals the possibility to articulate the range of principles to achieve the treaty’s 
purpose in particular disputes”. 197  The treaty’s purpose, of course, is the protection of 
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investments.198 It is acknowledged that the FET clause provides what one tribunal describes as 
“much latitude” in interpretation, but this is viewed as the provision’s strength rather than its 
weakness.199 To cite Dolzer, such a lack of specificity nevertheless also ensures that the clause 
has “the potential to reach further into the traditional domaine réservé of the host state than any 
one of the other rules of the treaties”.200  
 
One of the most disputed questions before arbitral tribunals is the threshold required for the 
finding of an FET breach – how unfair does a government measure have to be to constitute a 
violation of ‘fair and equitable treatment’? Investment tribunals have offered a variety of 
different answers to that question, and despite certain attempts to revise treaties to require a 
higher threshold, investment tribunals continue to offer interpretations that lower the threshold 
required for the finding of an FET breach.201 Even under the most restrictive interpretation of 
the clause, it is nevertheless clear that there is no requirement that states have to act in bad faith 
or that they have to intend to act unfairly.202 In this respect, two cases involving measures taken 
by Argentina in response to its financial crisis in 2001 are instructive. The tribunal in Enron v. 
Argentina concluded that “[e]ven assuming that [Argentina] was guided by the best of 
intentions, which the Tribunal has no reason to doubt, there is here an objective breach of […] 
fair and equitable treatment”.203 If government measures based on the ‘best of intentions’ can 
be found to be unfair, so does government conduct based on reasoned judgement – to cite the 
tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina, “[e]ven though the measures adopted by Argentina may not 
have been the best, they were not taken lightly, without due consideration […] though unfair 
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and inequitable, [they] were the result of reasoned judgment”.204 Beyond the intentions of the 
state, it should also be emphasized that there is no requirement that states be in breach of 
domestic laws or administrative practices. Indeed, for good measure the tribunal in Tecmed 
adds that a state’s conduct can violate the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ provision even if, under 
its own laws, “the State was actually bound to act that way”.205 States can therefore find that 
they have acted unfairly even when they act in accordance with ‘the best of intentions’, 
‘reasoned judgement’, and in accordance with its own laws. 
 
Beyond the threshold required, what kind of conduct constitutes a violation of ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ in practice? The “perhaps […] most widely cited and accepted” definition 
of the clause is found in the Tecmed v. Mexico award,206 which: 
 “requires [states] to provide to international investments treatment that does not 
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to 
make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with 
the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives”.207 
In its requirement that states act “in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity, and totally 
transparently”, Zachary Douglas suggests that “[t]he Tecmed ‘standard’ is actually not a 
standard at all; it is rather a description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to which 
all states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain”.208 Lawyers representing the 
government of Chile in an investment dispute similarly complained that the standard entailed 
an “extreme” “programme for good governance”.209 The Tecmed standard has nevertheless 
been directly supported by many other tribunals, and similar interpretations also occur in other 
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investment awards. 210  The requirements of the FET standard has led some scholars and 
international bodies to conclude that investment treaties form a body of ‘global administrative 
law’ or that it amounts to a requirement for ‘good governance’.211 
 
Given that the aim behind the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard is to cover any gaps 
between the other treaty standards, and given that the standard is inherently subjective, in 
principle any allegation of unfairness can be invoked as an FET breach. Clearly revealing the 
subjective nature of many claims, Philip Morris justifies its fair and equitable treatment 
allegation on the basis that “[cigarette] packages definitely need health warnings, but they’ve 
got to be a reasonable size […] We thought 50 percent was reasonable. Once you take it up to 
80 percent, there’s no space for trademarks to be shown. We thought that was going too far”.212 
While it is in principle possible to determine a government measure to be unfair without further 
legal analysis of what ‘unfairness’ actually entails – and while some tribunals have adopted that 
approach – in practice certain types of government measures tend to fall foul of the FET 
standard more frequently than others. The aim of this section is to assess a few of the most 
common requirements that tribunals have associated with the FET clause in the past – the 
requirements for consistency, for transparency, for adherence to domestic law, and for judicial 
fairness – and the extent to which corporations can challenge environmental regulations on this 
basis. Each of these sub-elements seems laudable in principle, but can significantly broaden the 
scope for corporate challenges to environmental regulations in practice. 
 
Consistency 
 
The term consistency appears in different forms within arbitral awards and the academic 
literature. Some scholars have identified a requirement for consistency across time – an 
obligation that the state does not renege on assurances once made to an investor – and this will 
be discussed in the section on ‘protection from change’ below. What will be discussed here is 
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rather inconsistency at a particular point in time; when different agencies or levels of the state 
appear, from the investor’s point of view, to act in a contradictory fashion. In such cases the 
problem is often that one agency of the state, or one level of government, acts in such a way as 
to give hope to an investor that a project will succeed, only to find that the requirements of 
another part of the state makes the investment unfeasible. 
 
In MTD v. Chile, the company had sought to build a ‘self-sufficient satellite city’ outside 
Santiago. The investor was from the outset aware that the site selected for the proposed 
development formed part of Santiago’s greenbelt and was zoned for agricultural use only, but 
had been told by the prospective private seller of the land that the site could be easily re-
zoned.213 The Chilean agency responsible for the inflow of foreign investment funds is the 
Foreign Investment Commission (FIC), and MTD sought and received a standard FIC contract 
for its investment.214 The investor purchased the land, and subsequently began the process of 
seeking a modification to the site’s agricultural zoning from the relevant government agencies. 
This nevertheless proved more difficult than the investor had anticipated, and on the basis of 
Santiago’s urban development policy the relevant planning authorities eventually decided not 
to approve the zoning modification that was required for the project to proceed.215  MTD 
brought the case to investment arbitration, and alleged that the denial of a zoning modification 
amounted to a breach of fair and equitable treatment.  
 
As a preliminary matter, it was not alleged that Chile had ever provided any positive assurances 
to the investor that a change in zoning would be forthcoming or easily achieved. Furthermore, 
the tribunal that was instituted in the case readily agreed with Chile that MTD had exposed 
itself to significant business risk in failing to condition the purchase of the land upon receiving 
permission to re-zone, and furthermore for failing to seek any professional advice on the matter 
and for relying on the advice of the seller of the land (who it points out had a financial incentive 
to deceive the investor).216 The case rather concerns the allegation that, given that the FIC 
contract contained a brief description of the project and its proposed location, it was unfair for 
the FIC to approve the investment if the company did not subsequently receive the zoning 
modifications required for the project to proceed. Chile strongly objected to the implication that 
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the FIC was a “one-stop window” for project approval, and stressed that while the FIC contract 
ensured that the foreign investor would be granted national treatment, ”[j]ust as a domestic 
investor cannot obtain a waiver of the (zoning regulation) by executive fiat, neither could 
MTD”.217 In assessing these claims, the tribunal duly acknowledges that the FIC contract makes 
perfectly clear that the investor is not exempt from seeking other required permits, approvals 
and authorizations. On this basis, the tribunal determined that the investor was not automatically 
entitled to a zoning modification by virtue of the FIC contract.218 
 
While the tribunal did not find a violation of the terms of the FIC contract, where it did find a 
breach of fair and equitable treatment is precisely in Chile’s “inconsistency of action between 
two arms of the same Government vis-à-vis the same investor”.219 The basic premise behind 
the tribunal’s analysis is that whatever the domestic composition of the Chilean state, under 
international law the state of Chile needs to be considered “as a unit”.220 Based on this premise, 
it was unfair for the state (embodied in the FIC) to approve an investment that was “against the 
policy of the State itself” (namely the urban development policies of other agencies).221 The 
tribunal’s analysis in respect to what ‘policy’ this refers to is rather unclear – after all, the 
investor was well aware that the reason for the current agricultural zoning for the land was 
precisely because of the government’s current policy to maintain Santiago’s greenbelt. In 
seeking to clear up the confusion, the annulment tribunal established that the ‘policy’ referred 
to is nevertheless not the current policy of the state as embodied in the agricultural zoning, but 
rather a policy against changing the current zoning.222 Chile strongly objected to this notion of 
a “meta-policy” not to change the zoning in the future – there was only the existing policy and 
the investor’s right to seek a modification of that policy.223 The annulment tribunal nevertheless 
implies that had the Chilean planning agency been open-minded towards a zoning modification 
Chile would have subsequently had the right to decide not to change it, but on the basis of 
various statements by ministers and agency officials from the planning authorities that a change 
would be ‘unfeasible’ the tribunal instead determined that within the relevant planning agencies 
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there had existed a policy against changing the current policy, and the FIC should have denied 
the investment on that basis.224 
 
Irrespective of the existence or otherwise of a ‘meta-policy’ not to change the current policy, 
the award is premised on the “considerable emphasis” that is placed on the “unity of the 
state”.225 Chile strongly objected to this emphasis on the basis that the Foreign Investment 
Commission did not have the legal authority to carry out evaluations in respect to zoning 
modifications or planning policy – this is precisely why the FIC contract specifically stated that 
it was without prejudice to the requirement to seek other approvals.226 Chile maintained that the 
tribunal’s analysis “ignores the law of the host State and the necessary separation of powers 
which is the basis for the rule of law. Organs of the State can have different mandates and 
concerns: inconsistency of policy between them does not necessarily entail any breach of 
international law”.227 The annulment tribunals nevertheless maintained that ”what could do 
with improvement [...] was co-ordination at the level of the FIC” – which would amount 
precisely to making the FIC into more of the “one-stop window” than Chile maintained it was 
ever intended to be.228 In the failure of the state to act “as a monolith”, Chile had breached the 
FET standard and was asked to compensate the investor.229  
 
All states are composed of different ministries and agencies and levels of government, with 
some sort of division of labour between them, yet the tribunal’s emphasis in this case is on the 
obligation of the state to act “as a unit, as a monolith”.230 Past and current cases suggest that 
investors can appeal to ‘consistency’ in two different ways. The first is where the state’s way 
of organizing itself is on its own deemed in breach of the FET standard, irrespective of whether 
it is in breach of domestic law. In MTD v. Chile, the tribunal did not find that the actions of the 
two different agencies amounted to a breach of the FIC contract, and while it did suggest that 
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there was scope within Chilean law for the FIC to exercise more of a coordinating function 
within its current mandate, it did not determine that the FIC had actually acted in breach of 
domestic laws in not exercising a sufficient coordinating function.231 As such, there was no 
breach of domestic administrative regulations or laws. The second is where there is genuine 
disagreement on where the authority of one agency ends and another begins, and where under 
domestic law one or the other agency has overstepped its authority. This may have been the 
case in Metalclad v. Mexico, where the federal government is alleged to have informed the 
investor that only federal authorizations for the investment were needed, while the municipal 
government maintained that certain municipal permits were also required. 232  In so far as 
inconsistency between different parts of a government is a common occurrence in many 
domestic legal systems, the FET standard can be a potent weapon against otherwise legitimate 
environmental regulations in circumstances that nevertheless reveal an imperfect division of 
labour between different agencies of a state. 
 
Transparency 
 
A second dimension of fair and equitable treatment that has been invoked by tribunals and 
commentators alike involves ‘transparency’ in respect to the domestic rules and regulations that 
will govern an investment, and the primary environmental example is Metalclad v. Mexico.233 
This case concerned the development of a hazardous waste landfill, and also involves issues of 
‘consistency’ between different levels of government, as discussed above. In this case, the 
federal government was favourable towards the project, but due to local environmental 
concerns the municipal government was not, and it eventually rejected the investor’s 
application for a municipal construction permit for the landfill. The investor brought the case 
to arbitration, and alleged that it had been given conflicting messages from the two levels of 
government as to whether a municipal construction permit was required in the first place, and 
if so, on what grounds such a permit could be denied. The investment tribunal made two 
assessments in respect to the permit. Firstly, it decided that according to Mexican law a 
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municipal permit could not be denied on the environmental grounds invoked but only on more 
limited grounds, and that the municipality had therefore acted outside of its authority in denying 
the permit. 234  Secondly, and perhaps in anticipation of objections that an international 
investment tribunal might not be in the best position to interpret domestic Mexican 
administrative law, the tribunal furthermore declared that the difficulty involved in determining 
whether a municipal permit was required on its own entailed a lack of transparency.235  
 
The tribunal decided that the transparency obligation entailed that “all relevant legal 
requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully operating investments 
[…] should be capable of being readily known to all affected investors”, adding for good 
measure that “[t]here should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters”.236 Mexico 
was therefore found in breach of the transparency requirement of the FET standard because of 
the “absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit”.237 
That such a transparency breach was found to have occurred in the context of this case is 
interesting, because Metalclad was from the outset aware that such a municipal permit either 
was required, or that the Mexican law in this respect was unclear. Before purchasing the 
company that operated the landfill, Metalclad found out that it had previously been denied a 
municipal construction permit to construct a hazardous waste landfill on two previous 
occasions.238 It therefore initially conditioned the purchase of the property on either receiving 
a municipal permit, or on receiving a judgement from the Mexican courts that such a municipal 
permit was not required.239 Neither of these two conditions were met, but Metalclad contends 
that it nevertheless proceeded with the investment on the basis of ‘oral assurances’ by federal 
government officials. Mexico exasperatedly notes that there is “no contemporaneous 
documentary evidence of such alleged oral assurances”, but for reasons that are unclear from 
the award the tribunal seems to have accepted Metalclad’s word on this matter.240 Whatever the 
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true situation in respect to the ‘oral assurances’ allegedly provided, the interesting aspect of the 
transparency analysis is that Metalclad was from the outset aware that the law was unclear, and 
it was also fully aware that the municipality itself maintained its right to deny such permits. 
Metalclad’s decision to invest despite an uncertain legal situation can therefore only be 
interpreted as a calculated business risk, and when its gamble failed the investment tribunal 
decided that the lack of a clear legal situation that had been at the heart of that gamble was itself 
a violation of international investment law. 
 
The transparency requirement is not on its own unreasonable, but in the context of investor-
state dispute settlement it can provide ammunition for corporations to target environmental 
regulations. The possibility for conflicting or difficult to interpret regulations and 
administrative requirements exist within most legal systems. In cases such as Metalclad, 
domestic and foreign companies alike can normally request authoritative interpretations from 
domestic courts. In contrast, the tribunal in Metalclad determined that the “absence of a clear 
rule” was on its own a violation of transparency. This provides an added incentive for investors 
to refrain from seeking a (possibly unfavourable) domestic legal interpretation of the law and 
rather to gamble on a favourable interpretation, and subsequently to seek compensation from 
investment tribunals if such gambles fail. 
 
Adherence to Domestic Laws and Procedures 
 
While breaches of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ have often been found in cases where there is 
no corresponding breach of domestic laws, FET claims are nevertheless also often made on the 
basis of violations of domestic laws or administrative procedures. A number of such cases 
concern attempts by states to take measures to protect the environment in ways that did not 
strictly adhere to domestic procedures. 
 
The primary case in this respect is Ethyl v. Canada. This case does not invoke the FET clause 
per se (quite likely because the case emerged before the potency of this clause had been 
recognized) but non-adherence to domestic rules played a large part in its outcome. The case 
concerns the Manganese-based Fuel Additives Act introduced by the Canadian parliament. The 
parliament had sought to ban the fuel additive MMT on the basis of potential but uncertain 
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health risks, as well as crucially because MMT had been found to interfere with emissions 
control devices in vehicles and therefore caused increased pollution. 241  However, this 
legislative attempt was hampered by Canada’s own structures of decision-making. While MMT 
is hazardous in high doses, the Department of Health had found that “current levels of [MMT] 
to which the population in large urban centres are exposed are below the benchmark air level 
at which no adverse health risks are expected”. 242  The health effects were therefore too 
uncertain for the parliament to have the authority to introduce the ban as health or environmental 
legislation.243 While the evidence on interference with pollution control devices in cars was 
more certain, the federal parliament did not have the authority to introduce legislation on this 
basis either; fuel standards were under provincial jurisdiction, and the environmental and health 
effects of increased pollution were too indirect to qualify for federal legislation. 244 So the 
federal parliament adopted a strategy that it had successfully adopted in other circumstances in 
the past to circumvent such constraints – it introduced a ban on the international and 
interprovincial trade in MMT, on the basis that it would be uneconomical to produce MMT on 
an intraprovincial basis and the parliament would accomplish indirectly what it could not 
accomplish directly, namely the phase out of MMT.245 At the same time that Ethyl was pursuing 
its case in investment arbitration, the province of Alberta challenged the parliamentary act on 
the basis of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT). The latter domestic panel found the 
parliamentary act in violation of the agreement on the basis that trade restrictions should not be 
used to achieve non-trade related objectives such as environmental or health protection.246 In 
response to this finding, Canada settled the investment treaty dispute with Ethyl. 
 
A dissenting judge in the AIT panel observed that the Canadian federal government had been 
“faced with a genuine dilemma” – the environmental objective was legitimate, but the character 
of the risks in combination with divisions between federal and provincial jurisdiction made it 
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difficult for the parliament to prohibit the substance.247 The Globe and Mail reported at the time 
that “the MMT debacle provides a textbook case in how not to enact health and environmental 
regulation”. 248  Some commentators complain that critics of the Ethyl settlement do not 
recognize that the MMT legislation had already been defeated before the AIT panel, but what 
is interesting about this case is nevertheless what Ethyl could achieve on the basis of investor-
state arbitration, which it may not have achieved on the basis of a breach of domestic law 
alone.249 Firstly, the AIT panel findings were non-binding and advisory, so there is no guarantee 
that Canada would have rescinded the parliamentary act on this basis alone.250 Secondly, even 
if it had, the AIT panel findings would not have required Canada to provide Ethyl with CAD 
19.5 million in compensation for lost profits, nor a government statement that there was not 
sufficient evidence that MMT was harmful (a statement that the company used for advertising 
purposes to deny any health effects of MMT) – these additional benefits were provided on the 
basis of the investment treaty dispute.251  
 
In a number of similar pending cases companies are challenging state conduct as contrary to 
the domestic laws or administrative procedures of the state itself. In Bilcon v. Canada, the 
company claims that Canada breached domestic administrative requirements, firstly, in 
subjecting its proposed basalt quarry to a more onerous form of environmental assessment 
(including public consultation) than is normally applied to projects of its kind; and secondly, 
for subsequently denying a permit on the basis that the project would be contrary to ‘community 
core values’, a notion that Canada maintains is included under the stated criteria of ‘socio-
economic effects’ but that the company maintains is beyond the scope of environmental impact 
assessments.252 In the Ethyl case, the parliament presumably knew that such a round-about way 
of introducing environmental and health legislation was not fully in adherence to domestic 
procedure, but in many of the current cases, including Bilcon, the states concerned do not share 
the investor’s assessment of the domestic law requirements. In such cases, there remains the 
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possibility that genuine environmental regulations will be struck down by tribunals as violations 
of domestic procedure even if they had not been interpreted as such by the states themselves. If 
such a determination is made, this will amplify the negative consequences to the state beyond 
those that a domestic breach alone would entail under domestic law. 
 
Judicial Fairness 
 
A breach of fair and equitable treatment can also emerge through judicial unfairness.253 This is 
normally regarded as one of the least controversial requirements of international investment 
law, but it can have potentially problematic consequences in practice. There are no concluded 
environmental cases in this respect, but the pending arbitration in Chevron v. Ecuador 
highlights some of the potential risks. This arbitration arises from an underlying conflict with a 
long history between indigenous groups and Texaco, now a subsidiary of Chevron. In the 1970s 
and 1980s Texaco was the operator of a consortium formed to extract oil in the rainforests of 
northern Ecuador, and in the process it is alleged to have disposed of 18 billion gallons of toxic 
waste into open unlined pits and rivers in the rainforest, causing severe environmental 
degradation and related illnesses.254 For almost two decades affected communities from Lago 
Agrio have pursued a legal case against Texaco to secure remediation of the environment and 
compensation for the consequences.  
 
The legal journey of the Lago Agrio communities began with a class action lawsuit brought in 
the U.S., but Texaco objected to U.S. jurisdiction and argued that the case should be heard in 
Ecuador.255 The Lago Agrio plaintiffs had chosen the U.S. venue partly because collective 
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lawsuits were more difficult under Ecuadorian law, partly because they feared Texaco would 
not submit to Ecuadorian jurisdiction, and partly – ironically in hindsight – because they 
believed the Ecuadorian courts to be unfair, prone to corruption, and susceptible to political 
influence (the government at the time was favourably disposed towards Texaco; the government 
today is favourable towards the Lago Agrio plaintiffs).256 The U.S. court eventually agreed to 
dismiss the case, but it did so explicitly in light of repeated assurances by Texaco that it would 
accept any legal judgement arrived at in Ecuador.257 After the Lago Agrio plaintiffs refiled their 
case in Ecuador, Chevron nevertheless brought an investment treaty claim to escape the 
consequences of an unfavourable Ecuadorian court judgement. In addition to contesting the 
substance of the underlying environmental liability claim, Chevron also argues that the 
Ecuadorian judicial process has been unfair and that it has not been provided with the 
opportunity for a fair trial. The investment treaty claim is ongoing, but the Ecuadorian court has 
now rendered an unprecedented USD 18 billion judgement against Chevron.258 The company 
is asking the investment tribunal to either invalidate the Ecuadorian judgement and to render it 
internationally unenforceable, or otherwise to require Ecuador to compensate it for the costs of 
compliance with the judgement.259 If the investment tribunal were to take the first option to 
invalidate the Ecuadorian judgement on the grounds that the judicial process had been unfair, 
then the third party plaintiffs would have nowhere left to pursue their claims.260 As such, the 
avoidance of a ‘denial of justice’ for Chevron would amount to a ‘denial of justice’ for the 
indigenous people. Pending a final award, the arbitral tribunal has already commanded Ecuador 
to “take all measures necessary to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement and 
recognition within and without Ecuador of the judgements”. 261  Civil society groups have 
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expressed concern that this already requires the executive of the government to interfere with 
the judicial branch, and with the rights of the victorious third party claimants to enforce a 
judgement that is legal according to the laws of their country.262 
 
Chevron’s denial of justice and ‘effective means’ claims rest on several independent allegations. 
Some of these allegations implicate the American contingency fee lawyers representing the 
plaintiffs, who are accused of fraud and ‘colluding’ with the court. 263  If these claims are 
successful, then the lawyers representing the plaintiffs will share responsibility for any arbitral 
decision to leave the plaintiffs without access to a forum that can provide a fair hearing for the 
underlying environmental concerns. Several of the allegations nevertheless concern more 
general forms of judicial unfairness. In terms of the quality of the judgement itself, Chevron is 
probably correct that it contains considerable flaws – while the underlying environmental 
claims are supported by plausible evidence, the actual measure of compensation does seem 
widely inflated.264 Chevron nevertheless also raises various process-related complaints related 
to a failure by Ecuador to “follow its own laws, rules, and procedures during the litigation”.265 
This raises wider questions of the ability of developing country judicial systems to provide fair 
trials. Other cases are instructive; in White Industries v. India a tribunal found that India had 
failed to provide a fair judicial process in the context of judicial delays that are generally 
common within the Indian judicial system.266 Findings of process-related forms of unfairness 
can also encourage large corporations to use their superior resources to orchestrate judicial 
problems simply by putting strain on the system. A U.S. court in an unrelated case once 
castigated Chevron for seeking to “bombard this Court with distracting and irrelevant 
documents”, and such a strategy would be all the more potent in a developing world context – 
indeed, in Chevron v. Ecuador the company is accused of “[s]wamping the court with largely 
irrelevant paper” and “filing multiple end-of-day motions in rapid-fire mode” in such a way 
that “[e]ven a sophisticated court with ample technical and personnel support would have 
difficulty in handling this deluge”.267 Ecuador contends that the “endless cycle of motion-
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denial-appeal” was “a Chevron routine” played out to create problems, delays, recusal of judges 
unable to keep up, and ultimately “to create a record of purported due process violations by the 
court”. If process-related judicial unfairness were to be found sufficient to invalidate a domestic 
judgement, then corporations can be encouraged to contribute to any judicial overload that can 
cause such unfairness. 
 
If tribunals decide to invalidate domestic law judgements on the basis of denials of justice or 
effective means, communities in many parts of the world may find themselves without access 
to a judicial forum to hold transnational corporations accountable. If the threshold of sufficient 
judicial unfairness is low enough that many developing world states struggle to meet it, then 
this could also encourage corporations to take less care in avoiding lawsuits, for instance in 
applying less stringent environmental protection measures to their operations. It could also 
encourage companies to avoid out of court settlements on the basis of a twin legal strategy 
where if the domestic liability claim fails, then the investment treaty denial of justice claim may 
succeed. Some tribunals have nevertheless refrained from invalidating judgements in the 
context of judicial unfairness, and have instead “step[ped] into the shoes and mindset” of 
domestic courts and judges to decide what a fair resolution of the case would have entailed.268 
This can seem suitable in certain cases, but would be difficult in a case like Chevron; the 
tribunal would not be able to assess the underlying environmental claims of the third parties 
that cannot be heard before the tribunal, and then it would have to decide whether to let Chevron 
off the hook for what may be genuine environmental harm simply on the basis that the trial 
itself was inadequate.269  It is this possibility that would raise the prospect that the unfair 
domestic legal systems that exist in many countries around the world can make it difficult to 
hold corporations accountable anywhere. 
 
Concluding Remarks on ‘Unfairness’ 
 
Fair and equitable treatment claims are an “almost ubiquitous presence” in recent investment 
treaty litigation, and a wide range of environmental measures are alleged to be in breach of this 
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treatment standard.270 Many of the currently pending FET cases are based on general claims 
that particular environmental measures are unfair, arbitrary, unreasonable or disproportionate, 
and it is difficult to know in advance how tribunals will address such claims. For instance, the 
energy company Vattenfall brought a lawsuit to challenge Hamburg’s decision to ‘arbitrarily’ 
increase, from one to two years, the monitoring phase for the efficiency of a ‘fish stair’ designed 
to allow fish to swim upriver to breed, which the company was required to construct to mitigate 
the environmental effects of its power plant. 271  To the chagrin of environmental groups, 
Germany decided to settle the case rather than face the prospect of a potentially costly 
arbitration, and it acquiesced to reducing the monitoring period for the ‘fish stair’ back to one 
year and further reduced the requirements of fish monitoring generally. 272  In a currently 
pending case, Bilcon contends that certain Nova Scotian restrictions on test blasting to develop 
quarries – a practice potentially harmful to fish and whales – are “unnecessary and arbitrary”.273 
In another pending case, the Renco Group maintains that Peru has acted unfairly in failing to 
provide the company with a more generous extension of time to bring its smelting and refining 
complex into compliance with environmental regulations – despite the fact that it was the only 
mining or smelting facility to have received an extension at all, and indeed, Peru even had to 
change its legislation to grant one since the initial legal framework did not allow for 
extensions.274 Whatever else may or may not be required by the FET standard, there is within 
the academic literature and arbitral awards a certain recognition that inconsistency, lack of 
transparency, failure to adhere to domestic legal requirements or procedures, and judicial 
unfairness can constitute a breach of the FET provision. At face value such requirements may 
appear uncontroversial, but this section has shown that in practice these can have implications 
for the ability of states to introduce measures to protect the environment. 
 
The discrimination and expropriation standards discussed previously are ones that can be 
disagreed with as a matter of principle – should (developing world) states not be allowed to 
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impose more stringent environmental requirements on multinational corporations than on their 
smaller domestic counterparts? Should states not be allowed to expropriate property for a 
legitimate environmental purpose without having to provide possibly inhibitating full market 
value compensation? In contrast, the fair and equitable treatment clause is difficult to disagree 
with as a matter of principle – the requirement for ‘fairness’ is difficult to dispute on a normative 
plane. In practice, two possible risks nevertheless emerge. Firstly, how is ‘fairness’ itself 
defined? Was it really unfair for Hamburg to increase the monitoring period for its ‘fish stair’, 
or for different agencies of Chile to stick to their own areas of competency and for the state 
itself thereby to fail to act as a monolithic unit? Secondly, even if there is agreement in principle 
that a particular type of government conduct or measure is unfair, are the consequences 
themselves fair? In Ethyl, the Canadian parliament had presumably acted in good faith to 
address environmental concerns – should it have really had to compensate the company for its 
lost profits, or issue a statement that a controversial gasoline additive is safe? In Metalclad v. 
Mexico, might corporations that encounter an unclear rule be encouraged to gamble on a 
favourable interpretation of it, with a view to bringing a ‘transparency’ case against a state were 
the gamble to fail and the state to insist upon the less favourable interpretation of the rule? 
 
The primary risk in terms of the FET clause is nevertheless that states are not perfect. This alone 
provides an opening for corporations to challenge government conduct as unfair. Whether they 
succeed depends both on the particular threshold adopted by a tribunal, as well as the 
circumstances of the case. Countries in the developed world have, for the most part, been 
successful at fending off FET challenges, but even here there are certainly exceptions. For 
instance, in the non-environmental case of Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the tribunal found that an 
administrative agency of Canada had violated the FET clause through the rather brusque 
manner in which it sought to audit a company to verify its export quota for softwood lumber.275 
In particular, the tribunal was not impressed by the agency’s refusal to travel to Oregon to audit 
the company, and its requirement that the company send the required documents to its head 
office in Canada – several truckloads full of them. The tribunal dismissed the agency’s claim 
that it was not authorized to conduct verification outside Canada, and concluded that the 
agency’s “imperious insistence on having its way” was in breach of fair and equitable 
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treatment.276 A domestic Canadian court, had it ever had the chance, may have agreed that the 
agency had acted unfairly. However, if the Canadian administrative agency was found not to 
have met the international law requirement of providing an investor with fair and equitable 
treatment, it is reasonable to assume that the administrative agencies of Cambodia or Cameroon 
are unlikely to pass the test even in the best of circumstances.277 While it may in principle be 
desirable for states to meet the challenge and to ensure good standards of domestic governance, 
in practice the present consequences of such requirements are more likely to be large 
compensation claims from corporations dissatisfied with measures taken to protect the 
environment.  
 
Protection from Change 
 
Jeswald Salacuse, a prominent scholar of international investment law, maintains that the 
original purpose behind investment treaties was to “restrain host country action against the 
interests of investors – in other words, to enable the form of legal commitments made to 
investors to resist the forces of change often demanded by the political and economic life in 
host countries”.278 Most advocates of investment treaties would support this proposition: the 
purpose is to protect corporations from ‘the forces of change’ that characterize politics within 
states, or to use the preferred term in the investment treaty context, to protect corporations from 
‘political risk’. The term ‘political risk’ is inherently forward-looking; to cite Paul Comeaux 
and Stephan Kinsella, “[p]olitical risk is the risk that the laws of a country will unexpectedly 
change to the investor’s detriment after the investor has invested capital in the country. […] Put 
simply, political risk is the risk of government intervention”. 279  In providing examples of 
‘political risk’, Comeaux and Kinsella list government interventions to “raise import or export 
duties, increase taxes, impose further regulations, or nationalize or expropriate the assets of the 
investor”.280 Investment treaties are not designed to prevent all forms of ‘political risk’ – this 
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would disable government intervention that affects corporations altogether – but they are, to 
cite a prominent international law firm, nevertheless “powerful tools for managing and 
mitigating political risk”. 281  The challenge, of course, is that most of the government 
interventions that constitute the corporations’ ‘political risk’ is undertaken for a variety of 
public purposes, and an UNCTAD report notes with concern that “the borderline between 
protection from political risk and undue interference with legitimate domestic policies is 
becoming increasingly blurred”.282  
 
This entire chapter essentially details the types of ‘political risk’ that corporations can expect 
protection from. While companies sometimes do challenge government measures or policies 
that existed at the time of their investment, most disputes at least ostensibly concern new and 
allegedly unexpected forms of government intervention. Investment treaties allow companies 
to challenge such government interventions on the basis that they are discriminatory, 
tantamount to an expropriation, or in one way or another ‘unfair’. However, sometimes 
companies challenge government regulations on the basis that the change of circumstances 
itself is unfair – not because the measure is discriminatory, expropriatory or unjust on its own 
terms, but because the company had legitimately expected that such a government measure 
would not be adopted. This is the question considered here: in what circumstances can 
corporations be protected from change itself? Since new environmental regulations by 
definition constitute a form of ‘political risk’ for corporations, understanding where the 
boundary lies between permissible changes and changes that breach an investor’s legitimate 
expectations is critical to answering the question of the extent to which corporations can 
challenge environmental protection measures. 
 
Investment treaties do not contain a treatment standard that would explicitly protect companies 
from ‘change’, yet such protection has nevertheless largely made it into arbitral awards via the 
concept of ‘legitimate expectations’. Tribunals have often taken the view, to cite a prominent 
arbitrator, that “businesses should have the opportunity to identify their rights with clarity 
before committing resources to cross-border transactions. Thereafter, competing social policies 
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will rarely justify the disturbance of settled expectations”. 283  The notion of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ implies that states should not introduce government policies that frustrate the 
reasonable expectations that an investor based its investment decision upon. Arbitrators observe 
that the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ has today been “stretched to the point of meaning 
anything and everything at once”, and companies routinely allege that new government 
measures breach their expectations in one way or another. 284  The concept of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ is nevertheless not actually present in investment treaties either, and the concept 
was initially invented by investment tribunals themselves.285 At first the concept of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ appeared in interpretations of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard; an 
inherently open-ended standard that allows for such arbitral innovation. One prominent 
arbitrator has protested that “[t]he assertion that fair and equitable treatment includes an 
obligation to satisfy or not to frustrate the legitimate expectations of the investor at the time of 
his/her investment does not correspond, in any language, to the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms”, but investment tribunals have on the whole been content to find that a breach of 
legitimate expectations is ‘unfair’.286 Thomas Wälde observes that there has furthermore been 
a significant growth in the centrality placed on the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ over 
recent years, “from an earlier function as a subsidiary interpretative principle […] to its current 
role as a self-standing subcategory and independent basis for a claim under the ‘fair and 
equitable standard’”.287 Today, tribunals tend to take the view that protection of a company’s 
legitimate expectations is either the “dominant element” of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, or at least “one of the major components”.288 Furthermore, ‘legitimate expectations’ 
has also more recently emerged in international investment law via a different route: treaty 
revisions of the expropriation clause. New U.S. and Canadian investment treaties suggest that 
one of the three factors to be considered in the assessment of an expropriation is, alongside the 
economic effect and the character of the measure, “the extent to which the government action 
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations”.289 Tribunals are therefore 
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correct to point out that there is now an “overwhelming trend” in support of the notion that 
investors’ legitimate expectations enjoy protection under investment treaties.290 
 
To say that investment treaties offer protection for an investor’s ‘legitimate expectations’ does 
nevertheless not say anything about how such legitimate expectations arise in the first place. 
Indeed, an UNCTAD report observes that the investment treaty claims of many corporations – 
and the rulings of many tribunals – “ignores the fact that investors should legitimately expect 
regulations to change over time as an aspect of the normal operation of legal and policy 
processes of the economy they operate in”.291 Michele Potestà observes that the concept of 
‘legitimate expectations’ arise in three different senses within the investment treaty context. In 
the first sense of the term (the broadest and also the most controversial sense), corporations 
contend that they had legitimately expected government intervention not to occur on the basis 
of the general regulatory framework present when they invested, and that the company was 
subsequently denied a ‘stable and predictable’ regulatory framework. In the second sense, 
corporations allege that certain government measures are in breach of specific representations 
or assurances to the investor that such regulatory change would not occur. In the third sense 
(the narrowest and least controversial), corporations argue that they had legitimately expected 
the state to abide by the terms of a contract or agreement that it had concluded with the 
investor.292 In practice, concluded arbitral awards reveal significant overlap between the three 
categories. This section will first consider the two broader senses in which the term occurs, 
where the state had not contractually agreed not to change its policies, and will then consider 
government intervention in breach of contract. 
 
‘Legitimate Expectations’ 
 
In a first sense, Potestà maintains that tribunals have found that the investors’ expectations 
“were grounded in the general legislative and regulatory framework in force when they made 
their investment”, and the alleged investment treaty breach is in the subsequent unexpected 
change of that general framework.293 This first approach is in line with the ideological desire of 
many commentators to ensure as wide a protection as possible from ‘political risk’, and many 
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tribunals have evoked the need to ensure stability and predictability for investors. For instance, 
CMS v. Argentina maintained that “there can be no doubt […] that a stable legal and business 
environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”, while Occidental v. 
Ecuador concluded that “there is certainly an obligation not to alter the legal and business 
environment in which the investment has been made”.294 The tribunal in Tecmed similarly 
maintains that states should act in such a way that investors “may know beforehand any and all 
rules and regulations that will govern its investments”. 295 Despite the tendency of tribunals to 
require states to provide stability and predictability in principle, in practice tribunals have been 
reluctant to find a state in breach of its investment treaty obligations on the basis of a failure to 
do so alone. Most of the concluded arbitral awards that Potestà draws upon, or that seem to 
espouse such principles, have in practice tended to either invoke other FET breaches as well 
(arbitrariness, lack of consistency or transparency, etc), or otherwise more specific 
representations or contractual obligations provided towards the state in line with the second or 
third sense in which the term is used. For instance, while the tribunals in the cases arising out 
of the Argentine financial crisis seem to invoke stability and predictability on their own terms 
as essential elements of fair and equitable treatment, in practice they have been strongly 
influenced by the fact that further more specific guarantees had been made towards specific 
investors. 
 
There are no concluded environmental cases that centre on a breach of legitimate expectations 
arising out of the general framework that existed at the time of the investment,296 but a non-
environmental example is Micula v. Romania.297 The companies concerned had invested in 
food and beverage production facilities in a disadvantaged region in Romania, and the dispute 
concerned a tax incentives scheme to encourage investments in such regions and the subsequent 
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decision to terminate the scheme. The tribunal acknowledged that Romania had strongly 
preferred to maintain the scheme, but that the European Commission had made its termination 
a condition for becoming part of the EU.298 The tribunal appreciated the “quandary” that this 
placed Romania in, and readily acknowledged that the decision had been made in good faith 
and was reasonable in light of the priority accorded to EU accession. 299  The investors 
nevertheless maintained that they had legitimately expected the law to remain in force for 10 
years. The law itself did not specify a minimum duration, but the legislation was applicable to 
disadvantaged regions and the region it had invested in had been designated as such in other 
legislation for a period of 10 years.300 The tribunal first undertook an investigation into whether 
Romania had breached its domestic legal obligations in prematurely terminating the scheme, 
and found that there was not sufficient evidence that it had.301 The question before the tribunal 
was thus specifically whether a government measure that was not found to be unlawful under 
Romanian law nevertheless breached the investor’s legitimate expectations. Romania strongly 
objected that the investors could have no expectations that a piece of general legislation would 
remain unchanged; that the government had unilaterally introduced the law and that it was 
within its sovereign prerogatives to unilaterally change it. The tribunal nevertheless concluded 
that the investor had legitimately expected the scheme to be maintained for 10 years, and that 
“[i]t is irrelevant whether the state in fact wished to commit itself; it is sufficient that it acted in 
a manner that would reasonably be understood to create such an appearance”.302 Despite the 
evident lawfulness of its actions under domestic law, and the reasonable policy reasons behind 
the termination of the scheme, the tribunal therefore found Romania in breach of the investment 
treaty and liable for USD 250 million in compensation for the companies’ lost profits and 
interest.303 
 
This case arose out of generally applicable legislation and would therefore be an example of 
the first sense in which the term ‘legitimate expectations’ is used within Potestà’s framework, 
but even here it is notable that the tribunal placed emphasis on the fact that requirements 
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associated with the legislation had given the specific investor certain assurances. The benefits 
from the tax incentives scheme were only granted to investors who had received a certificate 
from the state confirming their eligibility for the scheme, and the acquisition of such a certificate 
is deemed to have given rise to a more individual sense of entitlement for the investors 
concerned. 304  Furthermore, the investor did not allege that it had expected ‘stability’ and 
‘predictability’ as such, but rather that the legislation itself implicitly suggested that a 10-year 
duration could be expected. In contrast, in the first scenario cases cited by Potestà (such as the 
Argentine cases) the tribunals imply that general regulatory changes were in themselves 
problematic, but in the end it appears that additional more individualized guarantees were 
instrumental in the actual finding of a violation of the treaty. The extent to which ‘legitimate 
expectations’ based on the general regulatory framework – absent other forms of ‘unfairness’ 
– are protected by investment treaties is therefore questionable, but where more specific 
representations have been made it is clear that they are; this is the second sense of the term 
within Potestà’s framework. In such instances, it is furthermore clear that “[e]ven a reasonable 
change in policy is prohibited if the investor reasonably relies on promises or assurances that 
such a shift will not occur”.305 This is reiterated in the Methanex award, where the tribunal 
specifies that an environmental regulation can still be deemed an expropriation if “specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign investor 
contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such regulation”.306  
 
‘Legitimate expectations’ in Potestà’s second sense does not require any contractual guarantees 
by the state, and then several thorny questions emerge. Firstly, the question is what qualifies to 
make a state liable for compensation for a change of policy – an ‘assurance’, a ‘specific 
commitment’, a ‘promise’, a ‘representation’? In reference to current treaty negotiations the 
European Commission has reassured civil society groups that “a breach of legitimate 
expectations is limited to situations where the investment took place only because of a promise 
made by the States that was subsequently not honoured”.307 However, the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development has pointed out that leaked drafts refer not to a “promise” but to 
a “specific representation”, and its lawyers contend that this is a significantly more open-ended 
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term, and further one that contrasts directly with the more restrictive term “specific written 
obligation” that the EU has used in other contexts.308 Secondly, this lack of specificity also 
raises the question of intent – do states only become liable for breaches of consciously made 
promises, or is Micula v. Romania right to suggest that “[i]t is irrelevant whether the state in 
fact wished to commit itself; it is sufficient that it acted in a manner that would reasonably be 
understood to create such an appearance”.309 Thirdly, it raises the question of who can make 
representations on behalf of the state, and in what circumstances their word counts as a 
representation – some current cases concern representations by administrative staff and public 
officials, and indeed at least one case concerns a president allegedly making a promise towards 
a company in private while simultaneously committing himself to the opposite policy in public 
electoral campaigning. 310  A concluded environmental case in this respect is Metalclad v. 
Mexico, and while this concerns a number of different issues, a breach of the investor’s 
legitimate expectations is indicated in so far as federal government officials had provided 
assurances that a municipal construction permit that was subsequently denied was a mere 
formality. The Metalclad case highlights some of the difficulties with the concept – the alleged 
assurances were not made in writing or otherwise formalized, it was from the outset clear that 
the municipality did not agree with the assurances provided by the federal officials, and 
furthermore the tribunal never considered the evidence provided by Mexico that the implicated 
federal official had received bribes by the company to facilitate the investment project.311 
 
An interesting example of the difficulties involved with the notion of ‘specific representations’ 
in the environmental context is found in Vattenfall v. Germany. This case was not concluded 
on the merits, but Germany is reported to have settled the case on terms favourable towards the 
investor – including by withdrawing some of the contested environmental requirements – and 
the alleged breach of the company’s ‘legitimate expectations’ seems to have been central to the 
case. The dispute arose from the construction of a new coal-fired power plant in the city of 
Hamburg, and concerns requirements associated with an immission control permit and a water 
use permit. The water use permit was required to extract cooling water from the Elbe river and 
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to return water of a higher temperature back to the river, and Vattenfall was from the outset 
aware that the relevant authorities were concerned that the proposed increase in the water 
temperature “would cause serious harm to the ecology of the river”.312 Vattenfall was keen to 
proceed with its investment as soon as possible, and it consequently sought a preliminary 
construction permit that would enable it to begin operations before the final immissions control 
and water use permits had been granted. Germany’s legal position in the case is not publicly 
known, but according to Vattenfall’s request for arbitration the company had negotiated and 
reached an agreement with the city authorities on environmental requirements of the project, 
and that it was subsequently issued the requested preliminary start permit. 313  Vattenfall’s 
request for arbitration is very unspecific about the nature of the underlying agreement, but the 
company does not indicate it was legally binding, and more importantly it contends that this 
formed the basis for the preliminary start permit, which it cites as follows: 
“A decision in favour of the applicant can be expected in immission protection 
proceedings. According to a provisional assessment of the immission control 
application there are no obstacles that cannot be removed by covenants that stand 
in the way of approval. Assessment of the submitted application documents has 
revealed that from the current point of view it is highly probable that the provisions 
of [relevant regulations] in relation to the proposed plant are met”.314 
The company cites the above statement in support of its claim that it had legitimately expected 
the final environmental permits to be issued in line with whatever agreement it had previously 
reached with the city authorities. However, the above citation itself casts doubt on the 
company’s claims – the use of formulations such as “can be expected”, “according to a 
provisional assessment”, “from the current point of view it is highly probable” suggests the 
final permits were still subject to change from whatever Vattenfall might have negotiated with 
the city. Indeed, it would probably be legally dubious to guarantee environmental permits based 
on certain conditions before the full assessments associated with the allocation of the final 
permits had been undertaken, a process that would take several months and that the company 
was unwilling to wait for before starting construction.315  
 
Vattenfall did eventually receive the immissions control and water use permits, but the 
investment treaty dispute was based on its objection that both “were coupled with restrictions”, 
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in the latter case “extremely severe” restrictions, that “clearly deviate […] from what the 
Vattenfall Group was entitled to expect”. 316  The restrictions included stricter criteria on 
extraction of water from the river as well as the temperature of returned cooling water, as well 
as what it considers an ‘arbitrary’ extension of the monitoring period for the ‘fish stair’ it was 
obliged to construct.317 The company contended that the changes were ‘politically motivated’; 
the restrictions are attributed to changes in the political composition of the local government 
following a strong electoral performance of the Green Party in local elections.318 In contrast, 
the city authorities maintained that the restrictions were justified on environmental grounds and 
required under the EU’s Water Framework Directive.319 The company initiated arbitration on 
the basis that the new environmental restrictions significantly reduced the capacity of the plant 
and made it uneconomical, and thereby asked for EUR 1.4 billion in compensation, presumably 
in substantial part for lost profits.320 In order to avoid arbitration, Germany settled the case and 
offered a number of environmental concessions to the company, including more favourable 
water use requirements and a reduction of the requirements for fish monitoring.321 As such, a 
Greenpeace lawyers concludes that the investment treaty dispute “lead to settlement involving 
reduced environmental standards which was probably not necessary under German law and 
might not have come about without the [investment treaty] case”.322 
 
Scholars suggest that the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is an “extremely flexible tool” to 
enable tribunals to find government measures in breach of the treaty where no more specific 
breaches have been found, and few environmental cases are launched today without a reference 
to the investor’s legitimate expectations.323 Sometimes references are made to expectations 
based upon the general regulatory framework applicable at the time of the investment, but 
arbitral awards suggest such claims are unlikely to be successful in the absence of other 
contributory factors, either in terms of other violations (such as lack of transparency) or of 
‘specific representations’. What is clear is nevertheless that tribunals are unlikely to look kindly 
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upon environmental regulations enacted contrary to ‘specific representations’ made to 
particular companies, and Vattenfall v. Germany shows what consequences such legal 
obligations can have in practice. While this case was settled before a tribunal had assessed the 
claims, the finding in Micula v. Romania that reasonable policies adopted in good faith can 
constitute a violation of an investor’s expectations even where a state has not intended to 
commit itself to a particular conduct causes grounds for concern. Such concern is further 
amplified by the nature of the concept itself, which involves “looking at the issues at hand from 
the perspective of the investor only” and therefore “runs the risk that the true purpose of the 
[fair and equitable treatment provision] will be lost under the weight of investor concerns 
alone”.324 
 
Contractual Expectations 
 
If there is contestation in respect to how far companies can legitimately expect political and 
regulatory change not to take place on the basis of the general legislative framework or specific 
representations, there is more agreement that contractual or semi-contractual obligations are 
very often protected by investment treaties. In its broadest sense such protection can be 
achieved through reference to the fair and equitable treatment or indirect expropriation 
provisions alone, but roughly 40% of treaties also contain a so-called ‘umbrella clause’.325 The 
umbrella clause requires states to uphold any obligations they have entered into with investors, 
and thus provide further protection from contractual breaches. Finally, while contractual 
breaches often operate within the investment treaty framework, many contracts allow 
corporations to proceed directly to international arbitration, with or without an investment treaty. 
Such contractual disputes are often raised in less transparent venues, such as the court of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and often little is known about the cases. Adherence to 
contractual obligations may at first glance appear to be relatively uncontroversial – unlike the 
cases above, here the state clearly agreed to be bound by certain obligations. What is less 
controversial legally is nevertheless equally problematic politically; there are circumstances in 
which states may seek to breach contracts in order to protect their citizens. This sub-section 
will first investigate how contractual obligations become a straight-jacket in times of crisis, and 
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thereafter look at how the requirement to observe contractual obligations can prevent states 
from protecting the environment. 
 
As a consequence of a 2001 financial crisis that the Economist likened to the ‘Great Depression’, 
Argentina has become the most sued country in the world under the international investment 
regime.326 Over 50 investment treaty challenges have been brought in response to measures the 
government had taken to address the financial crisis.327 In most cases, companies have alleged 
that Argentina’s decision to break currency convertibility between the peso and the dollar was 
in breach of semi-contractual guarantees provided by government decree to foreign companies, 
particularly in privatized public utilities. The companies maintained that they had invested on 
the basis of generous guaranteed rates of return calculated in U.S. dollars, and that the 
devaluation of the peso and the changes to the tariff regimes breached their legitimate 
expectations.328  There is little dispute that currency convertibility had become a problem; 
indeed, the IMF determined that Argentina had waited too long to break convertibility and the 
tribunal in Enron v. Argentina acknowledged that it had “no reason to doubt” that Argentina 
was “guided by the best of intentions” in the decisions it had taken to address the financial 
crisis.329  
 
The question nevertheless remained whether Argentina’s actions were in breach of its 
investment treaties. On the basis of a long-dormant ‘necessity’ clause in most investment 
treaties, Argentina maintained that the magnitude of the financial crisis allowed it to breach the 
semi-contractual guarantees it had provided; that it could not afford to continue paying foreign 
investors in public utilities in pre-agreed rates convertible to the dollar; and that its actions 
ensured that “all participants in the economy would share the necessary burden collectively”.330 
Tribunals have reached divergent conclusions in respect to the Argentine financial crisis, but 
many have found precisely that foreign investors were contractually protected from sharing in 
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that necessary burden. Beyond any other case, the Argentine cases reveal the extent to which 
tribunals would require states to abide by contractual obligations. Despite the fact that income 
per capita more than halved in a matter of weeks; that half the Argentine population was living 
below the poverty line within a year’s time; and that the country at one point saw a succession 
of five presidents take office in a period of ten days; tribunals nevertheless maintained that 
contractual obligations remained because the financial crisis did not amount to “total economic 
and social collapse”. 331  Many of the tribunals have maintained that the foreign investors 
deserved “stability and predictability”, notwithstanding the fact that Argentine economic and 
political life at the time was anything but stable and predictable.332 While the high returns 
expected by investors before the financial crisis indicate awareness of certain political and 
economic risks, many of the investment tribunals viewed contractual guarantees initially 
offered in completely different circumstances as virtually sacred.333 
 
The strong preference for contractual stability evidenced in the Argentine cases can enable 
corporations to challenge environmental protection measures that are deemed in breach of 
contractual guarantees. Many kinds of contracts can have environmental consequences of one 
kind or another, but the focus here is on contracts concluded between foreign companies and 
host governments in respect to larger investments. Very often such contracts create a “special 
legal regime” for particular investment projects that can deviate significantly from the general 
legal framework of the country.334 To cite Global Witness, what such contracts often do is 
“essentially to create a state within a state”.335 Developed countries rarely conclude contracts 
that derogate significantly from generally applicable law or that exempt investors from future 
legislative changes – indeed, it would often cause constitutional difficulties were they to do so 
– but this is common practice in the developing world, including in respect to investment 
projects with involvement from international financial institutions such as the World Bank.336  
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The effect of investment contracts on the ability of states to subsequently introduce more 
stringent environmental regulations is two-fold. Firstly, many contracts include specific 
provisions that relate to the environment. For instance, a concession contract with Mozambique 
entitles the company “to drill for and have the free use of water and impound surface waters”; 
a contract concluded with Bangladesh specifically permits the company to engage in the 
environmentally destructive practice of ‘flaring’ natural gas; and a contract with Liberia allows 
the company free use of timber with no requirement that it be sustainably harvested in line with 
its forestry law.337 These clauses all place certain specific environmental protection measures 
beyond the scope of future regulation by the states concerned. If Bangladesh were to prohibit 
the practice of ‘flaring’ natural gas or Mozambique to restrict the use of water, the states would 
be in breach of the respective contracts they had concluded with the companies concerned. In 
these cases, the states specifically agreed to be bound by such limits on its future regulatory 
powers in respect to specific environmental protection measures. 
 
Beyond such specific contractual obligations that implicate the environment, there is 
nevertheless also a second and much broader sense in which companies can invoke contracts to 
restrain states in their introduction of new environmental protection measures. This is through 
the use of ‘stabilization clauses’, in contracts sometimes referred to as ‘Change of Law’ 
clauses.338 Piero Bernardini, the Vice-President of the arbitration court of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, maintains that stabilization clauses are “[t]he most important of the 
contractual guarantees”.339 These clauses are essentially designed to provide investors with 
legal and regulatory stability, and they accomplish this objective by either exempting a 
company from compliance with any subsequent laws or regulations that the state may introduce 
(so-called ‘freezing clauses’), or by requiring states to compensate the company for additional 
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costs incurred as a result of compliance with such laws or regulations (termed ‘economic 
equilibrium clauses’). 340  In so far as ‘freezing clauses’, as the term implies, ‘freeze’ 
environmental regulations at a given point in time, these are normally perceived as more 
restrictive on the regulatory ability of states. In contrast, ‘economic equilibrium clauses’ are 
perceived as more enabling – they do allow states to enact new environmental regulations and 
to apply them to the foreign company – but in requiring compensation to be provided for costs 
incurred such clauses can still place a substantial financial strain on the resources of countries 
in the developing world, and this provides an economic disincentive towards introducing new 
environmental regulations. The provision of compensation for compliance with environmental 
regulations also undermines the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Stabilization clauses normally 
‘stabilize’ the legal framework of an investment at the date of the conclusion of the contract, 
and some contracts specifically clarify that companies are protected from already concluded 
laws that have not yet entered into force, or from already anticipated changes in law (in one 
instance, foreseeable changes to labour laws as a result of EU candidacy). 341 Stabilization 
clauses may also further clarify that corporations are not only protected from legal changes 
introduced at the initiative of domestic actors, but also from laws required for compliance with 
international obligations or treaties, such as international environmental treaties.342 Finally, 
stabilization clauses can be either full or partial. Full stabilization clauses apply to all new laws 
and regulations, including those pertaining to environmental regulations, and approximately 60 % 
of investor-state contracts in the developing world are estimated to contain full stabilization 
clauses. 343  In contrast, partial stabilization clauses normally only protect companies from 
changes to fiscal or tax conditions. While such partial stabilization clauses clearly impose less 
restrictions on the regulatory powers of states, they too can impact on environmental regulations 
– perhaps ironically, market-based mechanisms for environmental protection, such as carbon 
taxes or environmental levies, are likely to be prohibited by such partial stabilization clauses.344 
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A major recent report on behalf of a World Bank and a UN agency concludes that “the practice 
of using stabilization clauses of some kind is widely established across industries and regions 
of the world”.345 The knowledge of the specifics of stabilization clauses and investor-state 
contracts generally is nevertheless severely hampered by confidentiality, and as such the full 
extent of the contractual obligations of states towards companies is unknown. There are no 
known arbitral disputes in respect to stabilization clauses that concern environmental or other 
generally applicable public interest regulations, though in a currently pending dispute Veolia 
maintains that Egypt had breached a stabilization clause by virtue of changes to local labour 
laws, including an increase in the minimum wage.346 It is unclear whether the apparent absence 
of arbitral disputes in this respect is due to voluntary compliance by states with its contractual 
obligations not to introduce such regulations or whether it is due to companies’ unwillingness 
to invoke contractual guarantees against public interest regulations, or finally, whether it may 
be due to the fact that contract-based disputes are often heard in confidential tribunals. Antony 
Crockett concludes that “[f]rom a legal standpoint, the argument that stabilisation clauses may 
have a ‘chilling effect’ on environmental regulation or human rights standards in host States is 
well made [but] it has not been proven that stabilisation clauses have had this effect in 
practice”.347 
 
Stabilization clauses are both prevalent and potentially powerful legal tools to protect 
corporations from changes to the legal and regulatory frameworks of the states in which they 
operate – in contrast to other forms of protection offered by international investment law, there 
is no need to show that the economic costs of the environmental regulations rise to a certain 
threshold or that they are in any way unfair or discriminatory. If such clauses are powerful in 
the wide scope of their potential impact, they are furthermore powerful in the long duration of 
their validity. Investment contracts are normally in force for between 10 – 25 years, and some 
are valid for much longer.348 Several World Bank funded projects have stabilization clauses 
valid for more than 30 years.349 The Shemberg study identified one contract that froze all laws 
and regulations applicable to a metals’ smelter for an initial period of 50 years, renewable at 
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the company’s choice for an additional 50 years beyond that.350 If the last few decades provide 
any indication of changes that are yet to come, then environmental regulations frozen at today’s 
standards for particular foreign investment projects are soon likely to be significantly lower 
than those prevalent for other parts of the economy. Furthermore, since most such contracts are 
concluded with states in the developing world, laws and regulations are likely to be ‘frozen’ at 
a level below that which is already prevalent in much of the developed world. Some long-term 
investor-state contracts do allow for evolution of environmental standards by invoking 
international standards of various kinds, but even these are rarely adequate substitutes for state 
regulations. For instance, contracts in the energy sector frequently specify that companies are 
obliged to operate in accordance with “the standards and practices generally prevailing in the 
international petroleum pipeline industry for comparable projects”.351 While these requirements 
do allow for an evolution of applicable environmental standards over time, it is not clear what 
‘practices’ or ‘standards’ are actually referred to, and in any case it would not take a cynic to 
suggest that the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident has cast doubt on the utility of whatever 
standards and practices are 'generally accepted' within this particular industry itself.352 
 
Prominent scholars suggest that stabilization clauses are re-emerging “in the most extensive 
form ever seen”, and this is likely to provide companies with significant opportunities to 
challenge new environmental regulations.353 The prevailing secrecy that surrounds investor-
state contracts nevertheless ensures that neither scholars nor citizens know the full extent of the 
legal guarantees provided to investors. Despite the fact that investment contracts enable states 
to tie their hands in respect to public interest regulations pertaining to an investment for decades 
or even a century, there is no need for the people of the state to offer their consent to the future 
limitations this involves. Most investor-state contracts are negotiated and concluded in secret.354 
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Once contracts are signed, they may also be protected by ‘commercial confidentiality’ and are 
in many developing countries not publicly disclosed.355 Finally, secrecy often prevails also 
when disputes arise – if corporations challenge environmental regulations on the basis of 
contractual guarantees, such disputes are more frequently addressed in confidential tribunals 
than other investment law disputes.356 
 
Concluding Remarks on Change 
 
Arbitral practice and the investment law literature are both predisposed towards supporting the 
protection of the ‘legitimate expectations’ of corporations against legal and regulatory changes 
that take place after an investment has been made, and conceives of this in terms of protection 
from ‘political risk’. The particular forms of regulatory change that companies can legitimately 
expect to be protected against, in the absence of conduct that is discriminatory, unfair or 
tantamount to expropriation, nevertheless remains unclear. Irrespective of whether companies 
are deemed to deserve protection from general regulatory changes, or only for breaches of 
‘specific assurances’ or contracts, this provides corporations with important avenues for 
challenging newly enacted environmental policies or measures. While the desire of corporations 
to ensure protection from ‘political risk’ is understandable (and has long been achieved through 
both public and private political risk insurance) such protection through investment arbitration 
can significantly interfere with the normal operations of any state. After all, politics is far from 
static – on the basis of new knowledge or new appreciations of certain risks or a new sense of 
priorities, people and the governments that represent them change their minds. Yet current 
investment treaty disputes refer to any unfavourable ‘change of mind’ as a repudiation of a 
company’s legitimate expectations. Given the inclusion of ‘legitimate expectations’ and 
contractual stability in investment law the arguments they make are legally plausible. In a 
current dispute, Vattenfall (the same company that successfully challenged Hamburg’s 
environmental restrictions on its power plant) is bringing Germany to arbitration for its decision 
to phase out nuclear energy.357 There is a long history of public and legislative debate in respect 
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to nuclear energy in Germany. In 2002 the parliament had decided to phase out nuclear power, 
but by 2010 it had nevertheless decided to extend the life of the country’s nuclear plants.358 
Within a year the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan resulted in nation-wide protests, and the 
parliament decided to close a number of nuclear plants as part of a policy that “represents a 
180-degree reversal of the administration’s previous policy”. 359  There is no doubt that 
Vattenfall has evidence to suggest that it had legitimately expected a life-time extension of its 
power plants as provided in 2010 legislation, and the very use of the German term 
‘energiewende’ in public discourse to indicate the u-turn this decision involves is likely to 
support the company’s investment treaty allegations.360 But such is also the nature of politics, 
and neither companies, citizens nor legislatures can anticipate the type of changes that might 
occur. 
 
Compensation 
 
This chapter has detailed the myriad ways in which corporations can challenge national 
environmental regulations in investment tribunals, but what happens if they win? Proponents 
of investment treaty arbitration often seek to reassure concerned civil society groups that in 
contrast to the dispute settlement panels of the World Trade Organization, investment tribunals 
normally do not ask states to withdraw legislation.361 The normal consequence of an investment 
treaty violation is the payment of compensation to the company.362 As such, the European 
Commission emphasizes that even the success of lawsuits by corporations “does not prevent 
governments from passing laws, nor does it lead to laws being repealed. At most, it can lead to 
compensation being paid”.363 The argument here is nevertheless that “at most” is not so little; 
the compensation requirement should not be dismissed lightly. While Thomas Wälde describes 
compensation as the “least sovereignty-intrusive remedy”, states faced with multi-billion dollar 
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lawsuits for the introduction of environmental protection measures are unlikely to feel that their 
regulatory powers are entirely unfettered.364 
 
In line with the emphasis of the European Commission, a corporate lawyer explained to 
listeners of the Canadian radio station CBC that investment tribunals cannot force states to 
withdraw environmental protection measures such as a moratorium on mining; “all these 
tribunals can do is to… is to compensate the company for its economic losses”. 365  This 
statement is not only misleading in terms of the notion that compensation is an unproblematic 
requirement, but also because terms such as ‘economic losses’ probably has a different meaning 
to ordinary listeners of the CBC from the meaning attributed to the term in investment treaty 
arbitration. For the most part, the calculation of a company’s ‘economic losses’ in investment 
arbitration includes also a consideration of its ‘lost profits’. The standard of compensation 
required depends on the nature of the government measure – a lawful expropriation in 
accordance with the terms of the treaty requires fair market value compensation, while any 
breach of the treaty requires restitutionary damages. In the latter respect, tribunals often cite the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory case that compensation must 
“wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in 
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.366 The compensation required 
for violations of investment treaty provisions therefore clearly includes reasonably 
ascertainable lost profits. In practice, this is nevertheless not much different from the measure 
of compensation required for lawful expropriations (such as the expansion of a national park to 
protect endangered species), because the fair market value of an investment in itself already 
includes an assessment of lost profits.367 The requirement that corporations be compensated for 
lost profits is therefore well established in international investment law. 
 
The magnitude of investment projects in today’s world, in combination with the requirement 
for ‘lost profits’, means that companies are often asking for billions of dollars in compensation 
for any treaty breaches. Current environmental cases are no exception – Vattenfall is seeking 
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EUR 3.5 billion for the effect of Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy, while the 
Renco Group is reportedly seeking USD 800 million from Peru for allegedly unfair conduct in 
respect to environmental regulations. 368  Many proponents of investment treaty arbitration 
nevertheless emphasize that such large figures are irrelevant, and that while 
“[e]nvironmentalists and scholars fret over the extremely large amounts claimed in lawsuits […] 
they fail to look at the concrete results”.369 Indeed, the concrete results do suggest that the 
compensation claimed is substantially more than that finally awarded by tribunals – a frequently 
cited study by Susan Franck reveals that investors claimed an average of USD 343 million in 
compensation but only eventually received an average of USD 10 million. 370  However, 
dismissing large compensation claims on this basis is premature – more substantial awards do 
exist, and many were awarded after the Franck study was concluded. The largest award to date 
is the high profile USD 50 billion ruling against Russia in the Yukos case.371 The second largest 
is the USD 2.3 billion award against Ecuador in favour of Occidental Petroleum, and is 
reportedly equivalent to Ecuador’s entire annual education budget. 372  Both of these cases 
nevertheless involved expropriations of considerable assets, and in the latter case Ecuador had 
already offered over USD 400 million in compensation to Occidental Petroleum.373 This does 
not alleviate the substantial financial strain imposed on governments by compensation 
requirements of such magnitude, but these awards at least implicate in substantial part actual 
losses that would need to be borne by either the state or the company. A more interesting case 
is therefore Al Kharafi v. Libya, a dispute that concerned a proposed tourism development, 
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which had received the required permits and approvals but soon ran into difficulties.374 The 
permits were withdrawn and construction never commenced. An otherwise unremarkable case, 
what is remarkable is the measure of compensation awarded for lost profits. In addition to 
compensation for the USD 5 million that the company had actually spent on the initial 
development of the project, the tribunal required Libya to pay a further 900 million to the 
company in compensation for its anticipated lost profits over a period of 83 years.375 While 
companies routinely request several hundred million dollars in lost profits beyond the actual 
losses incurred as a result of government measures, the USD 900 million difference in Al 
Kharafi v. Libya between costs actually incurred and compensation awarded suggests such 
claims are not merely empty threats. 
 
Some advocates of investment arbitration dismiss large compensation claims for public interest 
measures in respect to the environment, public health or human rights on the basis that 
companies that have been awarded compensation at all have normally only been awarded a few 
million, “a pittance when compared with the hundreds of millions originally claimed”.376 
Awards in the seven environmental cases that have been concluded on the merits in favour of 
the company have indeed not exceeded USD 50 million. The fact that only a ‘pittance’ has been 
granted in comparison with the claims made should nevertheless not give the impression that 
the awards are not generous under the circumstances of the case. In Tecmed v. Mexico, the 
tribunal noted that the “considerable difference” between the tender price and the actual 
investment into the landfill (USD 4,5 million) and the compensation sought by the company 
(USD 52 million) was “likely to be inconsistent with the legitimate and genuine estimates on 
return on the Claimant’s investment at the time of making the investment”.377 On this basis, the 
tribunal awarded compensation for the tender price and subsequent investments into the site, 
and a further $1 million in compensation for lost profits.378 Similarly, in S.D. Myers v. Canada, 
                                                             
374 Diana Rosert, ‘Libya Ordered to Pay US$935 Million to Kuwaiti Company for Cancelled Investment Project; 
Jurisdiction Established Under Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital’, Investment Treaty News, 
1:5 (19 January 2014), p. 13-15 
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a case that concerned lost profits during a 15-month period in which the border was closed to 
hazardous PCB exports, the tribunal dismissed the CAD 70 million claim as unrealistic but 
granted CAD 6 million almost entirely in lost profits.379 Widely inflated compensation claims 
for lost profits continue to emerge in investment arbitration for environmental cases – in a case 
brought by V.G. Gallo, Canada objected that the lost profits claim of CAD 250 million in 
comparison to the costs incurred amounted to an anticipated return of nearly 20,000 % on the 
investment.380 It has already been argued that non-environmental cases reveal that the risk for 
substantial awards remain, but beyond that risk it should also be recognized that the actual 
awards granted in investment disputes can be generous given the circumstances of the cases, 
even if they do not approximate the optimistic claims of the companies. 
 
This chapter has sought to show that companies do not only receive compensation for clearly 
unfair government conduct, but that investment treaty provisions can also be violated in 
circumstances where states have in good faith pursued valuable public purposes. It has further 
been shown that market value compensation is also required for lawful expropriations 
motivated by environmental protection goals deemed ‘laudable’ by the tribunals themselves. In 
light of this, the standard of compensation required by investment treaties is very favourable to 
the companies concerned. Compensation for ‘lost profits’ is required without consideration for 
either the financial impact on the state, or for the often considerable profits the company had 
already made from its investment in the host state. 381  While tribunals are increasingly 
addressing public interest considerations at the merits stage of the arbitration – and are adopting 
‘proportionality’ approaches that balance the regulatory needs against the impact on investors 
– such public interest considerations or balancing is rarely deemed relevant in determining the 
compensation to be provided.382 Once a breach of a treaty has been found, an assessment is 
exclusively based on the market value of the investment or the investor’s situation in the 
absence of the unfavourable government measure. 
 
                                                             
379 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Second Partial Award. 
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Beyond elemental questions of fairness, this raises serious questions about the practical 
implications. So far investment disputes in respect to environmental regulations have not 
resulted in awards that are unaffordable to the states concerned, but a number of disputes 
concerning large natural resources projects in the developing world highlight the risks. What 
happens if a small developing country decides to protect a rainforest in which a transnational 
corporation had already received exploration rights for oil or minerals, and where such oil or 
minerals had been located in large quantities? Fair market value compensation for interference 
with investments with large anticipated profits would inevitably be prohibitively expensive. 
Similarly, wider environmental protection measures that affect investors across an entire sector 
can be equally costly. In response to measures taken to address the financial crisis, Argentina 
faced more than fifty investor-state disputes, and Spain is currently facing more than thirty 
disputes as a result of its decision not to maintain its very generous tariff regime for solar energy 
– the collective costs of these lawsuits, if successful, would amount to several billion euros.383 
Tribunals in concluded cases have not accepted any lower standard of compensation in such 
cases, and ‘lost profits’ remains the norm. Finally, the very principle of compensation for 
environmental protection measures raises concerns in respect to the ‘polluter pays’ principle – 
the costs of protecting the environment is shifted from the foreign investment project that causes 
the environmental degradation to the taxpayer. 384  Despite this, even the otherwise more 
balanced model investment treaty of the International Institute of Sustainable Development 
maintains the conventional standards of compensation.385 Given such risks in respect to the 
standard of compensation required, it is remarkable that there are hardly any proposals to 
change this. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In its promotion of major trade and investment treaties currently being negotiated with Canada 
and the United States, the European Commission maintains that only a ‘limited’ set of 
protections are afforded to corporations by investment treaties.386 Indeed, on the face of it, the 
treatment standards in investment treaties may appear limited to only protecting corporations 
from state conduct that is in any case unreasonable or at least antithetical to a global capitalist 
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order that few governments in today’s world seek to challenge. This chapter has nevertheless 
sought to show that transnational corporations do not only perceive investment treaties as 
protection against such measures, but more broadly as “a valuable safeguard against possible 
policy choices” made by the states in which they operate. 387  While the previous chapter 
demonstrated that the institutional set-up of international arbitration made the international 
investment regime a powerful tool for challenging state measures, this chapter has revealed that 
such challenges are successful against a wide range of government measures taken by states in 
their pursuit of public purposes. 
 
The focus of this chapter has been on corporate challenges to state measures designed to protect 
the environment. Sanford Gaines suggests that the early environmental cases that initially raised 
concerns amongst civil society groups were not followed by a ‘second wave’, but that second 
wave is now clearly here; at least ten environmental cases are currently pending, several of 
which concern high profile public policy decisions such as Quebec’s moratorium on ‘fracking’ 
and Germany’s phase-out of nuclear energy.388 This chapter has shown that there are a myriad 
of ways in which companies can challenge environmental protection measures precisely 
because the terms of investment treaties are so open-ended. The ‘limited’ treatment standards 
found in investment treaties – national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, protection 
from expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, ‘legitimate expectations’ – conceal a much 
broader set of government conduct that is susceptible to challenge by corporations. The term 
‘discrimination’ does not only apply to intentionally protectionist measures by states, but also 
to differential treatment justified on environmental grounds (such as ensuring domestic disposal 
capacity for hazardous waste) if the state has not chosen the policy option that has the least 
impact on the foreign investor.389 The term ‘expropriation’ relates not only to direct state 
appropriation of property but also to measures ‘tantamount to’ expropriation, and depending on 
the approach adopted this can be assessed solely on the basis of the economic impact of a 
measure (the ‘sole effects’ approach), on the basis of proportionality (based on a scale that it 
has been argued is heavily tilted in favour of corporations), or in respect to the state’s ‘police 
powers’ (but even in this most environmentally friendly approach, states may still need to show 
that a state measure is based on a thorough scientific assessment and a range of other potential 
criteria). Furthermore, while the European Commission suggests that investment treaties only 
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afford corporations “[p]rotection against expropriation which is not for a public policy purpose 
and not fairly compensated”, such a claim is directly misleading in so far as it implied that 
expropriation for a public purpose would not require compensation.390 There is no dispute that 
a measure that amounted to an expropriation (say, the expansion of a national park to protect 
engendered species) requires full market value compensation, that includes a consideration of 
a company’s lost profits, even where the tribunal itself praises the ‘laudable’ public purpose 
behind it.391 The term ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is sufficiently wide to ensure that state 
environmental measures “guided by the best of intentions” and based on “reasoned judgement” 
can still violate the treaty.392 This standard allows investment tribunals to act as “pre-agreed 
review agencies” of state actions and to “set standards for States in their internal administrative 
processes”.393 Corporate challenges to environmental protection measures based on ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ reveal that states have to be very careful in their regulatory or 
administrative conduct towards foreign companies so as not to breach this standard. Finally, 
through arbitral innovation the term ‘legitimate expectations’ has become one of the most 
potent requirements of investment treaties. Given that it is “irrelevant whether the state in fact 
wished to commit itself” to a certain conduct towards the investor, states can end up surprised 
by what companies expect from them, and a number of current cases revolve around 
moratoriums or denials of permits for investment projects in the very early stages of 
development, where a state (and its people) have only just begun to appreciate the 
environmental risks of a project.394 Even in cases where the state did explicitly agree to commit 
itself not to change the regulatory framework – such as in providing contractual guarantees to 
freeze environmental regulations applicable to an investment project for decades to come – it 
is not implausible to suggest that subsequent governments may thoroughly come to regret such 
a promise. Investment treaty standards enable corporations to challenge any kind of government 
measure in a myriad of different ways, and expansive interpretations of such clauses ensure that 
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they stand a good chance of winning. Where a breach of an investment treaty is found, the 
company is entitled to full compensation, including a measure of lost profits that may well 
exceed the sums a company spent on the investment in the first place. 
 
Proponents of investment arbitration adopt a number of rhetorical strategies to ensure criticism 
is kept at bay. Describing investment protection in terms with distinctly positive connotations 
– protection from ‘discrimination’ and ‘unfair and inequitable treatment’ – ensures that it 
becomes impossible to disagree with investment treaty provisions as a matter of principle; who 
would advocate that anyone be discriminated against or treated unfairly? Similarly, the 
European Commission’s rhetorical strategy in current investment treaty negotiations is to couch 
the treaties in terms of only requiring adherence to “basic principles of the rule of law”.395 
Sornarajah suggests that this provides investment treaties “legitimacy by transference” in so far 
as “no one can quarrel with the rule of law”. 396  This chapter has sought to counter such 
rhetorical strategies by demonstrating that investment treaty provisions entail more than 
immediately meets the eye. Investment tribunals do not primarily deal with outrageous cases – 
for the most part, investment awards go into minute detail to understand the domestic 
administrative processes of states or spend over 50 pages on a close analysis of the scientific 
assessment that underlies a state measure. The knowledge that tribunals will closely analyze 
any indication of wrongdoing may have further encouraged corporations to file investment 
treaty disputes in the hope that the document discovery process itself (such as access to internal 
government e-mails) allows for what Canada in one case complained amounted to “an extensive 
fishing expedition” for evidence of any kind of administrative irregularities or private 
conversations of politicians or administrative staff revealing any discriminatory intent, broadly 
conceived.397  
 
In the light of the dismissals of the claims in Methanex (California’s prohibition of a gasoline 
additive that had polluted groundwater), Glamis Gold (California’s requirement for backfilling 
of open-pit mines), and Chemtura (Canada’s prohibition of a pesticide that is being phased out 
internationally), many have suggested that ‘genuine’ environmental measures were after all not 
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under threat.398  However, even in such cases that concern very reasonable environmental 
measures, the U.S. and Canada had to spend many years defending themselves before 
international tribunals, and in two of the cases were still left several million dollars out of pocket 
due to legal fees and arbitral costs.399 While developed countries with considerable experience 
of litigious corporations in domestic courts have a fairly good track record of meeting such 
international investment treaty challenges, this should not be expected in many of the current 
cases in the developing world. To cite Sornarajah, “[w]hat is frightening to developing countries 
is that the experience gained in the litigation between the United States and Canada, both of 
which have the resources to meet such arguments through armies of lawyers will be transported 
onto the litigation involving developing countries without such resources”. 400  In some 
circumstances states may be able to walk a very fine line in their adoption of policies that affect 
foreign investors and thereby escape investment treaty challenges, and to meet such challenges 
head on with ‘armies of lawyers’ when disputes arise, but there is likely to be other 
circumstances where otherwise genuine environmental measures are found to breach one or 
another of the investment treaty provisions. 
 
International investment law is believed to be the fastest growing area of international law 
today.401 This is not surprising; it provides corporations with avenues to challenge unfavourable 
government conduct in a myriad of ways, and to do so before investment tribunals with none 
of the protections against judicial bias that are found in domestic or formal international courts. 
The speed at which the investment arbitration system has developed in recent years is largely 
attributable to the promise of a generous measure of compensation to the corporation in the case 
of a win, and only a few millions in legal costs when they lose. In contrast, for states the risks 
of a lawsuit are high; a few million in legal costs when they win, and possibly the payment of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in lost profits alone to a company when they lose. The incentives 
towards an out-of-court settlement (possibly by withdrawing environmental regulations) are 
therefore strong. Investment treaty scholars often remark that the direct recourse of corporations 
to an international court to protect international rights makes this “one of the most important 
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progressive developments in the procedure of international law in all its history”.402 In contrast, 
even moderate critics like José Alvarez suggests that the investment treaty regime amounts to 
“the most bizarre human rights treaty ever conceived” – in essence a "human rights treaty for a 
special-interest group”, or what is in this thesis termed a ‘transnational capitalist class’.403 
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Chapter 4 
Investor-‘State’ Dispute Settlement: Protection from Social 
Movements? 
 
Scholarly analysis of what is formally known as ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ normally 
proceeds on the assumption that investment arbitration is simply about resolving disputes 
between investors and states, as indeed the term implies. In contrast, this chapter seeks to 
illustrate how investment disputes are ultimately not disputes between the two parties that 
formally confront each other before the investment tribunal. These disputes do indeed originate 
from investors (normally transnational corporations), but their ultimate opponents are often 
particular societal groups (such as local community groups or social movements) that have 
come to oppose certain corporate plans or practices. Each of these non-state actors have 
normally sought to make use of state institutions in their struggles with each other, and it is 
when these social movements or civil society groups have been victorious in domestic political 
debates that the corporation seeks to challenge the state in investment arbitration. The 
corporation’s ultimate adversary is normally not present within the arbitral setting, but even 
where it is, it is only permitted to appear as a ‘non-party’ or ‘third party’ within the limited 
remit of making an amicus curiae (‘friend of the court’) submission. Crucially, these social 
movements and civil society groups also remain conspicuously absent within the primarily legal 
scholarly literature on the subject, which follows legal practice in its conception of the dispute 
as one between investors and states and which insists on referring to social movements as ‘third 
parties’.1 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the politics of international 
investment law. In order to do so, it draws upon the theoretical approach developed in Chapter 
1 to develop an alternative perspective on the political struggles that underpin investor-state 
dispute settlement; a perspective in which civil society groups or social movements are not 
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relegated to ‘third party’ status (let alone disappear altogether) but where they are placed in 
direct opposition to the corporation that brings the investment treaty lawsuit. The focus remains 
on investment disputes about the environment, and the chapter is structured into three 
substantial sections, according to the alternative chronology of the investment disputes 
themselves. The first section considers who investment disputes are actually between, and 
explores the original conflicts between transnational corporations and their civil society 
opponents. The second section considers how the non-state dispute becomes an investor-state 
dispute, and investigates how the state eventually responds to such societal struggles and comes 
out in support of one or the other of these two groups. The third section considers the political 
implications of investor-state arbitration for the underlying social struggle between the 
transnational corporation and its civil society adversary.  
 
The first section of this chapter begins with the question of who investment disputes are actually 
between. The previous chapter has already detailed how investment treaties allow corporations 
to challenge measures that states around the world take to prohibit dangerous substances;2 to 
regulate the environmental impact of corporate activities (ranging from the use of cooling water 
by power plants to the backfilling of open-pit mines);3  or to deny permits or licenses to 
investments deemed harmful or excessively risky (from polluting landfills to ‘fracking’ for 
shale gas).4 This section proceeds to look at the societal actors – local community groups, 
environmental movements, or non-governmental organizations – who were often the ones to 
take the initiative for such state measures in the first place. It is argued that the underlying 
political contestation between opposing social groups – transnational corporate actors and their 
adversaries – is often misrepresented or rendered invisible within the discipline of international 
investment law.  
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Such a research agenda requires an unpacking of ‘the state’. The territorial state is formally the 
respondent before the investment tribunal, but the second section of this chapter maintains that 
in order to understand the social struggles that underpin investment treaty disputes a particular 
understanding of the state is required. It will not suffice to conceive of the state as an 
independent agent in its own right – let alone to treat it as a ‘black box’ – since this easily 
conceals the underlying disputes between transnational corporations and opposing social 
groups and often leads to unfounded assumptions about why states act. It is rather necessary to 
disaggregate the state, and to explore how state institutions and state officials relate to societal 
struggles. This section therefore explores how in the course of struggles with each other, both 
transnational corporations and opposing social groups seek to sway state officials and state 
institutions to act in support of their cause. The battle for the state can be likened to a ‘tug-of-
war’ between these opposing non-state groups, and investor-state disputes often emerge 
precisely when the transnational corporation’s civil society adversaries win such a tug-of-war 
and the state comes out in support of its environmental agenda. 
 
The third section of this chapter investigates the role that international investment law plays in 
these underlying social struggles between corporations and their civil society opponents. The 
most obvious political implication of investment law is that struggles between transnational 
corporations and opposing social groups do not end with a victory in favour of one or the other 
in domestic political debates. To cite a network of civil society organizations, “even when we 
succeed in getting governments on our side, a higher authority lurks in the background that can 
overrule people and overrule governments to give corporations what they want”.5 That higher 
authority is the global investment regime and its enforcement through investor-state dispute 
settlement. As a component of an emerging ‘transnational state’, the primary utility of 
international investment law lies in its ability to trump any domestic political decision or any 
domestic legislation that is found to be inconsistent with the corporate rights discussed in the 
previous chapter. The role of international investment law in social struggles is nevertheless not 
limited to cases in which social movement victories in domestic political debates have turned 
costlier than anticipated as a result of a corporate victory in investment arbitration; rather, the 
third section also suggests that the latent possibility of investment arbitration plays a role at 
every stage of the social struggle and consequently that the consequences of the global 
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investment treaty regime for social struggles around the world extend far beyond the few 
environmental cases that have been concluded to date. 
 
Social Groups in Investment Disputes 
 
The problem with adopting a state-centric perspective is, to cite William Robinson, “what we 
don’t see when we do see nation-states”.6 The wider argument of this thesis is that the state-
centrism inherent in much analysis of the global investment treaty regime conceals how the 
historical origins, current role, and future evolution of this regime is shaped by particular social 
groups that cannot be reducible to states. This chapter maintains that the same lesson applies to 
the particular investment disputes themselves. Here the role of one non-state actor (the company) 
is indeed rendered visible, but what conventional analysis of ‘investor-state disputes’ often does 
not make apparent is how these disputes often arise directly out of civil society protests or 
campaigns against particular corporations or corporate practices, and how arbitral proceedings 
are directly implicated in such social struggles. 
 
It may nevertheless seem an overstatement to suggest that civil society groups are ‘rendered 
invisible’ within the investment law literature. This is the case for some disputes, but in other 
disputes scholars routinely mention protests or objections from civil society groups – for 
instance, much legal analysis of Glamis Gold v. USA acknowledge that the Quechan Indian 
Nation had strongly opposed the development of a gold mine in an area of spiritual 
significance.7 What is rendered invisible is not always the civil society opposition itself, but 
their agency in disputes that are ultimately between them and the corporation concerned. Where 
civil society protests are acknowledged, they are often only briefly mentioned as background 
or contextual factors behind the ‘investor-state dispute’ rather than conceived of as agents in 
the dispute in their own right. In a sense, this is unsurprising. As a specialized and fairly obscure 
area of academic research, the discipline of international investment law is populated by legal 
scholars whose concern is understandably not with the political origins of investment disputes 
but with the legal arguments of the two parties that formally confront each other before the 
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investment tribunal, and the investment tribunal’s analysis of their respective legal claims. This 
priority accorded to the legal dispute is often made explicit in work on investment law and the 
environment, which is the topical focus of this thesis. Jorge Viñuales’ recent book specifies that 
his work “does not seek to provide an analysis of the investment-environment equation from an 
economic or political perspective”, while Åsa Romson’s treatment of the same subject “aims at 
a ‘legal’ answer to its questions, rather than a ‘political’ or ‘sociological’ answer”.8 Given this 
legal focus, it is not surprising that such scholars approach the dispute as one between the 
investor and the state who formally appear before the investment tribunal. In contrast, while 
political research on the global investment regime exists, there tends to be a division of labour 
where political research is focused on the evolution or impact of the global investment regime 
as a whole while the task of analyzing particular investment disputes is left for the lawyers. 
 
In contrast, the critical literature on international investment law is explicitly political, and does 
consider the investment disputes themselves.9 Most notably, both David Schneiderman and the 
doctoral thesis of Kyla Tienhaara explicitly draw on critical international theory in general and 
Stephen Gill’s theory of ‘new constitutionalism’ in particular. In doing so, their work could be 
expected to contribute to the research agenda suggested here. However, neither appear to 
foreground social groups as the ultimate agents in the context of particular investment disputes. 
Schneiderman tends to focus on how international investment law constrains the state itself, 
and it is the agency of the state that he refers to in speaking of the “immobilization of local 
agency”.10 In contrast, this chapter reiterates that the state is not an agent, and the agency that 
is immobilized is ultimately that of particular groups of people. Schneiderman does investigate 
civil society resistance in his book-length treatment of constitutionalism and investment law, 
but he does so in reference to the possibilities for ‘citizenship’ rather than in reference to actual 
investment disputes that arise from social struggles around the world.11 While his work strongly 
informs the approach adopted in this thesis, it does not accomplish what is intended in this 
chapter.  
                                                             
8 Jorge Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 2; Åsa Romson, Environmental Policy Space and International Investment Law 
(Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2012), p. 30. 
9 E.g. Tienhaara seeks to provide a “distinctly political dimension to a topic that often remains within the 
purview of legal studies”. Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign 
Investors at the Expense of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 4. 
10 David Schneiderman, ‘Transnational Legality and the Immobilization of Local Agency’, Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science, 2 (2006), p.387. 
11 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s 
Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Part III. 
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Kyla Tienhaara’s doctoral thesis adopts a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework and an 
empirical focus on investment law and the environment, and her research is at first glance very 
similar to that conducted here. She explicitly seeks to move beyond a conceptualization of the 
state “as a unit” and towards an understanding of how “domestic politics factor into government 
responses”,12 but her approach does nevertheless not appear to impact on her case analysis in 
the way suggested in this chapter. Protests from opposing social groups are normally relegated 
to the ‘background’ sections of her case studies while the ‘dispute’ is explicitly between the 
investor and the state, and she follows conventional practice in referring to civil society 
organizations presenting amicus curiae briefs as ‘third parties’ or ‘non-parties’ to the dispute.13 
This makes perfect sense from the perspective of the investor-state dispute settlement process 
itself, but conceals the ultimate nature of the conflict as one between social groups acting 
through states and other social structures. This does not detract from her objective; rather than 
investigating the implications of investment law for social struggle, as does this project, her 
thesis seeks to investigate the implications “for environmental governance” and “public 
policy”. 14  It is nevertheless not entirely clear why she would need the neo-Gramscian 
framework adopted to do so. Indeed, in turning the doctoral thesis into a book all references to 
neo-Gramscianism and new constitutionalism were removed, with no apparent effect on her 
analysis of the environmental investment disputes themselves.15 The book remains an important 
analysis of the implications of investment law for environmental governance, but it does not 
shift our perceptions away from an understanding that investment disputes are between 
investors and states towards an investigation of the underlying struggles between opposing 
social groups. 
 
The scholarly analysis that most closely approximates the aim of this chapter is offered in two 
journal articles by Ibironke Odumosu, who adopts a Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL) perspective.16  While it was argued in Chapter 1 that there is sometimes a 
tendency in the TWAIL literature to adopt a state-centric perspective, Odumosu is directly 
                                                             
12 Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the 
Expense of Public Policy, PhD Thesis (Vrije Universiteit, 4 September 2008), p. 395. 
13 E.g. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance’, p. 131; 166-168.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Compare Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance, PhD Thesis, with Tienhaara, The 
Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
16 Ibironke Odumosu, ‘The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in Investment Dispute Settlement,’ 
Pennsylvania State International Law Review, 26 (2007-2008), pp. 251-287; Ibironke Odumosu, ‘Locating Third 
World Resistance in the International Law on Foreign Investment’, International Community Law Review, 9 
(2007), pp. 427-444. 
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concerned with examining “the law and politics of investment dispute settlement from the 
praxis of Third World communities' engagement with foreign investment and tribunals' 
responses to such engagement”.17 She observes that “peoples’ concerns were largely ignored 
and written out of the history and the picture of investment dispute settlement”, and concludes 
that investment arbitration “is not the most hospitable place for Third World resistance”.18 
Odumosu’s argument is well made and this chapter adopts a similar approach to understanding 
investment disputes themselves (while broadening it out beyond the Third World), but her lack 
of an overall framework for understanding why people are written out of the history of 
investment law detracts from the analysis. She admonishes tribunals for not considering Third 
World ‘voices’, and concludes that “[t]ribunals have an even greater responsibility to interpret 
the law in a manner that directly incorporates the interests of peoples in investment dispute 
settlement”.19 In contrast, this thesis has argued that the very purpose for which investment law 
was founded is precisely to support a transnational capitalist class in its struggle with other 
social groups (or ‘peoples’). The composition and institutional set-up of tribunals reflects this, 
and her aim of encouraging “lawyers and tribunals to follow this path” of giving voice to 
resistance movements is to appeal to the wrong party, and the law itself is furthermore often 
formulated in such a way as to discourage any sympathetic arbitrators from following her 
path.20 An investment law that ‘incorporates the interests of peoples’ is not impossible, but the 
present approach is distinguished from Odumosu’s in that such an outcome would not be 
expected in the absence of a successful counter-struggle by precisely the social groups that are 
finding their victories against corporations undermined in investment tribunals. 
 
The Origins of Investment Disputes 
 
In contrast to the existing mainstream and critical international law literature, the aim of this 
chapter is to promote a new research agenda that places the underlying conflicts between 
transnational corporations and opposing social groups at the centre of the analysis. The 
argument is not that all investor-state disputes stem directly and immediately from active 
conflicts between social groups, but that in order to render visible the disputes that do, we need 
a particular conception of the national state. It is, after all, the state that is formally the 
                                                             
17 (My emphasis) Odumosu, ‘The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance’, p. 257.  
18 Ibid, p. 286. 
19 Ibid, p. 287. 
20 Ibid, p. 287; see chapter 2 for further information about the political leanings of investment arbitrators and 
tribunals. 
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respondent before investment tribunals. The theoretical premise that informs the analysis is that 
states are important social structures within which struggle takes place, but only people – often 
acting collectively – are agents in that struggle. The state is not conceived of as an actor in its 
own right (let alone a ‘black box’) but as a ‘strategically selective’ arena for struggle, and the 
real political agents behind all investment disputes are ultimately social groups.21 Within the 
approach adopted in this thesis, investment disputes can emerge in three different ways, each 
of which emphasizes the social origin of the state or state action.  
 
The first – and probably most unusual – way in which investment disputes can emerge is from 
the pre-existing legal or institutional structure of the state itself. An example could possibly be 
MTD v. Chile, discussed in the previous chapter, that seemed to arise out of the institutional 
structure of the Chilean state and what the tribunal determined was a lack of coordination 
between different arms of that state.22 In that case, it could be argued that the agency of 
particular actors was less important as a cause of the investment dispute than the institutional 
set-up and associated practices of the Chilean state itself. A social forces approach to the state 
would acknowledge its importance as a social structure, but remind the reader that the state is 
precisely a social structure. While an analysis of the rise of the state system and the emergence 
of particular states is beyond the scope of this thesis, it nevertheless needs to be kept in mind 
that the state itself and the particular institutional set-up of that state is ultimately the outcome 
of the agency of particular social groups, and the ‘congealment’ of historical struggles between 
them.23  
 
Most investment disputes nevertheless do not originate from the existing state structure itself 
but from political change, which in turn originates from the actions of state officials – the 
politicians or administrative staff who hold particular positions within the social structure of 
the state. It is normally only when state officials make particular decisions (such as to deny an 
environmental permit or to introduce environmental legislation) that corporations bring a 
lawsuit. The second way in which investment disputes can emerge is from state officials acting 
upon their own initiative, without any obvious connection to existing civil society protests or 
                                                             
21 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 40; Andreas Bieler & Adam 
David Morton, Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations 
in the Global Political Economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 18. 
22 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (25 
May 2004); see the section on ‘consistency’ in Chapter 3. 
23 William Robinson, Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of a Transnational State, Theory and Society, 
30:2 (2001), p. 165; Jonathan Joseph, Marxism and Social Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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campaigns. The approach adopted here would nevertheless caution against assuming that state 
officials are distinct from the society in which they live, and would rather conceive of them as 
societal beings whose social background will influence the actions they undertake as state 
officials.24 The question of why state officials are motivated to exercise their agency in support 
of particular social or class groups will be considered in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Thirdly, while almost all investment disputes formally arise out of the agency of state officials 
(themselves conceived as embedded within the society in which they live), this chapter 
distinguishes between those that emerge at their own initiative from those that seem to arise 
when state officials react and respond to the protests or campaigns of civil society groups. It is 
in such circumstances that the form of legal analysis prevalent within the discipline of 
international investment law, preoccupied as it is with the two parties facing each other before 
the investment tribunal, tends to render invisible the company’s ultimate adversary within civil 
society. The aim behind this section is to bring attention to the underlying disputes between 
transnational corporations and civil society groups. Of the 44 concluded, settled, discontinued 
or pending investment disputes relating to environmental protection measures identified in this 
thesis, at least 28 are likely to have arisen in substantial part in response to civil society 
campaigns or protests.25 This amounts to 64% of the disputes considered in this thesis, and in 
many other disputes civil society pressure may have been important without leaving enough of 
an evidence trail. In a surprising number of the cases, civil society pressure appears to have 
been the primary factor behind the decisions of state officials to introduce environmental 
protection measures.  
 
To provide an overview of investment disputes for which there is evidence that civil society 
protests or campaigns have influenced the decisions of state officials to protect the environment, 
a table of such cases is included below. The table below does not include investment disputes 
emerging as a result of the structure of the state or measures taken primarily at the initiative of 
state officials. Neither does it include disputes where the origins are uncertain. As such, despite 
the similarity in the nature of the two cases Unglaube v. Costa Rica and Santa Elena v. Costa 
Rica (both concern expropriations to expand national parks), the table includes the former but 
                                                             
24 See Chapter 1 on states and state officials.  
25 For a full list of environmental cases, see the appendix at the end of the thesis. This figure does not include 
Allard v. Barbados and the solar energy cases against Spain – the ‘pro-environment’ cases discussed in the 
introductory section of Chapter 3 – but only those that arose from environmental protection measures. 
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not the latter, since this chapter has identified evidence that civil society protests or campaigns 
were significant in the former case but not in the latter.26  
 
As illustrated in the table, the civil society protests from which investment disputes emerge can 
take one of two different forms. Firstly, disputes can arise as a result of civil society pressure 
for general legislative or regulatory changes with only an incidental effect on the particular 
corporation that subsequently seeks recourse to arbitration. For instance, Canadian state 
officials attributed the decision to phase out a particular lawn pesticide to pressure from 
environmental groups, and German state officials are likely to have taken the decision to phase 
out nuclear power at least in part due to the major protests that followed the Fukushima nuclear 
accident, and in neither case were any particular nuclear power company or producer of lawn 
pesticide directly targeted by the civil society actors.27 Secondly, disputes can arise as a result 
of civil society protests or campaigns that are at least in part targeted against the specific 
corporation that ultimately brings the lawsuit; most of the investment disputes considered here 
fall into this category. For instance, while civil society groups in Costa Rica have been active 
in pushing for a more environmentally friendly approach to its natural resources in general, 
Infinito Gold’s mining proposals also engendered protests and legal challenges against the 
company’s specific project.28 To clarify, the categorization of particular cases in the table below 
is based on what is interpreted to be the target of the civil society protests themselves; not the 
specific form in which the state environmental protection measure is taken. Where 
environmental protests target a specific corporation but results in general legislative changes 
(e.g. a moratorium on all mining of a particular kind), the case appears in the second category, 
                                                             
26 In Unglaube v. Costa Rica, non-governmental environmental organizations had brought legal challenges 
against the state of Costa Rica for not taking sufficient action to protect the nesting sites of leatherback turtles, 
and these legal challenges were instrumental in prompting Costa Rica to take the measures that were 
subsequently challenged by Unglaube before the investment tribunal. In contrast, this thesis has not identified 
any evidence of involvement by environmental groups in the Santa Elena case, but this does of course not mean 
that such involvement did not exist. Marion Unglaube & Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1 & ICSID Case No. ARB/09/20 (16 May 2012), para. 78-79, 184, 259-260; see also, 
Fernando Cabrera Diaz, ‘German Investor Launches ICSID Case against Costa Rica over Alleged Expropriation 
of Land near Endangered Turtle Habitat’, Investment Treaty News (6 December 2009), p. 2. 
27 Internal government documents identify ‘disappointment of environmental groups’ as a motivation for not 
removing a Quebec ban on the lawn pesticide, see Dow v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration, para. 22; for Vattenfall 
II v. Germany see Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Rhea Tamara Hoffman, ‘The German Nuclear Phase-Out 
Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration? Background to the New Dispute Vattenfall v. Germany 
(II)’, Briefing Note (June 2012), available at: {http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/german_nuclear_phase_out.pdf} 
accessed 24 August 2012; Helen Pidd, ‘Germany to Shut All Nuclear Reactors: Move Prompted by Mass 
Protests Against Nuclear Power Following Japan’s Nuclear Disaster’, The Guardian (30 May 2011), available at 
{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/30/germany-to-shut-nuclear-reactors} accessed 30 August 2012. 
28 Infinito Gold Ltd v. Republic of Costa Rica, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status by Asociación Preservacionista 
de Flora y Fauna Silvestre, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5 (15 September 2014), section 4-6. 
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not the first. The footnotes provide a brief explanation for why the particular case is determined 
to have arisen specifically in response to civil society campaigns or protests. 
 
Environmental investment disputes caused primarily or in substantial part by general 
civil society campaigns or protests. 
Chemtura v. Canada Opposition by the World Wildlife Fund against the pesticide 
lindane.29 
Dow Agrosciences v. Canada Opposition by environmental organizations in Quebec to a lawn 
pesticide.30 
John Andre v. Canada Petitioning by aboriginal groups and their representatives for 
continued right to hunt caribou.31 
Vattenfall v. Germany (II) Nation-wide demonstrations against nuclear power in response to 
the Fukushima nuclear accident.32 
Sun Belt v. Canada Public opposition to large-scale exports of water on conservation 
grounds.33 
 
 
                                                             
29 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in prohibiting the pesticide lindane, 
and the main initiative for this appears to have come from an industry group to which the investor itself belongs. 
The World Wildlife Fund nevertheless also seems to have been critical in putting pressure on both the 
government and the industry group. For instance, one industry leader suggested that he had, after the decision on 
the voluntary withdrawal of lindane had been taken, phoned the World Wildlife Fund to ask them to leave him 
alone. The World Wildlife Fund had also lobbied the government to prohibit the pesticide. Chemtura v. Canada, 
Award, para. 169, 173; see also World Wildlife Fund Canada, ‘Press Release: Toxic Pesticide Should Be 
Banned’ (24 November 1999), available at {http://www.foodsafety.ksu.edu/en/news-
details.php?a=3&c=29&sc=220&id=33272} accessed 3 March 2014. 
30 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in its prohibition on a lawn 
pesticide, and internal government documents noted “disappointment of environmental groups” as a reason for 
maintaining the prohibition, revealing their prior campaigning on the issue. Dow v. Canada, Notice of 
Arbitration, para. 22. 
31 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in its withdrawal and subsequent 
elimination of quotas for the hunting of caribou, following a sharp decline in caribou numbers. Representatives 
of aboriginal groups appear to have been active in making their concerns heard and ensuring that they would be 
entitled to continue with subsistence hunting. This led the investor, involved in hunting tourism, to challenge the 
allocation of quotas as discriminatory. John R. Andre v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent (19 March 
2010); Bob Weber, ‘Aboriginal Hunters Fight for Right to Hunt; Way of Life’, The Daily Gleaner (8 February 
2010), p. A7. 
32 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in its phase-out of nuclear power, 
and this followed – and is likely to be at least partly a response to – decades of environmental campaigning as 
well as large protests immediately after the Fukushima accident against nuclear power. Pidd, ‘Germany to Shut 
All Nuclear Reactors’; Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Hoffman, ‘The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test’. 
33 The company maintains that the state acted unlawfully in its prohibition on bulk water exports, and Wagner 
suggests that public opposition on conservation grounds prompted the prohibition. Martin Wagner, ‘International 
Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection’, Golden Gate University Law Review, 29 (1999), p. 
488. 
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Environmental investment disputes caused primarily or in substantial part by civil 
society protests against specific corporations or investment projects: 
Abengoa v. Mexico Local community opposition to hazardous waste landfill.34 
Bear Creek v. Peru Large protests by indigenous groups and local community groups 
against proposed silver mine.35 
BDC v. Philippines Protests by fishermen and conservation groups in respect to 
dredging and rehabilitation of lake.36 
Bilcon v. Canada Local community opposition to large basalt quarry.37 
Burlington Resources v. Ecuador Opposition by indigenous people to environmental effects of 
proposed oil extraction.38 
Chevron v. Ecuador Environmental liability lawsuit by indigenous communities in 
respect to pollution from oil exploitation.39 
                                                             
34 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in the municipal government’s 
decision to deny the company an operating permit for its hazardous waste landfill. That decision was a direct 
response to public protests and the campaigning activities of a group known as ‘We Are All Zimapán’, the leader 
of which was elected municipal governor with a mandate to close the landfill. Abengoa v. Mexico, Award, para. 
581-607. See also, Katia Fach Gómez, ‘ICSID Claim by Spanish Companies against Mexico over the Center for 
the Integral Management of Industrial Resources’ (28 June 2010), pp. 1-26, available at 
{http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1631835} accessed 10 April 2014; Xinhua General News 
Service, ‘Police, Civilians Clash in Rural Mexico Over Chemical Waste’ (9 April 2009).  
35 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in cancelling permits for the 
company’s proposed silver mine. It is widely acknowledged that the decision was taken in response to major 
protests. Bear Creek Mining, ‘Bear Creek Reports Peruvian Government Resolution Which Potentially Further 
Delays Santa Ana Esia’, News Release (1 June 2011), available at 
{http://www.bearcreekmining.com/s/news.asp?ReportID=605737} accessed 7 January 2015; The Globe and 
Mail, ‘Peru Protest Turns Deadly, Bear Creek Project Halted’ (24 June 2011), available at 
{http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/peru-protest-turns-deadly-bear-creek-project-
halted/article2074903/} accessed 12 June 2014; Dow Jones, ‘Peru to End Bear Creek Silver Mine Project’, 
MarketWatch (25 June 2011), available at {http://www.marketwatch.com/story/peru-to-end-bear-creek-silver-
mine-project-2011-06-25} accessed 12 June 2014. 
36 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in cancelling a contract for the 
dredging of a large lake. The contract was awarded by the previous government in a ‘midnight deal’, and the 
termination took place in the shadow of major protests by conservation groups and fishing advocates. Luke Eric 
Peterson, ‘ICSID Claims Round-Up: Cases Against Turkey, Turkmenistan, The Philippines, and Guinea 
(Conakry) Are Registered’, Investment Arbitration Reporter (14 November 2011), available at 
{http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20111114_1} accessed 16 August 2012. 
37 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in denying an environmental permit 
for its basalt quarry. This decision was made in response to a public consultation process, which had highlighted 
public opposition to the project within the local community. William Ralph Clayton and others & Bilcon of 
Delaware v. Government of Canada, Memorial of the Investors, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (25 July 2011); 
William Ralph Clayton and others & Bilcon of Delaware v. Government of Canada, Government of Canada 
Counter-Memorial, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (9 December 2011). 
38 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in not acting forcefully enough to 
allow the oil project to proceed in the face of opposition from indigenous communities. Burlington Resources 
Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 (2 June 2010), para. 26-37, 
216; 250-340. 
39 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in the decision of a domestic court 
to hold the company liable for compensation to the community surrounding its oil exploitation project, or 
alternatively for not itself stepping in to compensate the local community. The dispute arose because of local 
communities seeking compensation through US courts and subsequently Ecuadoran courts. Chevron Corporation 
& Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, First Partial Award, PCA Case No 2009-23; Chevron 
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Commerce Group v. El Salvador Social movement opposition to gold mining in general, as well as 
the company’s specific gold mine. Most probably arose as part of 
opposition to Pacific Rim’s proposed project.40 
Copper Mesa v. Ecuador Protests by indigenous groups concerned about the 
environmental effects of oil exploitation.41 
Enron and others v. India Opposition by local community groups and national 
organizations to major power plant, in part due to environmental 
effects.42 
Glamis Gold v. USA Opposition by Native Americans to the environmental and 
spiritual impact of proposed open pit gold mine in sacred area.43 
Harken v. Costa Rica Opposition by environmental groups to mining and oil extraction 
by the company, as well as in environmentally sensitive areas in 
general.44 
Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica Opposition by environmental groups to mining and oil extraction 
by the company, as well as in environmentally sensitive areas in 
general.45 
                                                             
Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, Submission of Amici: Fundación 
Pachamama & International Institute of Sustainable Development, PCA Case No 2009-23 (5 November 2010). 
40 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in its revocation of environmental 
permits for mining. This is likely to have come about as a result of anti-mining protests that initially targeted the 
gold mine proposed by Pacific Rim, but the social movement increasingly used environmental degradation from 
the Commerce Group mine as evidence of the risks of the larger Pacific Rim mine. The wider anti-mining 
protests in El Salvador are discussed in more detail below. 
41 Little information is available on the case, but the company is believed to object to actions taken in respect to 
its mining concessions. The project had been confronted with major protests by indigenous groups, but it is not 
clear whether these were the cause of the state’s actions. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Copper Miner Files Its Statement 
of Claim in Previously-Unannounced Ad-Hoc Arbitration Against Ecuador’, Investment Arbitration Reporter (1 
March 2012), available at {http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20120302} accessed 16 August 2012.  
42 Enron, Bechtel and other investors in the Dabhol Power Plant maintains that the state, deeming the project not 
worth the costs, acted in violation of investment law in its decision to stop it. Major public protests had 
developed against the project on the perception that the initial agreements were based on corruption, but also 
involved local community protests on environmental grounds. Gus Van Harten, ‘TWAIL and the Dabhol 
Arbitration’, Trade Law and Development, 3:1 (2011), p. 137-141, 155; Tai-Heng Cheng, ‘Developing 
Narratives in International Investment Law’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 9 (2011), p. 221. 
43 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in California’s decision to introduce 
a backfilling requirement for open-pit mines, a decision taken in large part in response to opposition by the 
Quechan Indian Nation and later other civil society groups. The Quechan Indian Nation had also been involved 
in the legislative process that resulted in the impugned measures. Glamis Gold v. USA, Award. Glamis Gold, 
Ltd. v. United States of America, Application of the Quechan Indian Nation to File Amicus Curiae Submission 
(19 August 2005); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae Submission of the Quechan 
Indian Nation (16 October 2006). 
44 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in its revocation of permits for oil 
exploitation, and domestic legal proceedings initiated by environmental groups and environmental campaigns 
appear to have been instrumental in that revocation. Kyla Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of 
Arbitration: A View from Political Science’, in Chester Brown & Kate Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 618 – 621. 
45 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in the Supreme Court’s decision to 
cancel a number of permits for the company’s proposed gold mine. The Supreme Court decision was taken 
directly in response to legal proceedings commenced by environmental groups opposed to the project, and the 
company itself acknowledges that its problems arise from environmental non-governmental organizations. 
Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status by Asociación Preservacionista de Flora y Fauna 
Silvestre, section 4-6; Infinito Gold Ltd. V. Republic of Costa Rica, Request for Arbitration, ICSID Case No. 
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Lone Pine Resources v. Canada Environmental protests in respect to the risks of ‘fracking’ for 
shale gas under the St Lawrence river.46 
Metalclad v. Mexico Local community opposition to a hazardous waste landfill on 
environmental grounds.47 
Oak Investments v. El Salvador Protests by local community groups and environmental groups in 
respect to pollution from batteries recycling facility.48  
Pacific Rim v. El Salvador Local community opposition to proposed gold mine, later 
forming into a nation-wide movement.49 
Renco v. Peru Local protests in respect to health effects of pollution from a 
metals smelting and refining complex, and environmental 
liability lawsuit by affected people.50 
St Mary’s v. Canada Local opposition to proposed aggregate quarry in rural 
community.51 
                                                             
ARB/14/5 (6 February 2014), para. 76, 89. Anthony Vaccaro, ‘Elusive Green Macaw Stops Infinito For Now’, 
The Northern Miner, 94:37 (2-9 November 2008). The company was previously known as Vannessa Ventures, 
and environmental groups have been actively opposing its project and bringing legal injunctions since the 
earliest proposals in 2002, see Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration’, p. 622-626. 
46 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in cancelling permits for fracking 
for shale gas before the environmental assessment process was complete, and the company itself maintains that 
the state actions arose “in response to these pressures” from interest groups. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (6 September 2013), para. 39-40. 
47 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in the municipal government’s 
denial of a construction permit for a hazardous waste landfill, and the governor remarked that the strength of 
opposition was such that it would have been a ‘political Molotov cocktail’ to allow the project to proceed. The 
tribunal itself remarks that the “opposition of the local population” may have been one of the reasons for the 
denial of the municipal permit. This case is discussed in detail below. Metalclad v. Mexico, Award, para. 92.  
48 Little information is available on the case, but the company is believed to object to the decision to shut down 
its batteries recycling facility for breaches to environmental law. It is reported that the decision was made in the 
shadow of protests by the local community and environmental groups. Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Shareholders in 
Shuttered Battery Recycling Plant Put El Salvador on Notice of Claims for Treaty Breach’, Investment 
Arbitration Reporter (19 September 2009), available at {http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20091008_17} 
accessed 16 August 2012. 
49 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in not providing it with the permits 
required to move from exploration to exploitation of its gold deposits. That decision is likely to have been 
prompted by a major anti-mining movement that had developed in El Salvador, and that is discussed in more 
detail below. 
50 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in not stepping in to compensate 
citizens who had brought a liability suit for the health consequences of living close to the company’s metals 
smelter, which was previously a state-owned smelter. The company also maintains that the state acted unlawfully 
when it sought an extension to complete the environmental remediation required by the privatization contract. 
Peru granted the extension, but only on the condition of further remediation obligations. The Peruvian decision 
on the extension was made in the shadow of civil society criticisms of pollution both before domestic courts and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Indeed, Peru cites its imposition of additional requirements before 
the Inter-American Court as evidence that it had responded to the concerns of the local community. The Renco 
Group, Inc. v. The Republic of Peru, Memorial on Liability, UNCT/13/1 (20 February 2014); Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, ‘Admissibility: Community of La Oroya, Peru’, Petition 1473-06, Report No. 76/09 (5 
August 2009), para. 1-2; 30-31; 42. 
51 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in denying permits for a proposed 
aggregate quarry. The quarry had engendered extensive local community opposition, and the investor itself 
indicates that the influence of these groups were instrumental in prompting the state measures. The headline on 
the local community group website is now “Together We Will Did Succeed”, suggesting they do believe their 
opposition was instrumental in the state action that led to investment arbitration. St Mary’s VCNA, LLC. v. the 
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Tecmed v. Mexico Local community opposition to hazardous waste landfill on 
environmental grounds.52 
Unglaube v. Costa Rica Campaigns by environmental organizations to protect the nesting 
grounds of leatherback turtles in the vicinity of the investor’s 
tourist resort.53 
Vattenfall v. Germany (I) Primarily local opposition to environmental effects and climate 
impact of proposed large coal-fired power plant.54 
V.G. Gallo v. Canada Opposition by aboriginal and other nearby communities to 
environmental effects of plans to turn a man-made lake into a 
landfill.55 
Windstream Energy v. Canada Opposition to offshore wind turbines in the Great Lakes.56 
 
The above table suggests that most of the disputes considered here arise from civil society 
protests or campaigns in respect to specific corporations as opposed to more general campaigns. 
There are many possible reasons for this, but two are worth mentioning here. Firstly, the above 
table only includes investment disputes for which there is evidence that civil society protests or 
                                                             
Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (14 September 2011), para. 12, 
16, 25, 33-56; see also the website of the local community group, Friends of Rural Communities and the 
Environment (FORCE), available at {http://www.stopthequarry.ca/} accessed 28 March 2014. 
52 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in its decision not to renew the 
permits required for the company to operate its hazardous waste landfill. The tribunal itself maintains that the 
decision had been made in response to public protests, and all evidence points in that direction. Tecmed v. 
Mexico, Award; see also Anna O’Leary, ‘Women and Environmental Protest in a Northern Mexican City,’ The 
Arizona Report, 6:1 (Spring 2002), pp. 1, 4-5. 
53 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in expanding a national park so as to 
expropriate its property, and some of the state measures had been taken directly in response to domestic legal 
challenges by non-governmental organizations. Unglaube v. Costa Rica, Award, para. 78-79, 184, 259-260; see 
also, Diaz, ‘German Investor Launches ICSID Case against Costa Rica’, p. 2. 
54 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in imposing delays and introducing 
stricter environmental requirements on a proposed power plant. The investor itself acknowledges that public 
opposition and a Green Party victory in a local election was what prompted these additional delays and 
environmental requirements. Vattenfall v. Germany, Request for Arbitration, para. 27 – 30, 54; see also, Nathalie 
Bernasconi, ‘Background Paper on Vattenfall v. Germany Arbitration’ (Winnipeg: International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, July 2009), p. 1; Sebastian Knauer, ‘Vattenfall vs. Germany: Power Plant Battle Goes 
to International Arbitration’, Spiegel International (15 July 2009). 
55 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in not allowing the company’s 
proposed project to proceed. In this case there is evidence of public opposition and opposition from indigenous 
groups – some of which is noted by Canada in its statement of defence – but it is not known to what extent the 
actions of the state can be interpreted as a response to such civil society opposition. Vito G. Gallo v. Government 
of Canada, Statement of Defence, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (15 September 2008), para. 2, 46, 63-70. 
56 The company maintains that the state acted in violation of investment law in introducing a moratorium on 
offshore wind energy. A public consultation process, that had evidenced growing concerns about offshore wind, 
is cited as an important factor by Canada for its decision to introduce a moratorium; indeed, one section of its 
memorial is entitled “Public and Scientific Concerns Lead to a Decision to Defer Offshore Wind Developments 
Until a Comprehensive Regulatory Framework Can Be Established”. The company likewise maintains that “anti-
wind opponents” were an important influence on the politicians taking the decision to introduce the moratorium. 
Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, Amended Response to the Notice of Arbitration, 
UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (26 April 2013), para. 39-40; Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of 
Canada, Amended Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (11 May 2013), para. 29. 
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campaigns played a part in the decision of state officials to introduce the impugned 
environmental measure, and it may simply be easier to identify a connection between the 
activities of civil society groups and the actions of state officials in investment disputes that 
emerge from protests against specific corporations. Secondly, protests that are not targeted at 
specific corporations may be more likely to result in general regulatory changes, and following 
Methanex v. USA and similar high-profile cases such general regulatory changes may be 
perceived to be less susceptible to challenge within investment arbitration than state measures 
that target particular corporations. 
 
Finally, while most of the environmental disputes considered here arise when state officials 
react and respond to civil society groups, it is also perfectly feasible that the non-state groups 
to which state officials respond are other corporations. If so, then the ultimate origins of an 
investment dispute is a struggle between two different corporations or corporate fractions that 
seek to use the institutions and officials of the state in their battle with each other. A few of the 
environmental disputes considered here could be characterized as inter-capitalist in origin. For 
example, Ethyl v. Canada arose when parliament introduced a prohibition on the use of MMT 
in gasoline to prevent interference with pollution control devices in cars, but was summarized 
by the Globe and Mail at the time as featuring “a battle between Big Auto and Big Oil over the 
costs of pollution abatement”.57 The domestic Canadian decision to prohibit MMT could be 
perceived as a victory of Big Auto over Big Oil, but given the outcome of the investment 
arbitration that followed, the newspaper concluded that “[w]hen the car and oil firms went to 
battle, Ottawa lost”.58 It is similarly possible to interpret two pending disputes – Chevron v. 
Ecuador and Renco v. Peru – that both in part originate from local residents bringing liability 
suits on the basis of environmental harm as, in fact, ultimately involving conflicts between 
different fractions of capital. Without the international contingency-fee lawyers representing 
them the local residents are unlikely to have been able to bring the liability suits that are at issue 
before the investment tribunals, but in the event of success the lawyers too are likely to make a 
substantial profit.59 Finally, many scholars suggest that environmental regulations are mere 
                                                             
57 Shawn McCarthy, ‘Gas War: The Fall and Rise of MMT – When the Car And Oil Firms Went to Battle, 
Ottawa Lost’, The Globe and Mail (24 July 1998), p. A1.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Chevron specifically refers to the ‘contingency-fee lawyers’ in its Notice of Arbitration, and in Renco v. Peru 
there is evidence that U.S.-based lawyers were active in distributing fliers to find enough plaintiffs for a class-
action suit in the U.S. Chevron Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, Notice of 
Arbitration, PCA Case No 2009-23 (23 September 2009), para. 3; The Renco Group, Inc. v. The Republic of 
Peru, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim, UNCT/13/1 (9 August 2011), para. 35. 
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pretexts for protectionism,60 but protectionism – in so far as it occurs – should be interpreted 
precisely as a victory by a national corporation or sector against transnational capital. The 
majority of the investment disputes concerning the environment that serve as the focus for this 
thesis have nevertheless been interpreted as originating from conflicts between corporations 
and local community groups or environmental movements. 
 
The Real Parties to the Conflict 
 
It has already been argued that the investment law literature interprets investment disputes 
precisely as investor-state disputes, but what are the consequences of this for the civil society 
actors from whose protests or campaigns the dispute ultimately arose? In many cases, that civil 
society opposition is rendered invisible or only mentioned in passing as a contextual or 
background factor. In other cases, the focus on the investor-state dispute leads to an actual 
misrepresentation of the social movements with which the dispute originates. Both lead to an 
oversight of the social struggles that underpin investment law, a problematic understanding of 
the disputes themselves, and consequently a lack of attention to the political consequences of 
investment law for social movements around the world. 
 
An example of how social movements are not only neglected but also misrepresented is 
Metalclad v. Mexico, the first NAFTA dispute to be concluded on the merits in 2000. The 
tribunal itself refrained from any consideration of the local community protests that had 
emerged against the company’s hazardous waste landfill, but these protests were acknowledged 
as a cause of the conflict by both the investor and the state in their legal representations to the 
tribunal.61 What is interesting about this case is that both the company and the state of Mexico 
characterized the local community protesters in the same way, and in providing background 
context for the case the investment law literature on the topic has followed the two formal 
parties to the ‘investor-state dispute’ in their portrayal of the local community. The then 
President of Metalclad contended that “[b]elieve me, the natural and expected opposition to a 
                                                             
60 Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in 
International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50 (2001), pp. 811-848. 
61 Metalclad nevertheless contests the extent of the opposition, and suggests it is by a vocal minority. President 
of Metalclad, interviewed in the film ‘Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy’, Films for the Humanities and 
Sciences (first broadcast 5 February 2002 on PSB), min. 24.45; Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican 
States, Reply, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (21 August 1998), Chapter 3, para 33-35; Chapter 6, para. 222; 
Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Respondent’s Post-Hearing Submission, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1 (undated), para. 46, 159, 173. 
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landfill in your backyard is no different in Mexico than it is in the United States”, and Mexico 
– observing that the tribunal had been provided with “extensive evidence as to the universal 
phenomenon of the NIMBY (the ‘Not In My Back Yard’) factor” – simply agrees with the 
company that this “is illustrated perfectly here”.62 The legal literature has directly followed the 
investor and the state in understanding local community protesters as ‘NIMBY’. For example, 
Sanford Gaines highlights protests “from local citizens acting in classic NIMBY […] fashion”, 
and even Alessandra Asteriti, a scholar otherwise concerned with the environmental 
consequences of investment law, observes that the landfill was plagued by “the usual nimbyism 
associated with controversial hazardous waste disposal projects”.63 This representation of the 
local community has implications for how the legal literature understands the case itself, and 
critical to that understanding is the fact that the term ‘NIMBY’ is inevitably unflattering. Like 
Gains and Asteriti, David Gantz maintains that Metalclad “presents the classic ‘NIMBY’ […] 
problem that plagues the establishment of landfill and hazardous waste disposal facilities”, 
namely that the “need for such facilities is recognized, but no one wants to live near one”.64 It 
is this last sentence that captures the meaning of ‘NIMBY’ in a nutshell. The key characteristic 
of a ‘NIMBY’ protestor is political opposition motivated not by a universal ideal or a sense of 
right or justice, but rather by self-interested lobbying to have the facility in question placed in 
somebody else’s backyard instead. In this case the investment law literature directly follows 
the two official parties to the ‘investor-state dispute’ in their portrayal of the civil society 
protesters, but a critical aspect of the case is that these two parties were originally on the same 
side in what was ultimately a struggle between the company and civil society groups. The 
federal government had, after all, supported Metalclad’s pursuit to develop a hazardous waste 
landfill against the civil society protesters. So how accurate is the representation of the local 
community groups in characterizing them as ‘NIMBY’? 
 
This conflict originates in the decision of a Mexican corporation, COTERIN, to establish a 
transfer station for hazardous waste at a rural location known as La Pedrera. Within a year, the 
company had, in violation of its environmental permit, buried or otherwise disposed of an 
                                                             
62 Interviewed in the film ‘Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy’, min. 24.45; Metalclad v. Mexico, 
Respondent’s Post-Hearing Submission, para. 159. 
63 Sanford Gaines, ‘Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11’, 
International Environmental Agreements, 7 (2007), p. 181; Alessandra Asteriti, ‘Metalclad, Methanex and 
Chemtura: 10 Years of Environmental Issues in NAFTA Investment Arbitrations’, Transnational Dispute 
Management, 9:3, (2012), p. 10, available at SSRN: 
{http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021180} accessed 17 August 2012. 
64 David Gantz, ‘Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA 
Chapter 11’, George Washington International Law Review, 33 (2000-2001), para. 667. 
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estimated 20,000 tons of hazardous waste at the site without treatment or separation.65 The 
contamination at the site leached into the wider environment, and local residents soon 
complained of livestock dying as a result of contaminated water.66 A local newspaper at the 
time reported that people complained about hair loss, serious skin irritation, and vomiting, while 
later reports note concerns about what were believed to be unusually high incidences of cancer 
and birth defects.67 There is no independent verification of the health problems nor any clear 
evidence that any medical problems that did exist were in fact caused by contamination from 
the site, but the contamination itself as well as the illegal activities of COTERIN are 
undisputed.68 Metalclad itself admitted a “great risk to the inhabitants, flora, fauna of the area” 
as a result of the contamination.69  
 
Local community protests soon developed, and federal agencies ordered COTERIN to cease 
operations. Despite the official closure, trucks continued to unload hazardous waste at the site, 
and when the authorities failed to act local residents took the situation into their own hands and 
blockaded the site.70 Within a couple of years, and against the advice of a board member 
concerned with the pre-existing contamination, Metalclad nevertheless began to express an 
interest in the development of a hazardous waste landfill at the site.71 In 1993, despite the fact 
that COTERIN had not made any attempt to remediate the site and against the wishes of local 
community groups, the federal government authorized the site to re-open, and Metalclad 
acquired 94% of the shares of COTERIN. 72  Before the investment tribunal, Metalclad 
maintained that “much of the opposition and apprehension engendered by the site stems from 
                                                             
65 Metalclad refers only to “environmental infractions”. The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, 
Reasons for the Judgment, Supreme Court of British Columbia 664 (2001), para. 5; Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, 
Chapter 3, para 36; Metalclad v. Mexico, Respondent’s Post-Hearing Submission, para. 45-46, 172; 
Businessweek, ‘Nafta to the Rescue?’ (3 August 1997), available at 
{http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1997-08-03/nafta-to-the-rescue-intl-edition} accessed 8 Febuary 2014; 
Juli Abouchar & Richard King, ‘Environmental Laws as Expropriation Under NAFTA’, Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 8:2 (1999), p. 212. 
66 Andrew Wheat, ‘Toxic Shock in a Mexican Village’, Multinational Monitor, 16:10 (October 1995), available 
at {http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1995/10/mm1095_07.html} accessed 8 February 2014. 
67 ‘Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy’, min. 23.15; Metalclad v. Mexico, Respondent’s Post-Hearing 
Submission, para. 175-176. 
68 Metalclad itself accepts, but potentially downplays, the illegalities of the previous owners and the pollution at 
the site. Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, Chapter 3, para 36, 94. 
69 Contemporaneous Metalclad document cited in: Metalclad v. Mexico, Respondent’s Post-Hearing Submission, 
para. 177. Before the tribunal it did not address the public health risks of the contamination, but admitted that 
“the former owners of COTERIN were not in compliance with the law and that the tangible result of their 
activities was a site in need of remediation”.  
70 Wheat, ‘Toxic Shock in a Mexican Village’; Gaines, ‘Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State 
Arbitration’, p. 178. 
71 Metalclad v. Mexico, Respondent’s Post-Hearing Submission, para. 50. 
72 Metalclad v. Mexico, Award, para. 29-30; Wheat, ‘Toxic Shock in a Mexican Village’. 
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the pre-Metalclad period”, but would further insist on the need to distinguish between its own 
ownership of the site and the conduct of the former owners.73 While it remarks that the “federal 
authorities in particular were greatly influenced by the change in ownership”, the local 
community and the national environmental groups that subsequently became involved were not 
persuaded that a landfill at the site was a good idea.74 
 
Given its geo-physical conditions, the site itself was not ideal for a hazardous waste landfill; an 
independent study revealed that an aquifer beneath the site supplied water to the area, and an 
advisory committee set up by Metalclad was tasked to investigate precisely whether “the 
engineering project could remediate the natural disadvantages of the physical surroundings of 
the site”.75 A measure of trust would therefore have been required in Metalclad’s ability and 
inclination to construct a sufficiently safe landfill. Fernando Bejarano Gonzales, coordinator 
for the Campaign on the Hazardous Waste Program of Greenpeace Mexico, maintained that 
“[m]ost of the Mexican environmental standards governing site selection for a toxic landfill 
have been violated by this project” and further questioned why “a North American company 
[would] select a site that already has problems and select, as well, a partner that has 
demonstrated grave irresponsibility?”76 Concerns in respect to the site itself and the conduct of 
the previous owners were further amplified by the refusal of Metalclad to immediately 
remediate the contamination the company had incurred under previous owners.77 It had reached 
an agreement with the federal authorities that remediation would occur concurrently with 
operations of the landfill, presumably in order to cover the costs with incomes from the new 
operations.78 The local community would therefore have had to accept the disposal of new 
hazardous waste at the site before it would have the opportunity to see for itself that Metalclad 
intended to remediate the old contamination, and the protests that followed – including another 
blockade of the facility when it was intended to open – suggests that the measure of trust that 
this arrangement would have required was not present in the local community.79 
 
                                                             
73 Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, Chapter 3, para. 35. 
74 Ibid, Chapter 3, para. 95 
75 (Emphasis added) Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, Chapter 3, para. 43. 
76 Wheat, ‘Toxic Shock in a Mexican Village’. Metalclad also hired a former Mexican state official to liaison 
with the municipality and the local community, but that state official was also involved in opening the landfill 
under its previous owners and associated with the contamination that then occurred, making it further less likely 
that the local community and Greenpeace would distinguish between the old and new owners. Metalclad v. 
Mexico, Respondent’s Post-Hearing Submission, para. 187. 
77 Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, Chapter 6, para 195. 
78 Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, Chapter 3, para 26. 
79 Metalclad v. Mexico, Award, para. 46. 
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Whatever the ultimate trustworthiness of Metalclad, is it fair to characterize the local 
community opposition as acting in a ‘classic NIMBY fashion’? Given the history of 
documented illegal contamination at the site; associated environmental and health hazards 
acknowledged even by the company itself; the decision of Metalclad to postpone remediation 
of pre-existing pollution; and finally the natural geo-physical disadvantages of the site; is it fair 
to suggest that the landfill faced “the kind of opposition common to most landfill projects”? 
The notion of ‘NIMBY’ implies a recognition that a landfill has to be located somewhere, but 
a desire to have it relocated in somebody else’s backyard instead. There is little indication that 
the local community groups would have thought a landfill with the above characteristics 
acceptable anywhere, and under such circumstances the ‘NIMBY’ label appears designed to 
discredit any genuine environmental concerns such groups may have.  
 
Most investment law scholars tend to rely for their analysis on the legal documents submitted 
in a particular case, and the Metalclad v. Mexico case highlights some of the implications this 
may have for the portrayal of the civil society groups with which a particular dispute originates. 
The two parties to this dispute are ultimately COTERIN and Metalclad on the one hand, and 
members of the local community and national environmental groups on the other, both of whom 
were vying for the attention and support of any political institutions at their disposal. The local 
community succeeded in gaining the support of the municipal government; the Governor 
remarked that the extent of the opposition ensured that to do otherwise would have been a 
“political Molotov cocktail”. 80  In contrast, Bejarano Gonzales from Greenpeace Mexico 
maintains that the federal government “sacrificed the community’s interest by caving into 
Metalclad’s politic pressures” and in providing Metalclad with (many of) the permits required 
to re-open the landfill.81 It was this conflict between the municipal and the federal government 
(reflected in federal government assurances that the municipality would not have a basis for 
denying a construction permit for the landfill, and the municipality’s subsequent denial of 
precisely such a permit) that led to the tribunal’s determination that Mexico had violated the 
investment treaty.82 What the notion of investor-state arbitration often obscures is precisely the 
fact that the (federal) government of a state can often have been a willing accomplice of the 
                                                             
80 Cited in, ‘Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy’, min. 25.30. 
81 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Witness Statement of Fernando Bejarano Gonzales, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 16, in documents related to the documentary ‘Trading Democracy’, 
National Security Archieve Electronic Briefing Book No. 65 (undated, posted 5 February 2002, available at 
{http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB65/} accessed 7 January 2015. 
82 See the section on protection from ‘unfairness’ in Chapter 3. 
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corporation to begin with. This should render both the state’s and the investor’s portrayal of 
their local community opposition suspect, yet legal scholars on the topic appear to have taken 
their interpretation of the protesters at face value. In doing so, they may therefore have 
contributed to a problematic and potentially inaccurate representation of the local community 
protesters as ‘NIMBY’. In turn, such a characterization does not take the particular 
environmental concerns of the local community in respect to the landfill into consideration as 
an important dimension of the story that unfolded and of the underlying dispute itself. 
 
Metalclad v. Mexico reveals the importance of understanding civil society groups as parties to 
the investment disputes, but who then are these civil society groups? Despite the emphasis on 
a transnational capitalist class as one of the primary agents in the investment law context, it 
does not follow that its civil society adversary is organized along (working) class lines. In 
contrast, of the investment disputes that relate to environmental protection measures that serve 
as the focus for this thesis, very few are class-based groups: most are local community 
movements, broader social movements, or non-governmental organizations of various kinds 
who emphasize the protection of the environment as a key concern. There is sometimes a 
distinction drawn between ‘old’ class-based social movements and ‘new’ social movements 
that are defined by identity (gender, ethnicity, etc) or “supra-class” concerns such as the 
environment, but neither are these social movements necessarily “supra-class”. 83  Many 
disputes emerge when corporations engage or seek to engage in environmentally destructive 
activities that in turn affect people’s livelihoods. For example, Pacific Rim v. El Salvador 
initially emerged after local farmers discovered that the river they used for irrigation had dried 
up already at the exploratory stages of the company’s gold mining project.84 Bilcon v. Canada 
arose in part because of concerns about the impact of a large quarry and marine terminal for 
shipping on whales were raised by local people who made a living from eco-tourism and whale-
watching trips.85 Burlington Resources v. Ecuador arose when indigenous groups found the 
rainforest they depended on inaccessible due to explosives used in oil exploration.86 Many 
                                                             
83 Martin Shaw, ‘Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach’, Millennium – 
Journal of International Relations, 23:3 (1994), p. 652.  
84 Pacific Rim claims that it used water from the river only temporarily, and after protests had emerged it 
committed not to use river water directly but to collect it through rainfall. Randal C. Archibold, ‘First a Gold 
Rush, Then the Lawyers’, New York Times (25 June 2011), available at 
{http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/world/americas/26mine.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&} accessed 15 
March 2015. 
85 Robert Fournier, Jill Grant & Gunter Muecke, ‘Environmental Assessment of the Whites Point Quarry and 
Marine Terminal Project’, Joint Review Panel Report (October 2007), p. 75-78. 
86 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ‘Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador’, 
Judgement: Merits and Reparations (27 June 2012). 
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investment disputes arise from civil society groups who occupy a disadvantaged position within 
a global capitalist economy – even if they are not working class – though in some others the 
middle/upper class background of the company’s adversary is critical to their success. St. 
Mary’s v. Canada was prompted by a very successful struggle within a relatively wealthy rural 
community against a large quarry, and the organizers raised almost one million Canadian 
dollars by framing contributions “as a kind of insurance against ensuing property 
devaluation”.87 Many other investment disputes in respect to the environment are nevertheless 
indeed ‘supra-class’ in so far as they emerge from concern about life itself – from the health 
risks of pesticides, hazardous waste landfills, or nuclear power. Investment disputes always by 
definition emerge on the one hand from corporations, but there is no set rule about what kind 
of societal groups oppose them or the particular practices they are involved in. 
 
Corporations, and sometimes states, are often inclined to distinguish between local community 
opposition to an investment project on the one hand, and national civil society groups or more 
widespread social movements on the other. This often places the company’s adversaries in a 
no-win situation. For instance, in Metalclad v. Mexico the local community opposition is 
dismissed as ‘NIMBY’ while opponents from further afield, often more organized civil society 
groups that campaign on specific issues (in this case primarily Greenpeace), are dismissed as 
“radical and inflexible”.88 Similarly, Pacific Rim describes the civil society opposition from 
beyond the local area as “extremist”; its press releases refer to “rogue” civil society 
organizations and even Oxfam is accused of having “factions” that are “very anti-
development”.89 Despite the tendency to distinguish between local and outside opposition, it is 
very often out of solidarity with local struggles or out of concern with setting a dangerous 
precedent that wider campaigns arise. In Metalclad v. Mexico the local community had taken 
the initiative to approach Greenpeace for support, while in Enron v. India national groups 
became involved in a local struggle that was conceived as “symbolic and important”.90 In many 
                                                             
87 Jeff Mahoney, ‘Quarry Foes Set to Celebrate Holding Their Ground’, Hamilton Spectator (24 April 2013), 
available at {http://www.stopthequarry.ca/news/latestnews/} accessed 28 March 2014. 
88 Metalclad v. Mexico, Reply, Chapter 6, para. 222, 216. 
89 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/12 (29 March 2013), para. 331; Pacific Rim Mining, ‘Pacific Rim Provides a Progress Report on 
Activities in El Salvador and Nevada,’ News Release (30 April 2012), available at {http://www.pacrim-
mining.com/s/News.asp?ReportID=522141} accessed 7 January 2013; Mining Watch, Debunking Eight 
Falsehoods By Pacific Rim Mining / OceanaGold in El Salvador, (March 2014), p. 6. 
90 Metalclad v. Mexico, Witness Statement of Fernando Bejarano Gonzales, para. 3-5; Medha Patkar, ‘Against 
Globalization – And For Power to the People: An Interview with Medha Patkar’, Multinational Monitor, 18:11 
(November 1997), available at {http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm1197.07.html} accessed 11 July 
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cases local or national groups also reach out to international civil society organizations that can 
amplify their message.91 
 
There is no assumption that people – whatever their structural position within a global economy 
– will rise up to oppose foreign corporations, but these investment disputes arise when a sub-
section of the people do. But what about other sub-sections within that community or society? 
Many of the investment disputes considered here involve not only the corporations and their 
civil society opponents, but also other societal groups that may support either of the initial 
parties to the dispute, and many investment disputes initially involve polarizing intra-
community struggles. These struggles often raise difficult questions about the priority accorded 
to the jobs promised by the investment project vis-à-vis environmental concerns or other 
priorities. In Renco v. Peru, a dispute over pollution from a metals smelter, workers at the 
smelter castigated civil society organizations concerned with its health effects as ‘Anti-Labor’ 
and pelted researchers aspiring to take blood samples to assess lead levels with stones and 
eggs.92 A neurologist at the local hospital, who claimed to have received death threats for 
issuing warnings about the health effects of pollution from the smelter, lamented that “[p]eople 
here have to choose between two alternatives that aren’t really alternatives… do you want life, 
or do you want work?”93 Such dilemmas recur in several other cases; in the context of local 
community opposition to Bilcon’s quarry in a rural and increasingly jobless region of Canada, 
a placard at a rally in favour of the quarry simply asked “who will feed my children?”94 
 
The next section will argue that the corporation is party to these intra-state struggles in so far 
as they too seek to influence domestic state institutions, but they are also party to the intra-
community struggles. The corporations are often actively involved in these struggles from the 
very beginning, in attempting to persuade certain sections of the population while directly 
opposing the unpersuadable. The tools at their disposal include the provision of positive 
information about the anticipated benefits of the investment (especially work opportunities), as 
well as directly attacking any negative portrayals of the project – Infinito Gold went so far as 
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to demand to vet the content of a University of Costa Rica course on mining and brought several, 
so far unsuccessful, defamation suits against opponents of its project.95 In this context, the 
charitable contributions that companies often detail in submissions to the investment tribunal 
as evidence of their ‘corporate social responsibility’ are also far from politically innocent. 
Charitable contributions are unsurprisingly used to win over local community support and as a 
consequence to undermine any opposition, and given this role in the social struggle these can 
become very controversial – protesters against Pacific Rim’s gold mine in El Salvador went so 
far as to blockade an eye exam clinic sponsored by the company, presumably on the grounds 
that it was used to buy support for the project.96 Some forms of corporate social responsibility 
also have more subtle effects on the underlying social struggles. For instance, in its memorial 
to the investment tribunal, Renco provides extensive details on measures it had taken to help 
the local community, including house visits to train people in hand washing, bathing and 
cleaning the house so as to limit exposure to lead.97 One local resident nevertheless observed 
that mothers had come to feel personally responsible for their children’s lead poisoning after 
the company had stressed their “bad hygienic habits”, and the company’s house visits to train 
people in cleanliness may therefore have contributed to reducing opposition to the smelter itself 
as the cause of the lead contamination of the area.98  
 
The investment projects considered in this thesis often have hugely divisive effects on inter- 
and intra-community relations, and the companies’ tactics often play a considerable part in 
nurturing such conflicts, either as an unintended consequence or as part of a divide-and-rule 
strategy to ensure the projects’ acceptance. For instance, the underlying dispute behind 
Burlington Resources v. Ecuador emerged from the opposition of the Sarayaku indigenous 
people to oil exploration and exploitation in their ancestral lands. The Sarayaku people have 
their own authority structure that is recognized by law in Ecuador, along with legal title to the 
land, and the company initially sought to work through these governance structures.99 The 
Sarayaku people nevertheless decided not to accept the project in anticipation of the 
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environmental consequences and the impact on their way of life, and rejected the charitable 
contributions offered by the company. In response, the company set up the ‘Independent 
Communities of Sarayaku’ and provided charitable contributions conditional on the acceptance 
of the investment to these communities instead.100 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
was later to observe that this “failed to respect the internal and external structures of authority 
and representation within and outside the communities”, and the company’s decision to 
circumvent these authority structures served to “fragment the communities” and “led to 
conflicts between the communities […] and affected intercommunity relations”. 101 Similar 
concerns have been raised in respect to other cases; in respect to the intra-community conflict 
that emerged from Pacific Rim’s proposals a local resident remarked that “[n]ow in our 
communities, you don’t trust people you’ve trusted your entire life”.102  
 
Concluding Remarks on Social Groups in Investment Disputes 
 
Many investment disputes originate directly from conflicts between transnational corporations 
and local communities or environmental groups or movements. Some of these involve petitions, 
letter-writing campaigns or demonstrations.103 Others involve direct action tactics or more 
significant societal upheavals – for instance, several of the Mexican campaigns against 
particular hazardous waste landfills involve human chains and blockades around the sites;104 
Bear Creek v. Peru involved major road blockades;105 Tecmed v. Mexico featured a 192-day 
sit-in of the municipal town hall;106 and the Sarayaku uprooted themselves from their villages 
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and set up ‘Peace and Life camps’ throughout the rainforest to oppose Burlington Resources.107 
The non-environmental case of Bechtel v. Bolivia originated from what has come to be known 
as the Cochabamba ‘water war’.108 Several of the disputes between corporations and their 
opponents have resulted in injuries or even deaths – police beat up local residents who protested 
Enron’s power plant;109 six protesters were killed and more than thirty injured in region-wide 
protests that appear to have initially emerged from protests against Bear Creek’s proposed silver 
mine; 110  at least four anti-mining campaigners protesting Pacific Rim’s gold mine were 
murdered and several others received death threats.111 Despite the fact that these disputes often 
involve major conflicts between transnational corporations and their civil society opponents, 
academic research on the topic nevertheless continues to perceive investment disputes as simply 
‘investor-state disputes’ and pay scant attention to the civil society groups from which the 
disputes originate, and the social struggles that investment arbitration arises from. 
 
It could plausibly be argued that there is no reason for investment law scholars to preoccupy 
themselves with such questions. After all, foreign investment projects all around the world face 
opposition from local communities and environmental groups, and there is little that sets the 
above struggles apart aside from the fact that they will be resolved in international investor-
state arbitration. The disputed actions are furthermore, whatever their origins, formally taken 
by ‘states’. There are nevertheless two important reasons why the underlying origins of the 
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disputes deserve further attention by scholars of international investment law. Firstly, from a 
legal point of view, it is often the very nature of the state as an institution responsive to societal 
struggles that renders it vulnerable to investment arbitration in the first place, as will be 
discussed further in section 3 of this chapter, and an adequate understanding of the legal dispute 
therefore requires an understanding of how and why the state responded to societal pressures. 
Secondly, and from a political point of view, an understanding of the struggles between 
transnational corporations and their civil society opponents is required to understand the 
particular role that international investment law plays in global politics today. As the next step 
in the analysis, the achievement of an alternative understanding nevertheless requires an 
adequate conception of the ‘state’. 
 
The Battle for the State 
 
The first section of this chapter has illustrated how the underlying struggles that prompt 
investment disputes are often ultimately between corporations and their opponents amongst 
local communities or environmental movements. For an investment dispute to emerge, that 
underlying struggle nevertheless needs to be transformed into an investor-state dispute. The aim 
of this second section is to demonstrate how a dispute between opposing non-state groups 
evolves into a dispute between an investor and a state.  
 
Given the nature of the state as an institution for the governance of society, Ralph Miliband 
observes that it is ultimately “for the state’s attention, or for its control, that men compete; and 
it is against the state that beat the waves of social conflict. It is to an ever greater degree the 
state which men encounter as they confront other men”.112 In the context of investment disputes, 
the struggle for the state can be likened to a ‘tug-of-war’ where two opposing societal groups 
each seeks to pull the state towards their cause, and corporations very often win such struggles. 
Sometimes the company’s opponents are nevertheless victorious in their battle for the state, and 
this is when companies have acquired the right to seek recourse to investor-state arbitration. 
This section will first provide an illustration of how such a tug-of-war for a particular state (El 
Salvador) has played out in practice, and will thereafter discuss the tools that different societal 
groups have at their disposal in that tug-of-war and consequently the reasons why states have 
come out in support of one or another societal group. 
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The investment dispute Pacific Rim v. El Salvador evolved from an underlying dispute between 
the company and local community groups, and later a broader social movement against mining. 
The first signs of conflict emerged during the company’s exploratory work in search of gold in 
the province of Cabañas, and were triggered by distinctly local concerns – farmers were 
concerned that the cause of water shortages in wells and the local river were due to the 
company’s pumping of water for its exploratory work, and other local residents maintained that 
the company had trespassed on their property in order to drill exploratory bore holes.113 The 
opposition intensified during the public consultation period, which was required to convert the 
company’s exploration licence into one for exploitation, and new local community groups, such 
as the Environmental Committee of Cabañas, were formed to oppose the project. 114  The 
Cabañas-based Association for Economic and Social Development (ADES) commissioned an 
independent report on the company’s environmental impact assessment (EIA) from an 
American hydro-geologist, which concluded that the EIA had failed to address the significant 
environmental concerns of cyanide-leach gold mining and “would not be acceptable to 
regulatory agencies in most developed countries”.115 The use of two tons of cyanide a day raised 
concerns about spills and the adequacy of the company’s plans for water treatment, as well as 
the sheer scale of the company’s requirement for water: Pacific Rim would have used as much 
water in a single day as a Salvadoran family living near the mine used for household 
consumption in twenty years.116 Environmental concerns were further amplified by severe acid 
mine drainage from an existing gold mine in a nearby province operated by the Commerce 
Group, which was later also to bring a now discontinued investment dispute against El 
Salvador.117  Such local concerns gave rise to a broader social movement against mining, 
prompted in part by concerns about the risk of Pacific Rim’s operations to the Río Lempa River, 
which provides over half the country’s population with its drinking water.118 The National 
Roundtable on Mining (colloquially known as La Mesa), an umbrella organization of local 
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community groups and national environmental organizations, was formed in 2006. The 
influential Conference of Bishops of the Catholic Church of El Salvador issued a statement in 
opposition to mining in 2007, which concluded that “[n]o material advantage can be compared 
with the value of human life”.119 An opinion poll in the same year found that 62.5% of people 
in El Salvador opposed mining.120 
 
While there was substantial opposition to mining, such opposition was by no means unanimous 
and the government of El Salvador observes that the local community “had become highly 
polarized for and against mining”.121 Pacific Rim presents itself as “an environmentally and 
socially responsible mining company”,122 and maintains that cyanide-leach gold mining in the 
Salvadoran context would have “a negligible impact on the local environment”. 123  The 
company worked hard to sway the local opinion, and presented opponents to the project as 
“anti-development” and ignorant of the realities of modern mining.124 The company had also 
funded social projects in the region, and its promise of work to a rural region with few job 
opportunities contributed to the support it received; indeed, one local resident resigned himself 
to supporting the project “because I need work, but I’d do it knowing there’d be consequences 
tomorrow”.125 As part of the intra-community struggles that developed for and against mining, 
four environmental activists were murdered and several others have received death threats for 
their involvement in anti-mining protests,126 to the extent that the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights issued precautionary measures in 2009 to protect members of one of the civil 
society groups as well as reporters of a radio station critical of mining.127 Even if Pacific Rim 
is not directly responsible for the murders, it is clear that the wider debate on mining prompted 
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by its proposal has provoked significant intra-community tensions. In some areas, the conflict 
over mining appears to have even reignited hostilities from the Salvadoran civil war, which 
ended with a peace agreement in 1992. Two environmental NGOs issued a “Declaration of 
Independence” from mining licences granted by the government, on the basis that the lands 
were the “fruits of the peace accords”, and the body of one of the murdered activists showed 
signs of torture consistent with Death Squad tactics from the civil war.128 So how did this 
dispute between the mining company and its local supporters on the one hand, and other parts 
of the local community and environmental groups on the other, evolve into an investor-state 
dispute? 
 
Within the investment law literature there is a tendency to expect the state to behave as a unitary 
actor, but this case study illustrates how that expectation contradicts the very nature of the state 
as an institution responsive to societal pressures. The investment disputes considered in this 
chapter very often reveal conflicting pressures on state officials, and in particular pressures 
stemming from the public by virtue of the democratic structure of many states and from 
business actors by virtue of the capitalist structure of the global economy. Within the present 
investment dispute against El Salvador, the institutional structure of the state as well as the state 
officials occupying positions within the state were from the outset favourably inclined towards 
mining investments in general and Pacific Rim’s proposals in particular. Before the arbitral 
tribunal, the company goes to great lengths to prove that the state was supportive in the initial 
stages of the development of the project, in order to set up the argument that its ‘legitimate 
expectations’ were breached in subsequently not permitting the project to proceed.129 Pacific 
Rim points out that when it had initially begun to develop its mining plans, El Salvador ranked 
11th globally in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, a testament to its 
adoption of a neoliberal economic strategy in general. It furthermore maintains that high level 
politicians had “consistently assured” the company that they were “supportive” of the 
company’s own gold mining proposals.130 While the investment law literature often assumes 
that the investor is unrepresented within the state due to its status as a foreigner without formal 
rights of participation, the company in this case does not appear to have felt fettered by its 
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foreign status. The company is explicit that its lobbying measures often bore fruit; in praising 
the 2001 reform of El Salvador’s mining laws to the mining companies’ advantage, the 
company also candidly admits that these were laws that “we, as a matter of fact, had a hand in 
helping the government draft”.131 It was only when civil society opposition emerged that it 
found the state less responsive towards its requests, and even then the tug-of-war for the state 
was ongoing for several years until the state’s support seems to have shifted decisively towards 
the company’s opponents. 
 
In 2006-2007, as opposition towards mining was gaining ground and the company was finding 
it more difficult than anticipated to secure the conversion of the exploration permit to an 
exploitation permit, 132  each of the two non-state adversaries lobbied for a bill before the 
legislative assembly. La Mesa lobbied in favour of a law to prohibit mining, but it did not 
achieve the required legislative support.133 Pacific Rim in contrast helped to draft and lobbied 
in favour of a law to make it easier for companies to gain mining permits; the proposed law 
would have removed the requirement that land owners authorize mining under their land (many 
local landowners opposed mining and were not inclined to provide such permission), and would 
also have changed the permitting process to make it easier to proceed from exploration to 
exploitation.134 Revealing the pressures that state officials perceived themselves to be under 
from the company’s opponents, Pacific Rim’s internal e-mails from the time note that it had 
been informed that the governing party, ARENA, had decided to postpone the introduction of 
the company’s bill to the legislative assembly until after the elections “for reasons of election 
strategy, to not stir up opposition to the reform project”.135 The company further maintained 
that resistance to the pro-mining law was not “on the part of the government” but related to 
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“electoral concerns”.136 In other internal e-mails the company is explicit about its success in 
lobbying the government; “we have sought and obtained the commitment of support for the 
project from the PCN (one of the moderate parties – their vote along with ARENA will ensure 
that the reform passes)” and the e-mail concludes, “[w]ith a great deal of satisfaction, I can 
inform you that we are ready in the legislative area”.137  
 
The company did nevertheless not manage to replicate its earlier successes in drafting the 
country’s mining laws and the bill did not pass, but this reveals the conflicting pressures that 
state officials were under from the company on the one hand, and civil society groups opposed 
to mining on the other. It also reveals that the governing right-wing ARENA party was from 
the outset favourable towards mining; the company describes how even after it had publicly 
“ceased all official communication” with the company, high-level politicians met privately to 
offer personal assurances, and US embassy officials suggest that the administration had 
provided a “wink and a nod” that permits would eventually be approved.138 As late as 2007 the 
president, Antonio Saca, had requested participation in a pro-mining documentary, but by the 
following year he had adopted a more cautious stance and pronounced that “[w]e want to 
generate a space to reflect on the benefits or disadvantages of mining”, and that once “we’re 
shown proof that green mining exists [then] a law must be made to make everything very 
clear”. 139  By 2009, in the run-up to an election in which the opposition FMLN party 
campaigned against mining, and faced also with the possibility of an international investment 
dispute with the company, Saca conclusively pronounced that he would “not grant a single 
permit” for mining.140 By that stage he appears to have decided it more prudent to face the wrath 
of the company before an international investment tribunal than the wrath of the anti-mining 
groups and a population increasingly sceptical of mining in the run-up to an election. 
 
Before the arbitral tribunal, the company goes to great lengths to show how the state initially 
supported the company, and appears baffled – even “astonished” – that state officials were to 
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respond to the civil society opposition by introducing a moratorium on mining.141 The company 
repeatedly remarks that El Salvador’s decision is “politically motivated”, and by implication 
illegitimate, and that it has breached the company’s ‘legitimate expectations’.142 La Mesa, the 
umbrella organization for the local community and environmental groups that opposed mining 
and whose activism prompted the conflict, is not a party to the investment dispute – the 
underlying dispute has now evolved into an investor-state dispute – but the tribunal permitted 
it to submit an amicus curiae brief. That brief is unique amongst amicus curiae briefs in 
investment disputes. Rather than simply detailing the public interest implications of a particular 
state policy – and despite the fact that amicus curiae are formally non-parties to the dispute – 
La Mesa directly maintains that it, and not El Salvador, is the company’s true adversary in the 
investment proceedings. La Mesa maintains that “[t]he government of El Salvador was not the 
source of Pacific Rim’s problem”, and that the Saca administration’s turn against mining was 
simply an attempt “to mirror popular opposition genuinely rooted elsewhere”. 143 La Mesa 
objects that “the real political controversy is between the investor and La Mesa”, and challenges 
the way that the dispute “has been taken to a forum where La Mesa cannot participate in equal 
footing”.144  It is this insight that serves as the foundation for understanding the role that 
international investment law plays in global political struggles today. 
 
In order to understand how investment disputes are ultimately disputes between non-state 
groups – as illustrated in the above dispute between Pacific Rim and La Mesa – it is imperative 
to understand the nature of the state itself and what ultimately leads the state to support one or 
another societal group in the struggle between them. Investment disputes formally arise only 
when a state ultimately adopts a new measure that impacts unfavourably on a particular 
corporation. To treat the state as an agent in its own right is to conceal the above struggles, but 
state officials – as human beings – do possess agency, and they are the ones who have the formal 
authority to make decisions on behalf of the state. As discussed in Chapter 1, the theoretical 
premise of this thesis is that it should not be assumed that state officials act in the ‘national 
interest’ or by virtue of their position within the structure of the state itself. Rather, state officials 
act in response to various structural pressures and on the basis of their own interests and ideas 
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as societal beings. The aim of this section is to analyse why a state, via its state officials, would 
take a particular side in the societal struggles considered here. 
 
Crucially, it is important to understand that both corporations and their civil society opponents 
have different tools at their disposal in their tug-of-war with each other for the support of the 
state. This argument directly contradicts what appear to be some foundational assumptions 
within the investment law literature. While it is not uncommon that civil society groups that 
oppose particular corporations also directly oppose ‘complicit’ state officials, the investment 
law literature in contrast often implies that the dispute is an investor-state dispute precisely 
because the foreign investor is not already represented within or by the state, while the citizens 
of a state by definition are.145 The tribunal in both Tecmed v. Mexico and Azurix v. Argentina 
cite a European Court of Human Rights ruling that “non-nationals” (in this context foreign 
investors) are “vulnerable to domestic legislation” because they “will generally have played no 
part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption”.146 On 
the basis of this observation, both tribunals proceed to suggest that the citizens of a state may 
therefore have to “bear a greater burden” than foreign companies in the introduction of public 
interest measures, and by implication to compensate transnational corporations where such 
measures are excessively costly. 147 The tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico elaborates that “the 
foreign investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it, 
partly because the investors are not entitle [sic] to exercise political rights reserved to the 
nationals of the State, such as voting for the authorities that will issue the decisions that affect 
such investors”.148 This section will argue that while it may be true that some non-nationals 
(such as immigrants or refugees) lack participation and are not “consulted” in the decisions that 
affect them, it would be excessively formalistic to assume that this observation applies to 
transnational corporations. 149  Indeed, in the above illustrative case, Pacific Rim candidly 
admitted that it had “had a hand in helping the government draft” the “very friendly mining 
laws” by which it operated, an admission that is not consistent with the claim that foreign 
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companies have “nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it”.150 Academic 
commentators frequently follow tribunals in their premise that foreign corporations lack 
influence on the decisions of state officials. Andrew Newcombe, for instance, suggests that 
transnational corporations lack a “voice” in host state policy-making because it “typically lacks 
representation in the political process and may not have any input into decisions that 
significantly affect its investment”.151 In the investment disputes considered in this thesis, there 
is extensive evidence of corporate lobbying and also of the success of such corporate lobbying, 
even if the investment disputes often emerge because the state ultimately sided with the 
corporation’s civil society adversaries. In order to support the argument that corporations and 
civil society groups engage in a tug-of-war for the state, this section investigates the powerful 
tools that corporations can wield to lend force to their arguments and to persuade state officials 
to support them. It therefore seeks to illustrate why corporations are powerful enough to have 
“voice” in policy decisions within states even in the absence of formal representation and the 
right to vote. This does not mean that civil society groups lack such voice, but that the question 
of how a particular state relates to a particular struggle between a transnational corporation and 
its civil society adversary is far from the foregone conclusion implied within the investment 
law literature.  
 
This chapter will look at three reasons why state officials might act the way they do in response 
to societal struggles. Firstly, state officials are motivated to exercise their agency in particular 
ways by virtue of the structure of the state itself and its position vis-à-vis other social structures. 
To take the most obvious examples, the structure of many states as democratic ensures that state 
officials need to consider the wishes of those who can vote, and the structural differentiation of 
the state from the economy ensures that state officials need to consider the wishes of those who 
control the economy. Secondly, state officials are themselves both agents in their own right 
with personal interests and beliefs, as well as societal beings, and their position within that 
society will influence their ideology, their sense of personal belonging, their loyalties, and the 
personal incentives they have to support one or the another adversary to the investment dispute. 
Thirdly, state officials are also under pressure from outside the country itself – from other states 
or international organizations – but these pressures themselves stem ultimately from particular 
(and perhaps ‘foreign’) societal groups. 
                                                             
150 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, para. 78.  
151 Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, ICSID Review, 20:1 
(2005), p. 46-47. 
243 
 
State Officials and Structural Pressures 
 
In describing the struggle for the state that underpins the investment disputes as a tug-of-war 
between the corporation and its opponents, the intention is nevertheless not to imply that it is 
only the contemporary strength of each side that determines the outcome of the struggle. Each 
side also has the victories or defeats of historic struggles to contend with, as these have become 
“congealed” in the very institutional and legal fabric of the state.152 It is the structure of the 
state, as the congealment of historical agency, which provides the ‘strategically selective’ 
context within which today’s struggles take place.153 State officials are important actors by 
virtue of their position within the structure of the state, but these positions also limit their 
authority and their agency can only be exercised within the parameters set by the structure of 
the state itself. In some circumstances the institutional structure of the state or the legal 
framework is so precise as to leave state officials with little room to exercise any agency at all 
in respect to which social group to support in a particular battle. The focus of this section is 
nevertheless on cases in which state officials do have a choice in how to act, but where the 
structural context of the state nevertheless provides them with certain incentives and 
disincentives to support one societal group over another. 
 
By virtue of historic agency, the state has a particular institutional structure as well as a 
framework of existing laws, that in a myriad of ways can influence how state officials act in the 
context of new societal conflicts. The investment disputes considered here reveal that a wide 
variety of such pre-existing institutional features or laws or procedures, as components of the 
state structure, can exert pressure on state officials to support either the investor or its adversary. 
For instance, Glamis Gold v. USA concerns the proposed development of an open-pit gold mine 
along an ancient trail network, which the Quechan indigenous people compare in spiritual 
significance to Jerusalem or Mecca.154 State officials emphasized a domestic legal “obligation 
to consult” with Native Americans and acknowledged the “exceedingly strong” objections of 
the Quechan people in respect to the gold mine, and this exercise of consultation may have 
increased the pressure that state officials felt themselves to be under to adopt the restrictions on 
mining that were opposed by the investor but desired by the indigenous groups.155 In turn, the 
                                                             
152 Robinson, Social Theory and Globalization’, p. 165. 
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existence of this ‘obligation to consult’ reflects long struggles by Native Americans to protect 
their rights to their historic lands. However, these state officials also confronted other structural 
and legal constraints that supported the investor. From the Gold Rush onwards the US has had 
liberal mining laws, and in this case US federal law did not allow state authorities to deny the 
company a mining permit altogether; it only permitted the authorities to make such a permit 
contingent on mitigation or reclamation requirements.156 The state measure challenged before 
the investment tribunal was therefore not a prohibition of Glamis’ mine – as such would have 
been unlawful – but a new Californian requirement to backfill mines. This had the intended 
effect of reducing the anticipated profit margin of the gold mine sufficiently to dissuade the 
company from pursuing the project,157 and the investment tribunal found such a backfilling 
requirement to be permitted by the investment treaty – but with increasing gold prices or 
decreasing technology costs the same battle between the company and indigenous people may 
arise yet again in the future. Marxist scholars contend that, in general, the state is ‘strategically 
selective’ in favour of a capitalist class.158 
 
Amongst the variety of structural constraints that provide the context within which state 
officials make their decisions to support one or another social group, there are two that explain 
more directly why state officials, when given the choice, would support either the company or 
its opposition – the nature of many states as democratic, and the nature of the economy as 
‘private’ and external to state control. It is true, as investment tribunals and the accompanying 
investment law literature have indicated, that citizens have power over the state through 
democratic influence. It is nevertheless also true that business actors, holding the levers of 
control of an economy that is differentiated from the state, also exercise power over state 
officials. This sub-section will first consider capitalism and its structural separation of the state 
from the economy, for this is the reason why state officials often initially support business actors, 
and will thereafter consider the democratic nature of the state, for this is the reason why state 
officials are sometimes forced to shift sides when social uprisings against particular businesses 
or business practices occur. 
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A distinctive characteristic of capitalism as a mode of production is the formal differentiation 
between the sphere or politics and the sphere of economics. 159  The territorial state exists 
alongside a (global) economy, where it is corporations and the capitalists that control them that 
choose where and how and if to make their investments. This implies, to cite Ellen Meiksins 
Wood, that “[m]any social functions are removed from the sphere of political control or 
communal deliberation and put under the direct control of capital”. 160  This compels state 
officials, who do not directly control the economy and who do not themselves make economic 
decisions, but who nevertheless depend on the economy in various ways, to strive to ‘attract’ 
investment and to persuade corporations to make beneficial business decisions.161 In Bilcon v. 
Canada, the company points out that the promotional slogan of the provincial government is 
“Nova Scotia is open for business”, and within investment arbitration proceedings companies 
often support their claims of breaches of ‘legitimate expectations’ with evidence that the 
governments had initially been favourably disposed towards foreign investment in general and 
their investments in particular.162 There is a wide-ranging debate on whether the global mobility 
of corporations leads state officials to reduce or refrain from increasing environmental 
regulations in order to attract investment.163 While research on the topic appears to be hampered 
by the difficulty of devising methods that would actually capture the phenomenon if it did 
exist,164 it is nevertheless clear from the investment disputes considered here that state officials 
are concerned to attract investments and often do seem initially prepared to accept 
environmental or other negative social consequences in order to do so. 165  As long as the 
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economy is under ‘private’ as opposed to state or communal control, businesses will possess 
the power to make economic decisions that affect people’s livelihoods and welfare, as well as 
the state’s resources and state officials’ ability to achieve their aims, and this lends credibility 
to their lobbying efforts and state officials will have strong incentives to cooperate. Companies’ 
possession of private economic power can nevertheless also be put to more direct use to achieve 
their aims. Corporations often provide funding to think tanks and other institutions that can help 
to set an agenda that state officials will find it difficult to depart from, and the private ownership 
of many media organizations may make them business-friendly and lead state officials to fear 
taking action that may lead them to be portrayed in an unfavourable light to potential voters. 
Finally, in a number of investment disputes companies appear to have more directly used their 
private economic power to persuade state officials to support them. In one environmental case, 
Lucchetti v. Peru, the company’s USD 3 million bribe to a high state official, Vladimiro 
Montesinos, to secure a favourable judicial outcome that would permit the building of a pasta 
factory adjacent to protected wetlands, became part wider a congressional inquiry and political 
scandal.166 Of the environmental cases, bribery may also have played a part in Enron v. India 
and Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, and the private economic power of business actors thereby 
lends them a source of power that their civil society opponents often do not possess.167 
 
In contrast, while the corporations’ civil society opponents do not have the economic power to 
pressure state officials, they often have the democratic right to decide whether to re-elect them, 
and even in non-democratic countries state officials do seem worried that public opposition 
could grow strong enough to unseat them. The potential power of democracy or popular 
majorities is therefore substantial, but in practice it is rarely used against corporations - given 
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that the economy and society’s wealth is in private ownership and beyond direct democratic 
control, people too are dependent on businesses to make decisions to invest and provide 
employment in their country. The investment disputes considered here nevertheless often 
emerge where certain groups of people – perhaps locked in an intra-community battle with other 
groups who prioritize the employment opportunities businesses can provide – decide that the 
protection of the environment is a stronger priority and gain sufficient public support to 
convince state officials to support them. It is in such circumstances that a Bolivia-based civil 
society organization is right to describe international investment law as a “defence system 
against democracy”.168 
 
The investment disputes considered in this thesis are replete with examples of state officials, 
subject to significant public pressure, making decisions to adopt environmental protection 
measures that lead affected corporations to bring investment lawsuits. In many cases, the 
investment disputes between the corporations and the social groups seem to become subject to 
significant electoral debate and campaigning. Disputes in respect to particular investment 
projects seem to have been an important factor in the outcome of local or municipal elections, 
and some investment disputes have even impacted on national elections. In the El Salvadoran 
and two of the Costa Rican cases (Infinito Gold and Harken), the underlying public opposition 
to the companies’ respective natural resource extraction plans grew so strong as to persuade all 
main parties in national elections to support the anti-mining social movements.169 In some cases, 
social movements have seen their own leaders win elections and thereby themselves become 
state officials; the investment dispute in Abengoa v. Mexico emerged from the opposition of a 
group called We Are All Zimapán to the investor’s hazardous waste landfill, and when the 
group’s leader won the elections for municipal president he promptly proceeded to try to cancel 
the licences for the landfill.170 The fact that elections often form a turning point, in which a state 
that had previously supported the company shifts its support to its opponents instead, is 
testament to the power of democracy in struggles between societal groups. 
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State Officials as Societal Beings 
 
While state officials are subject to structural pressures to support one or another societal group, 
they are also societal beings in their own right and subject to the social conditioning that this 
brings. Their position within society is likely to affect their beliefs and ideology, their 
understanding of how the world works, their sense of personal belonging, as well as the personal 
reasons or interests they may have to support one or another group in societal struggles. 
 
Given the social situatedness of most high level state officials, it is not surprising that state 
officials tend to promote business-friendly policies. While the class composition of state 
officials differs from country to country and from one political party to another, people with a 
personal or family background in business or within the upper classes tend to be over-
represented, and it is not unusual that state officials have held directorships with companies or 
practiced with private law firms.171 This provides such state officials with a particular position 
in society and influences who their acquaintances are and which social groups they associate 
with. Ralph Miliband observes that it is “much easier for businessmen, where required, to divest 
themselves of stocks and shares as a kind of rite de passage into government service than to 
divest themselves of a particular view of the world, and of the place of business within it”.172 
Because business actors control the economy, it is not surprising that there is also a ‘revolving 
door’ between government and the corporate sector and state officials seeking to secure 
employment after leaving government may be inclined to maintain a business-friendly 
appearance within it. In several investment disputes, state officials who have supported 
particular investment projects have subsequently secured employment with those same 
companies afterwards. For instance, the federal state official that sought to secure the re-
opening of Metalclad’s landfill was, to cite the company’s director, subsequently granted a job 
“interface[ing] with all the government people down there [in Mexico] for us”,173 while the El 
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Salvadoran environmental agency official who worked to push through Pacific Rim’s 
environmental permit application was subsequently given a position as Director of 
Sustainability for the company.174 
 
While state officials tend to belong to or be closely linked to the capitalist class, the social 
situatedness of state officials can also work in favour of other societal groups. In Bilcon’s claim 
against Canada, the company details opposition by state officials at various levels of 
government. One of them (a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia for the region 
in which the investor sought to develop its controversial quarry) maintained that he had won 
the election precisely because of his opposition to the quarry, but his background as a lobster 
fisherman, given the opposition of many fishermen to the quarry, is also likely to have 
influenced his decision-making in respect to the company’s investment.175  
 
State Officials and External Pressures 
 
Finally, in many investment disputes state officials may respond not to domestic societal 
pressures or the social conditioning that results from their own position within that society, but 
to pressures from other states or international organizations, or to structural pressures stemming 
from international agreements. For instance, in a dispute with Chemtura in respect to a 
prohibition on a pesticide, Canada’s signature of the Aarhus Protocol on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants appears to have played an important role in determining the conduct of state 
officials.176 A state official further remarked that “[e]verybody was pressuring. I mean, my 
goodness, countries that had already banned lindane very much wanted other countries that 
were still using it to stop”.177 Here there may be a temptation to perceive states as agents, as 
does the state official in the above statement, but it should be kept in mind that such pressures 
also ultimately stem from society and struggles between societal groups. In many cases, the 
pressure imposed by other states may stem directly from the corporation itself – it is not 
uncommon that foreign companies seek to persuade their ‘home states’ to pressure the host 
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state in which it operates, and here the ‘revolving door’ between business and the home state is 
often particularly evident. In Gabriel Resources v. Romania – a threatened investment dispute 
concerning the environmental implications of a large gold and silver mine – the Canadian 
ambassador that pressured Romania on behalf of the company subsequently joined its Board of 
Directors,178 while in Enron v. India the U.S. ambassador who pressured the Indian government 
on behalf of the company subsequently joined the Board of Directors of an Enron subsidiary.179 
 
Concluding Remarks on the Battle for the State 
 
It will not be possible to determine conclusively what motivated state officials to side with 
either the corporation or its opponents in any particular struggle, but the point is that both have 
tools at their disposal and favourable conditions to persuade the state. State officials are 
furthermore not detached from society or wider societal struggles, but are agents within such 
struggles. This is perhaps uncontentious as an empirical observation, but the argument made 
here is that this observation has implications for our understanding of investment disputes. 
There is a tendency within the investment law literature to perceive the investor as external to 
the state in which it operates and to struggles within that state; the premise is that foreign 
corporations lack “voice” and participation in the decision-making process of host states.180 
This is true on a formal level – the company will not have the right to vote for state officials, a 
privilege afforded only to the company’s opponents – but it is misleading as a factual statement. 
The investment disputes considered here reveal that corporations engage in significant lobbying 
efforts within host states to secure their aims.181 Such corporate lobbying is credible not only 
because the company’s arguments are backed by the threat to take their investment elsewhere, 
but also through incentives for state officials, from promises of future work in the corporate 
sector to outright bribery, and disincentives, such as the threat of funding efforts to delegitimize 
them in the eyes of voters. State officials, many of whom are furthermore socially conditioned 
to be favourably disposed towards business, do consult with corporations and listen to their 
concerns. Given that companies sometimes go so far as to acknowledge their role in co-drafting 
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favourable legislation, it is implausible to suggest that companies lack “voice” within the 
domestic policy process or have “nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it”.182 
The conventional representation of investor-state disputes as involving two distinct and 
oppositional agents – investors and states, where the former is unrepresented within the latter – 
therefore serves to conceal the underlying struggles between corporations and their civil society 
opponents and how both are engaged in a tug-of-war for the support of the state.  
 
If the investment law literature portrays the investor as external to the policy-making process 
of the host state and as powerless in the face of electoral pressures, this may be a consequence 
of the fact that investor-state disputes do emerge precisely in those cases where the company’s 
opponents are victorious in the tug-of-war for the state. In a sense, this characteristic of investor-
state disputes renders an analysis of the underlying social struggles encouraging for social 
movements and civil society activists around the world. The state is certainly a defender of the 
interests of a capitalist class – and there is certainly a recognition within many civil society 
organizations and social movements that state officials are favourably inclined towards their 
corporate opponents – but the investment disputes considered here serve as testament to the fact 
that state officials sometimes do switch sides despite an initial reluctance to do so. Indeed, in 
cases such as the ones against El Salvador and Costa Rica, social movements have even been 
sufficiently successful to persuade all main political parties before an election to back their 
aims. 183  Similarly, the Peruvian president, who had previously maintained that the 
environmental concerns of mining “is an issue of the past century [since] today mines live 
alongside cities without any problems” – and had further accused indigenous groups of being 
‘dogs in the manger’ (after Aesop’s fable) for preventing the development of mining – did 
respond, if reluctantly, to major social protests by imposing a suspension on Bear Creek’s 
controversial silver mine; Bear Creek lamented that it was “the wrong reaction to a political 
situation”. 184 
 
                                                             
182 As does Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation’, para. 122. 
183 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, para. 386, 390;  Spalding, ‘El Salvador: 
Horizontalism and the Anti-Mining Movement’, p. 322; Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of 
Arbitration’, p. 620. 
184 Alan García Pérez, ‘The Dog in the Manger’, Peruvian Times (republished, 30 October 2007), available at { 
http://www.peruviantimes.com/30/president-alan-garcias-policy-doctrinethe-dog-in-the-manger-
syndrome/2860/} accessed 20 January 2015; Brenda Bouw, ‘Canadian Mining Firm Threatens Legal Action 
Against Peru’, The Globe and Mail (26 June 2011), available at {http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/canadian-mining-firm-threatens-legal-action-against-peru/article585641/} accessed 19 September 2014.  
252 
 
The Network for Justice in Global Investment observes that “[a]cross the world, citizens and 
social movements are mounting strong and effective campaigns to fight the environmental and 
social abuses of transnational corporations”.185 The underlying struggles considered in this 
chapter are the ones where such civil society groups have actually won; they are testament to 
the major victories that do, albeit perhaps rarely, occur at the domestic level. But as the Network 
for Justice further observes, “corporations and their political allies have assembled a powerful 
arsenal of legal weapons in their defense”.186 This is the context in which the corporate recourse 
to investment arbitration needs to be understood. The utility of the global investment protection 
regime for corporations is precisely its placing of another hoop that any victorious civil society 
groups (now represented by the state) have to jump through in order to achieve their 
environmental aims. 
 
International Investment Law in Social Struggle 
 
The two previous sections of this chapter have established that ‘investor-state disputes’ are 
ultimately not really between investors and states at all. The first section explored how 
investment disputes are often directly between corporations and their civil society adversaries, 
while the second section considered how both have often fought long battles to ensure that state 
institutions and state officials supported them. The nature of the state in a capitalist world order 
is such that corporations are very often successful in persuading the state to support their 
interests in such struggles. International investment disputes nevertheless demonstrate that the 
adversaries of corporations can sometimes win such domestic public policy debates, to the 
detriment of the corporations who then approach investment tribunals for compensation. This 
unpacking of ‘investor-state disputes’ is in turn imperative for understanding the role that 
international investment law plays in social struggles around the world today, and 
understanding that role is the aim of this third, and final, section of the chapter.  
 
The Democracy Center, a Bolivian-based NGO involved in reporting on the Cochabamba 
Water War that sparked an investment dispute between Bechtel and Bolivia, refers to investor-
state dispute settlement as a corporate “counter-strategy” in the event that people “win [such 
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domestic political debates] and get the law on our side”.187 The argument made in this section 
is that this understanding – that investment law is a response to civil society victories – only 
captures one (albeit perhaps the most important one) of the roles that investment law plays in 
social struggles around the world. In contrast, this third section of this chapter will detail four 
roles that investment law plays in such social struggles, in reverse order from the chronology 
of the social struggle itself.  
 
Firstly, there is indeed the one identified by the Democracy Center and increasingly other non-
governmental organizations and social movements around the world: corporations can win 
investment disputes, and while states are not required to actually withdraw the state measure 
that the corporation’s civil society adversary had fought for, this legal regime does compel the 
state to reallocate funds designed for other social purposes to the payment of compensation. 
This first sub-section will not unduly repeat the argument made in the previous chapter about 
how corporations can win such disputes, but it will rather explore how it is often the very nature 
of the state, as a social structure inherently responsive to societal struggles, that leads to the 
state’s defeat in the first place. Secondly, investment law can nevertheless also play an 
important role in social struggles around the world before the company wins an investor-state 
dispute, and often even before it has formally filed such a dispute in the first place. The second 
sub-section will consider how the very possibility of an investment dispute can shift the balance 
of power in a domestic struggle to give the corporation the upper edge, even in the absence of 
a legal award in its favour. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as ‘regulatory chill’, and 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that corporations often win these kinds of underlying 
public policy debates precisely because they are fought ‘in the shadow of’ a looming investment 
treaty claim.188 Thirdly, investment law can nevertheless also play a hitherto unrecognized role, 
not only in lending force to the corporation’s argument in an ongoing tug-of-war for the state, 
but also in influencing the ability of its civil society adversaries to form opposition in the first 
place. The third sub-section will consider how corporations are increasingly approaching 
investment law as a means of protecting them from the civil society protesters themselves, and 
in particular to prevent direct action protests from emerging against their operations. Fourthly, 
investment law can also play a part in social struggle by influencing the corporation’s own 
                                                             
187 Jim Shultz, ‘Getting Action: More Powerful Than Governments: How Corporations Use Global Investment 
Rules to Get Around Democracy’, (6 December 2011), available at {http://democracyctr.org/corporate/getting-
action-more-powerful-than-governments/} accessed 4 September 2012. 
188 Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance. 
254 
 
behaviour either in the context of social struggles or before such struggles have even emerged. 
The fourth sub-section will consider how investment law provides corporations with protection 
from ‘political risk’ and in doing so can engender a sense of corporate invulnerability towards 
societal opposition. This, in turn, can influence how careful they are in their corporate conduct 
and the extent to which they take precautionary measures to prevent opposition from arising in 
the first place. The last three of these four sub-sections therefore indicate that undivided 
attention to the disputes that have actually been resolved in investor-state arbitration will only 
capture the tip of the iceberg as far as the political implications of investment law are concerned. 
 
The Role of International Investment Law in Social Movement Victories 
 
In response to the proposal of Gabriel Resources to develop Europe’s largest gold deposit, 
through an opencast cyanide-leach mining project that would involve shaving off four mountain 
tops and resettling the town of Rosia Montana, an activist of the growing Save Rosia Montana 
movement remarked that “[i]f the project goes ahead, it must be stronger than democracy”.189 
To cite David Schneiderman, what international investment law does is precisely to “establish 
thresholds of tolerable democratic behaviour”.190 International investment law has arisen as part 
of a wider political strategy of a transnational capitalist class to place limits on what states can 
do, through enforceable constraints that Stephen Gill refers to as a ‘new constitutionalism’.191 
Corporations often approach international investment tribunals precisely when democracy 
intervenes in their plans. The previous chapter has already detailed how arbitral tribunals have 
interpreted each of the investment protection standards to mean far more than immediately 
meets the eye, and that this consequently ensures that states have a high threshold to cross if 
they are to introduce new environmental or public interest regulations in response to public 
pressure. Should a state measure not meet that threshold, compensation will be required to wipe 
out any negative consequences for the investor, including for a loss of anticipated profits. 
Prompted by a major social movement to save Rosia Montana, the government and parliament 
of Romania has begun to question Gabriel Resources’ plans and the company is now reported 
to be preparing a notice of intent to commence arbitration in case Romania decides not to allow 
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the project to proceed.192 International investment law cannot force Romania to permit the 
project to proceed, but it can – if the investor wins – force it to make an unpalatable choice 
between doing so and paying the company up to USD 4 billion in compensation for putting an 
end to its plans.193 Such costs will be borne by the citizens of Romania in the form of higher 
taxes or, more probably, reduced public spending. As a result, any domestic political victory by 
the Save Rosia Montana movement may not feel like quite as much of a victory after all. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, investment treaties can in various ways protect 
corporations from state measures adopted for environmental purposes. Such state measures can 
be deemed discriminatory, expropriatory, unfair and inequitable, or as involving impermissible 
political change in breach of a corporation’s ‘legitimate expectations’. This sub-section will not 
repeat the argument made in the previous chapter, but it will rather draw attention to the fact 
that it is often the very responsiveness of the state to societal pressure that leads it to lose 
investment treaty challenges in the first place. The investment law literature treats the state as 
an agent in its own right and refrains from any consideration of the social struggles through 
which a state measure has emerged. As Odumosu observes, this leads tribunals to construct the 
state “as an abstract, artificial entity separate from and divorced from its population”.194 This 
sub-section will argue that it is precisely the fact that the state is not the rational and unitary 
actor divorced from its population that investment law expects it to be that causes it to lose 
investor-state disputes. Firstly, it will consider how investment law expects the state to behave 
as a rational actor that itself weighs the pros and cons of a particular policy or measure, and 
will contrast this to the actual nature of the state as a social structure that cannot easily stand 
aloof from societal struggles. Secondly, it will consider how investment tribunals expect the 
state to behave as a unitary actor, and will contrast this with the actual nature of the state as a 
social structure that changes over time and that also consists of different institutions at any 
given point in time. 
 
The expectation in the legal literature and arbitral awards that the state ought to behave as a 
rational actor has resulted in a proliferation of corporate challenges against ‘politically 
motivated’ state conduct. ‘Legitimate’ public interest measures based on state initiative and the 
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state’s own ‘rational’ assessment of the situation (preferably grounded in the conclusions of a 
thorough scientific assessment) are increasingly contrasted with ‘illegitimate’ public interest 
measures that are introduced in response to public pressure. Odumosu remarks that there is an 
assumption that any public interest measure that is not taken at the state’s own initiative is 
“arbitrary or unreasonable because it was adopted in response to public demand”.195 This is 
often framed in terms of ‘political motivation’; in Inmaris v. Ukraine the tribunal casually 
remarked that a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard would be found if a state 
measure was “undertaken for political reasons or other improper motives”.196 Such awards that 
highlight the illegitimacy of politics are sometimes contrasted with AES v. Hungary, which 
determined, contra the investor’s allegation of ‘political motivation’, that “the fact that an issue 
becomes a political matter, such as the excessive profits of the [energy] generators […] does 
not mean that the existence of a rational policy is erased. In fact, it is normal and common that 
a public policy matter becomes a political issue; that is the arena where such matters are 
discussed and made public”.197 However, even if the approach of the AES tribunal was to win 
the day, the conclusion is simply that a rational state policy is not erased by any wider political 
pressure on the state, and the existence or otherwise of a rational policy on behalf of the state 
itself, absent public pressure, will continue to be a subject of investigation.  
 
The notion of ‘political motivation’ raised by corporations to challenge state measures can be 
understood in a stronger and a weaker sense of the term. In a weaker sense, state officials are 
alleged to be simply responding to public pressure as opposed to undertaking their own rational 
assessment; in the stronger sense, state officials are alleged to be undertaking measures 
detrimental to corporations in order to position themselves in public policy debates for electoral 
gain.  
 
Biwater v. Tanzania involves ‘political motivation’ in the stronger sense. The dispute arose 
from a failed privatization project for the water services of Dar es Salaam; the company quickly 
found itself in financial difficulty – probably because it had underbid to win the contract – and 
unable to meet its commitments to maintain and improve water services.198 Even the World 
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Bank observed that “[t]he primary assumption on the part of almost all involved […] was that 
it would be very hard, if not impossible, for the private operator to perform worse than [the 
previous state-owned operator]. But that is what happened”.199 After a few years Tanzania 
decided to terminate the contract, and the tribunal acknowledged that the crisis engendered by 
the company’s performance “could have threatened a vital public service and the situation 
therefore had to be resolved one way or the other in the near future”. 200  The tribunal 
nevertheless determined that Tanzania had acted unlawfully during the termination process 
itself, and one of several unlawful acts involved the public pronouncements of a politician, who 
the company maintained was in “populist campaign mode”.201 The tribunal determined that his 
public pronouncements to announce the termination of the contract “exceeded the bounds of 
normal information [and] included severe criticisms of [Biwater] which were at least in part 
clearly motivated by political considerations”.202 There is no suggestion that the politician made 
any harsher judgement than castigating the company for its “poor performance”, but he did so 
publicly and repeatedly and the tribunal suggests that this “inflamed the situation, and polarised 
public opinion still further”.203 The tribunal does not challenge Tanzania’s right to cancel the 
contract under the circumstances of the company’s contractual performance, but objected to 
public statements that were “undermining [Biwater] in the general public’s eye”.204  
 
In the context of Tanzanian politics, the pronouncements of the state official were nevertheless 
not surprising; this was a “very public and widely reported issue” and it is in the nature of 
politics that politicians will seek to present themselves in a positive light to voters.205 In this 
case, the politician may have wanted to be seen to act decisively in response to an important 
public issue, and would certainly have wanted to avoid blame being laid at his doorstep. Luke 
Peterson of Investment Arbitration Reporter concludes that the award puts “elected officials on 
notice that they must tread delicately with respect to their public pronouncements in the context 
of quarrels over foreign owned investments”.206 However, given that such delicate action can 
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cost a politician votes, it may rather be that the pressure on state officials to position themselves 
in social struggles and public policy debates subsequently leads states to lose investor-state 
disputes.  
 
In a weaker sense, state officials are not taking the initiative to situate themselves politically in 
respect to a public issue, but may be more passively responding to public pressure with the 
introduction of new regulations or policies. The environmental cases discussed in the previous 
chapter reveals that states are more likely to win investment disputes if they can show that they 
had introduced environmental protection measures at their own initiative and in response to 
thorough scientific assessments, as in Methanex v. USA and Chemtura v. Canada.207 Both 
tribunals extensively considered the scientific assessments in response to which the 
environment protection measures had been introduced. In contrast, where states have lost, as in 
Metalclad v. Mexico and Tecmed v. Mexico, scholars have tended to conclude that the state 
measures “were not truly environmental protection measures” but were rather “pretextual” and 
in fact “motivated by local political […] considerations”, despite the fact that the local political 
debates themselves directly arose from the environmental concerns of the local populations.208  
 
In Tecmed v. Mexico, the tribunal draws a sharp distinction between the state’s own assessment 
of the environmental situation and the environmental concerns of the community, where it could 
have legitimately acted on the basis of the former but not the latter.209 In respect to the state’s 
own assessment, the environmental agency had found that the company had breached 
environmental regulations on several different occasions, but at the time responded by issuing 
the company with a series of fines and formal warnings.210 When a different government agency 
subsequently denied the company a renewal of its operating permit on the basis of such 
environmental infringements, the tribunal castigated it for taking a “literal and strict 
interpretation of the conditions under which the Permit was granted” that could not be explained 
in reference to its own assessment of the environmental dangers, but only by the ongoing public 
protests.211 Tecmed v. Mexico reveals that investment tribunals will not look kindly upon the 
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decision of a government to respond to public concern in the absence of its own assessment that 
the public concerns are serious enough to warrant action. In this case, the environmental 
agencies involved had been reluctant to act in the first place, and it was only upon the request 
of the protest movement that it had investigated and discovered the environmental hazards in 
the first place, and it subsequently retained a considerably higher level of tolerance for such 
breaches of the applicable regulations than the community in the surrounding area. 212 The 
tribunal, having determined that Mexico’s decision to deny a new permit was disproportional 
to its own assessment of the environmental risks, did not proceed to assess whether the decision 
was proportional to the surrounding community’s assessment of the environmental risks but 
rather considered what kind of ‘risk’ the protesters posed to the state itself and social order. The 
tribunal acknowledges that the public protests were “intense, aggressive and sustained” and 
“amount[ed] to significant pressure on the Mexican authorities”, but given that they were not 
“so great as to lead to a serious emergency situation, social crisis or public unrest”, Mexico was 
deemed to have acted unlawfully in its decision to respond to the protests by declining to offer 
a renewed permit for the landfill.213 
 
Gus Van Harten observes that investment tribunals have in the past appeared “suspicious of 
electoral decision-making and public involvement”, and this tendency to “scrutinize decisions 
more intensively as a result of [their] electoral political origins” has ensure that the question of 
the ‘political motivation’ behind state action has become an increasingly contested issue before 
arbitral tribunals. 214  In Vattenfall v. Germany, the company objected to the “politically 
motivated delay” in issuing permits for a large coal-fired power plant in Hamburg, and 
furthermore the “politically motivated” decision to impose additional environmental conditions 
on the project.215 Both of these were, as the investor acknowledges, directly due to a Green 
Party victory in local elections and its desire to act upon its electoral promises against the power 
plant. 216  Faced with a possibly costly investment treaty challenge, the German federal 
government finally intervened in the Hamburg dispute and acquiesced to removing such 
additional environmental requirements and waving the project through the permitting 
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process.217 In pending disputes, ‘political motivation’ has become a favourite accusation of 
companies. In Bear Creek v. Peru, arising from protests against the company’s proposed silver 
mine, the company objects that Peru’s decision to temporarily suspend the project is “politically 
motivated” and illegitimate because it is “based upon recent regional protests as opposed to the 
technical merits or procedures relating to its [environmental impact assessment]”. 218  In a 
pending dispute over Quebec’s decision to annul permits for the controversial fracking of shale 
gas, Lone Pine Resources objects that “there exists no valid public purpose” for annulling the 
permits before a scientific assessment has been completed, and it places great weight on a 
statement of the Quebec Deputy Premier that the decision was a “political decision”.219 The 
argument that the state is acting on the basis of ‘political motivation’ and in response to political 
protests is often directly juxtaposed to the notion that the state should act as a rational actor that 
has itself duly weighed the scientific pros and cons of a particular environmental measure and 
is acting objectively without regard to public pressure. 
 
In the Pacific Rim v. El Salvador case considered above, the social movement with which the 
dispute originates is explicitly seeking to counter the current trend within the legal debate on 
the subject. In response to the accusation by Pacific Rim that El Salvador’s decision not to 
award a mining permit is “politically motivated”, 220  the social movement retorts that the 
establishment of a nation-wide movement against mining and the state’s responsiveness to its 
concerns “are not ‘inconvenient’ facts that the Republic [of El Salvador] must ‘explain away;’ 
nor are they a basis for Pacific Rim to pin liability on the Republic. The communities do not 
and need not apologize for standing up in defense of their own rights, lives and livelihoods”.221 
In contrast to the present tendency of assuming that states should act upon their own rational 
assessment rather than in response to political struggles, the social movement objects that “[t]his 
‘political’ character of the public policy dialogue, particularly over issues of such importance 
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as the use of natural resources, is neither wrong, dirty, nor in breach of international law, as the 
investor would like to present it”. 222  This, nevertheless, is how international investment 
tribunals have tended to interpret any political considerations in the past, and any failure on 
behalf of a state to distance itself from societal struggles may well constitute a breach of 
international investment law. 
 
Tribunals do not only expect the state to act as a rational actor divorced from its population, but 
furthermore expect it to act as a unitary actor vis-à-vis corporations both across time, and at a 
given point in time. It is the reality of the nature of the state as a social structure that both 
changes over time in response to social struggles, and that reflects contestation between 
opposing social groups at any given point, that frequently leads to the state’s failure to act as a 
unitary actor and consequently to a state’s loss in investor-state arbitration. 
 
Firstly, tribunals expect the state to act as a unitary actor across time. Investment law was 
conceived as a means of protecting corporations from ‘political risk’, or unfavourable change 
over time.223 Corporations consequently often go to great lengths in arbitral proceedings to 
show how the state was initially supportive of an investment project, but how the state 
subsequently changed ‘its’ mind and undertook detrimental measures towards it. Despite often 
revealing a clear awareness that the state was subject to significant public pressure, companies 
can nevertheless claim to be ‘astonished’ that the state changed ‘its’ mind in response to such 
pressure.224 Tribunals directly follow the corporations in expecting the state to be an actor 
capable of making assurances that will hold into the future, whatever domestic opposition 
develops against it doing so. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, states are in a 
narrower sense expected to adhere to contracts and formal agreements signed by predecessor 
governments, which can include stabilization clauses that freeze environmental and other public 
interest regulations for periods of up to 100 years. 225  In a more expansive sense, future 
governments are also expected not to act contrary to any ‘legitimate expectations’ that a 
corporation may have developed as a result of public statements or informal assurances or 
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promises by particular state officials in the past.226 Viewed from the domestic angle, the state 
is a social structure that would normally be both permitted and expected to change over time 
through the introduction of new policies and regulations, but viewed from the international 
angle, arbitral tribunals declare that states are obliged to ensure that corporations “may know 
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investment”.227 Because the 
state is conceptualized as a unitary actor, when a new government changes the state’s policies 
and acts differently from predecessor governments such action is often framed as 
“contradictory”, as opposed to merely different.228 In so far as rules, regulations and policies 
change in response to political struggles within states, it can be the very nature of the state, as 
a social structure that changes over time, that leads to a loss in investment disputes.  
 
Secondly, investment tribunals also expect states to act as unitary actors at any particular point 
in time. To cite the tribunal in MTD v. Chile, the state should act like “a unit” or a “monolith” 
towards foreign investors – which Chile in this case failed to do, when the Santiago planning 
authorities denied a zoning modification required for a project that the foreign investment 
agency had already approved (despite Chile’s protestations that the foreign investment agency 
was not a “one-stop window” for project approval).229 A failure to behave as a unitary actor can 
often arise precisely due to an ongoing tug-of-war for the state between opposing societal 
groups, where different societal groups gain support in particular levels of government, 
particular agencies within the state, or from particular politicians. For instance, several of the 
investment treaty cases considered in the previous chapter – including Metalclad v. Mexico 
considered above – emerged when local community opponents won municipal elections, and 
took action against the corporation which in turn were different from assurances that had been 
provided by a federal government that was more favourably disposed towards the company.230 
In other cases, state officials have been torn between which societal group to support in an 
ongoing dispute, and it is their failure to act decisively in favour of one or the other that may 
have led to either inconsistent action or no action at all. For instance, in Pacific Rim v. El 
Salvador, the state at one point may have delayed beyond the statutory period a response to the 
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company’s environmental permit application; the government at the time was favourably 
disposed towards the project and perhaps reluctant to deny a permit, but perhaps also reluctant 
to approve one in the face of mounting social movement opposition (an alternative 
interpretation of the same event is given in the below paragraph).231 The state therefore often 
fails to act as a unitary actor when ongoing social struggles cause different state agencies or 
state officials to end up acting at cross-purposes as far as a particular investment project is 
concerned, or when the same state officials act inconsistently in light of opposing societal 
pressures. 
 
A failure of the state to act as a unitary actor at a particular point in time can nevertheless also 
arise when state officials have been ‘won over’ to support a corporation’s opponents, but where 
the institutional or legal structure of the state makes it difficult for state officials to act 
accordingly. In several pending cases, the state structure itself appears to congeal corporate 
interests. If the investors are correct in their interpretations of domestic law, the state officials 
had been coming up against the pre-existing legal framework of the state itself in trying to 
support the corporations’ opponents. For instance, Bilcon suggests that Canada, by its own 
domestic laws, did not under the circumstances of the case have any authority to stop its 
controversial quarry from going ahead. Bilcon asserts that by Canadian law quarry permits are 
“routinely granted […] with either no environmental assessment or with the minimal 
environmental assessment”, and that Canada had already acted unlawfully in “arbitrarily and 
unfairly forc[ing] [it] into the most expansive, expensive and time-consuming environmental 
assessment”.232 Canada is further alleged to have breached domestic law in allowing local 
community opposition during the public consultation process to derail the quarry proposals, 
where by domestic law local community input was “limited to scientific analysis and 
interpretation”.233 By the investor’s own account, there was significant opposition against the 
quarry, to the extent that virtually every level of government and ministry engaged in collusion 
to arrive at a “predetermined outcome” against the proposed quarry.234 Yet according to the 
investor, “this project is a legal project and there is nothing in law to prevent this project from 
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going ahead”.235 If the company is correct, state officials – who are in this case uniformly 
against the quarry, in large part due to public opposition – are nevertheless confronted with a 
pre-existing legal framework in which there are no lawful means to prevent it from going ahead.  
 
A similar scenario is encountered in Pacific Rim v. El Salvador. The company maintains that 
the Environmental Agency had “minimal (if any) discretion to deny the concession” and 
describes the environmental impact assessment process as a “formality”.236 If the investor is 
correct, El Salvador, by virtue of its own pre-existing legal framework (which the company 
openly acknowledges that it had a hand in drafting, and which emerged at time of neoliberal 
adjustment and World Bank involvement) was not legally permitted to stop the project on the 
basis of environmental concerns.237 The state’s domestic authority was limited to mitigation 
measures,238 yet such measures were not sufficient for the social movement – the investor itself 
describes the environmental agency as overworked, understaffed and inexperienced, and the 
local community severely doubted its ability to properly regulate a major mining project with 
potentially devastating consequences should something go wrong.239  
 
It remains to be seen whether the investors in the two cases are correct in their interpretations 
of domestic law, but the fact that this is a distinct possibility is revealed in Glamis Gold v. USA, 
where a domestic legal opinion found that the state could not lawfully prohibit the controversial 
gold mine against which the Quechan Indian Nation protested.240 As a result, state officials had 
to revert to indirect means – in this case mitigation measures known to be costly – to derail the 
proposed project.241 In these kinds of circumstances, state officials may well be persuaded to 
act outside the scope of authority that they possess by virtue of the (constraining) domestic legal 
framework. In doing so it is possible that they end up breaching also domestic laws or 
institutional procedures, but the domestic consequences of such a breach may well be 
significantly less severe than the consequences of losing an investment dispute. International 
investment law therefore locks into the future a domestic legal framework that is itself the 
outcome of previous social struggles. As we see in the above cases, such a domestic legal 
                                                             
235 Cited in Clayton & Bilcon v. Canada, Counter-Memorial, para. 206. 
236 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, para. 450, 454, 219. 
237 Ibid, para. 78; Chris Van Der Borgh, ‘The Politics of Neoliberalism in Postwar El Salvador’, International 
Journal of Political Economy, 30:1 (2000), pp 36-54. 
238 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Memorial on the Merits and Quantum, para. 541-542. 
239 Ibid, para. 9, 231; Broad & Cavanagh, ‘Like Water for Gold in El Salvador’. 
240 Glamis Gold. v. USA, Memorial, section II.B.3; Glamis Gold v. USA, Award. 
241 Ibid, Section V.C. 
265 
 
framework may be advantageous to the corporation but less advantageous to the local 
communities that find themselves deprived of any legal means to prevent the projects from 
going ahead. 
 
From a corporate perspective, the primary novelty and utility of international investment law 
lies in the right to bring a legal challenge against state measures that have often emerged through 
a victory by its opponents in domestic public policy debates. Such state measures can be 
challenged on a wide variety of different grounds, as considered in the previous chapter. Some 
of these ways of challenging a state measure are unrelated to any social struggle from which it 
may have emerged; for instance, it is unlawful for Costa Rica to expropriate land in order to 
expand a national park designed to protect endangered jaguars or sea turtles, without the 
provision of the generous standard of full market value compensation, irrespective of how the 
policy measure arose.242 This sub-section has nevertheless further argued that it is often the 
very responsiveness of the state to social struggle that leads to its loss in investment disputes. 
There is a growing academic literature on the effect of investment law on the ability of states 
to introduce public interest regulations, but this literature often concludes that states have not 
lost investment disputes because of the public interest regulation per se, but because of how or 
why it was introduced.243 It is sometimes implied that if the state had acted as it should – as a 
rational and unitary actor vis-à-vis the corporation – then it would have been permitted to 
introduce the public interest regulations at stake, or more likely it would not have sought to do 
so in the first place. It is the fact that the state acted on the basis of ‘political motivation’ or in 
‘contradictory’ ways that led to its loss in the investment dispute. This section has argued that 
such state action only appears ‘irrational’ or ‘contradictory’ because of the starting expectation 
that the state should behave like an agent in its own right in spite of the fact that it is, in actual 
fact, a social structure. The state is not detached and independent of society, but a social 
structure that is inherently responsive to social struggles between non-state groups, and it is this 
feature of the state that leads it to ‘politically motivated’ conduct or an inability to behave as a 
unitary agent. It is therefore often the very nature of the state that leads to the state’s loss in 
investment disputes.  
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The Role of International Investment Law in Domestic Political Struggles 
 
This thesis has primarily focused on how international investment law creates an additional 
hurdle for social movements to cross in order to ensure that their states protect them from 
detrimental corporate conduct, and vice versa how corporations can successfully invoke 
international investment agreements to protect their business interests from domestic public 
policy victories by their civil society opponents. This was elaborated on in the above sub-
section, but investment law does not only play a role after social struggle has culminated in 
state action, but it also influences what action a state takes in the first place. This second sub-
section will consider the role that international investment law plays in domestic politics well 
before a judgement is reached in an international tribunal, and often without such a judgement 
being reached at all. The very threat of an investment treaty challenge can shift the balance in 
the tug-of-war for the state in favour of the corporation.  
 
Within the investment law literature, this phenomenon is often discussed in reference to the 
notion of ‘regulatory chill’ – the prospect of an investor-state dispute has a chilling effect on 
the enthusiasm of state officials to introduce what they come to perceive as a potentially costly 
public policy measure.244 There are several instances in which states have withdrawn legislation 
or state measures subsequent to the threat of a lawsuit, and it is furthermore estimated that 27 % 
of investment disputes are formally settled after arbitration has commenced but before the 
tribunal has issued an award, and many of these involve some form of concession towards the 
company to persuade it to withdraw the legal challenge.245  Many scholars nevertheless dismiss 
the possibility of regulatory chill; for instance, Giugi Carminati resolutely declares that “critics 
have no evidence of this chilling effect”. 246  However, Carminati also conceives of the 
phenomena itself as occurring when the threat of arbitration causes the state to refrain from 
regulating “regardless of the merits” of the lawsuit, and the actual instances in which regulations 
have been withdrawn or cases settled may therefore be interpreted not as regulatory chill but as 
instances of the state’s dawning recognition that the contested state measure was, in fact, unfair 
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towards the investor or in breach of investment law.247 On the other hand, Charles Brower and 
Stephan Schill dismiss concerns about regulatory chill as ‘distorted’ because investment treaties 
“do not abolish the host state’s regulatory powers” in the first place.248 Other scholars highlight 
rather the possibility that regulatory chill may occur because state officials perceive that a 
lawsuit is credible, irrespective of whether it actually is, and furthermore maintain that 
regulatory chill may occur precisely because investment law is in a state of flux and because 
the merits of a case are often uncertain. 
 
From the perspective of this thesis, the interesting question is not so much whether state officials 
would withdraw environmental policy measures in response to a lawsuit with dubious merit. 
Given that the previous chapter has already argued that environmental protection measures can 
fall foul of investment treaties in various ways (and given that the previous sub-section has 
further argued that this often occurs because of the state’s responsiveness to societal struggles) 
the point is rather that international investment law has an impact on social struggles well before 
an investment tribunal issues its award. As such, the existing awards reflect the tip of an 
investment iceberg as far as the political implications are concerned. In the context of a ‘tug-
of-war’ for the state, the threat of an investment treaty challenge will provide states with an 
added incentive to support the corporation by increasing the cost and risk involved in supporting 
its opponents. There are three forms of evidence to support the proposition that the threat of a 
lawsuit can serve to give corporations the upper hand in an underlying social struggle. 
 
Firstly, the notion of ‘regulatory chill’ is a logically strong proposition. The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development describes investment treaty threats as a “routine lobbying 
instrument” by disaffected corporations, and one of its researchers adds, “They're real explicit. 
You know, this will be a breach of Chapter Eleven [of NAFTA] and we're gonna sue you for x 
hundred million dollars”.249 It is not surprising that corporations pursue such a strategy; for 
them, the risks of a lawsuit are low (the payment of a few million in legal costs if they lose) but 
the potential gains are high (at times several hundred million dollars). Nor is it surprising if 
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state officials were to reconsider a disputed measure in response to such a threat; for them, the 
risks associated with investment arbitration are high (the payment of a few million in legal costs 
when they win, and the payment of up to several hundred million dollars when they lose). Only 
an imprudent or very determined state official would dismiss such a threat without a second 
glance. Even if the risk of losing an investment dispute is perceived to be small, the high stakes 
involved ensures that the potential cost of such a loss would still mandate caution.  Prudent state 
officials are more likely to take the prospect of an investment treaty lawsuit into consideration 
and to proceed regardless only if they are certain of their legal case (and the previous chapters 
have detailed how arbitral innovation has thrown this field of law into a state of uncertainty) or 
if they have strong incentive to proceed with the state measures regardless. What further 
supports such a corporate strategy is the fact that many investment treaties require a six-month 
negotiation period between the investor and the state, and Jeswald Salacuse observes that “it is 
safe to say that virtually all such disputes go through a period of negotiation before reaching 
settlement or advancing to formal investor-State arbitration”.250 This is normally perceived as 
unproblematic and indeed positive if it averts further conflict, but the aim of such negotiations 
is specifically a resolution to the conflict between the corporation and the state, in negotiations 
that are conducted behind closed doors without the participation of the social movements from 
which the controversial state measure often originally arose. This process itself therefore 
favours the corporation in a tug-of-war for the state. Finally, beyond the potential direct cost of 
losing investment arbitration, the lawsuit itself (well before an award is issued) has been shown 
to lead to a loss in foreign direct investment and can quickly cancel out any economic benefits 
a state may have had from signing an investment treaty in the first place.251 This provides state 
officials with a further incentive to settle a dispute quickly and without attracting attention from 
the business world. 
 
Secondly, that ‘regulatory chill’ sometimes occurs is supported by the claims of state officials 
and corporations alike. After NAFTA came into force, one Canadian official maintained that 
he had “seen the letters from the New York and DC law firms coming up to the Canadian 
government on virtually every new environmental regulation […] Virtually all of the initiatives 
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were targeted and most of them never saw the light of day”.252 In public, state officials may 
often be reluctant to admit to having backed down to such investment treaty threats, but in some 
cases the impact of the legal challenge is openly acknowledged. For example, New Zealand has 
explicitly put its own tobacco plain packaging regulations on hold in light of Philip Morris’ 
pending investment treaty challenge against Australian regulations. The Associate Minister of 
Health observed that the government “will need to manage some legal risks” and therefore 
“Cabinet has decided that the Government will wait and see what happens with Australia’s legal 
cases, making it a possibility that if necessary, enactment of New Zealand legislation and/or 
regulations could be delayed pending those outcomes”.253 If state officials should be expected 
to be reluctant to admit to acting under corporate pressure, the corporations themselves openly 
acknowledge the impact of recourse to ISDS on forcing governments back to the negotiating 
table. The Vice President of a Chevron division observed that “[o]ne of the important, though 
rarely discussed, benefits of investor-state dispute resolution is the incentive it creates for 
parties to negotiate”, and further remarked that “Chevron has successfully concluded such 
negotiations in countries which have high quality investment treaties”.254 The investment treaty 
threat is therefore understood to have convinced state officials to take a decision different from 
the one that they would have taken in the absence of the threat of a lawsuit. Similarly, law firms 
commonly advise their corporate clients that investment treaties “can be used as leverage to 
compel the host state to enter into a favourable negotiated settlement”, and arbitrators 
favourable towards ISDS suggest that the impact of investment law is “less in its actual use, as 
in its implicit threat”.255 Beyond such statements, corporations in their choice of timing also 
often reveal that investment arbitration is not simply a response to a disadvantageous decision 
but part of a strategy to influence the political process itself. Ethyl issued its notice of intent to 
bring a lawsuit before the legislation it disagreed with had been passed, and while it was still 
being discussed by the Canadian parliament; the aim at that stage was presumably not to seek 
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compensation, but to dissuade Canadian parliamentarians from passing the Bill in the first 
place.256 
 
Finally, the threat of arbitration also appears to be the best explanation for the outcome of many 
actual disputes between corporations and their civil society adversaries. For instance, Vattenfall 
(I) v. Germany initially pitted the investor in a proposed coal-fired power plant in Hamburg 
against environmental groups opposed to the project. Over 12,000 people signed a petition 
against it, and public opposition to the project appears to have been significant in the strong 
showing of the Green Party in local elections.257 In coalition talks with the governing Christian 
Democrats, the Green Party in turn demanded the introduction of new environmental 
requirements on the power plant, and Vattenfall justified its lawsuit on the basis that such 
environmental requirements were ‘politically motivated’ and unduly expensive.258 In this case, 
the lawsuit did not necessarily sway the opinions of the Hamburg politicians – and certainly not 
those of the Green Party – but it ensured that other state officials became involved in a way that 
favoured the investor. Investment disputes are the responsibility of the federal government, and 
the Ministry of the Economy settled the case by withdrawing some of the contested 
environmental requirements.259 A Greenpeace investigation concludes that Germany/Hamburg 
would quite likely not have removed the environmental requirements in the absence of an 
investment treaty challenge, and the threat of the lawsuit is therefore the best explanation for 
the company’s success in the underlying dispute.260 Kyla Tienhaara details several other cases 
in which the possibility of an investment challenge seems to have swayed state officials in the 
direction of the company; for instance, in an Indonesian case involving a prohibition on open-
cast mining in certain protected rainforests, the threat of arbitration from several mining 
companies was mentioned in parliament and appears from the circumstances of the case to have 
been instrumental in the decision to provide many mining companies with rights to continue 
mining.261  
 
The influence of investment arbitration is also evident in several new environmental cases. In 
Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica and Gabriel Resources v. Romania, the state has fluctuated between 
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supporting the corporation and supporting its opponents, and the threat of arbitration seems to 
have coincided with a change of position in favour of the company. In Infinito Gold, the 
disputed measure involved the annulment of a mining permit in response to public opposition 
and domestic lawsuits brought by environmental groups and the CEO of the company candidly 
admitted that “[t]his kind of pressure [from submitting a notice of intent to commence 
arbitration] helped [the agencies involved] resolve the issue”.262 A few years later, when public 
pressure once more put the annulment of the mining concession on the agenda, a government-
commissioned study directly considered the costs of doing so in light of what was then a near-
certain investment treaty dispute – estimated at up to $1.7 billion in compensation for the 
company’s lost profits – and this may have accounted for why it took no further action at the 
time.263 Now environmental groups appear to have once more had their way, this time in 
bringing a successful domestic legal challenge to the Supreme Court that has resulted in the 
annulment of the concession, and it remains to be seen whether the arbitration runs its course 
this time.264 In Gabriel Resources, the company was under opaque circumstances awarded the 
initial approvals to engage in gold and silver mining in Rosia Montana, but public opposition 
on environmental grounds forced the pro-mining government to announce a procedure that 
would have cancelled the approvals. 265  When the company threatened arbitration, the 
Romanian government quickly replaced the procedure to cancel the concession with a ‘special 
draft law’ that would have allowed it to proceed, but in light of mounting public opposition the 
parliament did not pass the law and the company is now reported to be preparing its legal 
case.266 Finally, in respect to Enron’s power plant in India the CEO explicitly acknowledged 
that the fact that its investment contract allowed for arbitration was critical in ensuring the 
project was pushed through for longer, although it was ultimately cancelled and India provided 
compensation to the companies.267 
 
This sub-section has indicated that investment law does not only play an important role in social 
struggles around the world in so far as it allows corporations to challenge a disadvantageous 
                                                             
262 This was when the company was still known as Vannessa Ventures. Cited in Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and 
the Threat of Arbitration’, pp. 623-624. 
263 Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration’, p. 624. 
264 Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, Request for Arbitration. 
265 Council of Canadians, Earthworks, et al., ‘Open Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs’; Dale-Harris, 
‘Romania’s Powder Keg’. 
266 Dale-Harris, ‘Romania’s Powder Keg’. 
267 BusinessWeek, ‘Enron’s Rebecca Mark: You Have to Be Pushy and Aggressive’ (23 February 1997), 
available at {http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1997-02-23/enrons-rebecca-mark-you-have-to-be-pushy-
and-aggressive-intl-edition} accessed 23 January 2015. 
272 
 
state measure, but that it also influences whether state officials will decide to adopt such a 
measure in the first place. The threat or anticipation of an investment dispute does not force a 
determined government to change ‘its’ mind, but neither is it a factor that will be ignored in the 
decision-making process. Exclusive attention to concluded cases will therefore fail to capture 
the full political implications of investment law. The full implications are nevertheless 
impossible to determine; state officials may well refrain from a course of action in response to 
an investment treaty challenge that has never been made public.  
 
The Role of International Investment Law in Political Protests 
 
The previous two sub-sections have argued that international investment law plays an important 
role in social struggles around the world in two different ways – a victory in investment 
arbitration by a corporation can undermine a social movement victory in domestic public policy 
debates, and the very prospect of investment arbitration can furthermore determine who wins 
such a domestic public policy debate in the first place. Both of these possibilities are implicit 
within the legal literature on the subject, and the emphasis in the above sections has been to 
offer a non-state-centric account that brings social movements back in. What has not been 
recognized in any form is how international investment law not only influences who wins such 
a social struggle, but how it can also influence the ability of social movements to organize 
opposition in the first place. While corporations primarily approach investment law to prevent 
governments from introducing unfavourable regulations or policies that may be demanded by 
civil society groups, this third sub-section will explore how corporations are increasingly 
approaching investment law to persuade governments to take active measures to protect them 
from the civil society opposition itself, by clamping down on their protest activities. 
Corporations have not yet won a legal claim in this respect, but this section suggests that the 
political implications for protesters may well precede any legal consequences. 
 
International investment law can interfere with political protest in two different ways. Firstly, 
contracts concluded directly between corporations and states can have implications for the 
possibility for protest. In analysing an investor-state contract between Chad and a consortium 
of transnational oil companies, Sheldon Leader argues that the contract would compel Chad to 
take action to prevent both direct action protests as well as industrial action from interfering 
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with the company’s operations.268 The confidentiality of most investor-state contracts and the 
commercial arbitration process itself (and the fact that states also do take measures to break up 
protests of their own accord) makes it near impossible to know the extent of the implications 
for political protest. The focus here will instead be on investment treaties themselves, and in 
particular on the ‘full protection and security’ standard in such treaties. The investment law 
literature has shown interest in the full protection and security clause in recent years, but that 
interest is to a large extent in the novel use of the standard to ensure legal security for 
corporations. 269  The standard was nevertheless traditionally intended to provide physical 
security, and while this aspect is treated as relatively uncontroversial within the academic 
literature it may have unappreciated consequences for political protest. In at least five recent 
cases, corporations have brought legal claims against states for their alleged failures to afford 
corporations ‘full protection and security’ from adverse social demonstrations and direct action 
protests that have targeted their operations. In each of these five cases, the corporations were 
ultimately unsuccessful in their claims. This sub-section will nevertheless contend that the 
potential for such a victory remains, and therefore also the political implications. 
 
In some of the available cases, the companies do allege that the protesters had engaged in 
destruction of company property or intimidation, or even violence, against company officials 
or employees. However, it is important to note that such allegations are presented as 
independent from the wider claims that the states had failed to protect the companies’ 
operations from interference by the direct action protests. In two cases, Noble Ventures v. 
Romania and Plama v. Bulgaria, the corporations maintained that the states had failed to afford 
them ‘full protection and security’ from their own workers.270 The companies had run into 
financial difficulties, and both were several months overdue on the payment of their employees’ 
wages.271 This had sparked protests, strikes and (allegedly) occupations or blockades of the 
workplaces.272 Plama further alleged that the workers had used violence to evict the company 
director from the facility, and Noble Ventures alleged that the workers had engaged in sabotage 
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of equipment and in one case of beating a company officials, though such allegations were not 
proven within the investment proceedings. 273  The very act of protesting at the sites were 
nevertheless themselves also presented as unlawful, and Plama maintains that the worker’s 
protests “paralyzed production” at the facility while Noble Ventures complains of “a significant 
impairment of […] production”.274 In each case, the states are alleged to have failed in their 
responsibility to “restore order”.275 In two of the other cases, Tecmed v. Mexico and Abengoa 
v. Mexico, the companies maintained that the state had failed to protect their hazardous waste 
landfills from local community protests concerned with the environment, and in particular from 
human chains and road blockades to prevent more hazardous waste from being deposited at the 
sites.276 Tecmed specifically alleged that Mexican authorities “did not act as quickly, efficiently 
and thoroughly as they should have to avoid, prevent or put an end to the adverse social 
demonstrations expressed through disturbances in the operation of the Landfill or access 
thereto”.277 In the final case, Burlington Resources v. Ecuador, which will be discussed further 
below, the company maintains that the state had failed to protect its oil extraction operations 
from opposition by the Sarayaku indigenous people, on whose land the oil extraction was 
intended to take place.278 In each of these five cases, central to the companies’ claims is that the 
states should have ensured that the direct action protests did not interfere with their ability to 
engage in their normal commercial operations, which is of course precisely what the protesters 
had aspired to. 
 
The fact that the allegations within each of these five cases were dismissed by the investment 
tribunals may at first glance seem to dissuade any further concerns, but a closer look at the 
tribunals’ reasoning suggest that the claims themselves remain legally plausible and that the 
dismissals were rather due to the particular characteristics of the cases themselves. In Plama v. 
Bulgaria the tribunal simply concluded that it had been “unable to form any firm view as to 
what really transpired”, and conflicting evidence emerged as an issue also in other cases.279 
More importantly, several of the claims failed because the company could not show that the 
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state had actually failed in its duty to protect it from the protesters. What is truly striking about 
these cases is that the states had often already gone to great lengths to support the companies 
and to protect their operations from the protesters. While the Tecmed tribunal held that there 
was “not sufficient evidence supporting the allegation that the Mexican authorities […] ha[d] 
not reacted reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the 
direct action movements conducted by those who were against the Landfill”, this determination 
was made in a context in which Mexico had already sent in over 100 police officers to evict and 
arrest protesters in order to ensure access to the landfill.280 In Abengoa, the tribunal went so far 
as to praise Mexico, which had sent in 800 police officers to deal with the protests and to stop 
the road blockades, for “the enormous effort by the authorities” to “restore public order and 
ensure access to the Plant”.281 In Burlington Resources, the state had even sent in the military 
to protect the corporation’s activities, in an operation that a government press release at the time 
termed an ‘invasion’ of Sarayaku territory.282 In the above cases the states were not found to be 
in breach of the full protection and security standard, but in no case does the tribunal suggest 
that the legal reasoning itself was unsound. The full protection and security standard does 
probably not impose absolute liability on the state, but it is clear that the state is required to 
exercise ‘due diligence’ and to “take active measures to protect [investments] from adverse 
effects”.283 The only question is how far they have to go to discharge that duty. It is still an open 
question whether investment tribunals would have found the states in the above cases guilty of 
violating the investment treaty had the states been a little less inclined to support the company 
in the first place. 
 
If a company were to win such a legal case, the political implications would be the same as for 
the cases considered in the first sub-section – compensation would have to be provided for any 
loss in production as a result of the protests. However, the political implications of the full 
protection and security clause may extend well beyond such compensation. The second sub-
section above suggested that there is ample evidence that even the mere threat of investment 
arbitration can sometimes dissuade states from introducing whatever measure that a company 
objects to, and indeed corporations and their legal advisers suggest that the primarily utility of 
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investment law is that it can be used as “leverage” to get states to do what they want.284 The 
equivalent in respect to the full protection and security clause is that states may be inclined to 
clamp down on protest in order to avoid a lawsuit. The potential consequences for social 
movements are well illustrated in the Burlington Resources case. 
 
Burlington Resources claimed that Ecuador had failed to provide the company with full 
protection and security from the Sarayaku indigenous people, who were strongly opposed to 
the company’s plans to engage in oil exploration and exploitation within its territory, due to the 
effects on the environment and their way of life.285 Burlington maintains that the Sarayaku had 
engaged in sabotage of the company’s property and its seismic exploration base, and on one 
occasion members of the Sarayaku had apparently taken several company employees hostage, 
evidently in order to force a suspension of the company’s prospecting activities.286 Beyond such 
strategies, the Sarayaku had also engaged in a variety of peaceful protests, including uprooting 
themselves from their villages and setting up ‘Peace and Life’ camps along the parameters of 
their territory to keep the oil companies out. In addition to protection for its property and 
personnel, Burlington also maintained that Ecuador should have taken action to ensure that the 
company could proceed with its exploratory work in spite of the indigenous opposition.287 What 
is particularly interesting here is the reasoning behind the tribunal’s dismissal of the case. The 
tribunal was presented with extensive evidence that Ecuador and Burlington had in fact 
“worked jointly” (to use a phrase that kept recurring in company letters from the time) to ensure 
that the project could proceed despite the indigenous opposition.288 Indeed, the Minister of 
Energy and Mines had unequivocally told reporters that “the State must use all the State’s 
security forces to protect the companies that wish to work in Ecuador” and if “the presence of 
the police or the Armed Forces is necessary, the government will take the necessary steps in 
line with its commitment to honor the contract”. 289  While there was clear evidence of 
collaboration between the company and the state for the most part, there were nevertheless also 
circumstances in respect to one of the blocks where the company had already at the time 
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indicated it was dissatisfied with the level of support it had received. 290  The tribunal 
nevertheless dismissed the case, but it did so on the basis that the company had not made clear 
such dissatisfaction amounted, from its perspective, to a failure to provide full protection and 
security and consequently a violation of investment law.291 As such, the tribunal informed the 
company in no uncertain terms that it should have threatened arbitration, in order to give the 
state an opportunity to redress the problem before arbitration was filed. So what would have 
been the consequences of Burlington doing so for the Sarayaku people? 
 
It seems probable that the prospect of investment arbitration would have provided Ecuador with 
further incentive to support the company against the indigenous opposition, and the danger of 
providing the state with such a further incentive is aptly highlighted in this case. While 
Burlington maintained that Ecuador had failed to protect it from the indigenous opposition, the 
Sarayaku people likewise maintained that Ecuador had failed to protect their personal safety 
and way of life from both the company itself and the military that had been sent in to support 
it. The Sarayaku approached the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (an institution of the 
Organization of American States or OAS) for protection.292  In part, just as the company asked 
for protection for its seismic prospecting operation, the Sarayaku asked for protection against 
it. The Inter-American Court was later to determine that the burying of high-powered explosives 
throughout the territory prevented the Sarayaku from safe access for hunting and other 
traditional activities, and the explosions themselves further destroyed water sources, forests and 
sacred sites.293 The Court concluded that Ecuador was responsible for “for having gravely put 
at risk the rights to life and physical integrity of the Sarayaku People”.294 Beyond the risks 
associated with the company’s operations, the indigenous people furthermore objected to the 
“militarization” of its territory as well as a range of human rights abuses allegedly committed 
by both the military as well as the company itself, ranging from an armed attack on one of the 
‘Peace and Life’ camps through to abductions, violence, and torture of community leaders.295 
The Inter-American Commission issued precautionary measures to protect the Sarayaku, in 
response to which the Minister for Energy and Mines retorted, “the OAS does not give orders 
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here”.296 Most of the allegations remain unproven, but the Inter-American Court did implicitly 
question the military’s practice of handing over captured Sarayaku leaders to the oil company 
itself for interrogation, a further testament to the close cooperation between the state and the 
company.297 Amnesty International also issued a number of Urgent Actions to protect the 
Sarayaku and the environmental groups that supported them from death threats, and declared 
that “[c]oncerns for the safety of the environmental and Indigenous activists in Ecuador’s oil 
zones are well founded” and specifically highlighted how the security services had been 
involved in human rights abuses against the civilian population. 298  It is into such volatile 
situations that the threat of an investment treaty challenge could have further encouraged 
Ecuador, and the military forces that were in charge of protecting the company, to strike down 
on the indigenous protests and thereby to exacerbate an already dangerous situation for the 
Sarayaku people. 
 
The full protection and security standard is unique within international investment law, in that 
companies invoke it not to protect themselves from government action motivated by domestic 
political pressure, but to protect them directly from protests that affect their personnel, property 
and – crucially – their very operations and productive activities, which is often precisely what 
direct action protests aim to do. This particular aspect of international investment law therefore 
has the potential to more directly interfere with the political activities of social movements.  
 
The Role of International Investment Law in Corporate Conduct 
 
The above three sub-sections have explored the role of international investment law in social 
struggles in light of their impact on social movements: in undermining social movement 
victories in domestic political struggles, in undermining their possibilities for victory in the first 
place where such struggles are fought in the shadow of investment arbitration, and in 
undermining their ability to engage in direct action protests. This fourth and final sub-section 
will further argue that international investment law also affects the conduct of the corporations 
themselves in the context, or in anticipation, of such social struggles. International investment 
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law is often said to protect corporations from ‘political risk’. 299  Political risk can involve 
geopolitical risks or the risk of political violence or government instability, but it also includes 
“shifting legal and regulatory frameworks” and the broader risk of political decisions that are 
disadvantageous to an investment.300 In so far as it does so, that immunity towards political risk 
can plausibly affect how corporations choose to act.  Robert Ziff suggests that international 
investment law may involve ‘moral hazard’ in so far as it increases the “possibility that you 
will take less care to prevent an accident if you are insured against it”.301 In the context of the 
social struggles considered here, this has two possible implications. Firstly, international 
investment law can encourage corporations to make politically risky investments. A corporation 
may be more inclined to get involved in a project that is likely to provoke societal opposition if 
it believes itself to be insulated from any political changes that may plausibly occur, further 
down the line, as a result of such opposition. Secondly, international investment law can 
encourage corporations, after they have invested, to subsequently act in politically risky ways. 
A corporation that believes itself to be insulated from political changes may be less careful in 
its corporate conduct and may be less inclined to take precautionary action to prevent societal 
opposition from emerging. 
 
Chevron advocates international investment treaties as a means of “mitigat[ing] the risks 
associated with large-scale, capital intensive, and long term projects”, and specifically gives the 
example of “developing shale gas”. 302  That example is, not incidentally, one that has 
engendered widespread environmental protests and at least one moratorium on the practice to 
date.303 When Lone Pine Resources brought an investment claim against Quebec’s decision to 
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withdraw permits for shale gas extraction in response to public protests, the Council for 
Canadians questioned “[w]hy are we, the public, paying the price for sober second thoughts 
about fracking?”304 In so far as investment law provides corporations with a form of insurance 
from political risk, it can encourage corporations to disregard the potential for such political 
risk in the making of its investment decisions – in other words, it encourages investments in 
projects that can be expected to provoke societal resistance. Rather than avoiding politically 
risky investments, corporations may rather seek to encourage states to provide it with 
expressions of support, permits or contracts at the initial stages of an investment project, so that 
it will be able to invoke its ‘legitimate expectations’ that the project would be allowed to 
proceed if the state were to subsequently pursue a different policy. In order to do so, a minimum 
of publicity or even secrecy will be helpful – the longer it takes for societal opposition to 
develop, the more likely the corporation is to have acquired ‘legitimate expectations’ that will 
legally protect it from any future policy changes that a state may adopt in response.  
 
One way to ensure protection from future political change is through contracts, and the common 
use of confidentiality within the contracting process is helpful for corporations in ensuring that 
societal opposition does not emerge before the contract is signed. Gabriel Resources v. Romania 
and Enron v. India both concern confidential contracts – Enron later defended the practice of 
confidentiality, but acknowledged that a country “as yet unused to the phenomenon of 
privatization” might find the concept difficult to understand.305 By the time such contracts 
become publicly known, its effects are irreversable. The confidentiality of contracts is not 
limited to the developing world; the opposition Labour Party in the UK has recently discovered 
the government’s use of privatization contracts that guarantee company profits for ten years in 
the event of cancellation, but by the time the Labour Party discovery had been made the 
contracts were signed and final and any reversal of the privatization would incur considerable 
cost.306  
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Beyond contracts, international investment law also provides corporations with an incentive to 
ensure that the regular permitting process is as far underway as possible before societal 
opposition emerges, and keeping publicity to the minimum can be helpful in that respect. In 
Abengoa v. Mexico, the company was under the obligation to inform the local community of 
its plans to construct a hazardous waste landfill, but it chose not to do so until construction was 
well under way and even then appears to have specifically avoided the term ‘hazardous 
waste’.307 The local community opposition that subsequently emerged accused the company of 
concealing the true nature of its plans, and this may have contributed to the distrust of the 
company.308 The lack of public information ensured that local community opposition arose only 
after the facility was almost complete, and by the time that the municipality responded to the 
protests by closing the landfill the company had already commenced its operations. Had the 
company been more forthcoming about its plans, the local opposition is likely to have emerged 
sooner and the authorities may have thought twice about permitting the project to proceed in 
the first place. In the absence of international investment law, it would be prudent for the 
investor to only proceed with such a project if it would be fairly certain that local community 
opposition would not derail the project within a few years, and open communication would be 
in its own interest. International investment law changes that calculation. In this case, the 
investment tribunal observed that Abengoa had, notwithstanding its failure to inform the local 
community, received the applicable permits and had completed the construction of the facility, 
and that it had therefore legitimately expected to operate the landfill as planned.309 It ordered 
Mexico to provide the company with USD $38 million in compensation for costs incurred and 
lost profits calculated over a period of 30 years.310 As such, the company directly benefitted 
from its decision to keep a low profile and not to inform the local community before the project 
was well under way. 
 
International investment law can also influence corporate behaviour after an investment has 
already been made. To cite Robert Howse, “[k]nowing it is insulated against regulatory changes 
the firm may decide not to take precautions against the occurrence of events that, because of 
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their social costs, may predictably trigger regulatory responses that are costly to the firm”.311 
This point was made specifically in reference to stabilization clauses in contracts that freeze the 
(environmental) regulatory framework at a given point in time, but in so far as international 
investment law in general protects corporations against political risk the danger is that 
corporations may begin to feel invulnerable towards societal opposition and may therefore 
exercise less caution to prevent it from occurring. This is a distinct possibility in countries with 
fairly lenient environmental regulations, but where corporations would otherwise feel inclined 
to go beyond such regulations in order not to provoke local opposition. For example in the 
Mexican cases, Tecmed was only in slight breach of environmental law (it incurred small fines 
and formal warnings) while Metalclad negotiated an agreement with the government that would 
exempt it from immediately remediating illegal contamination accrued by the previous 
owners, 312  yet in doing so their approach to the environment provoked local community 
opposition that might otherwise have been prevented. The promise of compensation afforded 
by investment treaties ensures that corporations only have to do the minimum required by law, 
and do not have to take care to avoid societal opposition. Furthermore, international investment 
law can encourage corporations to continue investing well beyond the point at which the 
political situation might have otherwise suggested it made sense to do so; for instance, a study 
on the investment disputes that have emerged from Spain’s cuts to solar subsidies reveals that 
most of the companies had continued to increase their portfolios after it had already become 
evident that solar subsidies were likely to be reduced, and were indeed “still buying assets whilst 
actually preparing their […] lawsuit”.313 
 
The investment law literature tends to perceive protection from political risk in positive terms; 
the economic risk is legitimately to be borne by the company, and the political risk by the state. 
However, such immunity towards political change influences how corporations act in the 
context of societal struggles. While the evidence is inconclusive – and given the inherent 
difficulty of researching the topic, is likely to remain so – it is plausible to suggest that a 
corporation that is insured against the costs of political risk would be less inclined to take 
caution to avoid such risks. A sense of immunity towards detrimental political change can 
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encourage corporations to make investments that are likely to be politically risky and that can 
be expected to provoke societal opposition and political change further down the line. It can 
furthermore influence the extent to which corporations take care to prevent societal opposition 
from occurring after an investment has already been made. This fourth sub-section has therefore 
suggested that international investment law can influence not only the outcome of a social 
struggle, but can also change how corporations appreciate their own position vis-à-vis domestic 
politics and the citizens of the state in which it operates. As such, it can also plausibly increase 
the risk that disputes between the corporation and social groups affected by their operations 
develop in the first place. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Investment treaties are formally known as treaties for the “promotion and protection” of 
investments, and scholarly commentary and state negotiators similarly very often refer to 
investment law as offering precisely ‘protection’ for corporations. 314 The previous chapter 
asked the question: protection from what? It explored how corporations were protected from a 
wide range of government measures, and argued that the broad interpretation given to the 
investment treaty standards ensured that even state measures designed to protect the 
environment could be found to violate investment treaties. This chapter has moved beyond the 
question of what corporations are protected from in order to ask: protection from whom? 
 
The international investment law literature, as well as practitioners within the field, adopt the 
perspective of the dispute settlement process itself. Investor-State Dispute Settlement is 
perceived to be about resolving disputes between investors and states, and more specifically, 
investors seek protection from states. In contrast, this chapter has argued that the associated 
practice of conceiving the state as an actor in its own right immediately serves to render 
analytically irrelevant the domestic struggles through which investment disputes often emerge, 
as well as the corporations’ ultimate adversaries in civil society. The first section of this chapter 
has offered an alternative perspective on investment disputes, a perspective that de-centres the 
state and that seeks to bring the real agents in the political struggle to the forefront. As such, 
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corporations seek protection from people within states who have collectively organized to 
accomplish their goals through the structures of the state. The use of the word ‘protection’ in 
this context is nevertheless not to suggest that the corporations have been subject to an 
unprovoked attack that they deserve protection from; in contrast, people often have good reason 
to oppose corporations that have breached environmental regulations, that seek to engage in 
environmentally destructive mining activities, that produce chemicals or pesticides that harm 
people or the environment, or that otherwise expose people to environmental risks that they are 
unwilling to bear. At the precise juncture at which an investment dispute is filed, it is 
nevertheless the corporation that is on the backfoot in the underlying social struggle, and it is 
appropriate to refer to international investment law as offering corporations ‘protection’ from 
its civil society opponents. What enables this alternative perspective is a particular conception 
of the state, and the second section has argued that the state is most helpfully conceived not as 
an agent, but as a social structure that is the reflection and ‘congealment’ of wider societal 
struggles over the future of the society we are to live in. 
 
The third section of this chapter has explored what difference this alternative perspective makes 
for our understanding of the politics of international investment law, and maintains that it is 
only through this perspective that we can truly appreciate the underlying political struggles that 
this field of law is implicated in. Such a perspective reveals how international investment law 
has become a potent weapon wielded by corporations in ongoing disputes where their ultimate 
adversaries are not states, but particular groups of people within states. Most obviously, we see 
how corporations use investment law to protect themselves from the consequences of civil 
society victories in domestic political debates – this is when the corporation seeks recourse to 
international arbitration. International investment law nevertheless plays an important role at 
every stage of the social struggle, and not only when a victory in domestic politics has already 
been reached. The threat of arbitration can provide states with an incentive to support the 
corporation in such domestic political debates in the first place, a phenomenon that is sometimes 
referred to as ‘regulatory chill’. The threat of arbitration based on the ‘full protection and 
security’ standard can further encourage states to strike down on political protests, and therefore 
affects the ability of civil society actors to organize opposition in the first place. Finally, the 
knowledge that international investment law offers protection from ‘political risk’, and by 
implication the political consequences of societal opposition, can also influence the 
corporation’s own behaviour, and the extent to which it exercises caution to prevent such 
opposition from emerging in the first place.  
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The perspective put forward in this chapter contrasts directly with that put forward in the 
mainstream literature on the subject of international investment law, as well as that of most 
practitioners. In contrast, the perspective offered here coheres with the understanding of 
international investment law that seems to be increasingly prevalent both within the social 
movements that are finding their domestic political victories questioned in investment 
arbitration, as well as within wider civil society criticisms of ISDS. This is most evident in how 
the El Salvadoran social movement against mining objects that Pacific Rim has taken the 
underlying domestic political dispute “to a forum where its principal opponent-in-interest 
cannot appear” and where only the state is represented.315 The aim of this chapter has been to 
articulate this nascent civil society perspective in more definite terms, and to contrast it with 
the perspective found in the literature on the subject and in wider investment law practice. The 
argument made here is not that this alternative perspective is desired for its own sake. Rather, 
it is only through this perspective – that brings non-state actors to the forefront of the analysis 
– that we can truly appreciate the political struggles that underpin international investment law, 
and thereby the role that this field of law plays in social struggles around the world today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
315 Pac Rim v. El Salvador, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amici Curiae’, p. 20. 
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Conclusion 
 
Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, an experienced arbitrator in investment disputes, suggests that 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) resembles the rising of David against Goliath; the 
rising of the little investor against the mighty state.1 Such a perspective, albeit not always 
articulated in such stark terms, permeates the discipline of international investment law. The 
liberal ideology that informs both investment arbitration and related scholarship encourages the 
perception that international investment law is about protecting the ‘individual’ (the corporation) 
against abuses by the sovereign state, and the implicit aim is to limit the state’s power.2 From 
such a starting point, it has become increasingly common to compare international investment 
law with human rights law; after all, both seek to protect the individual from the state. 3 
Böckstiegel acknowledges that the David vs. Goliath analogy might suffer certain limitations, 
for “some of these private claimants, as large multinational corporations, may well have more 
resources available than a rather small state being a respondent”.4 What has been challenged in 
this thesis is nevertheless not the utility of this analogy in respect to the relative power of the 
corporation and the state, but the explanatory – and the political – implications of framing the 
dispute as one between the corporation and the state in the first place. This thesis has argued 
that international investment law is implicated in political struggles that are ultimately between 
opposing societal groups, both of whom seek to use the structures and personnel of the state in 
their struggles with each other. Once it becomes clear that the corporation is not confronting 
the state but local community groups, non-governmental organizations and social movements, 
the parallels drawn with David vs. Goliath appear ever more questionable.  
 
In order to explain the politics of international investment law, this thesis has put forward two 
arguments: one theoretical, the other empirical. The theoretical argument is that the state is not 
                                                             
1 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘Enterprise v. State: the New David and Goliath? – The Clayton Utz Lecture’, 
Arbitration International, 23:1 (2007), pp. 93-104. 
2 It is conventional to refer to the corporation as an ‘individual’, especially in the context that the ‘individual’ 
should not have to make a special sacrifice for the wider community; e.g. Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, 
‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in International Law’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50, 2001, p. 846; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United 
Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (29 May 2003), para. 122; Azurix Corp. v. the 
Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (14 July 2006), para. 311.  
3 Franklin Berman, ‘Evolution or Revolution?’, in Chester Brown & Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in International 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 658-672; Bruno Simma, 
‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
60 (2011), p. 576 (“the ultimate concern at the basis of both areas of international law is one and the same: the 
protection of the individual against the power of the State”).  
4 Böckstiegel, ‘Enterprise v. State: the New David and Goliath?’, p. 95. 
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an agent. The state is a social structure that ‘congeals’ past political struggles and that serves 
as a ‘strategically selective’ arena for contemporary political struggles, and the real agents in 
those political struggles are human beings, often acting collectively to achieve their aims. This 
theoretical argument enables the development of a new empirical understanding of international 
investment law. If the politics of international investment law cannot be explained in reference 
to the agency of states and ‘their’ respective interests, then who are these struggles between, 
and what are they about? 
 
In a narrower sense, this thesis is about many different political struggles around the world, 
within which ISDS has come to play a part. These political struggles arise when local 
community groups, non-governmental organizations or wider social movements come to 
oppose certain corporate projects or practices, and where they have sought to act through the 
state to achieve their aims. Contrary to the assumptions prevalent within the investment law 
literature, the corporation does not stand outside these struggles as an innocent bystander that 
lacks “voice” in the domestic politics of the host state: they too are deeply involved in the intra-
community struggles as well as the struggle for the support of the state.5 La Mesa, the social 
movement in El Salvador that arose against Pacific Rim’s gold mining proposals, points out 
that the company and the social movement had been locked in a domestic political battle for 
several years, and the company had a track record of success in high level lobbying.6 As La 
Mesa reiterates, “[o]nly now that it perceives it has lost that political debate” does the company 
bring a legal dispute to arbitration.7 Pacific Rim is therefore asking the tribunal “to effectively 
reverse the results of that [political] process in this [arbitral] forum”.8 
 
This thesis has argued that international investment law forms a powerful tool for corporations 
to challenge state measures introduced to protect other societal groups. To cite Juan Fernández-
Armesto, an investment arbitrator: 
“When I wake up at night and think about arbitration, it never ceases to amaze me 
that sovereign states have agreed to investment arbitration at all […] Three private 
individuals are entrusted with the power to review, without any restriction or appeal 
                                                             
5 Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, ICSID Review, 20:1 
(2005), p. 46-47; Tecmed v. Mexico, Award, para. 122. 
6 See Chapter 4 for details about the case. 
7 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, Amicus Curiae Submission by Member Organizations of La 
Mesa Nacional Frente a la Minería Metálica de El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (20 May 2011), p. 1. 
8 Ibid, p. 13. 
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procedure, all actions of the government, all decisions of the courts, and all laws 
and regulations emanating from parliament”.9 
Corporations have acquired the right to at their own initiative bring a legal claim against a state 
to an international tribunal that is, by virtue of its institutional structure, closely attuned to the 
interests of a transnational capitalist class. The European Commissioner for Trade maintains 
that this is uncontroversial because such tribunals only uphold “basic principles of the rule of 
law”, but this thesis has argued that, in practice, each of the seemingly innocent investment 
treaty rules mean far more than immediately meets the eye.10 On the basis of a close analysis 
of corporate challenges against environmental regulations, which should in principle be beyond 
the boundary of what investment law is intended to protect corporations from, the thesis has 
shown that states have a high threshold to cross if they are to introduce measures that negatively 
affect transnational corporations. Furthermore, the very fact that these disputes often emerge 
when states respond to public pressure is itself likely to increase the state’s probability of losing 
such a dispute; to cite Ibironke Odumosu, “[i]nvestment law privileges some rationales for 
adopting regulatory measures over others” and “public demand seems to be at the bottom of the 
ladder of acceptable rationales”.11 Pacific Rim may or may not win its particular case, but ISDS 
provided the company with a second chance to challenge state measures when its political 
strategy failed, and if it does win, international investment law is backed by unprecedented 
means of enforcing such a monetary award. 
 
To investigate only the legal cases where a corporation has actually won an investment dispute 
would only reveal the tip of the iceberg, as far as the political implications for social struggles 
are concerned. This thesis has detailed a number of different ways in which investment law 
influences such struggles, and most importantly, the threat of investment arbitration has itself 
been shown to influence the outcome of the underlying political struggle for the state – 
unsurprisingly, upon being informed that a particular state measure will lead to a lawsuit of 
hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, state officials are inclined to think twice about introducing 
                                                             
9 Cited in Gus Van Harten, ‘China Investment Treaty: Expert Sounds Alarms in Letter to Harter’, The Tyee (16 
October 2012), available at {http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2012/10/16/China-Investment-Treaty/} accessed 19 
March 2015. 
10 Karel De Gucht, ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Real Debate’, European 
Commission Speech No 14/406, Speech at the European Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat (Berlin, 22 May 
2014), available at: {http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-406_en.htm} accessed 31 August 2014;  
11 Ibironke Odumosu, ‘Locating Third World Resistance in the International Law on Foreign Investment’, 
International Community Law Review, 9 (2007), p. 436; see also Gus Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and 
Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 68-73. 
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it in the first place. Given that such threats are made discreetly behind closed doors to particular 
state officials, it is impossible to know the full extent of the role that international investment 
law plays in social struggles around the world today. This is nevertheless estimated to be the 
“fastest growing area of international law today”, and this thesis suggests that it deserves closer 
and more sustained scrutiny from critical scholars of global politics than it has so far been 
granted.12 
 
In a wider sense, the international investment regime did not appear out of nowhere, and this 
thesis has also explored the political struggles through which it has emerged and evolved. To 
imply that the investment regime emerged in the context of political struggle may nevertheless 
seem counter-intuitive, since bilateral investment treaty negotiations have witnessed very little 
in the way of struggle. These have been negotiated with little fanfare and expanded around the 
world, literally, “BIT by BIT”.13 However, the agency of a transnationalizing capitalist class 
has been imperative in the making of the international investment regime, and it has exercised 
that agency in the context of wider political struggles; more specifically, it sought to undermine 
the agency of other social groups (whether anti-colonial movements in the Third World or 
environmental movements in the West), who were using national state structures to promote 
their interests. International investment law is now embedded within a wider network of 
supranational institutions and national state structures that make up what William Robinson 
describes as a ‘transnational state’. 14  The thesis has argued that the significance of 
conceptualizing this as one transnational state is because the past and present agency of a 
transnational capitalist class is not only ‘congealed’ and exercised within the nodal points of 
the network (in the various political and legal institutions themselves), but in how the network 
is formed in the first place. It is precisely the enforced ‘boundaries’ and helpful interconnections 
between a variety of national and supranational political institutions that ensures that the 
transnational state, as a whole, supports this class. The agency of a transnational capitalist class 
is therefore not only ‘congealed’ in and exercised through the international investment regime 
itself, but also in the particular ways in which it is situated vis-à-vis other political and legal 
                                                             
12 UNCTAD ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, IIA Monitor, 1 (2009), p. 2, available 
at {http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-Monitor.aspx} 
accessed 1 May 2012; Charles Brower & Stephan Schill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 9 (2008-2009), p. 472. 
13 Jeswald Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries’, International Lawyer, 24 (1990), pp. 655-675. 
14 William Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
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institutions. International investment law serves as a “trump card” against national state power 
without challenging the sovereignty of the state to sign investment treaties in the first place.15 
The fragmentation of the supranational sphere further ensures that a transnational capitalist 
class has acquired extensive supranational rights in comparison with other social groups, and 
that no other global court can challenge an investment tribunal’s judgement should the rights 
of those respective groups come into conflict. As such, by virtue of the way in which 
international investment law is situated vis-à-vis other institutions, it serves as a global supreme 
court to settle the concerns of transnational corporations. 
 
The political struggles over international investment law do not end where this thesis does; 
indeed, they have only just begun. It is customary to suggest that the international investment 
regime has recently, as corporations enthusiastically began to challenge public interest 
regulations and this field of law was exposed to the daylight, experienced a ‘backlash’.16 That 
backlash has arrived from a wide variety of different directions. Methanex v. USA and similar 
cases engendered widespread anxieties about the risk posed to public interest regulations in the 
NAFTA context, and various non-governmental organizations, media figures and state officials 
began to suggest that international investment law had ‘gone too far’ in the direction of 
protecting corporations. One of the most prominent critics is the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD), an active player in changing the course of international 
investment law. The IISD does not challenge global capitalism as such, and it maintains that 
foreign investment “is an essential component of a sound global strategy for sustainable 
development”.17 It has nevertheless gone to great lengths to pursue changes to treaties so as to 
‘balance’ the rights and obligations of both investors and states, and it has met with some 
success in that respect.18 Stronger criticism has emerged from a variety of NGOs that perceive 
the international investment regime to be beyond rescue, and who maintain it is, to cite Public 
Citizen, nothing but a “corporate power tool”.19 In the same way that corporations increasingly 
pursue their political aims through wider business networks and lobbies, so are many of these 
NGOs acting as part of wider ‘transnational advocacy networks’ that coordinate opposition to 
                                                             
15 The term ‘trump card’ is from Andreas Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 2. 
16 Michael Waibel & Asha Kaushal et al (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and 
Reality (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010). 
17 Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, et al, IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for 
Sustainable Development: Negotiator’s Handbook, 2nd ed (Winnipeg: IISD, 2006), p. x. 
18 Ibid, p. 2. 
19 Public Citizen, ‘TPP: Corporate Power Tool’, Flyer (2013), available at {http://www.citizen.org/TPP} 
accessed 23 March 2015. 
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international investment law.20 These NGOs have had some success in halting new investment 
treaty negotiations, but the only countries that have begun to withdraw from the investment 
regime are South Africa and a few Latin American states, the latter as part of the popular 
reaction against neoliberalism and the ‘Pink Tide’ that brought left-wing parties to power.21 
 
In the face of the ‘backlash’, many corporate lobbying groups have dug in their heels to defend 
investor-friendly versions of investment treaties and many arbitrators have publicly opposed 
even modest change; for instance, Stephen Schwebel has dismissed the criticisms as “nonsense” 
and has railed against what he terms the “regressive” development of international law.22 Those 
arbitrators who do advocate change rarely do it out of conviction; to cite Yves Fortier, the rising 
opposition simply “cannot be ignored, lest we truly imperil the system” and the unpalatable 
choice is “Change or Decline”.23 Other arbitrators similarly consider ISDS reform the “price” 
that will have to be paid to maintain the international investment regime, and transnational 
corporate lobbying groups are beginning to arrive at the same conclusion. 24  This does 
nevertheless not mean that any changes are welcome; Charles Brower, a top arbitrator, reiterates 
                                                             
20 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1998); Network for Justice in Global Investment, About the Project, 
available at {http://justinvestment.org/about/}; Seattle to Brussels Network, About Us, available at 
{http://www.s2bnetwork.org/about-us/} accessed 20 March 2015.  
21 Civil society pressure was critical in the abandonment of MAI negotiations, and it has recently forced the 
European Commission to halt the investment chapter negotiations of TTIP; see Chapter 2. Luke Eric Peterson, 
‘Venezuelan Exit from ICSID Raises Questions Both Legal and Financial’, Investment Arbitration Reporter (31 
January 2012), available at {http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20120131_3} accessed 21 August 2012; 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report, Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development (New York: 
United Nations, 2013), p. 108. 
22 For instance, within the recent consultation on the U.S. Model BIT corporate lobbies strongly advocated a 
return to the treaty language before the 2004 revisions took place. See, U.S. Department of State, ‘Report of the 
Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy Regarding th Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: Annexes’, (30 September 2009), available at 
{http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm} accessed 20 March 2015. Stephen Schwebel, ‘A Critical 
Assessment of the U.S. Model BIT’, Keynote Address, British Institute of International & Comparative Law, 
Twelfth IFT Public Conference (London, 15 May 2009) p. 12; Stephen Schwebel, ‘The Overwhelming Merits of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 32 (2008-2009), p. 269. 
 investor-friendly treaties of the past.See model BIT negs and request to go back to 2004 treaty. 
23 Yves Fortier, ‘Investment Protection and the Rule of Law: Change or Decline’, Speech, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 50th Anniversary Event Series (London: 17 March 2009), p. 12. 
24 Bernard Honatiau, cited in Cecilia Olivet & Pia Eberhardt, Profiting from Crisis: How Corporations and 
Lawyers are Scavenging Profits from Europe’s Crisis Countries (Amsterdam/Brussels: Transnational Institute & 
Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014), p. 49, available at: {http://www.tni.org/briefing/profiting-injustice} 
accessed 13 March 2014; William Park, another top arbitrator, also expresses concern that if nothing is done then 
ISDS may “fall prey to public pressure arising from a backlash against investor victories.” Guillermo Aguilar 
Alvarez & William W. Park, ‘The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11’, The Yale Journal 
of International Law, 28 (2003), p. 399. Finally, as stated by BusinessEurope, “[b]eing aware of the criticism 
ISDS is currently receiving, [BusinessEurope] is ready to discuss solutions”. BusinessEurope, ‘Speaking Points 
on Investment Protection and ISDS’, TTIP Stakeholder Event (12 March 2014), p. 2, available at 
{http://www.esf.be/new/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/TTIP-Stakeholder-Presentations-Event-12-March-2014-
Luisa-Santos-Businesseurope-on-ISDS.pdf} accessed 20 March 2015. 
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in no uncertain terms, “any proposal that alters any of the fundamental elements of international 
arbitration” is “unacceptable”.25  
 
Drawing upon a neo-Gramscian literature, the approach of the transnational capitalist class and 
its supporters can be conceptualized as a strategy of co-optation that Gramsci called 
‘trasformismo’ – dominant social groups seek to maintain the investment regime by means of 
offering concessions to certain (less radical) groups and by means of “restricting democratic 
participation to safely channelled areas”.26 The management of opposition is evident in the 
recent push towards encouraging NGOs to work within the system by submitting amicus curiae 
briefs, which investment tribunals have in the past accepted specifically because they are 
deemed to “support the process in general”.27 The attempt to channel opposition into safe areas 
is also evident in the way that the European Commission approached the consultation process 
with civil society, which it was forced to undertake as a result of growing opposition to TTIP 
negotiations.28 In response to concerns from corporate lobbies that such public consultation 
should not become a ‘referendum’ on whether or not to include the investment chapter, the 
European Commission duly made clear that “[t]he terms of this debate should not be: ISDS or 
not ISDS […] [t]he core question is: what sort of ISDS do we want”.29 In response to growing 
opposition, the beneficiaries and supporters of the investment regime have acquiesced to certain 
permissible criticisms while seeking to undermine systemic challenges. This strategy has 
prompted the drafting of what UNCTAD refers to as a ‘new generation’ of investment treaties, 
                                                             
25 Cited in Cecilia Olivet & Pia Eberhardt, ‘Arbitrators’ Role in the Recent Investment Arbitration Boom’, 
Investment Treaty News, 3:3 (March 2013), p. 16. 
26 Stephen Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy’, Global Change, 
Peace & Security, 10:1 (1998), p. 27; William Robinson, ‘Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation-State to 
Transnational Hegemony’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:4 (2005), p. 572.  
27 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons 
to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration (15 January 2001), para. 49. 
28 The European Commission itself states that it “felt it was necessary to launch this particular public 
consultation as a response to the growing public debate and increased concerns over ISDS within TTIP”, see 
European Commission, ‘European Commission Launches Public Online Consultation on Investor Protection in 
TTIP’ (27 March 2014), available at {http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1052} accessed 20 
March 2015.  
29 BusinessEurope had expressed concerns that “[i]t is important to us that this [EU] public consultation is not a 
referendum on ISDS”, and beyond the above statement the European Commission also carefully phrased all the 
question so that only suggestions for improvements in the system could be raised, while criticism of the system 
could not. Shawn Donnan & Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Transatlantic Trade Talks Hit German Snag’, Financial Times (14 
March 2014), available at {http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc5c4860-ab9d-11e3-90af-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2zkMLADkB} accessed 5 May 2014; Karel De Gucht, ‘Statement on TTIP’, European 
Commission Speech/14/549, Speech at the European Parliament Plenary Debate (Strasbourg, 15 July 2014), 
available at: {http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-549_en.htm} accessed 22 August 2014; 
European Commission, ‘Report on Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and ISDS in the TTIP 
Agreement’, Commission Staff Working Document (Brussels: 13 January 2015), available at 
{http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179} accessed 20 March 2015. 
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so far adopted primarily in North America, where opposition has been most significant.30 Some 
of the changes may turn out to be moderately effective – for instance, tribunals confronted with 
the new North American treaties may have less leeway to adopt the most expansive 
interpretations of expropriation and fair and equitable treatment.31 The effectiveness of other 
changes may be more questionable – there has been a large increase in environmental clauses, 
but the new preambular clauses tend to be only selectively considered and some environmental 
clauses have, upon closer examination, been found to be “absolute oxymorons” with no legal 
effect whatsoever.32 Most importantly, these changes are designed to address Methanex-style 
cases, in which the corporation was deemed to have challenged non-discriminatory regulations, 
adopted according to an admirable administrative and scientific process, in a context where the 
investor could not pretend to have legitimately expected such regulations not to emerge. Despite 
current changes, many state measures are unlikely to meet the high standards expected by 
investment tribunals, and corporations will continue to find ways to challenge state measures 
taken to further the interests of other societal groups. 
 
Stephan Schill, a strong proponent of international investment law, is assured that current 
changes involve “a process of recalibration or fine-tuning of investment treaty obligations” but 
no “fundamental contestation”.33 The supporters of the international investment regime have 
enabled it to evolve by addressing the most immediate criticisms through modest changes – and 
have in doing so averted a larger and more cohesive force from emerging against it – while 
ignoring calls for action that would undermine the utility of the regime for transnational 
corporations. Paradoxically, at the same time that commentators have lamented a ‘backlash’ 
against ISDS, major new treaty negotiations have gained momentum, that would more fully 
                                                             
30 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2013), p. iii.  
31 Vinualez suggests that the exceptions to specific investment treaty protection clauses are likely to be more 
effective than more broadly formulated clauses, see Jorge Viñuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in 
International Law: An Ambiguous Relationship’, Centre for International Environmental Studies Research 
Paper, No. 2 (forthcoming in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 80, 2010), p. 52. 
32 Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, ‘Environmental Concerns in International Investment Agreements: A 
Survey’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 1 (May 2011), p. 7 (almost 50% of newly 
negotiated treaties include environmental clauses); Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 
Petitioner’s Final Submissions by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, UNCITRAL Ad Hoc 
Arbitration (16 October 2000), para. 12-14; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 274; Howard Mann, ‘Investment 
Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exceptions Clauses Create a Safe Haven for Governments’, Issues in 
International Investment Law, Background Papers for the Developing Country Investment Negotiators’ Forum, 
(Singapore: 1-2 October 2007) p. 8 (the ‘deceptive’ clause is one that specifies that states can introduce any 
measure to protect the environment that is “otherwise consistent with this Chapter”). 
33 Stephan Schill, ‘W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law’, 
The European Journal of International Law, 22:3 (2011), p. 896. 
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than before connect some of the world’s largest economies: the U.S., the EU, Canada, China 
and Japan. 34  The future of the international investment regime is therefore far from 
predetermined, and it will depend on a battle between opposing social groups that is being 
waged today. 
 
What, then, is ultimately at stake in this battle? This thesis opened with the suggestion that the 
struggle over international investment law is a struggle for the future. In a sense, all of the 
different struggles detailed in this thesis are struggles for the future – the future of the sea turtles 
of Costa Rica; the future of nuclear power in Germany; the future of indigenous peoples’ way 
of life in Ecuador; the future of fracking in Quebec; the future of the children with lead 
poisoning in La Oroya, Peru. It is nevertheless also a struggle for the future in a wider sense – 
a struggle over the very possibility for a different future. A transnational capitalist class is 
fighting for political closure and a future without ‘political risk’; for social movements, it will 
be a struggle to re-open the very possibility for change. 
 
This thesis has drawn upon Stephen Gill’s theory of ‘new constitutionalism’ and David 
Schneiderman’s application of that theory to international investment law, in order to 
demonstrate how a transnational capitalist class approaches the international investment regime 
as a means of ‘locking in’ favourable conditions in the present into the future. There is no 
aspiration to ‘lock in’ the present as such – the transnational capitalist class is still using its 
formidable lobbying powers to expand its power, and not only to maintain it – but this field of 
law is designed to ‘lock out’ political changes that negatively affect corporations. In doing so, 
it is designed to restrain the opposing social groups that might bring such political change about. 
International investment law is, to cite Gill, part of a “conscious strategy to constrain the 
democratisation process that has involves struggles for popular representation for several 
centuries”.35 It is part of a much wider political struggle that can be traced at least as far back 
as to the fight by dominant groups against universal suffrage, which was at the time prompted 
by the fear that poor people would use their right to vote to the detriment of the rich. Ha-Joon 
Chang observes that when dominant groups lost that struggle against universal suffrage, “they 
                                                             
34 These include the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (EU-Canada), and various bilateral investment treaty 
negotiations between Canada and China, the U.S. and China, and the EU and China. 
35 Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy’, p. 37. 
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could not openly oppose democracy [so] they started criticising ‘politics’ in general”.36 It is 
abundantly clear that the emergence of international investment law involves a fight against 
‘politics’. Corporations often challenge state measures on the basis that they were ‘politically 
motivated’, and Gus Van Harten observes that tribunals share this “suspicio[n] of electoral 
decision-making and public involvement”.37 Indeed, the stated aim of investment treaties is to 
protect corporations from “political risk”, and tribunals have determined that adherence to 
investment law requires states to afford corporations certainty, predictability and stability – 
even, or especially, where social movements have emerged to challenge the status quo. 
International investment law is designed to contribute to a wider class project, to use Ioannis 
Glinavos’ phrase, to “decommission the political arms of the state” and to ensure that the future 
is closed to political change.38 In line with this aim, the recent ‘backlash’ has not only brought 
about modest changes to investment agreements in order to keep criticism at bay, but also seems 
to have evoked a more insidious response: while a state that comes to represent a different 
constellation of social forces can escape the strictures of NAFTA in six months, the equivalent 
for the newly negotiated CETA (the Canada-EU agreement) and the China-Canada BIT is 20 
years and 31 years respectively.39 The response to the ‘backlash’ has hitherto not been to cease 
the negotiation of new treaties, but to lock such new treaties as far into the future as possible. 
  
The theoretical insights of ‘new constitutionalism’ coheres with the understanding of 
international investment law that is becoming increasingly prevalent within the social 
movements that are fighting against it. While a transnational capitalist class has sought to 
disable ‘politics’ – a concept that it has sought to imbue with negative connotations – social 
movements have come to recognize that this is actually a synonym for ‘democracy’. The 
Democracy Centre observes that investment agreements seek to “keep activist democracy out 
                                                             
36 This is actually said in reference to ‘free-market economists’, but these were articulating the needs of 
dominant groups. Ha-Joon Chang, ‘Smith, Marx, the IMF: They Are All After You, George’, The Guardian (8 
May 2013), p. 30. 
37 Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints, p. 72-73. 
38 Ioannis Glinavos, ‘Neoliberal Law: Unintended Consequences of Market-Friendly Law Reforms’, Third 
World Quarterly, 29:6 (2008), p. 1095. 
39 However, early BITs are often 20 years in duration; a closer study would be needed to know whether NAFTA 
was exceptional or whether treaty durations are getting longer. United States of America, Treaty Between the 
Government of the USA and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (Model BIT), (2004), art. 22; European Union-Canada, Consolidated CETA Text (26 
September 2014; not yet signed), chapter 34, art. X.08; Canada – People’s Republic of China, Agreement for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (finalized for signature in 2012), art. 35, available at 
{http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/china-text-
chine.aspx?lang=eng&view=d} accessed 15 February 2013. 
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of some of the most important decisions of our time”.40 War on Want warns that the new 
investment agreements spell the “end to democracy”, while no-TTIP protesters in London 
unfurled a 26m long banner with the title “Hands off Democracy”.41 The defence of democracy 
has, interestingly, come to involve a defence of ‘sovereignty’ too. Public Citizen objects that 
international investment law constitutes “a Trojan Horse attack on sovereignty and democracy”; 
a Seattle to Brussels network petition laments that investment treaties “undermine the 
sovereignty and constitutions of both developed and developing countries, democratic 
governance and peoples’ interests”, and a letter by 240 NGOs from around the world against 
Pacific Rim’s lawsuit calls for El Salvador’s “domestic governance processes and national 
sovereignty be respected […] We stand on the side of democracy”. 42  The concept of 
sovereignty, and the state structures to which it relates, has not always had positive connotations 
within either the practical or (especially) the theoretical left-wing, yet for all its faults it seems 
to be regaining some of its emancipatory connotations as enabling of democracy. In line with 
some of the social movements, Schneiderman argues that states “remain salient locales for 
resistance”. 43  For social movements around the world, the struggle over international 
investment law ultimately involves a struggle for the future; to regain the democratic right, “as 
a people, to write the rules that determines what their futures are, and the futures for their 
children”.44 This struggle is not foreordained – it depends on how the transnational capitalist 
class exercises its agency, and how social movements exercise theirs. To cite War on Want, the 
                                                             
40 Jim Shultz, foreword in Thomas McDonagh, Unfair, Unsustainable, and Under The Radar: How 
Corporations Use Global Investment Rules to Undermine a Sustainable Future (Democracy Center, 2013), p. iii. 
41 John Hilary, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Charter for Deregulation, an Attack on 
Jobs, an End to Democracy (War on Want, 2015); #NoTTIP, ‘DropTTIP Banner Campaign’ (23 March 2015), 
available at {http://www.nottip.org.uk/dropttip-banner-campaign/} accessed 23 March 2015; see also Stop TTIP, 
‘European Citizens’ Initiative Against TTIP and CETA: Petition’, available at {https://stop-ttip.org/sign/} 
accessed 23 March 2015 (a ‘threat to democracy’).  
42 Public Citizen, ‘The Ten Year Track Record of the North American Free Trade Agreement: Undermining 
Sovereignty and Democracy’, p. 1, available at 
{http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7295} accessed 5 September 2013; Week of 
Action Against BITs and for an Alternative Investment Regime, Call for An Alternative Investment Model: Final 
Declaration (Brussels: 6 November 2011), available at {http://www.s2bnetwork.org/issues/eu-investment-
policy/} accessed 23 March 2015; International Trade Union Confederation, Amigos de le Tierra América Latina 
y el Caribe, et al, ‘Open Letter to World Bank Officials on Pacific Rim-El Salvador Case’ (12 December 2011), 
available at {http://www.ips-dc.org/open_letter_to_world_bank_officials_on_pacific_rim-el_salvador_case/} 
accessed 23 March 2015. 
43 David Schneiderman, Resisting Economic Globalization: Critical Theory and International Investment Law 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 3. 
44 Jim Shultz, Director of the Democracy Centre, Network for Justice in Global Investment, Global Investment 
Rules: Threat to Democracy and the Environment, video (November 2011), min: 7.40, available at 
{http://justinvestment.org/2011/12/video-global-investment-rules-threat-to-democracy-and-the-environment/} 
accessed 13 February 2015. 
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outcome of this struggle “will decide what type of future we bequeath to future generations, 
and to the planet we share”.45 The stakes could not be higher.  
 
It is conventional to end a critical thesis on international investment law with a set of 
recommendations. Kyla Tienhaara, for instance, advises states to incorporate sustainable 
development goals into investment treaties, to remove stabilization clauses from investment 
contracts, to engage in institutional reform, to increase transparency and participation, or even 
to omit investor-state dispute settlement altogether.46 Given the theoretical argument developed 
here, this thesis cannot conclude by offering recommendations to states. There is only one 
recommendation that is consistent with the argument in this thesis, and it is addressed to the 
human beings who possess the agency to make history: 
Fight Back. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
45 Said in respect to TTIP and other ‘free trade deals’, John Hilary, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership: A Charter for Deregulation, an Attack on Jobs, an End to Democracy (War on Want, 2015), p. 17. 
46 Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the 
Expense of Public Policy, PhD Thesis (Vrije Universiteit, 4 September 2008), pp. 381-386. 
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Appendix 
Investor-State Disputes in Respect to the Environment 
THE LEGAL PARTIES THE LAW & THE DISPUTE ARBITRAL HISTORY 
Abengoa v. Mexico 
(Abengoa, S.A. y COFIDES, 
S.A. v. United Mexican 
States) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/09/2 
Treaty: Spain-Mexico BIT 
 Dispute in respect to a 
hazardous waste landfill. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Final Award: 2013 
 
Allard v. Barbados 
(Peter A. Allard v. The 
Government of Barbados) 
Treaty: Canada-Barbados BIT 
 Dispute in respect to eco-
tourism project. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Status: Unknown 
Andre v. Canada 
(John R. Andre v. 
Government of Canada) 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
allocation of caribou quotas. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2010 
Status: Withdrawn or 
Inactive 
 
Baird v. USA 
(James Russell Baird v. 
United States of America) 
 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to 
proposed sub-seabed 
disposal of radioactive 
waste. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2002 
Status: Withdrawn 
 
BDC v. Philippines 
(Baggerwerken Decloedt En 
Zoon NV v. Republic of the 
Philippines)  
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/27 
Treaty: Belgium-Luxembourg-
Philippines BIT 
 Dispute in respect to the 
dredging of a lake. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2011 
Status: Pending 
 
Bear Creek v. Peru 
(Bear Creek Mining v. 
Republic of Peru) 
Treaty: Canada-Peru FTA 
 Dispute in respect to a 
proposed silver mine. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2014 
Status: Pending 
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Bilcon v. Canada 
(William Ralph Clayton, 
William Richard Clayton, 
Douglas Clayton, Daniel 
Clayton and Bilcon of 
Delaware Inc. v. 
Government of Canada) 
Institution: PCA Case No. 
2009-04 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
construction of a basalt 
quarry. 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Status: Pending 
 
Bishop v. Canada 
(David Bishop v. 
Government of Canada) 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
allocation of fishing quotas. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Status: Inactive 
 
Burlington v. Ecuador 
(Burlington Resources Inc v. 
Republic of Ecuador) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/5 
Treaty: USA-Ecuador BIT 
 Dispute in respect to oil 
production. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Award on Jurisdiction: 
2010 
Final Award: 2012 
 
Chemtura v. Canada 
(Chemtura Corporation 
(formerly Crompton 
Corporation) v. Government 
of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
pesticide lindane. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2001 
Final Award: 2010 
 
Chevron v. Ecuador 
(Chevron Corporation & 
Texaco Petroleum Company 
v. Republic of Ecuador) 
 
Institution: PCA Case No 
2009-23 
Treaty: USA-Ecuador BIT 
 Dispute in respect to oil 
exploration.  
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Status: Pending 
Commerce Group v. El 
Salvador 
(Commerce Group Corp. 
and San Sebastian Gold 
Mines, Inc. v. The Republic 
of El Salvador) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/17 
Treaty: CAFTA-DR Chapter 
10 
 Dispute in respect to gold 
mining. 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Final Award on 
Jurisdiction: 2011 
Connelly v. Canada 
(Albert Connolly & 
Brownfields Holding, Inc. v. 
Government of Canada) 
 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
development of a marble 
quarry. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2004 
Status: Withdrawn 
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Copper Mesa v. Ecuador 
(Copper Mesa v. Republic of 
Ecuador) 
 
Treaty: Canada-Ecuador BIT 
 Dispute in respect to copper 
mining. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Status: Unknown 
 
Dow v. Canada 
(Dow AgroSciences LLC v. 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to a lawn 
pesticide. 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Settled: 2011 
 
Enron v. India 
(Case 1: Enron v. India – 
details unknown) 
(Case 2: Capital India 
Power Mauritius I & Energy 
Enterprises (Mauritius) 
Company v. Maharashtra 
Power Development 
Corporation Limited, 
Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board & the 
State of Maharashtra) 
(Case 3: Bechtel & General 
Electric v. India – details 
unknown) 
Case 1 (Enron v. India) 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Rules 
Treaty: None; contractual 
arbitration. 
Case 2 (minority shareholder 
Bechtel v. India) 
Institution: ICC Case No. 
12913/MS 
Treaty: None; contractual 
arbitration. 
Case 3 (minority shareholders 
Bechtel & General Electric) 
Treaty: Mauritius-India BIT; 
Netherlands-India BIT. 
 Dispute in respect to the 
construction of a major 
power plant.  
 
Case 1: 
Request for Arbitration: 
1995 
Settled: 1996 
Case 2: 
Request for Arbitration: 
2003 
Final Award: 2005 
Case 3: 
Request for Arbitration: 
Unknown 
Settled: 2005 
Ethyl v. Canada 
(Ethyl Corporation v. 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
gasoline additive MMT. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1996 
Award on Jurisdiction: 
1998 
Settled: 1998 
 
Gallo v. Canada 
(Vito G. Gallo v. The 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to a 
proposed landfill.  
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2006 
Final Award on 
Jurisdiction: 2011 
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Glamis Gold v. USA 
(Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United 
States of America) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to a 
proposed gold mine. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2003 
Final Award: 2009 
 
Greiner v. Canada 
(William Jay Greiner & 
Malbaie River Outfitters 
Inc. v. Government of 
Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
allocation of fishing quotas. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Status: Withdrawn in 2011 
 
Harken v. Costa Rica 
(Harken Energy & Harken 
Costa Rica Holdings v. The 
Republic of Costa Rica) 
 
Institution: ICSID (not 
registered) 
Treaty: None (concession 
contract without arbitration 
clause) 
 Dispute in respect to oil 
production. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2003 
Status: Costa Rica did not 
consent to arbitration; case 
withdrawn. 
 
Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica 
(Infinito Gold LTD v. 
Republic of Costa Rica) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/5 
Treaty: Canada-Casta Rica 
BIT 
 Dispute in respect to gold 
mining. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2013 
Status: Pending 
 
Lone Pine v. Canada 
(Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. 
The Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to 
‘fracking’ for shale gas. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2012 
Status: Pending 
 
 
Lucchetti v. Peru 
(Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. 
and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. 
Republic of Peru) 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/4 
Treaty: Chile-Peru BIT 
 Dispute in respect to a pasta 
factory. 
Request for Arbitration: 
2002 
Final Award: 2005 
Decision on Annulment: 
2007 
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Maffezini v. Spain 
(Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. 
The Kingdom of Spain) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7 
Treaty: Argentina-Spain BIT 
 Dispute in respect to the 
construction of a chemical 
production facility. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1997 
Final Award: 2000 
Metalclad v. Mexico 
(Metalclad Corporation v. 
The United Mexican States) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to a 
hazardous waste landfill. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1997 
Final Award: 2000 
 
Methanex v. USA 
(Methanex Corporation v. 
United States of America) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
gasoline additive MTBE. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1999 
Partial Award: 2002 
Final Award: 2004 
 
Mesa Power v. Canada 
(Mesa Power Group, LLC v 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: PCA Case No. 
2012-17 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to 
renewable energy contracts. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2011 
Status: Pending 
 
MTD v. Chile 
(MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and 
MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic 
of Chile) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7 
Treaty: Malaysia-Chile BIT 
 Dispute in respect to the 
construction of a large 
planned community.  
Request for Arbitration: 
2001 
Final Award: 2004 
Decision on Annulment: 
2007 
Nepolsky v. Czech 
Republic 
(Georg Nepolsky v. Czech 
Republic) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: Germany-Czech 
Republic BIT 
 Dispute in respect to licence 
for underground water 
extraction. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Status: Withdrawn in 2010 
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Oak Investments v. El 
Salvador 
(Oak Investments and BAES 
v. Republic of El Salvador) 
 
Treaty: CAFTA-DR Chapter 
10; UK – El Salvador BIT 
 Dispute in respect to a 
battery manufacturing and 
recycling plant. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Status: Unknown 
 
Pacific Rim v. El Salvador 
(Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. 
The Republic of El Salvador) 
(Now by OceanaGold) 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/12 
Treaty: CAFTA-DR Chapter 
10; Domestic Investment Law 
 Dispute in respect to a 
proposed gold mine. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Status: Pending 
 
Plama v. Bulgaria 
(Plama Consortium Limited 
v. Republic of Bulgaria) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24 
Treaty: Energy Charter Treaty 
 Dispute in respect to a 
privatized oil refinery. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2002 
Final Award: 2008 
 
Renco v. Peru 
(The Renco Group, Inc v. The 
Republic of Peru) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/13/1 
Treaty: USA-Peru FTA 
 Dispute in respect to a 
privatized metals smelter. 
Request for Arbitration: 
2010 
Status: Pending 
 
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica 
(Compañía Del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena, S.A. v. The 
Republic of Costa Rica) 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1 
Treaty: The arbitration was 
based on customary 
international law, and 
prompted by U.S. pressure via 
the Helms Amendment. 
 Dispute in respect to the 
expansion of a national 
park. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1995 
Final Award: 2000 
S.D. Myers v. Canada 
(S.D. Myers, Inc. v. 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to the 
international trade of 
hazardous PCB waste. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1998 
Award on the Merits: 
2000 
Awards on Quantum: 
2002 
304 
 
Solar Investors v. Spain & 
the Czech Republic 
(Various – 22 investors have 
brought arbitration against 
Spain; 3 against Czech 
Republic) 
These will not be listed 
individually; at least 25 
different investors have 
brought arbitration against the 
two countries. Most are private 
equity funds.  
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Rules; Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce; 
ICSID. 
Treaty: Energy Charter Treaty; 
various intra-EU BITs. 
 Disputes in respect to solar 
energy subsidies. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2011-2014. 
Status: Pending 
St. Marys v. Canada 
(St. Marys VCNA, LLC v. 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to a 
proposed aggregate quarry. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2011 
Settled: 2013 
Award (based on 
settlement): 2013 
 
Sun Belt v. Canada 
(Sun Belt Water, Inc. v. 
Canada) 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11; 
USA-Canada FTA; GATT 
 Dispute in respect to 
licenses for bulk water 
exports.  
 
Request for Arbitration: 
1998 
Status: Withdrawn 
 
Tamimi v. Oman 
(Adel A Hamad I Al Tamimi 
v. Sultanate of Oman) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/33 
Treaty: USA-Oman FTA 
 Dispute in respect to a 
proposed limestone quarry. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2011 
Status: Pending 
 
Tecmed v. Mexico 
(Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed S.A. v. The United 
Mexican States) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2 
Treaty: Spain-Mexico BIT 
 Dispute in respect to a 
hazardous waste landfill. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2000 
Final Award: 2003 
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Unglaube v. Costa Rica 
(Marion Unglaube & 
Reinhard Unglaube v. 
Republic of Costa Rica) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/1; ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/20 
(two cases subsequently 
consolidated) 
Treaty: Germany-Costa Rica 
BIT 
 Dispute in respect to the 
expansion of a national 
park. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2008 
Final Award: 2012 
 
Vattenfall v. Germany (1) 
(Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall 
Europe AG, Vattenfall 
Europe Generation AG & Co. 
KG v. The Federal Republic 
of Germany) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/6 
Treaty: Energy Charter Treaty 
 Dispute in respect to the 
construction of a coal-fired 
power plant. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2009 
Settled: 2010 
Award (based on 
settlement): 2011 
 
Vattenfall v. Germany (2) 
(Vattenfall AB and others v. 
Federal Republic of 
Germany) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/12 
Treaty: Energy Charter Treaty 
 Dispute in respect to nuclear 
energy. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2012 
Status: Pending 
 
Vieira v. Chile 
(Sociedad Anónima Eduardo 
Vieira v. Republic of Chile) 
 
Institution: ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/7 
Treaty: Spain-Chile BIT 
 Dispute in respect to the 
allocation of fishing quotas. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2004 
Final Award: 2007 
Decision on Annulment: 
2010 
 
Windstream Energy v. 
Canada 
(Windstream Energy LLC v. 
Government of Canada) 
 
Institution: UNCITRAL 
Arbitral Rules 
Treaty: NAFTA Chapter 11 
 Dispute in respect to 
offshore wind energy. 
 
Request for Arbitration: 
2012 
Status: Pending 
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